Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                         N. ten Oever
Request for Comments: 8280                                    ARTICLE 19
Category: Informational                                          C. Cath
ISSN: 2070-1721                                Oxford Internet Institute
                                                            October 2017
Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                         N. ten Oever
Request for Comments: 8280                                    ARTICLE 19
Category: Informational                                          C. Cath
ISSN: 2070-1721                                Oxford Internet Institute
                                                            October 2017

Research into Human Rights Protocol Considerations




This document aims to propose guidelines for human rights considerations, similar to the work done on the guidelines for privacy considerations (RFC 6973). The other parts of this document explain the background of the guidelines and how they were developed.

本文件旨在提出人权考虑准则,类似于隐私考虑准则(RFC 6973)的工作。本文件的其他部分解释了指南的背景及其制定过程。

This document is the first milestone in a longer-term research effort. It has been reviewed by the Human Rights Protocol Considerations (HRPC) Research Group and also by individuals from outside the research group.


Status of This Memo


This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.


This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research and development activities. These results might not be suitable for deployment. This RFC represents the consensus of the Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents approved for publication by the IRSG are not a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

本文件是互联网研究工作组(IRTF)的产品。IRTF发布互联网相关研究和开发活动的结果。这些结果可能不适合部署。本RFC代表了互联网研究工作队(IRTF)人权协议考虑研究小组的共识。IRSG批准发布的文件不适用于任何级别的互联网标准;见RFC 7841第2节。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at


Copyright Notice


Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

版权所有(c)2017 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents ( in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.

本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件,因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。

Table of Contents


   1. Introduction ....................................................4
   2. Vocabulary Used .................................................6
   3. Research Questions .............................................12
   4. Literature and Discussion Review ...............................12
   5. Methodology ....................................................15
      5.1. Data Sources ..............................................17
           5.1.1. Discourse Analysis of RFCs .........................17
           5.1.2. Interviews with Members of the IETF Community ......17
           5.1.3. Participant Observation in Working Groups ..........17
      5.2. Data Analysis Strategies ..................................18
           5.2.1. Identifying Qualities of Technical Concepts
                  That Relate to Human Rights ........................18
           5.2.2. Relating Human Rights to Technical Concepts ........20
           5.2.3. Mapping Cases of Protocols, Implementations, and
                  Networking Paradigms That Adversely Impact Human
                  Rights or Are Enablers Thereof .....................21
   6. Model for Developing Human Rights Protocol Considerations ......40
      6.1. Human Rights Threats ......................................40
      6.2. Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations ................42
           6.2.1. Connectivity .......................................43
           6.2.2. Privacy ............................................43
           6.2.3. Content Agnosticism ................................44
           6.2.4. Security ...........................................45
           6.2.5. Internationalization ...............................46
           6.2.6. Censorship Resistance ..............................47
           6.2.7. Open Standards .....................................48
           6.2.8. Heterogeneity Support ..............................50
           6.2.9. Anonymity ..........................................51
           6.2.10. Pseudonymity ......................................51
           6.2.11. Accessibility .....................................53
           6.2.12. Localization ......................................53
           6.2.13. Decentralization ..................................54
           6.2.14. Reliability .......................................55
           6.2.15. Confidentiality ...................................56
           6.2.16. Integrity .........................................58
           6.2.17. Authenticity ......................................59
           6.2.18. Adaptability ......................................60
           6.2.19. Outcome Transparency ..............................61
   7. Security Considerations ........................................61
   8. IANA Considerations ............................................61
   9. Research Group Information .....................................62
   10. Informative References ........................................62
   Acknowledgements ..................................................80
   Authors' Addresses ................................................81
   1. Introduction ....................................................4
   2. Vocabulary Used .................................................6
   3. Research Questions .............................................12
   4. Literature and Discussion Review ...............................12
   5. Methodology ....................................................15
      5.1. Data Sources ..............................................17
           5.1.1. Discourse Analysis of RFCs .........................17
           5.1.2. Interviews with Members of the IETF Community ......17
           5.1.3. Participant Observation in Working Groups ..........17
      5.2. Data Analysis Strategies ..................................18
           5.2.1. Identifying Qualities of Technical Concepts
                  That Relate to Human Rights ........................18
           5.2.2. Relating Human Rights to Technical Concepts ........20
           5.2.3. Mapping Cases of Protocols, Implementations, and
                  Networking Paradigms That Adversely Impact Human
                  Rights or Are Enablers Thereof .....................21
   6. Model for Developing Human Rights Protocol Considerations ......40
      6.1. Human Rights Threats ......................................40
      6.2. Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations ................42
           6.2.1. Connectivity .......................................43
           6.2.2. Privacy ............................................43
           6.2.3. Content Agnosticism ................................44
           6.2.4. Security ...........................................45
           6.2.5. Internationalization ...............................46
           6.2.6. Censorship Resistance ..............................47
           6.2.7. Open Standards .....................................48
           6.2.8. Heterogeneity Support ..............................50
           6.2.9. Anonymity ..........................................51
           6.2.10. Pseudonymity ......................................51
           6.2.11. Accessibility .....................................53
           6.2.12. Localization ......................................53
           6.2.13. Decentralization ..................................54
           6.2.14. Reliability .......................................55
           6.2.15. Confidentiality ...................................56
           6.2.16. Integrity .........................................58
           6.2.17. Authenticity ......................................59
           6.2.18. Adaptability ......................................60
           6.2.19. Outcome Transparency ..............................61
   7. Security Considerations ........................................61
   8. IANA Considerations ............................................61
   9. Research Group Information .....................................62
   10. Informative References ........................................62
   Acknowledgements ..................................................80
   Authors' Addresses ................................................81
1. Introduction
1. 介绍

"There's a freedom about the Internet: As long as we accept the rules of sending packets around, we can send packets containing anything to anywhere." [Berners-Lee]

“互联网是自由的:只要我们接受发送数据包的规则,我们就可以将包含任何内容的数据包发送到任何地方。”[Berners Lee]

"The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF." [RFC3935]


The ever-growing interconnectedness of the Internet and society increases the impact of the Internet on the lives of individuals. Because of this, the design and development of the Internet infrastructure also have a growing impact on society. This has led to a broad recognition that human rights [UDHR] [ICCPR] [ICESCR] have a role in the development and management of the Internet [UNGA2013] [NETmundial]. It has also been argued that the Internet should be strengthened as an enabling environment for human rights [Brown].


This document aims to (1) expose the relationship between protocols and human rights, (2) propose possible guidelines to protect the Internet as an enabling environment for human rights in future protocol development, in a manner similar to the work done for privacy considerations [RFC6973], and (3) increase the awareness, in both the human rights community and the technical community, of the importance of the technical workings of the Internet and its impact on human rights.


Document authors who want to apply this work to their own can go directly to Section 6 of this document.


Open, secure, and reliable connectivity is necessary (although not sufficient) to exercise human rights such as freedom of expression and freedom of association [FOC], as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR]. The purpose of the Internet is to be a global network of networks that provides unfettered connectivity to all users, and for any content [RFC1958]. This objective of stimulating global connectivity contributes to the Internet's role as an enabler of human rights. The Internet has given people a platform to exchange opinions and gather information; it has enabled people of different backgrounds and genders to participate in the public debate; it has also allowed people to congregate and organize. Next to that, the strong commitment to security [RFC1984] [RFC3365] and privacy [RFC6973] [RFC7258] in the Internet's architectural design contributes to the strengthening of the Internet as an enabling environment for human rights. One could even argue that the Internet is not only an enabler of human rights but that human rights lie at the base of, and are ingrained in, the architecture of the networks that make up the Internet. Internet


connectivity increases the capacity for individuals to exercise their rights; the core of the Internet -- its architectural design -- is therefore closely intertwined with the human rights framework [CathFloridi]. The quintessential link between the Internet's infrastructure and human rights has been argued by many. [Bless1], for instance, argues that "to a certain extent, the Internet and its protocols have already facilitated the realization of human rights, e.g., the freedom of assembly and expression. In contrast, measures of censorship and pervasive surveillance violate fundamental human rights." [DeNardis15] argues that "Since the first hints of Internet commercialization and internationalization, the IETF has supported strong security in protocol design and has sometimes served as a force resisting protocol-enabled surveillance features." By doing so, the IETF enabled the manifestation of the right to privacy, through the Internet's infrastructure. Additionally, access to freely available information gives people access to knowledge that enables them to help satisfy other human rights; as such, the Internet increasingly becomes a precondition for human rights rather than a supplement.


Human rights can be in conflict with each other, such as the right to freedom of expression and the right to privacy. In such cases, the different affected rights need to be balanced. To do this, it is crucial that the impacts on rights are clearly documented in order to mitigate potential harm. This research aims to ultimately contribute to making that process tangible and practical for protocol developers. Technology can never be fully equated with a human right. Whereas a specific technology might be a strong enabler of a specific human right, it might have an adverse impact on another human right. In this case, decisions on design and deployment need to take this into account.


The open nature of the initial technical design and its open standards, as well as developments like open source, fostered freedom of communication. What emerged was a network of networks that could enable everyone to connect and to exchange data, information, and code. For many, enabling such connections became a core value. However, as the scale and the commercialization of the Internet grew, topics like access, rights, and connectivity have been forced to compete with other values. Therefore, important characteristics of the Internet that enable human rights might be degraded if they're not properly defined, described, and protected as such. Conversely, not protecting characteristics that enable human rights could also result in (partial) loss of functionality and connectivity, along with other inherent parts of the Internet's architecture of networks. New protocols, particularly those that upgrade the core infrastructure of the network, should be designed to continue to enable fundamental human rights.


The IETF has produced guidelines and procedures to ensure and galvanize the privacy of individuals and security of the network in protocol development. This document aims to explore the possibility of developing similar procedures for guidelines for human rights considerations to ensure that protocols developed in the IETF do not have an adverse impact on the realization of human rights on the Internet. By carefully considering the answers to the questions posed in Section 6 of this document, document authors should be (1) able to produce a comprehensive analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the protocol adequately protects against specific human rights threats and (2) potentially stimulated to think about alternative design choices.


This document was developed within the framework of the Human Rights Protocol Considerations (HRPC) Research Group, based on discussions on the HRPC mailing list (Section 9); this document was also extensively discussed during HRPC sessions. This document has received eleven in-depth reviews on the mailing list, and it received many comments from inside and outside the IRTF and IETF communities.


2. Vocabulary Used
2. 使用的词汇

In the discussion of human rights and Internet architecture, concepts developed in computer science, networking, law, policy-making, and advocacy are coming together [Dutton] [Kaye] [Franklin] [RFC1958]. The same concepts might have a very different meaning and implications in other areas of expertise. In order to foster a constructive interdisciplinary debate and minimize differences in interpretation, the following glossary is provided. It builds as much as possible on existing definitions; when definitions were not available in IETF documents, definitions were taken from other Standards Development Organizations (SDOs) or academic literature.


Accessibility: "Full Internet Connectivity", as described in [RFC4084], to provide unfettered access to the Internet.


The design of protocols, services, or implementations that provide an enabling environment for people with disabilities.


The ability to receive information available on the Internet.


Anonymity: The condition of an identity being unknown or concealed [RFC4949].


Anonymous: A state of an individual in which an observer or attacker cannot identify the individual within a set of other individuals (the anonymity set) [RFC6973].


Authenticity: The property of being genuine and able to be verified and be trusted [RFC4949].


Blocking: The practice of preventing access to resources in the aggregate [RFC7754]. Both blocking and filtering can be implemented at the level of "services" (web hosting or video streaming, for example) or at the level of particular "content" [RFC7754].


Censorship: Technical mechanisms, including both blocking and filtering, that certain political or private actors around the world use to block or degrade Internet traffic. For further details on the various elements of Internet censorship, see [Hall].


Censorship resistance: Methods and measures to mitigate Internet censorship.


Confidentiality: The property that data is not disclosed to system entities unless they have been authorized to know the data [RFC4949].


Connectivity: The extent to which a device or network is able to reach other devices or networks to exchange data. The Internet is the tool for providing global connectivity [RFC1958]. Different types of connectivity are further specified in [RFC4084].


The end-to-end principle, interoperability, distributed architecture, resilience, reliability, and robustness in combination constitute the enabling factors that result in connectivity to, and on, the Internet.


Content agnosticism: Treating network traffic identically regardless of content.


Decentralized: Implementation or deployment of standards, protocols, or systems without one single point of control.


End-to-end principle: The principle that application-specific functions should not be embedded into the network and thus stay at the endpoints. In many cases, especially when dealing with failures, the right decisions can only be made with the corresponding application-specific knowledge, which is available at endpoints not in the network.


The end-to-end principle is one of the key architectural guidelines of the Internet. The argument in favor of the end-to-end approach to system design is laid out in the


fundamental papers by Saltzer, Reed, and Clark [Saltzer] [Clark]. In these papers, the authors argue in favor of radical simplification: system designers should only build the essential and shared functions into the network, as most functions can only be implemented at network endpoints. Building features into the network for the benefit of certain applications will come at the expense of others. As such, in general system designers should attempt to steer clear of building anything into the network that is not a bare necessity for its functioning. Following the end-to-end principle is crucial for innovation, as it makes innovation at the edges possible without having to make changes to the network, and it protects the robustness of the network. [RFC2775] further elaborates on various aspects of end-to-end connectivity.


Federation: The possibility of connecting autonomous and possibly centralized systems into a single system without a central authority.


Filtering: The practice of preventing access to specific resources within an aggregate [RFC7754].


Heterogeneity: "The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing, protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers (e.g., point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different times and places. Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous organizations and internet service providers, each with their own separate policy concerns, there is a large heterogeneity of administrative domains and pricing structures." [FIArch]


As a result, per [FIArch], the heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be supported by design.


