Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Watsen
Request for Comments: 8366 Juniper Networks
Category: Standards Track M. Richardson
ISSN: 2070-1721 Sandelman Software
M. Pritikin
Cisco Systems
T. Eckert
Huawei
May 2018
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) K. Watsen
Request for Comments: 8366 Juniper Networks
Category: Standards Track M. Richardson
ISSN: 2070-1721 Sandelman Software
M. Pritikin
Cisco Systems
T. Eckert
Huawei
May 2018
A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols
用于引导协议的凭证工件
Abstract
摘要
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a pledge to an owner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge's manufacturer. This artifact is known as a "voucher".
本文件定义了一种策略，即使用质押的制造商直接或间接签署的工件，将质押安全地转让给所有者。这个工件被称为“凭证”。
This document defines an artifact format as a YANG-defined JSON document that has been signed using a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) structure. Other YANG-derived formats are possible. The voucher artifact is normally generated by the pledge's manufacturer (i.e., the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA)).
本文档将工件格式定义为已使用加密消息语法（CMS）结构签名的YANG定义的JSON文档。其他派生格式也是可能的。凭证工件通常由质押的制造商（即制造商授权签名机构（MASA））生成。
This document only defines the voucher artifact, leaving it to other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it.
此文档仅定义凭证工件，将其留给其他文档来描述访问它的专用协议。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
这是一份互联网标准跟踪文件。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关互联网标准的更多信息，请参见RFC 7841第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2018 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Survey of Voucher Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. CMS Format Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Renewals Instead of Revocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Voucher Per Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing . . . . . . 17
7.4. YANG Module Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.3. The Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.4. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . . 20
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Survey of Voucher Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
5. Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Tree Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.3. YANG Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.4. CMS Format Voucher Artifact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6. Design Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Renewals Instead of Revocations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Voucher Per Pledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.1. Clock Sensitivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.2. Protect Voucher PKI in HSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
7.3. Test Domain Certificate Validity When Signing . . . . . . 17
7.4. YANG Module Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.1. The IETF XML Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8.2. The YANG Module Names Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.3. The Media Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8.4. The SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type Registry . . 20
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
This document defines a strategy to securely assign a candidate device (pledge) to an owner using an artifact signed, directly or indirectly, by the pledge's manufacturer, i.e., the Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA). This artifact is known as the "voucher".
本文件定义了一种策略，即使用质押的制造商（即制造商授权签署机构（MASA））直接或间接签署的工件，将候选设备（质押）安全地分配给所有者。这个工件被称为“凭证”。
The voucher artifact is a JSON [RFC8259] document that conforms with a data model described by YANG [RFC7950], is encoded using the rules defined in [RFC8259], and is signed using (by default) a CMS structure [RFC5652].
凭证工件是一个JSON[RFC8259]文档，它符合YANG[RFC7950]描述的数据模型，使用[RFC8259]中定义的规则进行编码，并且（默认情况下）使用CMS结构[RFC5652]进行签名。
The primary purpose of a voucher is to securely convey a certificate, the "pinned-domain-cert", that a pledge can use to authenticate subsequent interactions. A voucher may be useful in several contexts, but the driving motivation herein is to support secure bootstrapping mechanisms. Assigning ownership is important to bootstrapping mechanisms so that the pledge can authenticate the network that is trying to take control of it.
凭证的主要目的是安全地传递一个证书，即“固定域证书”，该证书可用于认证后续交互。凭证在多种情况下可能有用，但本文的驱动动机是支持安全引导机制。分配所有权对于引导机制很重要，这样保证就可以验证试图控制它的网络。
The lifetimes of vouchers may vary. In some bootstrapping protocols, the vouchers may include a nonce restricting them to a single use, whereas the vouchers in other bootstrapping protocols may have an indicated lifetime. In order to support long lifetimes, this document recommends using short lifetimes with programmatic renewal, see Section 6.1.
凭单的使用期限可能会有所不同。在一些引导协议中，凭证可能包括一个nonce，将其限制为一次使用，而其他引导协议中的凭证可能有一个指定的生存期。为了支持较长的使用寿命，本文件建议在程序更新时使用较短的使用寿命，请参见第6.1节。
This document only defines the voucher artifact, leaving it to other documents to describe specialized protocols for accessing it. Some bootstrapping protocols using the voucher artifact defined in this document include: [ZERO-TOUCH], [SECUREJOIN], and [KEYINFRA]).
此文档仅定义凭证工件，将其留给其他文档来描述访问它的专用协议。使用本文档中定义的凭证工件的一些引导协议包括：[ZERO-TOUCH]、[SECUREJOIN]和[KEYINFRA]）。
This document uses the following terms:
本文件使用以下术语：
Artifact: Used throughout to represent the voucher as instantiated in the form of a signed structure.
工件：自始至终用于表示凭证，以签名结构的形式实例化。
Domain: The set of entities or infrastructure under common administrative control. The goal of the bootstrapping protocol is to enable a pledge to discover and join a domain.
域：在公共管理控制下的一组实体或基础设施。bootstrapping协议的目标是使承诺能够发现并加入域。
Imprint: The process where a device obtains the cryptographic key material to identify and trust future interactions with a network. This term is taken from Konrad Lorenz's work in biology with new ducklings: "during a critical period, the duckling would assume that anything that looks like a mother duck is in fact their mother" [Stajano99theresurrecting]. An equivalent for a device is to obtain the fingerprint of the network's root certification authority certificate. A device that imprints on an attacker suffers a similar fate to a duckling that imprints on a hungry wolf. Imprinting is a term from psychology and ethology, as described in [imprinting].
印记：设备获取加密密钥材料以识别和信任未来与网络的交互的过程。这一术语取自康拉德·洛伦兹（Konrad Lorenz）对新生小鸭的生物学研究：“在关键时期，小鸭会认为任何看起来像母鸭的东西实际上就是它们的母亲”[Stajano99TheRecurving]。设备的等效功能是获取网络根证书颁发机构证书的指纹。烙印在攻击者身上的装置与烙印在饿狼身上的小鸭的命运相似。印记是心理学和行为学的一个术语，如[印记]中所述。
Join Registrar (and Coordinator): A representative of the domain that is configured, perhaps autonomically, to decide whether a new device is allowed to join the domain. The administrator of the domain interfaces with a join registrar (and Coordinator) to control this process. Typically, a join registrar is "inside" its domain. For simplicity, this document often refers to this as just "registrar".
加入注册器（和协调器）：域的一个代表，可能是自动配置的，以决定是否允许新设备加入域。域管理员与加入注册器（和协调器）交互以控制此过程。通常，加入注册器“在”其域内。为简单起见，本文档通常将其称为“注册者”。
MASA (Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority): The entity that, for the purpose of this document, signs the vouchers for a manufacturer's pledges. In some bootstrapping protocols, the MASA may have an Internet presence and be integral to the bootstrapping process, whereas in other protocols the MASA may be an offline service that has no active role in the bootstrapping process.
MASA（制造商授权签署机构）：就本文件而言，签署制造商承诺凭证的实体。在一些引导协议中，MASA可能具有Internet存在，并且是引导过程的组成部分，而在其他协议中，MASA可能是在引导过程中没有活动角色的脱机服务。
Owner: The entity that controls the private key of the "pinned-domain-cert" certificate conveyed by the voucher.
所有者：控制凭证传递的“固定域证书”证书私钥的实体。
Pledge: The prospective device attempting to find and securely join a domain. When shipped, it only trusts authorized representatives of the manufacturer.
承诺：试图查找并安全加入域的潜在设备。装运时，它只信任制造商的授权代表。
Registrar: See join registrar.
注册官：见加入注册官。
TOFU (Trust on First Use): Where a pledge device makes no security decisions but rather simply trusts the first domain entity it is contacted by. Used similarly to [RFC7435]. This is also known as the "resurrecting duckling" model.
TOFU（首次使用时信任）：质押设备不做安全决策，而只是信任其联系的第一个域实体。与[RFC7435]类似使用。这也被称为“复活小鸭”模型。
Voucher: A signed statement from the MASA service that indicates to a pledge the cryptographic identity of the domain it should trust.
凭证：来自MASA服务的已签名声明，它向保证人指示其应信任的域的加密身份。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“不建议”、“可”和“可选”在所有大写字母出现时（如图所示）应按照BCP 14[RFC2119][RFC8174]所述进行解释。
A voucher is a cryptographically protected statement to the pledge device authorizing a zero-touch "imprint" on the join registrar of the domain. The specific information a voucher provides is influenced by the bootstrapping use case.
凭证是一种受密码保护的声明，用于向质押设备授权在域的加入注册器上进行零接触“印记”。凭证提供的特定信息受引导用例的影响。
The voucher can impart the following information to the join registrar and pledge:
凭单可向加入登记员和质押人提供以下信息：
Assertion Basis: Indicates the method that protects the imprint (this is distinct from the voucher signature that protects the voucher itself). This might include manufacturer-asserted ownership verification, assured logging operations, or reliance on pledge endpoint behavior such as secure root of trust of measurement. The join registrar might use this information. Only some methods are normatively defined in this document. Other methods are left for future work.
断言依据：表示保护印记的方法（这与保护凭证本身的凭证签名不同）。这可能包括制造商声明的所有权验证、有保证的日志记录操作，或者依赖于保证端点行为，例如安全的度量信任根。加入注册器可能会使用此信息。本文件中仅对一些方法进行了规范性定义。其他方法留给今后的工作。
Authentication of Join Registrar: Indicates how the pledge can authenticate the join registrar. This document defines a mechanism to pin the domain certificate. Pinning a symmetric key, a raw key, or "CN-ID" or "DNS-ID" information (as defined in [RFC6125]) is left for future work.
加入注册器的身份验证：指示质押如何对加入注册器进行身份验证。本文档定义了一种锁定域证书的机制。固定对称密钥、原始密钥或“CN-ID”或“DNS-ID”信息（如[RFC6125]中所定义）留作将来的工作。
Anti-Replay Protections: Time- or nonce-based information to constrain the voucher to time periods or bootstrap attempts.
反重放保护：基于时间或非时间的信息，用于将凭证限制在时间段或引导尝试中。
A number of bootstrapping scenarios can be met using differing combinations of this information. All scenarios address the primary threat of a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) registrar gaining control over the pledge device. The following combinations are "types" of vouchers:
使用这些信息的不同组合可以满足许多引导场景。所有场景都解决了中间人（MiTM）注册商控制质押设备的主要威胁。以下组合是凭证的“类型”：
|Assertion |Registrar ID | Validity |
Voucher |Log-|Veri- |Trust |CN-ID or| RTC | Nonce |
Type | ged| fied |Anchor |DNS-ID | | |
---------------------------------------------------------|
Audit | X | | X | | | X |
-------------|----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|
Nonceless | X | | X | | X | |
Audit | | | | | | |
-------------|----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|
Owner Audit | X | X | X | | X | X |
-------------|----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|
Owner ID | | X | X | X | X | |
-------------|----|-------|----------------|-----|-------|
Bearer | X | | wildcard | optional |
out-of-scope | | | | |
-------------|----|-------|----------------|-------------|
|Assertion |Registrar ID | Validity |
Voucher |Log-|Veri- |Trust |CN-ID or| RTC | Nonce |
Type | ged| fied |Anchor |DNS-ID | | |
---------------------------------------------------------|
Audit | X | | X | | | X |
-------------|----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|
Nonceless | X | | X | | X | |
Audit | | | | | | |
-------------|----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|
Owner Audit | X | X | X | | X | X |
-------------|----|-------|-------|--------|-----|-------|
Owner ID | | X | X | X | X | |
-------------|----|-------|----------------|-----|-------|
Bearer | X | | wildcard | optional |
out-of-scope | | | | |
-------------|----|-------|----------------|-------------|
NOTE: All voucher types include a 'pledge ID serial-number' (not shown here for space reasons).
注：所有凭证类型均包含“质押ID序列号”（此处因空间原因未显示）。
Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher is named after the logging assertion mechanisms that the registrar then "audits" to enforce local policy. The registrar mitigates a MiTM registrar by auditing that an unknown MiTM registrar does not appear in the log entries. This does not directly prevent the MiTM but provides a response mechanism that ensures the MiTM is unsuccessful. The advantage is that actual ownership knowledge is not required on the MASA service.
审核凭证：审核凭证以日志断言机制命名，然后由注册官“审核”以强制执行本地策略。注册机构通过审核未知的MiTM注册机构未出现在日志条目中，减轻了MiTM注册机构的负担。这不会直接阻止MiTM，但提供了一种确保MiTM不成功的响应机制。优点是MASA服务不需要实际的所有权知识。
Nonceless Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher without a validity period statement. Fundamentally, it is the same as an Audit Voucher except that it can be issued in advance to support network partitions or to provide a permanent voucher for remote deployments.
非空审核凭证：无有效期报表的审核凭证。从根本上说，它与审核凭证相同，只是可以提前发布以支持网络分区或为远程部署提供永久凭证。
Ownership Audit Voucher: An Audit Voucher where the MASA service has verified the registrar as the authorized owner. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM registrar by refusing to generate Audit Vouchers for unauthorized registrars. The registrar uses audit techniques to supplement the MASA. This provides an ideal sharing of policy decisions and enforcement between the vendor and the owner.