Human rights: Principles and norms that are indivisible, interrelated, unalienable, universal, and mutually reinforcing. Human rights have been codified in national and international bodies of law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] is the most well-known document in the history of human rights. The aspirations from [UDHR] were later codified into treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR], after which signatory countries were


obliged to reflect them in their national bodies of law. There is also a broad recognition that not only states have obligations vis-a-vis human rights, but non-state actors do as well.


Integrity: The property that data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental manner [RFC4949].


Internationalization (i18n): The practice of making protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different languages and scripts (see Section 6.2.12 ("Localization")).


"In the IETF, 'internationalization' means to add or improve the handling of non-ASCII text in a protocol" [RFC6365].


A different perspective, more appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from the beginning, is the definition used by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) [W3Ci18nDef]: "Internationalization is the design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language."


Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII), or they leave the question of encoding up to local guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability problems) [RFC3536]. If multiple charsets are permitted, they must be explicitly identified [RFC2277]. Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol allows the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully all scripts in use in the world. In today's world, that is normally best accomplished by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only, thereby shifting conversion issues away from ad hoc choices.


Interoperable: A property of a documented standard or protocol that allows different independent implementations to work with each other without any restriction on functionality.


Localization (l10n): The practice of translating an implementation to make it functional in a specific language or for users in a specific locale (see Section 6.2.5 ("Internationalization")).


(cf. [RFC6365]): The process of adapting an internationalized application platform or application to a specific cultural environment. In localization, the same semantics are preserved while the syntax may be changed [FRAMEWORK].


Localization is the act of tailoring an application for a different language, script, or culture. Some internationalized applications can handle a wide variety of languages. Typical users only understand a small number of languages, so the program


must be tailored to interact with users in just the languages they know. The major work of localization is translating the user interface and documentation. Localization involves not only changing the language interaction but also other relevant changes, such as display of numbers, dates, currency, and so on. The better internationalized an application is, the easier it is to localize it for a particular language and character-encoding scheme.


Open standards: Conform with [RFC2026], which states the following: "Various national and international standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-T, develop a variety of protocol and service specifications that are similar to Technical Specifications defined here. National and international groups also publish 'implementors' agreements' that are analogous to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of implementation-specific detail concerned with the practical application of their standards. All of these are considered to be 'open external standards' for the purposes of the Internet Standards Process."


Openness: Absence of centralized points of control -- "a feature that is assumed to make it easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold" [Brown].


Permissionless innovation: The freedom and ability to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that currently exist.


Privacy: The right of an entity (normally a person), acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing to share its personal information with others [RFC4949].


The right of individuals to control or influence what information related to them may be collected and stored, and by whom and to whom that information may be disclosed.


Privacy is a broad concept relating to the protection of individual or group autonomy and the relationship between an individual or group and society, including government, companies, and private individuals. It is often summarized as "the right to be left alone", but it encompasses a wide range of rights, including protections from intrusions into family and home life, control of sexual and reproductive rights, and communications secrecy. It is commonly recognized as a core right that underpins human dignity and other values such as freedom of association and freedom of speech.


The right to privacy is also recognized in nearly every national constitution and in most international human rights treaties. It has been adjudicated upon by both international and regional bodies. The right to privacy is also legally protected at the national level through provisions in civil and/or criminal codes.


Reliability: Ensures that a protocol will execute its function consistently as described and function without unexpected results. A system that is reliable degenerates gracefully and will have a documented way to announce degradation. It also has mechanisms to recover from failure gracefully and, if applicable, allow for partial healing [dict].


Resilience: The maintaining of dependability and performance in the face of unanticipated changes and circumstances [Meyer].


Robustness: The resistance of protocols and their implementations to errors, and resistance to involuntary, legal, or malicious attempts to disrupt their modes of operation [RFC760] [RFC791] [RFC793] [RFC1122]. Or, framed more positively, a system can provide functionality consistently and without errors despite involuntary, legal, or malicious attempts to disrupt its mode of operation.


Scalability: The ability to handle increased or decreased system parameters (number of end systems, users, data flows, routing entries, etc.) predictably within defined expectations. There should be a clear definition of its scope and applicability. The limits of a system's scalability should be defined. Growth or shrinkage of these parameters is typically considered by orders of magnitude.


Strong encryption / cryptography: Used to describe a cryptographic algorithm that would require a large amount of computational power to defeat it [RFC4949]. In the modern usage of the definition of "strong encryption", this refers to an amount of computing power currently not available, not even to major state-level actors.


Transparency: In this context, linked to the comprehensibility of a protocol in relation to the choices it makes for users, protocol developers, and implementers, and to its outcome.


Outcome transparency is linked to the comprehensibility of the effects of a protocol in relation to the choices it makes for users, protocol developers, and implementers, including the comprehensibility of possible unintended consequences of protocol choices (e.g., lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and negative externalities).


3. Research Questions
3. 研究问题

The Human Rights Protocol Considerations (HRPC) Research Group in the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) embarked on its mission to answer the following two questions, which are also the main two questions that this document seeks to answer:


1. How can Internet protocols and standards impact human rights, by either enabling them or creating a restrictive environment?

1. 互联网协议和标准是如何影响人权的,通过使人权成为可能还是创造一个限制性的环境?

2. Can guidelines be developed to improve informed and transparent decision-making about the potential impact of protocols on human rights?

2. 能否制定指导方针,改进关于议定书对人权的潜在影响的知情和透明决策?

4. Literature and Discussion Review
4. 文献与讨论综述

Protocols and standards are regularly seen as merely performing technical functions. However, these protocols and standards do not exist outside of their technical context, nor do they exist outside of their political, historical, economic, legal, or cultural context. This is best exemplified by the way in which some Internet processes and protocols have become part and parcel of political processes and public policies: one only has to look at the IANA transition, [RFC7258] ("Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack"), or global innovation policy, for concrete examples [DeNardis15]. According to [Abbate], "protocols are politics by other means." This statement would probably not garner IETF consensus, but it nonetheless reveals that protocols are based on decision-making, most often by humans. In this process, the values and ideas about the role that a particular technology should perform in society are embedded into the design. Often, these design decisions are partly "purely technical" and partly inspired by a certain world view of how technology should function that is inspired by personal, corporate, and political views. Within the community of IETF participants, there is a strong desire to solve technical problems and to minimize engagement with political processes and non-protocol-related political issues.


Since the late 1990s, a burgeoning group of academics and practitioners researched questions surrounding the societal impact of protocols, as well as the politics of protocols. These studies vary in focus and scope: some focus on specific standards [Davidson-etal] [Musiani]; others look into the political, legal, commercial, or social impact of protocols [BrownMarsden] [Lessig] [Mueller]; and yet others look at how the engineers' personal set of values get translated into technology [Abbate] [CathFloridi] [DeNardis15] [WynsbergheMoura].

自20世纪90年代末以来,一个新兴的学者和实践者群体研究了围绕协议的社会影响以及协议政治的问题。这些研究的重点和范围各不相同:一些研究侧重于具体标准[Davidson etal][Musiani];其他人则研究协议的政治、法律、商业或社会影响[BrownMarsden][Lessig][Mueller];还有一些人关注工程师的个人价值观如何转化为技术[Abbate][CathFloridi][DeNardis15][WynsbergheMoura]。

Commercial and political influences on the management of the Internet's infrastructure are well documented in the academic literature and will thus not be discussed here; see [Benkler], [Brown-etal], [DeNardis15], [Lessig], [Mueller], and [Zittrain]. It is sufficient to say that the IETF community consistently tries to push back against the standardization of surveillance and certain other issues that negatively influence an end user's experience of, and trust in, the Internet [DeNardis14]. The role that human rights play in engineering, infrastructure maintenance, and protocol design is much less clear.

对互联网基础设施管理的商业和政治影响在学术文献中有很好的记录,因此在此不再讨论;参见[Benkler]、[Brown etal]、[DeNardis15]、[Lessig]、[Mueller]和[Zittrain]。可以说,IETF社区一直试图抵制监视标准化和某些其他问题,这些问题会对最终用户的互联网体验和信任产生负面影响[Denardis4]。人权在工程、基础设施维护和协议设计中所起的作用就不那么明确了。

It is very important to understand how protocols and standards impact human rights, in particular because SDOs are increasingly becoming venues where social values (like human rights) are discussed, although often from a technological point of view. These SDOs are becoming a new focal point for discussions about "values by design" and the role of technical engineers in protecting or enabling human rights [Brown-etal] [Clark-etal] [DeNardis14] [CathFloridi] [Lessig] [Rachovitsa].

理解协议和标准如何影响人权非常重要,特别是因为SDO正日益成为讨论社会价值(如人权)的场所,尽管通常是从技术角度。这些SDO正在成为讨论“设计价值”和技术工程师在保护或促进人权方面的作用的新焦点[Brown etal][Clark etal][Denardis4][CathFloridi][Lessig][Rachovitsa]。

In the academic literature, five clear positions can be discerned in relation to the role of human rights in protocol design and how to account for these human rights in protocol development: Clark et al. [Clark-etal] argue that there is a need to design "for variation in outcome -- so that the outcome can be different in different places, and the tussle takes place within the design (...)" [as] "Rigid designs will be broken; designs that permit variation will flex under pressure and survive." They hold that human rights should not be hard-coded into protocols for three reasons: First, the rights in the UDHR are not absolute. Second, technology is not the only tool in the tussle over human rights. And last but not least, it is dangerous to make promises that can't be kept. The open nature of the Internet will never, they argue, be enough to fully protect individuals' human rights.


Conversely, Brown et al. [Brown-etal] state that "some key, universal values -- of which the UDHR is the most legitimate expression -- should be baked into the architecture at design time." They argue that design choices have offline consequences and are able to shape the power positions of groups or individuals in society. As such, the individuals making these technical decisions have a moral obligation to take into account the impact of their decisions on society and, by extension, human rights. Brown et al. recognize that values and the implementation of human rights vary across the globe. Yet they argue that all members of the United Nations have found "common agreement on the values proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In looking for the most legitimate set

相反,Brown等人[Brown etal]指出,“一些关键的、普遍的价值观——其中《世界人权宣言》是最合理的表达——应该在设计时融入到建筑中。”他们认为,设计选择具有离线后果,能够塑造群体或个人在社会中的权力地位。因此,作出这些技术决定的个人有道德义务考虑到其决定对社会的影响,进而对人权的影响。Brown等人认识到,全球各地的价值观和人权落实情况各不相同。然而,他们争辩说,联合国所有会员国都在《世界人权宣言》中宣布的价值观上找到了“共同的一致意见

of global values to embed in the future Internet architectures, the UDHR has the democratic assent of a significant fraction of the planet's population, through their elected representatives."


The main disagreement between these two academic positions lies mostly in the question of whether (1) a particular value system should be embedded into the Internet's architectures or (2) the architectures need to account for a varying set of values.


A third position, which is similar to that of Brown et al., is taken by [Broeders], in which Broeders argues that "we must find ways to continue guaranteeing the overall integrity and functionality of the public core of the Internet." He argues that the best way to do this is by declaring the backbone of the Internet -- which includes the TCP/IP protocol suite, numerous standards, the Domain Name System (DNS), and routing protocols -- a common public good. This is a different approach than those of [Clark-etal] and [Brown-etal] because Broeders does not suggest that social values should (or should not) be explicitly coded into the Internet, but rather that the existing infrastructure should be seen as an entity of public value.

第三个立场与Brown等人的立场类似,由[Broeders]提出,Broeders认为“我们必须找到方法继续保证互联网公共核心的整体完整性和功能性。”他认为,实现这一点的最佳方式是将互联网的主干网——包括TCP/IP协议套件、众多标准、域名系统(DNS)和路由协议——宣布为公共产品。这与[Clark etal]和[Brown etal]的方法不同,因为Broeders并不建议社会价值应该(或不应该)明确编码到互联网中,而是建议将现有基础设施视为公共价值的实体。

Bless and Orwat [Bless2] represent a fourth position. They argue that it is too early to make any definitive claims but that there is a need for more careful analysis of the impact of protocol design choices on human rights. They also argue that it is important to search for solutions that "create awareness in the technical community about impact of design choices on social values" and "work towards a methodology for co-design of technical and institutional systems."


Berners-Lee and Halpin [BernersLeeHalpin] represent a fifth position. They argue that the Internet could lead to even newer capacities, and these capacities may over time be viewed as new kinds of rights. For example, Internet access may be viewed as a human right in and of itself if it is taken to be a precondition for other rights, even if it could not have been predicted at the time that the UDHR was written (after the end of World War II).


It is important to contextualize the technical discussion with the academic discussions on this issue. The academic discussions are also important to document, as they inform the position of the authors of this document. The research group's position is that hard-coding human rights into protocols is complicated and changes with the context. At this point, it is difficult to say whether or not hard-coding human rights into protocols is wise or feasible. Additionally, there are many human rights, but not all are relevant for information and communications technologies (ICTs). A partial


catalog (with references to sources) of human rights related to ICTs can be found in [Hill2014]. It is, however, important to make conscious and explicit design decisions that take into account the human rights protocol considerations guidelines developed below. This will contribute to the understanding of the impact that protocols can have on human rights, for both developers and users. In addition, it contributes to (1) the careful consideration of the impact that a specific protocol might have on human rights and (2) the dissemination of the practice of documenting protocol design decisions related to human rights.