所有权审核凭证：MASA服务验证注册人为授权所有者的审核凭证。MASA服务通过拒绝为未经授权的注册人生成审计凭证来减轻MiTM注册人的负担。注册官使用审计技术来补充MASA。这为供应商和所有者提供了理想的策略决策和执行共享。
Ownership ID Voucher: Named after inclusion of the pledge's CN-ID or DNS-ID within the voucher. The MASA service mitigates a MiTM registrar by identifying the specific registrar (via WebPKI) authorized to own the pledge.
所有权ID凭证：以凭证中包含质押的CN-ID或DNS-ID命名。MASA服务通过识别授权拥有质押的特定注册商（通过WebPKI），减轻了MiTM注册商的负担。
Bearer Voucher: A Bearer Voucher is named after the inclusion of a registrar ID wildcard. Because the registrar identity is not indicated, this voucher type must be treated as a secret and protected from exposure as any 'bearer' of the voucher can claim the pledge device. Publishing a nonceless bearer voucher effectively turns the specified pledge into a "TOFU" device with minimal mitigation against MiTM registrars. Bearer vouchers are out of scope.
无记名凭证：无记名凭证以包含注册者ID通配符命名。由于未指明注册人身份，因此必须将该凭证类型视为机密，并保护其不被披露，因为凭证的任何“持有人”都可以主张质押设备。发布无记名凭证有效地将指定的质押转化为“豆腐”设备，对MiTM登记员的影响最小。无记名凭证超出范围。
The voucher's primary purpose is to securely assign a pledge to an owner. The voucher informs the pledge which entity it should consider to be its owner.
凭证的主要目的是将质押物安全地转让给所有人。凭单告知质押人应将其视为其所有者。
This document defines a voucher that is a JSON-encoded instance of the YANG module defined in Section 5.3 that has been, by default, CMS signed.
本文档定义了一个凭证，该凭证是第5.3节中定义的YANG模块的JSON编码实例，默认情况下已由CMS签名。
This format is described here as a practical basis for some uses (such as in NETCONF), but more to clearly indicate what vouchers look like in practice. This description also serves to validate the YANG data model.
本文将此格式描述为某些用途（如在NETCONF中）的实用基础，但更详细的说明是凭证在实践中的外观。该描述还用于验证YANG数据模型。
Future work is expected to define new mappings of the voucher to Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) (from JSON) and to change the signature container from CMS to JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) or CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE). XML or ASN.1 formats are also conceivable.
未来的工作预计将定义凭证到简明二进制对象表示（CBOR）（从JSON）的新映射，并将签名容器从CMS更改为JSON对象签名和加密（JOSE）或CBOR对象签名和加密（COSE）。XML或ASN.1格式也是可以想象的。
This document defines a media type and a filename extension for the CMS-encoded JSON type. Future documents on additional formats would define additional media types. Signaling is in the form of a MIME Content-Type, an HTTP Accept: header, or more mundane methods like use of a filename extension when a voucher is transferred on a USB key.
本文档为CMS编码的JSON类型定义了媒体类型和文件扩展名。未来关于其他格式的文档将定义其他媒体类型。信令的形式是MIME内容类型、HTTP Accept:头，或更普通的方法，如在USB密钥上传输凭证时使用文件扩展名。
The following tree diagram illustrates a high-level view of a voucher document. The notation used in this diagram is described in [RFC8340]. Each node in the diagram is fully described by the YANG module in Section 5.3. Please review the YANG module for a detailed description of the voucher format.
下面的树形图演示了凭证文档的高级视图。[RFC8340]中描述了此图中使用的符号。图中的每个节点由第5.3节中的YANG模块完整描述。有关凭证格式的详细说明，请查看YANG模块。
module: ietf-voucher
模块：ietf凭证
yang-data voucher-artifact:
+---- voucher
+---- created-on yang:date-and-time
+---- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+---- assertion enumeration
+---- serial-number string
+---- idevid-issuer? binary
+---- pinned-domain-cert binary
+---- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+---- nonce? binary
+---- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
yang-data voucher-artifact:
+---- voucher
+---- created-on yang:date-and-time
+---- expires-on? yang:date-and-time
+---- assertion enumeration
+---- serial-number string
+---- idevid-issuer? binary
+---- pinned-domain-cert binary
+---- domain-cert-revocation-checks? boolean
+---- nonce? binary
+---- last-renewal-date? yang:date-and-time
This section provides voucher examples for illustration purposes. These examples conform to the encoding rules defined in [RFC8259].
本节提供凭证示例以供说明。这些示例符合[RFC8259]中定义的编码规则。
The following example illustrates an ephemeral voucher (uses a nonce). The MASA generated this voucher using the 'logged' assertion type, knowing that it would be suitable for the pledge making the request.
下面的示例演示了临时凭证（使用nonce）。MASA使用“记录的”断言类型生成此凭证，知道它适用于提出请求的质押。
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "logged",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "logged",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"nonce": "base64encodedvalue=="
}
}
The following example illustrates a non-ephemeral voucher (no nonce). While the voucher itself expires after two weeks, it presumably can be renewed for up to a year. The MASA generated this voucher using the 'verified' assertion type, which should satisfy all pledges.
以下示例演示了非临时凭证（无临时凭证）。虽然优惠券本身在两周后到期，但它大概可以续期一年。MASA使用“已验证”断言类型生成该凭证，该断言类型应满足所有承诺。
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"expires-on": "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "verified",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"domain-cert-revocation-checks": "true",
"last-renewal-date": "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z"
}
}
{
"ietf-voucher:voucher": {
"created-on": "2016-10-07T19:31:42Z",
"expires-on": "2016-10-21T19:31:42Z",
"assertion": "verified",
"serial-number": "JADA123456789",
"idevid-issuer": "base64encodedvalue==",
"pinned-domain-cert": "base64encodedvalue==",
"domain-cert-revocation-checks": "true",
"last-renewal-date": "2017-10-07T19:31:42Z"
}
}
Following is a YANG [RFC7950] module formally describing the voucher's JSON document structure.
以下是正式描述凭证JSON文档结构的YANG[RFC7950]模块。
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher@2018-05-09.yang"
module ietf-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher";
prefix vch;
<CODE BEGINS> file "ietf-voucher@2018-05-09.yang"
module ietf-voucher {
yang-version 1.1;
namespace "urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher";
prefix vch;
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
import ietf-yang-types {
prefix yang;
reference "RFC 6991: Common YANG Data Types";
}
import ietf-restconf {
prefix rc;
description
"This import statement is only present to access
the yang-data extension defined in RFC 8040.";
reference "RFC 8040: RESTCONF Protocol";
}
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>
organization
"IETF ANIMA Working Group";
contact
"WG Web: <https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/anima/>
WG List: <mailto:anima@ietf.org>
Author: Kent Watsen
<mailto:kwatsen@juniper.net>
Author: Max Pritikin <mailto:pritikin@cisco.com> Author: Michael Richardson <mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Author: Toerless Eckert <mailto:tte+ietf@cs.fau.de>"; description "This module defines the format for a voucher, which is produced by a pledge's manufacturer or delegate (MASA) to securely assign a pledge to an 'owner', so that the pledge may establish a secure connection to the owner's network infrastructure.
作者：Max Pritikin<mailto:pritikin@cisco.com>作者：迈克尔·理查森<mailto:mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>作者：Toerless Eckert<mailto:tte+ietf@cs.fau.de>“说明”此模块定义凭证的格式，凭证由质押的制造商或代理人（MASA）生成，用于将质押安全地分配给“所有人”，因此，质押可以建立与所有者网络基础设施的安全连接。
The key words 'MUST', 'MUST NOT', 'REQUIRED', 'SHALL', 'SHALL NOT', 'SHOULD', 'SHOULD NOT', 'RECOMMENDED', 'NOT RECOMMENDED', 'MAY', and 'OPTIONAL' in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (RFC 2119) (RFC 8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“不建议”、“可能”和“可选”在所有大写字母出现时（如图所示）应按照BCP 14（RFC 2119）（RFC 8174）所述进行解释。
Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2018 IETF信托基金和被确定为代码作者的人员。版权所有。
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in Section 4.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
根据IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定第4.c节规定的简化BSD许可证中包含的许可条款，允许以源代码和二进制格式重新分发和使用，无论是否修改(https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info).
This version of this YANG module is part of RFC 8366; see the RFC itself for full legal notices.";
此模块的此版本是RFC 8366的一部分；有关完整的法律通知，请参见RFC本身。“；
revision 2018-05-09 {
description
"Initial version";
reference "RFC 8366: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
revision 2018-05-09 {
description
"Initial version";
reference "RFC 8366: Voucher Profile for Bootstrapping Protocols";
}
// Top-level statement
rc:yang-data voucher-artifact {
uses voucher-artifact-grouping;
}
// Top-level statement
rc:yang-data voucher-artifact {
uses voucher-artifact-grouping;
}
// Grouping defined for future augmentations
//为未来扩充定义的分组
grouping voucher-artifact-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
container voucher {
grouping voucher-artifact-grouping {
description
"Grouping to allow reuse/extensions in future work.";
container voucher {
description
"A voucher assigns a pledge to an owner (pinned-domain-cert).";
leaf created-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"A value indicating the date this voucher was created. This
node is primarily for human consumption and auditing. Future
work MAY create verification requirements based on this
node.";
}
leaf expires-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
must 'not(../nonce)';
description
"A value indicating when this voucher expires. The node is
optional as not all pledges support expirations, such as
pledges lacking a reliable clock.
description
"A voucher assigns a pledge to an owner (pinned-domain-cert).";
leaf created-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
mandatory true;
description
"A value indicating the date this voucher was created. This
node is primarily for human consumption and auditing. Future
work MAY create verification requirements based on this
node.";
}
leaf expires-on {
type yang:date-and-time;
must 'not(../nonce)';
description
"A value indicating when this voucher expires. The node is
optional as not all pledges support expirations, such as
pledges lacking a reliable clock.
If this field exists, then the pledges MUST ensure that the expires-on time has not yet passed. A pledge without an accurate clock cannot meet this requirement.
如果存在此字段，则认捐必须确保到期时间尚未过去。没有精确时钟的抵押不能满足这一要求。
The expires-on value MUST NOT exceed the expiration date
of any of the listed 'pinned-domain-cert' certificates.";
}
leaf assertion {
type enumeration {
enum verified {
description
"Indicates that the ownership has been positively
verified by the MASA (e.g., through sales channel
integration).";
}
enum logged {
description
"Indicates that the voucher has been issued after
minimal verification of ownership or control. The
issuance has been logged for detection of
potential security issues (e.g., recipients of
vouchers might verify for themselves that unexpected
vouchers are not in the log). This is similar to
unsecured trust-on-first-use principles but with the
logging providing a basis for detecting unexpected
events.";
}
enum proximity {
The expires-on value MUST NOT exceed the expiration date
of any of the listed 'pinned-domain-cert' certificates.";
}
leaf assertion {
type enumeration {
enum verified {
description
"Indicates that the ownership has been positively
verified by the MASA (e.g., through sales channel
integration).";
}
enum logged {
description
"Indicates that the voucher has been issued after
minimal verification of ownership or control. The
issuance has been logged for detection of
potential security issues (e.g., recipients of
vouchers might verify for themselves that unexpected
vouchers are not in the log). This is similar to
unsecured trust-on-first-use principles but with the
logging providing a basis for detecting unexpected
events.";
}
enum proximity {
description
"Indicates that the voucher has been issued after
the MASA verified a proximity proof provided by the
device and target domain. The issuance has been logged
for detection of potential security issues. This is
stronger than just logging, because it requires some
verification that the pledge and owner are
in communication but is still dependent on analysis of
the logs to detect unexpected events.";
}
}
mandatory true;
description
"The assertion is a statement from the MASA regarding how
the owner was verified. This statement enables pledges
to support more detailed policy checks. Pledges MUST
ensure that the assertion provided is acceptable, per
local policy, before processing the voucher.";
}
leaf serial-number {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The serial-number of the hardware. When processing a
voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its serial-number
matches this value. If no match occurs, then the
pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.";
}
leaf idevid-issuer {
type binary;
description
"The Authority Key Identifier OCTET STRING (as defined in
Section 4.2.1.1 of RFC 5280) from the pledge's IDevID
certificate. Optional since some serial-numbers are
already unique within the scope of a MASA.
Inclusion of the statistically unique key identifier
ensures statistically unique identification of the hardware.
When processing a voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its
IDevID Authority Key Identifier matches this value. If no
match occurs, then the pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.
description
"Indicates that the voucher has been issued after
the MASA verified a proximity proof provided by the
device and target domain. The issuance has been logged
for detection of potential security issues. This is
stronger than just logging, because it requires some
verification that the pledge and owner are
in communication but is still dependent on analysis of
the logs to detect unexpected events.";
}
}
mandatory true;
description
"The assertion is a statement from the MASA regarding how
the owner was verified. This statement enables pledges
to support more detailed policy checks. Pledges MUST
ensure that the assertion provided is acceptable, per
local policy, before processing the voucher.";
}
leaf serial-number {
type string;
mandatory true;
description
"The serial-number of the hardware. When processing a
voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its serial-number
matches this value. If no match occurs, then the
pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.";
}
leaf idevid-issuer {
type binary;
description
"The Authority Key Identifier OCTET STRING (as defined in
Section 4.2.1.1 of RFC 5280) from the pledge's IDevID
certificate. Optional since some serial-numbers are
already unique within the scope of a MASA.