Pursuant to the principle of constant change, because the function and scope of the Internet evolve, so does the role of the IETF in developing standards. Internet Standards are adopted based on a series of criteria, including high technical quality, support by community consensus, and their overall benefit to the Internet. The latter calls for an assessment of the interests of all affected parties and the specifications' impact on the Internet's users. In this respect, the effective exercise of the human rights of the Internet users is a relevant consideration that needs to be appreciated in the standardization process insofar as it is directly linked to the reliability and core values of the Internet [RFC1958] [RFC2775] [RFC3439] [RFC3724].


This document details the steps taken in the research into human rights protocol considerations by the HRPC Research Group to clarify the relationship between technical concepts used in the IETF and human rights. This document sets out some preliminary steps and considerations for engineers to take into account when developing standards and protocols.


5. Methodology
5. 方法论

Mapping the relationship between human rights, protocols, and architectures is a new research challenge that requires a good amount of interdisciplinary and cross-organizational cooperation to develop a consistent methodology.


The methodological choices made in this document are based on the political-science-based method of discourse analysis and ethnographic research methods [Cath]. This work departs from the assumption that language reflects the understanding of concepts. Or, as [Jabri] holds, policy documents are "social relations represented in texts where the language contained within these texts is used to construct meaning and representation." This process happens in society [Denzin] and manifests itself in institutions and organizations [King], exposed using the ethnographic methods of semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Or, in non-academic


language, the way the language in IETF/IRTF documents describes and approaches the issues they are trying to address is an indication of the underlying social assumptions and relationships of the engineers to their engineering. By reading and analyzing these documents, as well as interviewing engineers and participating in the IETF/IRTF working groups, it is possible to distill the relationship between human rights, protocols, and the Internet's infrastructure as it pertains to the work of the IETF.


The discourse analysis was operationalized using qualitative and quantitative means. The first step taken by the authors and contributors was reading RFCs and other official IETF documents. The second step was the use of a Python-based analyzer, using the "Bigbang" tool, adapted by Nick Doty [Doty], to scan for the concepts that were identified as important architectural principles (distilled on the initial reading and supplemented by the interviews and participant observation). Such a quantitative method is very precise and speeds up the research process [Ritchie]. But this tool is unable to understand "latent meaning" [Denzin]. In order to mitigate these issues of automated word-frequency-based approaches and to get a sense of the "thick meaning" [Geertz] of the data, a second qualitative analysis of the data set was performed. These various rounds of discourse analysis were used to inform the interviews and further data analysis. As such, the initial rounds of quantitative discourse analysis were used to inform the second rounds of qualitative analysis. The results from the qualitative interviews were again used to feed new concepts into the quantitative discourse analysis. As such, the two methods continued to support and enrich each other.

语篇分析采用定性和定量相结合的方法。作者和贡献者采取的第一步是阅读RFC和其他IETF官方文件。第二步是使用基于Python的分析器,使用Nick Doty[Doty]改编的“Bigbang”工具,扫描被确定为重要架构原则的概念(在最初阅读中提炼,并通过访谈和参与者观察进行补充)。这种定量方法非常精确,并且加快了研究过程[Ritchie]。但这一工具无法理解“潜在意义”[Denzin]。为了缓解基于词频的自动化方法的这些问题,并了解数据的“厚含义”[Geertz],对数据集进行了第二次定性分析。这些不同回合的话语分析被用于通知访谈和进一步的数据分析。因此,第一轮定量话语分析被用于第二轮定性分析。定性访谈的结果再次被用于将新概念引入定量话语分析。因此,这两种方法继续相互支持和丰富。

The ethnographic methods of the data collection and processing allowed the research group to acquire the data necessary to "provide a holistic understanding of research participants' views and actions" [Denzin] that highlighted ongoing issues and case studies where protocols impact human rights. The interview participants were selected through purposive sampling [Babbie], as the research group was interested in getting a wide variety of opinions on the role of human rights in guiding protocol development. This sampling method also ensured that individuals with extensive experience working at the IETF in various roles were targeted. The interviewees included individuals in leadership positions (Working Group (WG) chairs, Area Directors (ADs)), "regular participants", and individuals working for specific entities (corporate, civil society, political, academic) and represented various backgrounds, nationalities, and genders.


5.1. Data Sources
5.1. 数据源

In order to map the potential relationship between human rights and protocols, the HRPC Research Group gathered data from three specific sources:


5.1.1. Discourse Analysis of RFCs
5.1.1. RFCs的语篇分析

To start addressing the issue, a mapping exercise analyzing Internet infrastructure and protocol features vis-a-vis their possible impact on human rights was undertaken. Therefore, research on (1) the language used in current and historic RFCs and (2) information gathered from mailing-list discussions was undertaken to expose core architectural principles, language, and deliberations on the human rights of those affected by the network.


5.1.2. Interviews with Members of the IETF Community
5.1.2. 对IETF社区成员的采访

Over 30 interviews with the current and past members of the Internet Architecture Board (IAB), current and past members of the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), chairs of selected working groups, and RFC authors were done at the IETF 92 meeting in Dallas in March 2015 to get an insider's understanding of how they view the relationship (if any) between human rights and protocols, and how this relationship plays out in their work. Several of the participants opted to remain anonymous. If you are interested in this data set, please contact the authors of this document.

2015年3月在达拉斯举行的IETF 92会议上,对互联网体系结构委员会(IAB)现任和前任成员、互联网工程指导小组(IESG)现任和前任成员、选定工作组主席以及RFC作者进行了30多次访谈,以了解内部人士如何看待这种关系(如果有的话)人权和议定书之间的关系,以及这种关系在他们的工作中如何发挥作用。一些与会者选择匿名。如果您对此数据集感兴趣,请与本文件的作者联系。

5.1.3. Participant Observation in Working Groups
5.1.3. 工作组中的参与者观察

By participating in various working groups, in person at IETF meetings, and on mailing lists, information about the IETF's day-to-day workings was gathered, from which general themes, technical concepts, and use cases about human rights and protocols were extracted. This process started at the IETF 91 meeting in Honolulu and continues today.

通过参加各种工作组、亲自参加IETF会议和邮件列表,收集了IETF的日常工作信息,从中提取了关于人权和协议的一般主题、技术概念和用例。这一过程始于在檀香山举行的IETF 91会议,并一直持续到今天。

5.2. Data Analysis Strategies
5.2. 数据分析策略

The data above was processed using three consecutive strategies: mapping protocols related to human rights, extracting concepts from these protocols, and creation of a common glossary (detailed under Section 2). Before going over these strategies, some elaboration on the process of identifying technical concepts as they relate to human rights is needed:


5.2.1. Identifying Qualities of Technical Concepts That Relate to Human Rights

5.2.1. 确定与人权有关的技术概念的性质 Mapping Protocols and Standards to Human Rights 将议定书和标准与人权挂钩

By combining data from the three data sources named above, an extensive list of protocols and standards that potentially enable the Internet as a tool for freedom of expression and association was created. In order to determine the enabling (or inhibiting) features, we relied on direct references in the RFCs as related to such impacts, as well as input from the community. Based on this analysis, a list of RFCs that describe standards and protocols that are potentially closely related to human rights was compiled.

通过合并上述三个数据源的数据,创建了一份广泛的协议和标准清单,这些协议和标准有可能使互联网成为言论和结社自由的工具。为了确定使能(或抑制)特征,我们依赖RFC中与此类影响相关的直接参考,以及来自社区的输入。根据这一分析,汇编了一份说明可能与人权密切相关的标准和议定书的RFC清单。 Extracting Concepts from Selected RFCs 从选定的RFC中提取概念

The first step was to identify the protocols and standards that are related to human rights and to create an environment that enables human rights. For that, we needed to focus on specific technical concepts that underlie these protocols and standards. Based on this list, a number of technical concepts that appeared frequently were extracted and used to create a second list of technical terms that, when combined and applied in different circumstances, create an enabling environment for exercising human rights on the Internet.

第一步是确定与人权有关的议定书和标准,并创造促进人权的环境。为此,我们需要关注这些协议和标准背后的特定技术概念。在这份清单的基础上,提取了经常出现的一些技术概念,并利用这些概念编制了第二份技术术语清单,这些术语在不同情况下结合使用,为在互联网上行使人权创造了有利环境。 Building a Common Vocabulary of Technical Concepts That Impact Human Rights 建立影响人权的技术概念的共同词汇表

While interviewing experts, investigating RFCs, and compiling technical definitions, several concepts of convergence and divergence were identified. To ensure that the discussion was based on a common understanding of terms and vocabulary, a list of definitions was created. The definitions are based on the wording found in various IETF documents; if the definitions were not available therein, definitions were taken from other SDOs or academic literature, as indicated in Section 2.

在采访专家、调查RFC和汇编技术定义时,确定了几个趋同和分歧的概念。为了确保讨论基于对术语和词汇的共同理解,创建了定义列表。定义基于各种IETF文件中的措辞;如第2节所述,如果其中没有定义,则定义取自其他SDO或学术文献。 Translating Human Rights Concepts into Technical Definitions 将人权概念转化为技术定义

The previous steps allowed for the clarification of relationships between human rights and technical concepts. The steps taken show how the research process "zoomed in", from compiling a broad list of protocols and standards that relate to human rights to extracting the precise technical concepts that make up these protocols and standards, in order to understand the relationship between the two. This subsection presents the next step: translating human rights to technical concepts by matching the individual components of the rights to the accompanying technical concepts, allowing for the creation of a list of technical concepts that, when partially combined, can create an enabling environment for human rights.

以前的步骤有助于澄清人权与技术概念之间的关系。所采取的步骤显示了研究过程是如何“放大”的,从汇编与人权有关的议定书和标准的广泛清单到提取构成这些议定书和标准的精确技术概念,以便了解两者之间的关系。本小节介绍了下一步:将人权转化为技术概念,方法是将人权的各个组成部分与所附的技术概念相匹配,从而可以创建一份技术概念清单,如果将这些概念部分结合起来,可以为人权创造有利的环境。 List of Technical Terms That, When Partially Combined, Can Create an Enabling Environment for Human Rights 部分合并后可为人权创造有利环境的技术术语清单

Based on the prior steps, the following list of technical terms was drafted. When partially combined, this list can create an enabling environment for human rights, such as freedom of expression and freedom of association.


Architectural principles Enabling features and system properties for user rights


                      |                                                |
    +=================|=============================+                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 |           End-to-end        =                  |
    =                 |          Reliability        =                  |
    =                 |           Resilience        =  Access as       |
    =                 |        Interoperability     =   human right    |
    =    Good enough  |          Transparency       =                  |
    =     principle   |       Data minimization     =                  |
    =                 |  Permissionless innovation  =                  |
    =    Simplicity   |     Graceful degradation    =                  |
    =                 |          Connectivity       =                  |
    =                 |      Heterogeneity support  =                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 \------------------------------------------------/
    =                                               =
                      |                                                |
    +=================|=============================+                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 |           End-to-end        =                  |
    =                 |          Reliability        =                  |
    =                 |           Resilience        =  Access as       |
    =                 |        Interoperability     =   human right    |
    =    Good enough  |          Transparency       =                  |
    =     principle   |       Data minimization     =                  |
    =                 |  Permissionless innovation  =                  |
    =    Simplicity   |     Graceful degradation    =                  |
    =                 |          Connectivity       =                  |
    =                 |      Heterogeneity support  =                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 |                             =                  |
    =                 \------------------------------------------------/
    =                                               =

Figure 1: Relationship between Architectural Principles and Enabling Features for User Rights


5.2.2. Relating Human Rights to Technical Concepts
5.2.2. 将人权与技术概念联系起来

The technical concepts listed in the steps above have been grouped according to their impact on specific rights, as mentioned in the interviews done at IETF 92 as well as the study of literature (see Section 4 ("Literature and Discussion Review") above).

上述步骤中列出的技术概念已根据其对特定权利的影响进行分组,如IETF 92访谈以及文献研究所述(见上文第4节(“文献和讨论回顾”)。

This analysis aims to assist protocol developers in better understanding the roles that specific technical concepts have with regard to their contribution to an enabling environment for people to exercise their human rights.


This analysis does not claim to be a complete or exhaustive mapping of all possible ways in which protocols could potentially impact human rights, but it presents a mapping of initial concepts based on interviews and on discussion and review of the literature.


   | Technical Concepts    | Rights Potentially Impacted             |
   | Connectivity          |                                         |
   | Privacy               |                                         |
   | Security              |                                         |
   | Content agnosticism   | Right to freedom of expression          |
   | Internationalization  |                                         |
   | Censorship resistance |                                         |
   | Open standards        |                                         |
   | Heterogeneity support |                                         |
   | Anonymity             |                                         |
   | Privacy               |                                         |
   | Pseudonymity          | Right to non-discrimination             |
   | Accessibility         |                                         |
   | Content agnosticism   |                                         |
   | Security              | Right to equal protection               |
   | Accessibility         |                                         |
   | Internationalization  | Right to political participation        |
   | Censorship resistance |                                         |
   | Connectivity          |                                         |
   | Open standards        |                                         |
   | Localization          | Right to participate in cultural life,  |
   | Internationalization  |    arts, and science, and               |
   | Censorship resistance | Right to education                      |
   | Accessibility         |                                         |
   | Technical Concepts    | Rights Potentially Impacted             |
   | Connectivity          |                                         |
   | Privacy               |                                         |
   | Security              |                                         |
   | Content agnosticism   | Right to freedom of expression          |
   | Internationalization  |                                         |
   | Censorship resistance |                                         |
   | Open standards        |                                         |
   | Heterogeneity support |                                         |
   | Anonymity             |                                         |
   | Privacy               |                                         |
   | Pseudonymity          | Right to non-discrimination             |
   | Accessibility         |                                         |
   | Content agnosticism   |                                         |
   | Security              | Right to equal protection               |
   | Accessibility         |                                         |
   | Internationalization  | Right to political participation        |
   | Censorship resistance |                                         |
   | Connectivity          |                                         |
   | Open standards        |                                         |
   | Localization          | Right to participate in cultural life,  |
   | Internationalization  |    arts, and science, and               |
   | Censorship resistance | Right to education                      |
   | Accessibility         |                                         |
   | Connectivity          |                                         |
   | Decentralization      |                                         |
   | Censorship resistance | Right to freedom of assembly            |
   | Pseudonymity          |    and association                      |
   | Anonymity             |                                         |
   | Security              |                                         |
   | Reliability           |                                         |
   | Confidentiality       |                                         |
   | Integrity             | Right to security                       |
   | Authenticity          |                                         |
   | Anonymity             |                                         |
   |                       |                                         |
   | Connectivity          |                                         |
   | Decentralization      |                                         |
   | Censorship resistance | Right to freedom of assembly            |
   | Pseudonymity          |    and association                      |
   | Anonymity             |                                         |
   | Security              |                                         |
   | Reliability           |                                         |
   | Confidentiality       |                                         |
   | Integrity             | Right to security                       |
   | Authenticity          |                                         |
   | Anonymity             |                                         |
   |                       |                                         |

Figure 2: Relationship between Specific Technical Concepts with Regard to Their Contribution to an Enabling Environment for People to Exercise Their Human Rights


5.2.3. Mapping Cases of Protocols, Implementations, and Networking Paradigms That Adversely Impact Human Rights or Are Enablers Thereof

5.2.3. 绘制对人权产生不利影响或促成人权的协议、实施和网络范例的案例

Given the information above, the following list of cases of protocols, implementations, and networking paradigms that either adversely impact or enable human rights was formed.