Inclusion of the statistically unique key identifier
ensures statistically unique identification of the hardware.
When processing a voucher, a pledge MUST ensure that its
IDevID Authority Key Identifier matches this value. If no
match occurs, then the pledge MUST NOT process this voucher.
When issuing a voucher, the MASA MUST ensure that this field
is populated for serial-numbers that are not otherwise unique
within the scope of the MASA.";
}
leaf pinned-domain-cert {
type binary;
mandatory true;
When issuing a voucher, the MASA MUST ensure that this field
is populated for serial-numbers that are not otherwise unique
within the scope of the MASA.";
}
leaf pinned-domain-cert {
type binary;
mandatory true;
description "An X.509 v3 certificate structure, as specified by RFC 5280, using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) encoding, as defined in ITU-T X.690.
描述“RFC 5280规定的X.509 v3证书结构，使用ITU-T X.690中定义的可分辨编码规则（DER）编码。
This certificate is used by a pledge to trust a Public Key
Infrastructure in order to verify a domain certificate
supplied to the pledge separately by the bootstrapping
protocol. The domain certificate MUST have this certificate
somewhere in its chain of certificates. This certificate
MAY be an end-entity certificate, including a self-signed
entity.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf domain-cert-revocation-checks {
type boolean;
description
"A processing instruction to the pledge that it MUST (true)
or MUST NOT (false) verify the revocation status for the
pinned domain certificate. If this field is not set, then
normal PKIX behavior applies to validation of the domain
certificate.";
}
leaf nonce {
type binary {
length "8..32";
}
must 'not(../expires-on)';
description
"A value that can be used by a pledge in some bootstrapping
protocols to enable anti-replay protection. This node is
optional because it is not used by all bootstrapping
protocols.
This certificate is used by a pledge to trust a Public Key
Infrastructure in order to verify a domain certificate
supplied to the pledge separately by the bootstrapping
protocol. The domain certificate MUST have this certificate
somewhere in its chain of certificates. This certificate
MAY be an end-entity certificate, including a self-signed
entity.";
reference
"RFC 5280:
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile.
ITU-T X.690:
Information technology - ASN.1 encoding rules:
Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER),
Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished
Encoding Rules (DER).";
}
leaf domain-cert-revocation-checks {
type boolean;
description
"A processing instruction to the pledge that it MUST (true)
or MUST NOT (false) verify the revocation status for the
pinned domain certificate. If this field is not set, then
normal PKIX behavior applies to validation of the domain
certificate.";
}
leaf nonce {
type binary {
length "8..32";
}
must 'not(../expires-on)';
description
"A value that can be used by a pledge in some bootstrapping
protocols to enable anti-replay protection. This node is
optional because it is not used by all bootstrapping
protocols.
When present, the pledge MUST compare the provided nonce
value with another value that the pledge randomly generated
and sent to a bootstrap server in an earlier bootstrapping
message. If the values do not match, then the pledge MUST
NOT process this voucher.";
}
When present, the pledge MUST compare the provided nonce
value with another value that the pledge randomly generated
and sent to a bootstrap server in an earlier bootstrapping
message. If the values do not match, then the pledge MUST
NOT process this voucher.";
}
leaf last-renewal-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
must '../expires-on';
description
"The date that the MASA projects to be the last date it
will renew a voucher on. This field is merely informative;
it is not processed by pledges.
leaf last-renewal-date {
type yang:date-and-time;
must '../expires-on';
description
"The date that the MASA projects to be the last date it
will renew a voucher on. This field is merely informative;
it is not processed by pledges.
Circumstances may occur after a voucher is generated that
may alter a voucher's validity period. For instance, a
vendor may associate validity periods with support contracts,
which may be terminated or extended over time.";
}
} // end voucher
} // end voucher-grouping
}
Circumstances may occur after a voucher is generated that
may alter a voucher's validity period. For instance, a
vendor may associate validity periods with support contracts,
which may be terminated or extended over time.";
}
} // end voucher
} // end voucher-grouping
}
<CODE ENDS>
<代码结束>
The IETF evolution of PKCS#7 is CMS [RFC5652]. A CMS-signed voucher, the default type, contains a ContentInfo structure with the voucher content. An eContentType of 40 indicates that the content is a JSON-encoded voucher.
PKCS#7的IETF演变为CMS[RFC5652]。CMS签名凭证（默认类型）包含凭证内容的ContentInfo结构。eContentType为40表示内容是JSON编码的凭证。
The signing structure is a CMS SignedData structure, as specified by Section 5.1 of [RFC5652], encoded using ASN.1 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER), as specified in ITU-T X.690 [ITU.X690.2015].
签名结构是[RFC5652]第5.1节规定的CMS SignedData结构，使用ITU-T X.690[ITU.X690.2015]中规定的ASN.1可分辨编码规则（DER）进行编码。
To facilitate interoperability, Section 8.3 in this document registers the media type "application/voucher-cms+json" and the filename extension ".vcj".
为了促进互操作性，本文件第8.3节注册了媒体类型“应用程序/凭证cms+json”和文件扩展名“.vcj”。
The CMS structure MUST contain a 'signerInfo' structure, as described in Section 5.1 of [RFC5652], containing the signature generated over the content using a private key trusted by the recipient. Normally, the recipient is the pledge and the signer is the MASA. Another possible use could be as a "signed voucher request" format originating from the pledge or registrar toward the MASA. Within this document, the signer is assumed to be the MASA.
CMS结构必须包含[RFC5652]第5.1节所述的“signerInfo”结构，其中包含使用收件人信任的私钥在内容上生成的签名。通常情况下，接收者是质押，签署者是MASA。另一种可能的用途是作为“签名凭证请求”格式，源于对MASA的质押或登记。在本文件中，签字人假设为MASA。
Note that Section 5.1 of [RFC5652] includes a discussion about how to validate a CMS object, which is really a PKCS7 object (cmsVersion=1). Intermediate systems (such the Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI) registrar) that might need to evaluate the voucher in flight MUST be prepared for such an older format. No signaling is necessary, as the manufacturer knows the capabilities of the pledge and will use an appropriate format voucher for each pledge.
请注意，[RFC5652]的第5.1节讨论了如何验证CMS对象，该对象实际上是PKCS7对象（cmsVersion=1）。可能需要评估飞行中凭证的中间系统（如引导式远程安全密钥基础设施（BRSKI）注册器）必须为这种旧格式做好准备。无需发出信号，因为制造商知道质押的能力，并将为每个质押使用适当格式的凭证。
The CMS structure SHOULD also contain all of the certificates leading up to and including the signer's trust anchor certificate known to the recipient. The inclusion of the trust anchor is unusual in many applications, but third parties cannot accurately audit the transaction without it.
CMS结构还应包含收件人已知的签名者信任锚证书的所有证书。在许多应用程序中，包含信任锚是不寻常的，但是没有它，第三方无法准确地审计交易。
The CMS structure MAY also contain revocation objects for any intermediate certificate authorities (CAs) between the voucher issuer and the trust anchor known to the recipient. However, the use of CRLs and other validity mechanisms is discouraged, as the pledge is unlikely to be able to perform online checks and is unlikely to have a trusted clock source. As described below, the use of short-lived vouchers and/or a pledge-provided nonce provides a freshness guarantee.
CMS结构还可能包含凭证颁发者和接收方已知的信任锚之间的任何中间证书颁发机构（CA）的撤销对象。但是，不鼓励使用CRL和其他有效性机制，因为质押不太可能执行在线检查，也不太可能有可信的时钟源。如下文所述，使用短期代金券和/或临时提供的质押提供新鲜度保证。
The lifetimes of vouchers may vary. In some bootstrapping protocols, the vouchers may be created and consumed immediately, whereas in other bootstrapping solutions, there may be a significant time delay between when a voucher is created and when it is consumed. In cases when there is a time delay, there is a need for the pledge to ensure that the assertions made when the voucher was created are still valid.
凭单的使用期限可能会有所不同。在某些引导协议中，凭证可能会立即创建和使用，而在其他引导解决方案中，凭证创建和使用之间可能存在明显的时间延迟。在存在时间延迟的情况下，质押需要确保创建凭证时所作的声明仍然有效。
A revocation artifact is generally used to verify the continued validity of an assertion such as a PKIX certificate, web token, or a "voucher". With this approach, a potentially long-lived assertion is paired with a reasonably fresh revocation status check to ensure that the assertion is still valid. However, this approach increases solution complexity, as it introduces the need for additional protocols and code paths to distribute and process the revocations.
撤销工件通常用于验证断言（如PKIX证书、web令牌或“凭证”）的持续有效性。使用这种方法，一个可能存在很长时间的断言与一个合理的新撤销状态检查相结合，以确保断言仍然有效。然而，这种方法增加了解决方案的复杂性，因为它需要额外的协议和代码路径来分发和处理撤销。
Addressing the shortcomings of revocations, this document recommends instead the use of lightweight renewals of short-lived non-revocable vouchers. That is, rather than issue a long-lived voucher, where the 'expires-on' leaf is set to some distant date, the expectation is for the MASA to instead issue a short-lived voucher, where the 'expires-on' leaf is set to a relatively near date, along with a promise (reflected in the 'last-renewal-date' field) to reissue the voucher again when needed. Importantly, while issuing the initial voucher may incur heavyweight verification checks ("Are you who you say you are?" "Does the pledge actually belong to you?"), reissuing the voucher should be a lightweight process, as it ostensibly only updates the voucher's validity period. With this approach, there is only the one artifact, and only one code path is needed to process it; there is no possibility of a pledge choosing to skip the revocation status check because, for instance, the OCSP Responder is not reachable.
针对撤销的缺点，本文档建议使用短期不可撤销凭证的轻量级续订。也就是说，与发行长期凭证（其中“到期日”页设置为某个较远的日期）不同，MASA希望发行短期凭证，其中“到期日”页设置为相对较近的日期，并承诺（反映在“最后更新日期”字段中）在需要时再次发行凭证。重要的是，虽然签发初始凭证可能会招致重量级的验证检查（“你说你是谁？”“质押是否真的属于你？”），但重新签发凭证应该是一个轻量级的过程，因为它表面上只会更新凭证的有效期。使用这种方法，只有一个工件，并且只需要一个代码路径来处理它；质押不可能选择跳过撤销状态检查，因为，例如，无法访问OCSP响应者。
While this document recommends issuing short-lived vouchers, the voucher artifact does not restrict the ability to create long-lived voucher, if required; however, no revocation method is described.
虽然本文档建议发行短期凭证，但凭证工件并不限制创建长期凭证的能力（如果需要）；然而，没有描述撤销方法。
Note that a voucher may be signed by a chain of intermediate CAs leading up to the trust anchor certificate known by the pledge. Even though the voucher itself is not revocable, it may still be revoked, per se, if one of the intermediate CA certificates is revoked.
请注意，凭证可由一系列中间CA签署，直至质押所知的信托锚证书。即使凭证本身不可撤销，但如果其中一个中间CA证书被撤销，其本身也可能被撤销。
The solution described herein originally enabled a single voucher to apply to many pledges, using lists of regular expressions to represent ranges of serial-numbers. However, it was determined that blocking the renewal of a voucher that applied to many devices would be excessive when only the ownership for a single pledge needed to be blocked. Thus, the voucher format now only supports a single serial-number to be listed.
本文描述的解决方案最初允许单个凭证应用于多个认捐，使用正则表达式列表表示序列号的范围。然而，据确定，当只需要阻止单一质押的所有权时，阻止适用于许多设备的凭证续期将是过分的。因此，凭证格式现在只支持列出一个序列号。
An attacker could use an expired voucher to gain control over a device that has no understanding of time. The device cannot trust NTP as a time reference, as an attacker could control the NTP stream.
攻击者可以使用过期凭证控制不了解时间的设备。设备无法将NTP作为时间参考，因为攻击者可以控制NTP流。
There are three things to defend against this: 1) devices are required to verify that the expires-on field has not yet passed, 2) devices without access to time can use nonces to get ephemeral vouchers, and 3) vouchers without expiration times may be used, which will appear in the audit log, informing the security decision.
有三件事需要防范：1）需要设备验证expires on字段是否尚未通过；2）没有时间访问权限的设备可以使用nonce来获取临时凭证；3）可以使用没有过期时间的凭证，这些凭证将显示在审核日志中，通知安全决策。
This document defines a voucher format that contains time values for expirations, which require an accurate clock in order to be processed correctly. Vendors planning on issuing vouchers with expiration values must ensure that devices have an accurate clock when shipped from manufacturing facilities and take steps to prevent clock tampering. If it is not possible to ensure clock accuracy, then vouchers with expirations should not be issued.
此文档定义了包含到期时间值的凭证格式，到期时间需要精确的时钟才能正确处理。计划发行具有过期值的凭证的供应商必须确保设备从制造厂发货时具有准确的时钟，并采取措施防止时钟被篡改。如果无法确保时钟的准确性，则不应发行过期凭证。
Pursuant the recommendation made in Section 6.1 for the MASA to be deployed as an online voucher signing service, it is RECOMMENDED that the MASA's private key used for signing vouchers is protected by a hardware security module (HSM).