It is important to note that the assessment here is not a general judgment on these protocols, nor is it an exhaustive listing of all the potential negative or positive impacts on human rights that these protocols might have. When these protocols were conceived, there were many criteria to take into account. For instance, relying on a centralized service can be bad for freedom of speech (it creates one more control point, where censorship could be applied), but it may be a necessity if the endpoints are not connected and reachable permanently. So, when we say "protocol X has feature Y, which may endanger freedom of speech," it does not mean that protocol X is bad, much less that its authors were evil. The goal here is to show, with actual examples, that the design of protocols has practical consequences for some human rights and that these consequences have to be considered in the design phase.

必须指出,这里的评估不是对这些议定书的一般判断,也不是详尽列出这些议定书可能对人权产生的所有潜在消极或积极影响。在构思这些协议时,有许多标准需要考虑。例如,依赖集中化服务可能不利于言论自由(它会创建一个更多的控制点,可以在这里实施审查),但如果端点没有连接且无法永久访问,则可能是必要的。因此,当我们说“X协议具有可能危及言论自由的Y特征”时,并不意味着X协议是坏的,更不用说它的作者是邪恶的了。这里的目标是通过实际例子表明,议定书的设计对某些人权具有实际影响,这些影响必须在设计阶段加以考虑。 IPv4 IPv4

The Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), also known as "Layer 3" of the Internet and specified with a common encapsulation and protocol header, is defined in [RFC791]. The evolution of Internet communications led to continued development in this area, "encapsulated" in the development of version 6 (IPv6) of the protocol [RFC8200]. In spite of this updated protocol, we find that 23 years after the specification of IPv6 the older IPv4 standard continues to account for a sizable majority of Internet traffic. Most of the issues discussed here (Network Address Translators (NATs) are a major exception; see Section ("Address Translation and Mobility")) are valid for IPv4 as well as IPv6.


The Internet was designed as a platform for free and open communication, most notably encoded in the end-to-end principle, and that philosophy is also present in the technical implementation of IP [RFC3724]. While the protocol was designed to exist in an environment where intelligence is at the end hosts, it has proven to provide sufficient information that a more intelligent network core can make policy decisions and enforce policy-based traffic shaping, thereby restricting the communications of end hosts. These capabilities for network control and for limitations on freedom of expression by end hosts can be traced back to the design of IPv4, helping us to understand which technical protocol decisions have led to harm to this human right. A feature that can harm freedom of expression as well as the right to privacy through misuse of IP is the exploitation of the public visibility of the host pairs for all communications and the corresponding ability to differentiate and block traffic as a result of that metadata.

互联网被设计为一个自由开放的交流平台,最显著的是编码为端到端原则,这一理念也体现在IP的技术实现中[RFC3724]。虽然该协议被设计为存在于智能位于终端主机的环境中,但它已被证明提供了足够的信息,即更智能的网络核心可以做出策略决策并实施基于策略的流量整形,从而限制终端主机的通信。这些网络控制和限制终端主机言论自由的能力可以追溯到IPv4的设计,帮助我们了解哪些技术协议决定导致了对这项人权的损害。滥用IP可能损害言论自由和隐私权的一个特点是利用主机对的公共可见性进行所有通信,并利用元数据区分和阻止通信的相应能力。 Network Visibility of Source and Destination 源和目标的网络可见性

The IPv4 protocol header contains fixed location fields for both the source IP address and destination IP address [RFC791]. These addresses identify both the host sending and the host receiving each message; they also allow the core network to understand who is talking to whom and to practically limit communication selectively between pairs of hosts. Blocking of communication based on the pair of source and destination is one of the most common limitations on the ability for people to communicate today [CAIDA] and can be seen as a restriction of the ability for people to assemble or to consensually express themselves.


Inclusion of an Internet-wide identified source in the IP header is not the only possible design, especially since the protocol is most commonly implemented over Ethernet networks exposing only link-local identifiers [RFC894].


A variety of alternative designs do exist, such as the Accountable and Private Internet Protocol [APIP] and High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer (HORNET) [HORNET] as well as source routing. The latter would allow the sender to choose a predefined (safe) route and spoofing of the source IP address, which are technically supported by IPv4, but neither are considered good practice on the Internet [Farrow]. While projects like [TorProject] provide an alternative implementation of anonymity in connections, they have been developed in spite of the IPv4 protocol design.

存在多种替代设计,例如可问责的专用互联网协议[APIP]和网络层的高速洋葱路由(HORNET)[HORNET]以及源路由。后者允许发送方选择预定义(安全)路由并欺骗源IP地址,这在技术上受IPv4支持,但两者都不被视为互联网上的良好做法[Farrow]。虽然像[TorProject]这样的项目提供了连接中匿名性的替代实现,但它们是在IPv4协议设计的情况下开发的。 Address Translation and Mobility 地址转换和移动

A major structural shift in the Internet that undermined the protocol design of IPv4, and significantly reduced the freedom of end users to communicate and assemble, was the introduction of network address translation [RFC3022]. Network address translation is a process whereby organizations and autonomous systems connect two networks by translating the IPv4 source and destination addresses between them. This process puts the router performing the translation in a privileged position, where it is predetermined which subset of communications will be translated.


This process of translation has widespread adoption despite promoting a process that goes against the stated end-to-end process of the underlying protocol [NATusage]. In contrast, the proposed mechanism to provide support for mobility and forwarding to clients that may move -- encoded instead as an option in IP [RFC5944] -- has failed to gain traction. In this situation, the compromise made in the design of the protocol resulted in a technology that is not coherent with the end-to-end principles and thus creates an extra possible hurdle for freedom of expression in its design, even though a viable alternative exists. There is a particular problem surrounding NATs and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) (as well as other connections used for privacy purposes), as NATs sometimes cause VPNs not to work.

尽管这种翻译过程与底层协议的端到端过程[NATusage]背道而驰,但它仍被广泛采用。相比之下,为移动和转发到可能移动的客户机提供支持的拟议机制——改为在IP[RFC5944]中编码为选项——未能获得支持。在这种情况下,在议定书的设计中作出的妥协导致了一种与端到端原则不一致的技术,从而为其设计中的言论自由设置了额外的可能障碍,即使存在可行的替代方案。NAT和虚拟专用网络(VPN)(以及用于隐私目的的其他连接)存在一个特殊问题,因为NAT有时会导致VPN无法工作。 DNS 域名服务器

The Domain Name System (DNS) [RFC1035] provides service discovery capabilities and provides a mechanism to associate human-readable names with services. The DNS is organized around a set of independently operated "root servers" run by organizations that function in line with ICANN's policy by answering queries for which organizations have been delegated to manage registration under each Top-Level Domain (TLD). The DNS is organized as a rooted tree, and this brings up political and social concerns over control. TLDs are maintained and determined by ICANN. These namespaces encompass several classes of services. The initial namespaces, including ".com" and ".net", provide common spaces for expression of ideas,


though their policies are enacted through US-based companies. Other namespaces are delegated to specific nationalities and may impose limits designed to focus speech in those forums, to both (1) promote speech from that nationality and (2) comply with local limits on expression and social norms. Finally, the system has recently been expanded with additional generic and sponsored namespaces -- for instance, ".travel" and ".ninja" -- that are operated by a range of organizations that may independently determine their registration policies. This new development has both positive and negative implications in terms of enabling human rights. Some individuals argue that it undermines the right to freedom of expression because some of these new generic TLDs have restricted policies on registration and particular rules on hate speech content. Others argue that precisely these properties are positive because they enable certain (mostly minority) communities to build safer spaces for association, thereby enabling their right to freedom of association. An often-mentioned example is an application like .gay [CoE].


As discussed in [RFC7626], DNS has significant privacy issues. Most notable is the lack of encryption to limit the visibility of requests for domain resolution from intermediary parties, and a limited deployment of DNSSEC to provide authentication, allowing the client to know that they received a correct, "authoritative" answer to a query. In response to the privacy issues, the IETF DNS Private Exchange (DPRIVE) Working Group is developing mechanisms to provide confidentiality to DNS transactions, to address concerns surrounding pervasive monitoring [RFC7258].

如[RFC7626]所述,DNS存在重大隐私问题。最值得注意的是缺乏加密以限制中间方对域解析请求的可见性,以及有限地部署DNSSEC以提供身份验证,从而允许客户端知道他们收到了正确的“权威”查询答案。为了应对隐私问题,IETF DNS专用交换(DPRIVE)工作组正在开发为DNS交易提供保密性的机制,以解决围绕普遍监控的问题[RFC7258]。

Authentication through DNSSEC creates a validation path for records. This authentication protects against forged or manipulated DNS data. As such, DNSSEC protects directory lookups and makes it harder to hijack a session. This is important because interference with the operation of the DNS is currently becoming one of the central mechanisms used to block access to websites. This interference limits both the freedom of expression of the publisher to offer their content and the freedom of assembly for clients to congregate in a shared virtual space. Even though DNSSEC doesn't prevent censorship, it makes it clear that the returned information is not the information that was requested; this contributes to the right to security and increases trust in the network. It is, however, important to note that DNSSEC is currently not widely supported or deployed by domain name registrars, making it difficult to authenticate and use correctly.

通过DNSSEC的身份验证为记录创建验证路径。此身份验证可防止伪造或操纵的DNS数据。因此,DNSSEC保护目录查找并使劫持会话变得更加困难。这一点很重要,因为对DNS操作的干扰目前正成为阻止访问网站的主要机制之一。这种干扰既限制了出版商提供内容的表达自由,也限制了客户聚集在共享虚拟空间的集会自由。尽管DNSSEC没有阻止审查,但它明确表示,返回的信息不是所请求的信息;这有助于保障安全权并增加对网络的信任。然而,值得注意的是,域名注册商目前并不广泛支持或部署DNSSEC,这使得验证和正确使用DNSSEC变得困难。 Removal of Records 删除记录

There have been a number of cases where the records for a domain are removed from the name system due to political events. Examples of this removal include the "seizure" of wikileaks [BBC-wikileaks] and the names of illegally operating gambling operations by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) unit. In the first case, a US court ordered the registrar to take down the domain. In the second, ICE compelled the US-based registry in charge of the .com TLD to hand ownership of those domains over to the US government. The same technique has been used in Libya to remove sites in violation of "our Country's Law and Morality (which) do not allow any kind of pornography or its promotion." [techyum]

有许多情况下,由于政治事件,域名系统中的记录被删除。这方面的例子包括“查封”维基解密(BBC wikileaks)和美国移民和海关执法局(ICE)非法经营赌博活动的名称。在第一个案件中,一家美国法院命令注册官删除该域名。第二,ICE迫使负责.com TLD的美国注册中心将这些域名的所有权移交给美国政府。同样的技术在利比亚也被用于删除违反“我国法律和道德(不允许任何形式的色情或其宣传)”的网站

At a protocol level, there is no technical auditing for name ownership, as in alternate systems like Namecoin [Namecoin]. As a result, there is no ability for users to differentiate seizure from the legitimate transfer of name ownership, which is purely a policy decision made by registrars. While DNSSEC addresses the network distortion events described below, it does not tackle this problem.


(Although we mention alternative techniques, this is not a comparison of DNS with Namecoin: the latter has its own problems and limitations. The idea here is to show that there are several possible choices, and they have consequences for human rights.)

(虽然我们提到了替代技术,但这并不是DNS与Namecoin的比较:后者有其自身的问题和局限性。这里的想法是要表明有几种可能的选择,它们会对人权产生影响。) Distortion of Records 记录失真

The most common mechanism by which the DNS is abused to limit freedom of expression is through manipulation of protocol messages by the network. One form occurs at an organizational level, where client computers are instructed to use a local DNS resolver controlled by the organization. The DNS resolver will then selectively distort responses rather than request the authoritative lookup from the upstream system. The second form occurs through the use of Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), where all DNS protocol messages are inspected by the network and objectionable content is distorted, as can be observed in Chinese networks.


A notable instance of distortion occurred in Greece [Ververis], where a study found evidence of both (1) DPI to distort DNS replies and (2) more excessive blocking of content than was legally required or requested (also known as "overblocking"). Internet Service Providers (ISPs), obeying a governmental order, prevented clients from resolving the names of domains, thereby prompting this particular blocking of systems there.


At a protocol level, the effectiveness of these attacks is made possible by a lack of authentication in the DNS protocol. DNSSEC provides the ability to determine the authenticity of responses when used, but it is not regularly checked by resolvers. DNSSEC is not effective when the local resolver for a network is complicit in the distortion -- for instance, when the resolver assigned for use by an ISP is the source of injection. Selective distortion of records is also made possible by the predictable structure of DNS messages, which makes it computationally easy for a network device to watch all passing messages even at high speeds, and the lack of encryption, which allows the network to distort only an objectionable subset of protocol messages. Specific distortion mechanisms are discussed further in [Hall].


Users can switch to another resolver -- for instance, a public resolver. The distorter can then try to block or hijack the connection to this resolver. This may start an arms race, with the user switching to secured connections to this alternative resolver [RFC7858] and the distorter then trying to find more sophisticated ways to block or hijack the connection. In some cases, this search for an alternative, non-disrupting resolver may lead to more centralization because many people are switching to a few big commercial public resolvers.

用户可以切换到另一个解析器——例如,公共解析器。然后,扭曲者可以尝试阻止或劫持与该解析器的连接。这可能会引发一场军备竞赛,用户切换到该替代解析器[RFC7858]的安全连接,然后扭曲器试图找到更复杂的方法来阻止或劫持连接。在某些情况下,这种对替代的、无中断的解析器的搜索可能会导致更大的集中化,因为许多人正在转向几个大型的商业公共解析器。 Injection of Records 记录的注入

Responding incorrectly to requests for name lookups is the most common mechanism that in-network devices use to limit the ability of end users to discover services. A deviation that accomplishes a similar objective and may be seen as different from a "freedom of expression" perspective is the injection of incorrect responses to queries. The most prominent example of this behavior occurs in China, where requests for lookups of sites deemed inappropriate will trigger the network to return a false response, causing the client to ignore the real response when it subsequently arrives [greatfirewall]. Unlike the other network paradigms discussed above, injection does not stifle the ability of a server to announce its name; it instead provides another voice that answers sooner. This is effective because without DNSSEC, the protocol will respond to whichever answer is received first, without listening for subsequent answers.

对名称查找请求的错误响应是网络设备用来限制最终用户发现服务能力的最常见机制。与“言论自由”观点不同的是,实现类似目标的偏差是对查询的错误响应的注入。这种行为最突出的例子发生在中国,在中国,对被认为不合适的网站的查询请求将触发网络返回错误响应,导致客户端在随后到达时忽略真实响应[greatfirewall]。与上面讨论的其他网络范例不同,注入不会扼杀服务器宣布其名称的能力;相反,它提供了另一种更快回答问题的声音。这是有效的,因为在没有DNSSEC的情况下,协议将响应最先收到的答案,而不侦听后续答案。 HTTP 超文本传输协议

The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) version 1.1 [RFC7230] [RFC7231] [RFC7232] [RFC7233] [RFC7234] [RFC7235] [RFC7236] [RFC7237] is a request-response application protocol developed throughout the 1990s. HTTP factually contributed to the exponential growth of the


Internet and the interconnection of populations around the world. Its simple design strongly contributed to the fact that HTTP has become the foundation of most modern Internet platforms and communication systems, from websites to chat systems and computer-to-computer applications. In its manifestation in the World Wide Web, HTTP radically revolutionized the course of technological development and the ways people interact with online content and with each other.


However, HTTP is also a fundamentally insecure protocol that doesn't natively provide encryption properties. While the definition of the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) [RFC6101], and later of Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246], also happened during the 1990s, the fact that HTTP doesn't mandate the use of such encryption layers by developers and service providers was one of the reasons for a very late adoption of encryption. Only in the middle of the 2000s did we observe big ISPs, such as Google, starting to provide encrypted access to their web services.


The lack of sensitivity and understanding of the critical importance of securing web traffic incentivized certain (offensive) actors to develop, deploy, and utilize interception systems at large and to later launch active injection attacks, in order to swipe large amounts of data and compromise Internet-enabled devices. The commercial availability of systems and tools to perform these types of attacks also led to a number of human rights abuses that have been discovered and reported over the years.


Generally, we can identify traffic interception (Section and traffic manipulation (Section as the two most problematic attacks that can be performed against applications employing a cleartext HTTP transport layer. That being said, the IETF is taking steady steps to move to the encrypted version of HTTP, HTTP Secure (HTTPS).


While this is commendable, we must not lose track of the fact that different protocols, implementations, configurations, and networking paradigms can intersect such that they (can be used to) adversely impact human rights. For instance, to facilitate surveillance, certain countries will throttle HTTPS connections, forcing users to switch to (unthrottled) HTTP [Aryan-etal].

虽然这是值得赞扬的,但我们不能忘记这样一个事实:不同的协议、实施、配置和网络模式可以相互交叉,从而(可以)对人权产生不利影响。例如,为了便于监控,某些国家将限制HTTPS连接,迫使用户切换到(不受限制的)HTTP[Aryan etal]。 Traffic Interception 交通拦截

While we are seeing an increasing trend in the last couple of years to employ SSL/TLS as a secure traffic layer for HTTP-based applications, we are still far from seeing a ubiquitous use of encryption on the World Wide Web. It is important to consider that the adoption of SSL/TLS is also a relatively recent phenomenon.


Email providers such as were the first to enable SSL by default. Google did not introduce an option for its Gmail users to navigate with SSL until 2008 [Rideout] and turned TLS on by default later, in 2010 [Schillace]. It took an increasing amount of security breaches and revelations on global surveillance from Edward Snowden before other mail service providers followed suit. For example, Yahoo did not enable SSL/TLS by default on its webmail services until early 2014 [Peterson].

默认情况下,诸如riseup.net之类的电子邮件提供商是第一个启用SSL的。谷歌直到2008年才为其Gmail用户提供了使用SSL导航的选项[Rideout],并在2010年默认开启了TLS[Schillace]。在其他邮件服务提供商效仿之前,爱德华·斯诺登(Edward Snowden)不断增加的安全漏洞和全球监控披露才得以实现。例如,雅虎直到2014年初才在其网络邮件服务上默认启用SSL/TLS[Peterson]。

TLS itself has been subject to many attacks and bugs; this situation can be attributed to some fundamental design weaknesses, such as lack of a state machine (which opens a vulnerability for triple handshake attacks) and flaws caused by early US government restrictions on cryptography, leading to cipher-suite downgrade attacks (Logjam attacks). These vulnerabilities are being corrected in TLS 1.3 [Bhargavan] [Adrian].

TLS本身受到了许多攻击和bug;这种情况可归因于一些基本的设计缺陷,例如缺乏状态机(这为三重握手攻击打开了漏洞)和早期美国政府对密码的限制导致的缺陷,导致密码套件降级攻击(Logjam攻击)。TLS 1.3[Bhargavan][Adrian]中正在纠正这些漏洞。

HTTP upgrading to HTTPS is also vulnerable to having an attacker remove the "s" in any links to HTTPS URIs from a web page transferred in cleartext over HTTP -- an attack called "SSL Stripping" [sslstrip]. Thus, for high-security use of HTTPS, IETF standards such as HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [RFC6797], certificate pinning [RFC7469], and/or DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [RFC6698] should be used.

HTTP升级到HTTPS还容易受到攻击者从通过HTTP以明文传输的网页中删除HTTPS URI的任何链接中的“s”的攻击,这种攻击称为“SSL剥离”[sslstrip]。因此,对于HTTPS的高安全性使用,应使用IETF标准,如HTTP严格传输安全性(HSTS)[RFC6797]、证书固定[RFC7469]和/或基于DNS的命名实体身份验证(DANE)[RFC6698]。

As we learned through Snowden's revelations, intelligence agencies have been intercepting and collecting unencrypted traffic at large for many years. There are documented examples of such mass-surveillance programs with the Government Communications Headquarters's (GCHQ's) Tempora [WP-Tempora] and the National Security Agency's (NSA's) XKeyscore [Greenwald]. Through these programs, the NSA and the GCHQ have been able to swipe large amounts of data, including email and instant messaging communications that have been transported in the clear for years by providers unsuspecting of the pervasiveness and scale of governments' efforts and investment in global mass-surveillance capabilities.

我们从斯诺登的披露中了解到,情报机构多年来一直在拦截和收集未加密的流量。政府通信总部(GCHQ)的Tempora[WP Tempora]和国家安全局(NSA)的XKeyscore[Greenwald]都有此类大规模监视计划的记录实例。通过这些计划,美国国家安全局和GCHQ能够扫描大量数据,包括电子邮件和即时消息通信,这些数据多年来一直由供应商在不怀疑政府在全球大规模监控能力方面的努力和投资的普遍性和规模的情况下在无障碍环境中传输。

However, similar mass interception of unencrypted HTTP communications is also often employed at the national level by some democratic countries, by exercising control over state-owned ISPs and through the use of commercially available monitoring, collection, and censorship equipment. Over the last few years, a lot of information has come to public attention on the role and scale of a surveillance industry dedicated to developing different types of interception gear, making use of known and unknown weaknesses in existing protocols [RFC7258]. We have several records of such equipment being sold and utilized by some regimes in order to monitor entire segments of a population, especially at times of social and political


distress, uncovering massive human rights abuses. For example, in 2013, the group Telecomix revealed that the Syrian regime was making use of Blue Coat products in order to intercept cleartext traffic as well as to enforce censorship of unwanted content [RSF]. Similarly, in 2011, it was found that the French technology firm Amesys provided the Gadhafi government with equipment able to intercept emails, Facebook traffic, and chat messages at a country-wide level [WSJ]. The use of such systems, especially in the context of the Arab Spring and of civil uprisings against the dictatorships, has caused serious concerns regarding significant human rights abuses in Libya.

痛苦,揭露大规模侵犯人权行为。例如,2013年,Telecomix集团披露,叙利亚政权正在利用Blue Coat产品拦截明文流量,并对不需要的内容实施审查[RSF]。类似地,2011年,人们发现法国技术公司Amesys向卡扎菲政府提供了能够在全国范围内拦截电子邮件、Facebook流量和聊天信息的设备[WSJ]。特别是在阿拉伯之春和反对独裁政权的民间起义的背景下,这种制度的使用引起了人们对利比亚严重侵犯人权行为的严重关切。 Traffic Manipulation 交通操纵

The lack of a secure transport layer under HTTP connections not only exposes users to interception of the content of their communications but is more and more commonly abused as a vehicle for actively compromising computers and mobile devices. If an HTTP session travels in the clear over the network, any node positioned at any point in the network is able to perform man-in-the-middle attacks; the node can observe, manipulate, and hijack the session and can modify the content of the communication in order to trigger unexpected behavior by the application generating the traffic. For example, in the case of a browser, the attacker would be able to inject malicious code in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the browser or any of its plugins. Similarly, the attacker would be able to intercept, add malware to, and repackage binary software updates that are very commonly downloaded in the clear by applications such as word processors and media players. If the HTTP session were encrypted, the tampering of the content would not be possible, and these network injection attacks would not be successful.


While traffic manipulation attacks have long been known, documented, and prototyped, especially in the context of Wi-Fi and LAN networks, in the last few years we have observed an increasing investment in the production and sale of network injection equipment that is both commercially available and deployed at scale by intelligence agencies.


For example, we learned from some of the documents provided by Edward Snowden to the press that the NSA has constructed a global network injection infrastructure, called "QUANTUM", able to leverage mass surveillance in order to identify targets of interest and subsequently task man-on-the-side attacks to ultimately compromise a selected device. Among other attacks, the NSA makes use of an attack called "QUANTUMINSERT" [Haagsma], which intercepts and hijacks an unencrypted HTTP communication and forces the requesting browser to redirect to a host controlled by the NSA instead of the intended website. Normally, the new destination would be an exploitation

例如,我们从爱德华·斯诺登(Edward Snowden)向媒体提供的一些文件中了解到,国家安全局已经构建了一个称为“量子”的全球网络注入基础设施,能够利用大规模监视来识别感兴趣的目标,并随后实施任务人攻击,最终破坏选定的设备。在其他攻击中,NSA利用了一种称为“QUANTUMINSERT”[Haagsma]的攻击,该攻击拦截并劫持未加密的HTTP通信,并迫使请求浏览器重定向到NSA控制的主机,而不是预期的网站。通常,新的目的地将是一种剥削

service, referred to in Snowden documents as "FOXACID", which would attempt to execute malicious code in the context of the target's browser. The Guardian reported in 2013 that the NSA has, for example, been using these techniques to target users of the popular anonymity service Tor [Schneier]. The German Norddeutscher Rundfunk (NDR) reported in 2014 that the NSA has also been using its mass-surveillance capabilities to identify Tor users at large [Appelbaum].


Recently, similar capabilities used by Chinese authorities have been reported as well in what has been informally called the "Great Cannon" [Marcak], which raised numerous concerns on the potential curb on human rights and freedom of speech due to the increasingly tighter control of Chinese Internet communications and access to information.

最近,也有报道称,中国当局在被非正式称为“大炮”(Great Cannon)[Marcak]的地方使用了类似的能力,这引起了人们对人权和言论自由的担忧,因为中国对互联网通信和信息获取的控制越来越严格。

Network injection attacks are also made widely available to state actors around the world through the commercialization of similar, smaller-scale equipment that can be easily acquired and deployed at a country-wide level. Certain companies are known to have network injection gear within their products portfolio [Marquis-Boire]. The technology devised and produced by some of them to perform network traffic manipulation attacks on HTTP communications is even the subject of a patent application in the United States [Googlepatent]. Access to offensive technologies available on the commercial lawful interception market has led to human rights abuses and illegitimate surveillance of journalists, human rights defenders, and political activists in many countries around the world [Collins]. While network injection attacks haven't been the subject of much attention, they do enable even unskilled attackers to perform silent and very resilient compromises, and unencrypted HTTP remains one of the main vehicles.