根据第6.1节中提出的将MASA部署为在线凭证签署服务的建议，建议用于签署凭证的MASA私钥由硬件安全模块（HSM）保护。
If a domain certificate is compromised, then any outstanding vouchers for that domain could be used by the attacker. The domain administrator is clearly expected to initiate revocation of any domain identity certificates (as is normal in PKI solutions).
如果域证书受损，则攻击者可能会使用该域的任何未完成凭证。显然，域管理员需要启动任何域身份证书的吊销（这在PKI解决方案中是正常的）。
Similarly,they are expected to contact the MASA to indicate that an outstanding (presumably short lifetime) voucher should be blocked from automated renewal. Protocols for voucher distribution are RECOMMENDED to check for revocation of domain identity certificates before the signing of vouchers.
同样，他们也应联系MASA，以表明应阻止未付（可能是短期）凭证自动续订。建议使用凭证分发协议在凭证签名之前检查域标识证书的吊销情况。
The YANG module specified in this document defines the schema for data that is subsequently encapsulated by a CMS signed-data content type, as described in Section 5 of [RFC5652]. As such, all of the YANG modeled data is protected from modification.
如[RFC5652]第5节所述，本文件中指定的模块定义了随后由CMS签名数据内容类型封装的数据模式。因此，所有数据都受到保护，不会被修改。
Implementations should be aware that the signed data is only protected from external modification; the data is still visible. This potential disclosure of information doesn't affect security so much as privacy. In particular, adversaries can glean information such as which devices belong to which organizations and which CRL Distribution Point and/or OCSP Responder URLs are accessed to validate the vouchers. When privacy is important, the CMS signed-data content type SHOULD be encrypted, either by conveying it via a mutually authenticated secure transport protocol (e.g., TLS [RFC5246]) or by encapsulating the signed-data content type with an enveloped-data content type (Section 6 of [RFC5652]), though details for how to do this are outside the scope of this document.
实现应该知道，已签名的数据只受保护，不受外部修改；数据仍然可见。这种潜在的信息泄露与其说影响安全，不如说影响隐私。特别是，对手可以收集信息，例如哪些设备属于哪些组织，访问哪些CRL分发点和/或OCSP响应者URL以验证凭证。当隐私很重要时，CMS签名数据内容类型应加密，或者通过相互认证的安全传输协议（例如TLS[RFC5246]）传输，或者通过用封装数据内容类型封装签名数据内容类型（RFC5652]第6节），尽管关于如何做到这一点的详细信息超出了本文档的范围。
The use of YANG to define data structures, via the 'yang-data' statement, is relatively new and distinct from the traditional use of YANG to define an API accessed by network management protocols such as NETCONF [RFC6241] and RESTCONF [RFC8040]. For this reason, these guidelines do not follow template described by Section 3.7 of [YANG-GUIDE].
使用YANG通过“YANG data”语句定义数据结构相对较新，与传统使用YANG定义网络管理协议（如NETCONF[RFC6241]和RESTCONF[RFC8040]）访问的API不同。因此，这些指南不遵循[YANG-GUIDE]第3.7节所述的模板。
This document registers a URI in the "IETF XML Registry" [RFC3688]. IANA has registered the following:
本文档在“IETF XML注册表”[RFC3688]中注册URI。IANA注册了以下内容：
URI: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher Registrant Contact: The ANIMA WG of the IETF. XML: N/A, the requested URI is an XML namespace.
URI:urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf凭证注册人联系人：ietf的ANIMA工作组。XML:N/A，请求的URI是一个XML名称空间。
This document registers a YANG module in the "YANG Module Names" registry [RFC6020]. IANA has registered the following:
本文件在“阳模块名称”注册表[RFC6020]中注册阳模块。IANA注册了以下内容：
name: ietf-voucher
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher
prefix: vch
reference: RFC 8366
name: ietf-voucher
namespace: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:yang:ietf-voucher
prefix: vch
reference: RFC 8366
This document registers a new media type in the "Media Types" registry [RFC6838]. IANA has registered the following:
本文档在“媒体类型”注册表[RFC6838]中注册新媒体类型。IANA注册了以下内容：
Type name: application
类型名称：应用程序
Subtype name: voucher-cms+json
子类型名称：凭证cms+json
Required parameters: none
所需参数：无
Optional parameters: none
可选参数：无
Encoding considerations: CMS-signed JSON vouchers are ASN.1/DER encoded.
编码注意事项：CMS签名的JSON凭证采用ASN.1/DER编码。
Security considerations: See Section 7
安全注意事项：见第7节
Interoperability considerations: The format is designed to be broadly interoperable.
互操作性注意事项：该格式旨在实现广泛的互操作性。
Published specification: RFC 8366
已发布规范：RFC 8366
Applications that use this media type: ANIMA, 6tisch, and NETCONF zero-touch imprinting systems.
使用此介质类型的应用程序：ANIMA、6tisch和NETCONF零接触压印系统。
Fragment identifier considerations: none
片段标识符注意事项：无
Additional information:
其他信息：
Deprecated alias names for this type: none
此类型的已弃用别名：无
Magic number(s): None
幻数：无
File extension(s): .vcj
文件扩展名：.vcj
Macintosh file type code(s): none
Macintosh文件类型代码：无
Person and email address to contact for further information: IETF ANIMA WG
联系人和电子邮件地址以获取更多信息：IETF ANIMA WG
Intended usage: LIMITED
预期用途：有限
Restrictions on usage: NONE
使用限制：无
Author: ANIMA WG
作者：阿尼玛工作组
Change controller: IETF
更改控制器：IETF
Provisional registration? (standards tree only): NO
临时登记？（仅限标准树）：否
IANA has registered the following OID in the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)" registry:
IANA已在“S/MIME CMS内容类型的SMI安全性（1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1）”注册表中注册了以下OID：
Decimal Description References
------- -------------------------------------- ----------
40 id-ct-animaJSONVoucher RFC 8366
Decimal Description References
------- -------------------------------------- ----------
40 id-ct-animaJSONVoucher RFC 8366
[ITU.X690.2015] International Telecommunication Union, "Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation X.690, ISO/IEC 8825-1, August 2015, <https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[ITU.X690.2015]国际电信联盟，“信息技术-ASN.1编码规则：基本编码规则（BER）、规范编码规则（CER）和区分编码规则（DER）规范”，ITU-T建议X.690，ISO/IEC 8825-12015年8月<https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.690/>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，DOI 10.17487/RFC2119，1997年3月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5652] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", STD 70, RFC 5652, DOI 10.17487/RFC5652, September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC5652]Housley，R.，“加密消息语法（CMS）”，STD 70，RFC 5652，DOI 10.17487/RFC5652，2009年9月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652>.