通过在全国范围内容易获得和部署的类似小型设备的商业化,网络注入攻击也广泛提供给世界各地的国家行为者。已知某些公司在其产品组合中有网络注入装置[Marquis Boire]。他们中的一些人设计和生产的用于对HTTP通信进行网络流量操纵攻击的技术甚至在美国申请了专利[谷歌专利]。在商业合法拦截市场上获得攻击性技术导致了世界许多国家的侵犯人权行为和对记者、人权捍卫者和政治活动家的非法监视[Collins]。虽然网络注入攻击没有受到太多的关注,但它们确实使即使是不熟练的攻击者也能够执行静默且非常有弹性的妥协,而未加密的HTTP仍然是主要工具之一。

There is a new version of HTTP, called "HTTP/2" [RFC7540], which aims to be largely backwards compatible while also offering new options such as data compression of HTTP headers, pipelining of requests, and multiplexing multiple requests over a single TCP connection. In addition to decreasing latency to improve page-loading speeds, it also facilitates more efficient use of connectivity in low-bandwidth environments, which in turn enables freedom of expression; the right to assembly; the right to political participation; and the right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science. [RFC7540] does not mandate TLS or any other form of encryption, nor does it support opportunistic encryption even though opportunistic encryption is now addressed in [RFC8164].

有一个新版本的HTTP,称为“HTTP/2”[RFC7540],其目标是在很大程度上向后兼容,同时还提供新的选项,如HTTP头的数据压缩、请求的管道化以及通过单个TCP连接多路复用多个请求。除了减少延迟以提高页面加载速度外,它还有助于在低带宽环境中更有效地使用连接性,从而实现言论自由;集会权;政治参与权;以及参与文化生活、艺术和科学的权利。[RFC7540]不强制使用TLS或任何其他形式的加密,也不支持机会主义加密,即使机会主义加密现在在[RFC8164]中有提及。 XMPP XMPP

The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), specified in [RFC6120], provides a standard for interactive chat messaging and has evolved to encompass interoperable text, voice, and video chat. The protocol is structured as a federated network of servers, similar to email, where users register with a local server that acts on their behalf to cache and relay messages. This protocol design has many advantages, allowing servers to shield clients from denial of service and other forms of retribution for their expression; it is also designed to avoid central entities that could control the ability to communicate or assemble using the protocol.


Nonetheless, there are plenty of aspects of the protocol design of XMPP that shape the ability for users to communicate freely and to assemble via the protocol.

尽管如此,XMPP协议设计的许多方面都塑造了用户自由通信和通过协议组装的能力。 User Identification 用户识别

The XMPP specification [RFC6120] dictates that clients are identified with a resource (<node@domain/home> / <node@domain/work>) to distinguish the conversations to specific devices. While the protocol does not specify that the resource must be exposed by the client's server to remote users, in practice this has become the default behavior. In doing so, users can be tracked by remote friends and their servers, who are able to monitor the presence of not just the user but of each individual device the user logs in with. This has proven to be misleading to many users [Pidgin], since many clients only expose user-level rather than device-level presence. Likewise, user invisibility so that communication can occur while users don't notify all buddies and other servers of their availability is not part of the formal protocol and has only been added as an extension within the XML stream rather than enforced by the protocol.

XMPP规范[RFC6120]规定使用资源标识客户端(<node@domain/主页>/<node@domain/工作>)以区分与特定设备的对话。虽然协议没有规定客户端服务器必须向远程用户公开资源,但实际上这已成为默认行为。这样,远程朋友和他们的服务器就可以跟踪用户,他们不仅可以监视用户的存在,还可以监视用户登录的每个设备的存在。事实证明,这对许多用户来说是一种误导[Pidgin],因为许多客户端只公开用户级而不是设备级的存在。同样,用户不可见性(即在用户不通知所有伙伴和其他服务器其可用性的情况下进行通信)也不是正式协议的一部分,只是作为XML流中的扩展添加的,而不是由协议强制执行的。 Surveillance of Communication 通信监视

XMPP specifies the standard by which communications channels may be encrypted, but it does not provide visibility to clients regarding whether their communications are encrypted on each link. In particular, even when both clients ensure that they have an encrypted connection to their XMPP server to ensure that their local network is unable to read or disrupt the messages they send, the protocol does not provide visibility into the encryption status between the two servers. As such, clients may be subject to selective disruption of communications by an intermediate network that disrupts communications based on keywords found through DPI. While many operators have committed to only establishing encrypted links from


their servers in recognition of this vulnerability, it remains impossible for users to audit this behavior, and encrypted connections are not required by the protocol itself [XMPP-Manifesto].

他们的服务器意识到了这一漏洞,用户仍然无法审计这一行为,协议本身不需要加密连接[XMPP Manifesto]。

In particular, Section 13.14 of the XMPP specification [RFC6120] explicitly acknowledges the existence of a downgrade attack where an adversary controlling an intermediate network can force the inter-domain federation between servers to revert to a non-encrypted protocol where selective messages can then be disrupted.

特别是,XMPP规范[RFC6120]第13.14节明确承认存在降级攻击,其中控制中间网络的对手可以强制服务器之间的域间联盟恢复为非加密协议,从而中断选择性消息。 Group Chat Limitations 群聊限制

Group chat in XMPP is defined as an extension within the XML specification of XMPP ( However, it is not encoded or required at a protocol level and is not uniformly implemented by clients.

XMPP中的群组聊天被定义为XMPP的XML规范中的一个扩展( 但是,它不是在协议级别编码或要求的,也不是由客户端统一实现的。

The design of multi-user chat in XMPP suffers from extending a protocol that was not designed with assembly of many users in mind. In particular, in the federated protocol provided by XMPP, multi-user communities are implemented with a distinguished "owner" who is granted control over the participants and structure of the conversation.


Multi-user chat rooms are identified by a name specified on a specific server, so that while the overall protocol may be federated, the ability for users to assemble in a given community is moderated by a single server. That server may block the room and prevent assembly unilaterally, even between two users, neither of whom trust or use that server directly.

多用户聊天室由特定服务器上指定的名称标识,因此,虽然整个协议可能是联合的,但用户在给定社区中组装的能力由单个服务器控制。该服务器可能会单方面阻止会议室并阻止集会,即使是在两个用户之间,这两个用户都不信任或直接使用该服务器。 Peer-to-Peer 点对点

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) is a distributed network architecture [RFC5694] in which all the participant nodes can be responsible for the storage and dissemination of information from any other node (see [RFC7574], an IETF standard that discusses a P2P architecture called the "Peer-to-Peer Streaming Peer Protocol" (PPSPP)). A P2P network is a logical overlay that lives on top of the physical network and allows nodes (or "peers") participating in it to establish contact and exchange information directly with each other. The implementation of a P2P network may vary widely: it may be structured or unstructured, and it may implement stronger or weaker cryptographic and anonymity properties. While its most common application has traditionally been file-sharing (and other types of content delivery systems), P2P is a popular architecture for networks and applications that require (or encourage) decentralization. Prime examples include Bitcoin and other proprietary multimedia applications.


In a time of heavily centralized online services, P2P is regularly described as an alternative, more democratic, and resistant option that displaces structures of control over data and communications and delegates all peers to be equally responsible for the functioning, integrity, and security of the data. While in principle P2P remains important to the design and development of future content distribution, messaging, and publishing systems, it poses numerous security and privacy challenges that are mostly delegated to individual developers to recognize, analyze, and solve in each implementation of a given P2P network.

在高度集中的在线服务时代,P2P经常被描述为一种替代、更民主、更具抵抗力的选择,它取代了对数据和通信的控制结构,并授权所有对等方对数据的功能、完整性和安全性承担同等责任。原则上,P2P对于未来内容分发、消息传递和发布系统的设计和开发仍然很重要,但它带来了许多安全和隐私方面的挑战,这些挑战大多委托给单个开发人员来识别、分析和解决给定P2P网络的每个实现。 Network Poisoning 网络中毒

Since content, and sometimes peer lists, are safeguarded and distributed by their members, P2P networks are prone to what are generally defined as "poisoning attacks". Poisoning attacks might be aimed directly at the data that is being distributed, for example, (1) by intentionally corrupting the data, (2) at the index tables used to instruct the peers where to fetch the data, or (3) at routing tables, with an attempt to provide connecting peers with lists of rogue or nonexistent peers, with the intention to effectively cause a denial of service on the network.

由于内容(有时是对等列表)是由其成员保护和分发的,P2P网络容易受到通常被定义为“中毒攻击”的攻击。中毒攻击可能直接针对正在分发的数据,例如,(1)故意破坏数据,(2)用于指示对等方在何处获取数据的索引表,或(3)路由表,试图向连接的对等方提供恶意或不存在的对等方列表,旨在有效地在网络上造成拒绝服务。 Throttling 节流

P2P traffic (and BitTorrent in particular) represents a significant percentage of global Internet traffic [Sandvine], and it has become increasingly popular for ISPs to perform throttling of customers' lines in order to limit bandwidth usage [torrentfreak1] and, sometimes, probably as an effect of the ongoing conflict between copyright holders and file-sharing communities [wikileaks]. Such throttling undermines the end-to-end principle.


Throttling the P2P traffic makes some uses of P2P networks ineffective; this throttling might be coupled with stricter inspection of users' Internet traffic through DPI techniques, possibly posing additional security and privacy risks.

限制P2P流量会导致P2P网络的某些使用无效;这种限制可能与通过DPI技术对用户的互联网流量进行更严格的检查相结合,可能会带来额外的安全和隐私风险。 Tracking and Identification 追踪和识别

One of the fundamental and most problematic issues with traditional P2P networks is a complete lack of anonymization of their users. For example, in the case of BitTorrent, all peers' IP addresses are openly available to the other peers. This has led to ever-increasing tracking of P2P and file-sharing users [ars]. As the geographical location of the user is directly exposed, as could also be his identity, the user might become a target of additional harassment and attacks of a physical or legal nature. For example, it is known that


in Germany law firms have made extensive use of P2P and file-sharing tracking systems in order to identify downloaders and initiate legal actions looking for compensations [torrentfreak2].


It is worth noting that there are some varieties of P2P networks that implement cryptographic practices and that introduce anonymization of their users. Such implementations may be proved to be successful in resisting censorship of content and tracking of network peers. A prime example is Freenet [freenet1], a free software application that is (1) designed to make it significantly more difficult to identify users and content and (2) dedicated to fostering freedom of speech online [freenet2].

值得注意的是,有一些种类的P2P网络实现了加密实践,并引入了用户的匿名化。这种实现可能被证明在抵抗内容审查和跟踪网络对等点方面是成功的。一个主要的例子是Freenet[freenet1],这是一个自由软件应用程序,(1)旨在使识别用户和内容变得更加困难,(2)致力于促进在线言论自由[freenet2]。 Sybil Attacks Sybil攻击

In open-membership P2P networks, a single attacker can pretend to be many participants, typically by creating multiple fake identities of whatever kind the P2P network uses [Douceur]. Attackers can use Sybil attacks to bias choices that the P2P network makes collectively to the attacker's advantage, e.g., by making it more likely that a particular data item (or some threshold of the replicas or shares of a data item) is assigned to attacker-controlled participants. If the P2P network implements any voting, moderation, or peer-review-like functionality, Sybil attacks may be used to "stuff the ballots" to benefit the attacker. Companies and governments can use Sybil attacks on discussion-oriented P2P systems for "astroturfing" or creating the appearance of mass grassroots support for some position where in reality there is none. It is important to know that there are no known complete, environmentally sustainable, and fully distributed solutions to Sybil attacks, and routing via "friends" allows users to be de-anonymized via their social graph. It is important to note that Sybil attacks in this context (e.g., astroturfing) are relevant to more than P2P protocols; they are also common on web-based systems, and they are exploited by governments and commercial entities.


Encrypted P2P and anonymous P2P networks have already emerged. They provide viable platforms for sharing material [Tribler], publishing content anonymously, and communicating securely [Bitmessage]. These platforms are not perfect, and more research needs to be done. If adopted at large, well-designed and resistant P2P networks might represent a critical component of a future secure and distributed Internet, enabling freedom of speech and freedom of information at scale.

加密P2P和匿名P2P网络已经出现。它们为共享材料[Tribler]、匿名发布内容和安全通信[Bitmessage]提供了可行的平台。这些平台并不完美,需要做更多的研究。如果广泛采用,设计良好且具有抵抗力的P2P网络可能是未来安全分布式互联网的关键组成部分,从而实现大规模的言论自由和信息自由。 Virtual Private Networks 虚拟专用网络

The VPNs discussed here are point-to-point connections that enable two computers to communicate over an encrypted tunnel. There are multiple implementations and protocols used in the deployment of VPNs, and they generally diversify by encryption protocol or particular requirements, most commonly in proprietary and enterprise solutions. VPNs are commonly used to (1) enable some devices to communicate through peculiar network configurations, (2) use some privacy and security properties in order to protect the traffic generated by the end user, or both. VPNs have also become a very popular technology among human rights defenders, dissidents, and journalists worldwide to avoid local monitoring and eventually also to circumvent censorship. VPNs are often debated among human rights defenders as a potential alternative to Tor or other anonymous networks. Such comparisons are misleading, as some of the privacy and security properties of VPNs are often misunderstood by less tech-savvy users and could ultimately lead to unintended problems.