[RFC6020] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "YANG - A Data Modeling Language for the Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6020, DOI 10.17487/RFC6020, October 2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC6020]Bjorklund，M.，Ed.“YANG-网络配置协议的数据建模语言（NETCONF）”，RFC 6020，DOI 10.17487/RFC6020，2010年10月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6020>.
[RFC7950] Bjorklund, M., Ed., "The YANG 1.1 Data Modeling Language", RFC 7950, DOI 10.17487/RFC7950, August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC7950]Bjorklund，M.，Ed.“YANG 1.1数据建模语言”，RFC 7950，DOI 10.17487/RFC7950，2016年8月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7950>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8174]Leiba，B.，“RFC 2119关键词中大写与小写的歧义”，BCP 14，RFC 8174，DOI 10.17487/RFC8174，2017年5月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8259] Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259, DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[RFC8259]Bray，T.，Ed.“JavaScript对象表示法（JSON）数据交换格式”，STD 90，RFC 8259，DOI 10.17487/RFC8259，2017年12月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.
[imprinting] Wikipedia, "Wikipedia article: Imprinting", February 2018, <https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= Imprinting_(psychology)&oldid=825757556>.
[印记]维基百科，“维基百科文章：印记”，2018年2月<https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title= 印记（心理学）&oldid=8257556>。
[KEYINFRA] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Behringer, M., Bjarnason, S., and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructures (BRSKI)", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-12, March 2018.
[KEYINFRA]Pritikin，M.，Richardson，M.，Behringer，M.，Bjarnason，S.，和K.Watsen，“引导远程安全密钥基础设施（BRSKI）”，正在进行的工作，草稿-ietf-anima-Bootstrapping-KEYINFRA-12，2018年3月。
[RFC3688] Mealling, M., "The IETF XML Registry", BCP 81, RFC 3688, DOI 10.17487/RFC3688, January 2004, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC3688]Mealling，M.，“IETF XML注册表”，BCP 81，RFC 3688，DOI 10.17487/RFC3688，2004年1月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3688>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC5246]Dierks，T.和E.Rescorla，“传输层安全（TLS）协议版本1.2”，RFC 5246，DOI 10.17487/RFC5246，2008年8月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246>.
[RFC6125] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6125]Saint Andre，P.和J.Hodges，“在传输层安全（TLS）环境下使用X.509（PKIX）证书在互联网公钥基础设施内表示和验证基于域的应用程序服务身份”，RFC 6125，DOI 10.17487/RFC6125，2011年3月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.
[RFC6241] Enns, R., Ed., Bjorklund, M., Ed., Schoenwaelder, J., Ed., and A. Bierman, Ed., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)", RFC 6241, DOI 10.17487/RFC6241, June 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6241]Enns，R.，Ed.，Bjorklund，M.，Ed.，Schoenwaeld，J.，Ed.，和A.Bierman，Ed.，“网络配置协议（NETCONF）”，RFC 6241，DOI 10.17487/RFC6241，2011年6月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6241>.
[RFC6838] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures", BCP 13, RFC 6838, DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC6838]Freed，N.，Klensin，J.和T.Hansen，“介质类型规范和注册程序”，BCP 13，RFC 6838，DOI 10.17487/RFC6838，2013年1月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838>.
[RFC7435] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time", RFC 7435, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, December 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
[RFC7435]Dukhovni，V.，“机会主义安全：大部分时间的一些保护”，RFC 7435，DOI 10.17487/RFC7435，2014年12月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435>.
[RFC8040] Bierman, A., Bjorklund, M., and K. Watsen, "RESTCONF Protocol", RFC 8040, DOI 10.17487/RFC8040, January 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8040]Bierman，A.，Bjorklund，M.，和K.Watsen，“RESTCONF协议”，RFC 8040，DOI 10.17487/RFC8040，2017年1月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8040>.
[RFC8340] Bjorklund, M. and L. Berger, Ed., "YANG Tree Diagrams", BCP 215, RFC 8340, DOI 10.17487/RFC8340, March 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[RFC8340]Bjorklund，M.和L.Berger，编辑，“杨树图”，BCP 215，RFC 8340，DOI 10.17487/RFC8340，2018年3月<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8340>.
[SECUREJOIN] Richardson, M., "6tisch Secure Join protocol", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-secure-join-01, February 2017.
[SECUREJOIN]Richardson，M.，“6tisch安全连接协议”，正在进行的工作，草稿-ietf-6tisch-dtsecurity-Secure-Join-012017年2月。
[Stajano99theresurrecting] Stajano, F. and R. Anderson, "The Resurrecting Duckling: Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks", 1999, <https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/www/files/ publications/public/files/tr.1999.2.pdf>.
[Stajano 99TheRecurving]Stajano，F.和R.Anderson，“复活的小鸭：特设无线网络的安全问题”，1999年<https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/dtg/www/files/ 出版物/public/files/tr.1999.2.pdf>。
[YANG-GUIDE] Bierman, A., "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers of YANG Data Model Documents", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-20, March 2018.
[YANG-GUIDE]Bierman，A.，“YANG数据模型文件的作者和评审者指南”，正在进行的工作，草稿-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-20，2018年3月。
[ZERO-TOUCH] Watsen, K., Abrahamsson, M., and I. Farrer, "Zero Touch Provisioning for Networking Devices", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-21, March 2018.
[ZERO-TOUCH]Watsen，K.，Abrahamsson，M.，和I.Farrer，“网络设备的零接触供应”，正在进行的工作，草稿-ietf-netconf-zerotouch-212018年3月。
Acknowledgements
致谢
The authors would like to thank for following for lively discussions on list and in the halls (ordered by last name): William Atwood, Toerless Eckert, and Sheng Jiang.
作者要感谢以下在名单上和大厅（按姓氏排序）进行的热烈讨论：威廉·阿特伍德、托利斯·埃克特和盛江。
Russ Housley provided the upgrade from PKCS7 to CMS (RFC 5652) along with the detailed CMS structure diagram.
Russ Housley提供了从PKCS7到CMS（RFC 5652）的升级以及详细的CMS结构图。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Kent Watsen Juniper Networks
肯特沃特森刺柏网络公司
Email: kwatsen@juniper.net
Email: kwatsen@juniper.net
Michael C. Richardson Sandelman Software
Michael C.Richardson Sandelman软件公司
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
URI: http://www.sandelman.ca/
Max Pritikin Cisco Systems
Max Pritikin思科系统公司
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Toerless Eckert Huawei USA - Futurewei Technologies Inc. 2330 Central Expy Santa Clara 95050 United States of America
无托勒埃克特华为美国-未来威科技有限公司美国圣克拉拉中心出口2330号95050
Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de, toerless.eckert@huawei.com
Email: tte+ietf@cs.fau.de, toerless.eckert@huawei.com