As VPNs have increased in popularity, commercial VPN providers have started growing as businesses and are very commonly picked by human rights defenders and people at risk, as they are normally provided with an easy-to-use service and, sometimes, even custom applications to establish the VPN tunnel. Not being able to control the configuration of the network, let alone the security of the application, assessing the general privacy and security state of common VPNs is very hard. Such services have often been discovered to be leaking information, and their custom applications have been found to be flawed. While Tor and similar networks receive a lot of scrutiny from the public and the academic community, commercial or non-commercial VPNs are far less analyzed and understood [Insinuator] [Alshalan-etal], and it might be valuable to establish some standards to guarantee a minimal level of privacy and security to those who need them the most.

随着虚拟专用网络的普及,商业虚拟专用网络供应商已开始作为企业发展壮大,人权捍卫者和风险人群通常会选择商业虚拟专用网络供应商,因为他们通常提供易于使用的服务,有时甚至提供自定义应用程序来建立虚拟专用网络隧道。由于无法控制网络的配置,更不用说应用程序的安全性,评估普通VPN的一般隐私和安全状态非常困难。这类服务经常被发现泄露信息,并且它们的定制应用程序被发现存在缺陷。虽然Tor和类似网络受到公众和学术界的大量审查,但商业或非商业VPN的分析和理解远远不够[Insinuator][Alshalan etal],因此,制定一些标准来保证最需要它们的人获得最低程度的隐私和安全性可能很有价值。 No Anonymity against VPN Providers 对VPN提供商没有匿名性

One of the common misconceptions among users of VPNs is the level of anonymity that VPNs can provide. This sense of anonymity can be betrayed by a number of attacks or misconfigurations of the VPN provider. It is important to remember that, in contrast to Tor and similar systems, VPNs were not designed to provide anonymity properties. From a technical point of view, a VPN might leak identifiable information or might be the subject of correlation attacks that could expose the originating address of a connecting user. Most importantly, it is vital to understand that commercial and non-commercial VPN providers are bound by the law of the jurisdiction in which they reside or in which their infrastructure is


located, and they might be legally forced to turn over data of specific users if legal investigations or intelligence requirements dictate so. In such cases, if the VPN providers retain logs, it is possible that a user's information could be provided to the user's adversary and lead to his or her identification.

如果法律调查或情报要求如此,他们可能会在法律上被迫交出特定用户的数据。在这种情况下,如果VPN提供商保留日志,则可能会将用户的信息提供给用户的对手并导致其身份识别。 Logging 登录中

Because VPNs are point-to-point connections, the service providers are in fact able to observe the original location of connecting users, and they are able to track at what time they started their session and, eventually, also to which destinations they're trying to connect. If the VPN providers retain logs for a long enough time, they might be forced to turn over the relevant data or they might be otherwise compromised, leading to the same data getting exposed. A clear log-retention policy could be enforced, but considering that countries enforce different levels of data-retention policies, VPN providers should at least be transparent regarding what information they store and for how long it is being kept.

由于VPN是点对点连接,因此服务提供商实际上能够观察连接用户的原始位置,并且能够跟踪他们在何时开始会话,以及最终尝试连接到哪些目的地。如果VPN提供商将日志保留足够长的时间,他们可能会被迫移交相关数据,或者可能会受到其他危害,从而导致相同的数据被公开。可以强制执行明确的日志保留策略,但考虑到各国强制执行不同级别的数据保留策略,VPN提供商至少应该对其存储的信息及其保留时间保持透明。 Third-Party Hosting 第三方托管

VPN providers very commonly rely on third parties to provision the infrastructure that is later going to be used to run VPN endpoints. For example, they might rely on external dedicated server providers or on uplink providers. In those cases, even if the VPN provider itself isn't retaining any significant logs, the information on connecting users might be retained by those third parties instead, introducing an additional collection point for the adversary.

VPN提供商通常依赖第三方来提供稍后将用于运行VPN端点的基础设施。例如,他们可能依赖外部专用服务器提供商或上行提供商。在这些情况下,即使VPN提供商本身没有保留任何重要的日志,有关连接用户的信息也可能由这些第三方保留,从而为对手引入一个额外的收集点。 IPv6 Leakage IPv6泄漏

Some studies proved that several commercial VPN providers and applications suffer from critical leakage of information through IPv6 due to improper support and configuration [PETS2015VPN]. This is generally caused by a lack of proper configuration of the client's IPv6 routing tables. Considering that most popular browsers and similar applications have been supporting IPv6 by default, if the host is provided with a functional IPv6 configuration, the traffic that is generated might be leaked if the VPN application isn't designed to manipulate such traffic properly.

一些研究证明,由于不正确的支持和配置,一些商业VPN提供商和应用程序遭受了通过IPv6的严重信息泄漏[PETS2015 VPN]。这通常是由于缺少对客户端IPv6路由表的正确配置造成的。考虑到大多数流行浏览器和类似应用程序默认支持IPv6,如果主机提供了功能性IPv6配置,如果VPN应用程序未设计为正确处理此类流量,则生成的流量可能会泄漏。 DNS Leakage DNS泄漏

Similarly, VPN services that aren't handling DNS requests and aren't running DNS servers of their own might be prone to DNS leaking that might not only expose sensitive information on the activity of a user but could also potentially lead to DNS hijacking attacks and subsequent compromises.

类似地,不处理DNS请求且不运行自己的DNS服务器的VPN服务可能容易发生DNS泄漏,这不仅可能暴露用户活动的敏感信息,还可能导致DNS劫持攻击和后续危害。 Traffic Correlation 流量相关性

Some VPN implementations appear to be particularly vulnerable to identification and collection of key exchanges that, some Snowden documents revealed, are systematically collected and stored for future reference. The ability of an adversary to monitor network connections at many different points over the Internet can allow them to perform traffic correlation attacks and identify the origin of certain VPN traffic by cross-referencing the connection time of the user to the endpoint and the connection time of the endpoint to the final destination. These types of attacks, although very expensive and normally only performed by very resourceful adversaries, have been documented [SPIEGEL] to be already in practice, and they could completely nullify the use of a VPN and ultimately expose the activity and the identity of a user at risk.

一些VPN实现似乎特别容易受到密钥交换的识别和收集的影响,一些斯诺登文件透露,这些密钥交换被系统地收集和存储以供将来参考。敌方监控互联网上多个不同点的网络连接的能力可以让他们执行流量关联攻击,并通过交叉引用用户到端点的连接时间和端点到最终目的地的连接时间来识别某些VPN流量的来源。这些类型的攻击虽然非常昂贵,通常只由非常机智的对手执行,但据文献[SPIEGEL]记载,它们已经在实践中,并且可能完全取消VPN的使用,并最终暴露处于风险中的用户的活动和身份。 HTTP Status Code 451 HTTP状态代码451

"Every Internet user has run into the '404 Not Found' Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) status code when trying, and failing, to access a particular website" [Cath]. It is a response status that the server sends to the browser when the server cannot locate the URL. "403 Forbidden" is another example of this class of code signals that gives users information about what is going on. In the "403" case, the server can be reached but is blocking the request because the user is trying to access content forbidden to them, typically because some content is only for identified users, based on a payment or on special status in the organization. Most of the time, 403 is sent by the origin server, not by an intermediary. If a firewall prevents a government employee from accessing pornography on a work computer, it does not use 403.

“每一位互联网用户在尝试访问某个特定网站或访问失败时都会遇到'404 Not Found'超文本传输协议(HTTP)状态码”[Cath]。当服务器找不到URL时,服务器发送给浏览器的响应状态。“403禁止”是此类代码信号的另一个示例,它向用户提供有关正在发生的事情的信息。在“403”案例中,可以联系到服务器,但会阻止请求,因为用户试图访问禁止他们访问的内容,通常是因为某些内容仅针对已识别的用户,基于付款或组织中的特殊状态。大多数情况下,403是由源服务器发送的,而不是由中介发送的。如果防火墙阻止政府雇员访问工作计算机上的色情内容,它不会使用403。

As surveillance and censorship of the Internet are becoming more commonplace, voices were raised at the IETF to introduce a new status code that indicates when something is not available for "legal reasons" (like censorship):


The 451 status code would allow server operators to operate with greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect their operation. This transparency may be beneficial to both (1) these operators and (2) end users [RFC7725].


The status code is named "451" in reference to both Bradbury's famous novel "Fahrenheit 451" and to 451 degrees Fahrenheit (the temperature at which some claim book paper autoignites).


During the IETF 92 meeting in Dallas, there was discussion about the usefulness of 451. The main tension revolved around the lack of an apparent machine-readable technical use of the information. The extent to which 451 is just "political theatre" or whether it has a concrete technical use was heatedly debated. Some argued that "the 451 status code is just a status code with a response body"; others said it was problematic because "it brings law into the picture." Still others argued that it would be useful for individuals or for organizations like the "Chilling Effects" project that are crawling the Web to get an indication of censorship (IETF discussion on 451 -- author's field notes, March 2015). There was no outright objection during the Dallas meeting against moving forward on status code 451, and on December 18, 2015, the IESG approved "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles" (now [RFC7725]) for publication. HTTP status code 451 is now an IETF-approved HTTP status code that signals when resource access is denied as a consequence of legal demands.

在达拉斯举行的IETF 92会议期间,讨论了451的有用性。主要的紧张关系围绕着信息缺乏明显的机器可读的技术用途。451在多大程度上只是一个“政治舞台”,或者它是否有具体的技术用途,这引起了激烈的争论。一些人认为,“451状态代码只是一个带有响应主体的状态代码”;另一些人说这是有问题的,因为“它将法律带入画面”。还有一些人认为这对个人或像“寒蝉效应”项目这样的组织来说是有用的,这些组织正在网络上爬行,以获得审查的迹象(IETF 451讨论——作者现场笔记,2015年3月)。在达拉斯会议期间,没有人明确反对推进状态代码451,2015年12月18日,IESG批准了“报告法律障碍的HTTP状态代码”(现为[RFC7725]),以供发布。HTTP状态代码451现在是IETF批准的HTTP状态代码,当资源访问因法律要求而被拒绝时发出信号。

What is interesting about this particular case is that not only technical arguments but also the status code's outright potential political use for civil society played a substantial role in shaping the discussion and the decision to move forward with this technology.


It is nonetheless important to note that HTTP status code 451 is not a solution to detect all occasions of censorship. A large swath of Internet filtering occurs in the network, at a lower level than HTTP, rather than at the server itself. For these forms of censorship, 451 plays a limited role, as typical censoring intermediaries won't generate it. Besides technical reasons, such filtering regimes are unlikely to voluntarily inject a 451 status code. The use of 451 is most likely to apply in the case of cooperative, legal versions of content removal resulting from requests to providers. One can think of content that is removed or blocked for legal reasons, like copyright infringement, gambling laws, child abuse, etc. Large


Internet companies and search engines are constantly asked to censor content in various jurisdictions. 451 allows this to be easily discovered -- for instance, by initiatives like the Lumen Database.


Overall, the strength of 451 lies in its ability to provide transparency by giving the reason for blocking and giving the end user the ability to file a complaint. It allows organizations to easily measure censorship in an automated way and prompts the user to access the content via another path (e.g., Tor, VPNs) when (s)he encounters the 451 status code.


Status code 451 impacts human rights by making censorship more transparent and measurable. It increases transparency by signaling the existence of censorship (instead of a much broader HTTP error message such as HTTP status code 404) as well as providing details of the legal restriction, which legal authority is imposing it, and to what class of resources it applies. This empowers the user to seek redress.

《身份代码451》通过使审查制度更加透明和可衡量而影响人权。它通过发出审查存在的信号(而不是更广泛的HTTP错误消息,如HTTP状态码404)以及提供法律限制的详细信息、法律权威施加的限制以及适用于哪类资源来增加透明度。这使用户能够寻求补救。 DDoS Attacks DDoS攻击

Many individuals, including IETF engineers, have argued that DDoS attacks are fundamentally against freedom of expression. Technically, DDoS attacks are attacks where one host or multiple hosts overload the bandwidth or resources of another host by flooding it with traffic or making resource-intensive requests, causing it to temporarily stop being available to users. One can roughly differentiate three types of DDoS attacks:


1. volume-based attacks (which aim to make the host unreachable by using up all its bandwidth; often-used techniques are UDP floods and ICMP floods)

1. 基于卷的攻击(其目的是通过耗尽主机的所有带宽使主机无法访问;常用的技术是UDP洪水和ICMP洪水)

2. protocol attacks (which aim to use up actual server resources; often-used techniques are SYN floods, fragmented packet attacks, and "ping of death" [RFC4949])

2. 协议攻击(旨在耗尽实际服务器资源;常用的技术有SYN洪水、碎片数据包攻击和“死亡ping”[RFC4949])

3. application-layer attacks (which aim to bring down a server, such as a web server)

3. 应用层攻击(旨在关闭服务器,如web服务器)

DDoS attacks can thus stifle freedom of expression and complicate the ability of independent media and human rights organizations to exercise their right to (online) freedom of association, while facilitating the ability of governments to censor dissent. When it comes to comparing DDoS attacks to protests in offline life, it is important to remember that only a limited number of DDoS attacks solely involved willing participants. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the clients are hacked hosts of unrelated parties that


have not consented to being part of a DDoS (for exceptions, see Operation Ababil [Ababil] or the Iranian Green Movement's DDoS campaign at election time [GreenMovement]). In addition, DDoS attacks are increasingly used as an extortion tactic.


All of these issues seem to suggest that the IETF should try to ensure that their protocols cannot be used for DDoS attacks; this is consistent with the long-standing IETF consensus that DDoS is an attack that protocols should mitigate to the extent they can [BCP72]. Decreasing the number of vulnerabilities in protocols and (outside of the IETF) the number of bugs in the network stacks of routers or computers could address this issue. The IETF can clearly play a role in bringing about some of these changes, but the IETF cannot be expected to take a positive stance on (specific) DDoS attacks or to create protocols that enable some attacks and inhibit others. What the IETF can do is critically reflect on its role in the development of the Internet and how this impacts the ability of people to exercise their human rights, such as freedom of expression.


6. Model for Developing Human Rights Protocol Considerations
6. 制定人权议定书考虑事项的模式

This section outlines a set of human rights protocol considerations for protocol developers. It provides questions that engineers should ask themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want to understand their impact on human rights. It should, however, be noted that the impact of a protocol cannot be solely deduced from its design; its usage and implementation should also be studied to form a full assessment of the impact of the protocol on human rights.


The questions are based on the research performed by the HRPC Research Group. This research was documented prior to the writing of these considerations. The research establishes that human rights relate to standards and protocols; it also offers a common vocabulary of technical concepts that impact human rights and how these technical concepts can be combined to ensure that the Internet remains an enabling environment for human rights. With this, a model for developing human rights protocol considerations has taken shape.


6.1. Human Rights Threats
6.1. 人权威胁

Human rights threats on the Internet come in a myriad of forms. Protocols and standards can either harm or enable the right to freedom of expression; the right to non-discrimination; the right to equal protection; the right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science; the right to freedom of assembly and association; and the right to security. An end user who is denied access to certain services, data, or websites may be unable to disclose vital information about malpractice on the part of a government or other


authority. A person whose communications are monitored may be prevented from exercising their right to freedom of association or participation in political processes [Penney]. In a worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to physical danger. A realistic example to consider is when, based on information gathered by state agencies through information leakage in protocols, individuals perceived as threats to the state are subjected to torture, extrajudicial killings, or detention.


This section details several "common" threats to human rights, indicating how each of these can lead to harm to, or violations of, human rights. It also presents several examples of how these threats to human rights materialize on the Internet. This threat modeling is inspired by [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols"), which is based on security threat analysis. This method is by no means a perfect solution for assessing human rights risks in Internet protocols and systems; it is, however, the best approach currently available. Certain specific human rights threats are indirectly considered in Internet protocols as part of their security considerations [BCP72], but privacy guidelines [RFC6973] or reviews, let alone the assessments of the impact of protocols on human rights, are not standardized or implemented.


Many threats, enablers, and risks are linked to different rights. This is not surprising if one takes into account that human rights are interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible. Here, however, we're not discussing all human rights, because not all human rights are relevant to ICTs in general and to protocols and standards in particular [Bless1]:


The main source of the values of human rights is the International Bill of Human Rights that is composed of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR] along with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [ICESCR]. In the light of several cases of Internet censorship, the Human Rights Council Resolution 20/8 was adopted in 2012 [UNHRC2016], affirming "... that the same rights that people have offline must also be protected online ..." In 2015, the Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet [IRP] was developed and released. According to these documents, some examples of human rights relevant for ICT systems are human dignity (Art. 1 UDHR), non-discrimination (Art. 2), rights to life, liberty and security (Art. 3), freedom of opinion and expression (Art. 19), freedom of assembly and association (Art. 20), rights to equal protection, legal remedy, fair trial, due process, presumed innocent (Art. 7-11), appropriate social and international order (Art. 28),


participation in public affairs (Art. 21), participation in cultural life, protection of intellectual property (Art. 27), and privacy (Art. 12).


A partial catalog of human rights related to ICTs, including economic rights, can be found in [Hill2014].


This is by no means an attempt to exclude specific rights or prioritize some rights over others. If other rights seem relevant, please contact the authors of this document.


6.2. Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations
6.2. 人权考虑准则

This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a questionnaire about protocols and their (potential) impact. The questionnaire may be useful at any point in the design process, particularly after document authors have developed a high-level protocol model as described in [RFC4101]. These guidelines do not seek to replace any existing referenced specifications; rather, they contribute to them and look at the design process from a human rights perspective.


Protocols and Internet Standards might benefit from a documented discussion of potential human rights risks arising from potential misapplications of the protocol or technology described in the RFC in question. This might be coupled with an Applicability Statement for that RFC.


Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend specific practices. The range of protocols developed in the IETF is too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or how human rights might be balanced against other design goals. However, by carefully considering the answers to the following questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the protocol adequately takes specific human rights threats into account. This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a human rights protocol considerations section (following the example set in [RFC6973]), and the addition of a human rights protocol considerations section has also not yet been proposed. In considering these questions, authors will need to be aware of the potential of technical advances or the passage of time to undermine protections. In general, considerations of rights are likely to be more effective if they are considered given a purpose and specific use cases, rather than as abstract absolute goals.


6.2.1. Connectivity
6.2.1. 连通性



- Does your protocol add application-specific functions to intermediary nodes?

- 您的协议是否向中间节点添加了特定于应用程序的功能?

- Could this functionality be added to end nodes instead of intermediary nodes?

- 是否可以将此功能添加到终端节点而不是中间节点?

- Is your protocol optimized for low bandwidth and high-latency connections?

- 您的协议是否针对低带宽和高延迟连接进行了优化?

- Could your protocol also be developed in a stateless manner?

- 您的协议是否也可以以无状态的方式开发?

Explanation: The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] holds that "the intelligence is end to end rather than hidden in the network" [RFC1958]. The end-to-end principle is important for the robustness of the network and innovation. Such robustness of the network is crucial to enabling human rights like freedom of expression.


Example: Middleboxes (which can be content delivery networks, firewalls, NATs, or other intermediary nodes that provide "services" other than routing) serve many legitimate purposes. But the protocols guiding them can influence individuals' ability to communicate online freely and privately. The potential for abuse, intentional and unintentional censoring, and limiting permissionless innovation -- and thus, ultimately, the impact of middleboxes on the Internet as a place of unfiltered, unmonitored freedom of speech -- is real.




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

6.2.2. Privacy
6.2.2. 隐私



- Did you have a look at the guidelines in Section 7 of [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols")?

- 您是否看过[RFC6973]第7节(“互联网协议的隐私注意事项”)中的指南?

- Could your protocol in any way impact the confidentiality of protocol metadata?

- 您的协议是否会以任何方式影响协议元数据的机密性?

- Could your protocol counter traffic analysis?

- 您的协议是否可以对抗流量分析?

- Could your protocol improve data minimization?

- 您的协议能否改进数据最小化?

- Does your document identify potentially sensitive data logged by your protocol and/or for how long that data needs to be retained for technical reasons?

- 您的文档是否识别了协议记录的潜在敏感数据和/或出于技术原因,该数据需要保留多长时间?

Explanation: "Privacy" refers to the right of an entity (normally a person), acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to which it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which the entity is willing to share its personal information with others [RFC4949]. If a protocol provides insufficient privacy protection, it may have a negative impact on freedom of expression as users self-censor for fear of surveillance or find themselves unable to express themselves freely.


Example: See [RFC6973].




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

6.2.3. Content Agnosticism
6.2.3. 内容不可知论



- If your protocol impacts packet handling, does it use user data (packet data that is not included in the header)?

- 如果您的协议影响数据包处理,它是否使用用户数据(不包括在报头中的数据包数据)?

- Does your protocol make decisions based on the payload of the packet?

- 您的协议是否根据数据包的有效负载做出决策?

- Does your protocol prioritize certain content or services over others in the routing process?

- 在路由过程中,您的协议是否优先考虑某些内容或服务?

- Is the protocol transparent about the prioritization that is made (if any)?

- 协议是否对所确定的优先级透明(如有)?

Explanation: "Content agnosticism" refers to the notion that network traffic is treated identically regardless of payload, with some exceptions when it comes to effective traffic handling -- for instance, delay-tolerant or delay-sensitive packets based on the header.


Example: Content agnosticism prevents payload-based discrimination against packets. This is important because changes to this principle can lead to a two-tiered Internet, where certain packets are prioritized over others based on their content. Effectively, this would mean that although all users are entitled to receive their packets at a certain speed, some users become more equal than others.




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

- Right to equal protection

- 平等保护权

6.2.4. Security
6.2.4. 安全



- Did you have a look at [BCP72] ("Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations")?

- 您是否看过[BCP72](“关于安全注意事项的RFC文本编写指南”)?

- Have you found any attacks that are somewhat related to your protocol yet considered out of scope for your document?

- 您是否发现任何与您的协议相关但被认为超出文档范围的攻击?

- Would these attacks be pertinent to the features of the Internet that enable human rights (as described throughout this document)?

- 这些攻击是否与实现人权的互联网特征有关(如本文件所述)?

Explanation: Most people speak of security as if it were a single monolithic property of a protocol or system; however, upon reflection one realizes that it is clearly not true. Rather, security is a series of related but somewhat independent properties. Not all of these properties are required for every application. Since communications are carried out by systems and access to systems is through communications channels, these goals obviously interlock, but they can also be independently provided [BCP72].


Example: See [BCP72].




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

- Right to security

- 担保权

6.2.5. Internationalization
6.2.5. 国际化



- Does your protocol have text strings that have to be understood or entered by humans?

- 您的协议是否有人类必须理解或输入的文本字符串?

- Does your protocol allow Unicode? If so, do you accept texts in one charset (which must be UTF-8) or several (which is dangerous for interoperability)?

- 您的协议允许Unicode吗?如果是这样,您接受一个字符集(必须是UTF-8)还是多个字符集(这对互操作性很危险)中的文本?

- If character sets or encodings other than UTF-8 are allowed, does your protocol mandate proper tagging of the charset?

- 如果允许使用UTF-8以外的字符集或编码,您的协议是否要求正确标记字符集?

- Did you have a look at [RFC6365]?

- 您看过[RFC6365]了吗?

Explanation: "Internationalization" refers to the practice of making protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different languages and scripts (see Section 6.2.12 ("Localization")). "In the IETF, 'internationalization' means to add or improve the handling of non-ASCII text in a protocol" [RFC6365].


A different perspective, more appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from the beginning, is the definition used by the W3C [W3Ci18nDef]: "Internationalization is the design and development of a product, application or document content that enables easy localization for target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language."


Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII), or they leave the question of what coded character set (CCS) and encoding are used up to local guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability problems) [RFC3536]. If multiple charsets are permitted, they must be explicitly identified [RFC2277]. Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol allows the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully all scripts in use in the world. In today's world, that is normally best accomplished by allowing Unicode encoded in UTF-8 only.


In the current IETF policy [RFC2277], internationalization is aimed at user-facing strings, not protocol elements, such as the verbs used by some text-based protocols. (Do note that some strings, such as identifiers, are both content and protocol elements.) If the Internet wants to be a global network of networks, the protocols should work with languages other than English and character sets other than Latin characters. It is therefore crucial that at least the content carried by the protocol can be in any script and that all scripts are treated equally.


Example: See Section 6.2.12 ("Localization").




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to political participation

- 政治参与权

- Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

- 参与文化生活、艺术和科学的权利

6.2.6. Censorship Resistance
6.2.6. 审查抵抗



- Does this protocol introduce new identifiers or reuse existing identifiers (e.g., Media Access Control (MAC) addresses) that might be associated with persons or content?

- 该协议是否引入新标识符或重用可能与人员或内容相关联的现有标识符(例如,媒体访问控制(MAC)地址)?

- Does your protocol make it apparent or transparent when access to a resource is restricted?

- 当对资源的访问受到限制时,您的协议是否使其变得明显或透明?

- Can your protocol contribute to filtering in such a way that it could be implemented to censor data or services? If so, could your protocol be designed to ensure that this doesn't happen?

- 您的协议是否有助于过滤,从而可以实现对数据或服务的审查?如果是这样,您的协议是否可以设计为确保不会发生这种情况?

Explanation: "Censorship resistance" refers to the methods and measures to prevent Internet censorship.


Example: When IPv6 was developed, embedding a MAC address into unique IP addresses was discussed. This makes it possible, per [RFC4941], for "eavesdroppers and other information collectors to identify when different addresses used in different transactions actually correspond to the same node." This is why privacy extensions for stateless address autoconfiguration in IPv6 [RFC4941] have been introduced.


Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be used to facilitate censorship, as in the case of application-layer-based censorship, which affects protocols like HTTP. Denial or restriction of access can be made apparent by the use of status code 451, thereby allowing server operators to operate with greater transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect their operation [RFC7725].




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to political participation

- 政治参与权

- Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

- 参与文化生活、艺术和科学的权利

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

6.2.7. Open Standards
6.2.7. 开放标准



- Is your protocol fully documented in such a way that it could be easily implemented, improved, built upon, and/or further developed?

- 您的协议是否以易于实施、改进、构建和/或进一步开发的方式完整记录?

- Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation, running, or further development of your protocol?

- 您是否依赖专有代码来实现、运行或进一步开发您的协议?

- Does your protocol favor a particular proprietary specification over technically equivalent and competing specification(s) -- for instance, by making any incorporated vendor specification "required" or "recommended" [RFC2026]?

- 您的协议是否支持特定的专有规范,而不是技术上等效和竞争的规范?例如,通过使任何合并的供应商规范成为“必需”或“推荐”[RFC2026]?

- Do you normatively reference another standard that is not available without cost (and could you possibly do without it)?

- 您是否规范性地引用了另一个不可能免费提供的标准(并且您可能不使用它)?

- Are you aware of any patents that would prevent your standard from being fully implemented [RFC6701] [RFC8179]?

- 您是否知道有任何专利会妨碍您的标准的全面实施[RFC6701][RFC8179]?

Explanation: The Internet was able to be developed into the global network of networks because of the existence of open, non-proprietary standards [Zittrain]. They are crucial for enabling interoperability. Yet, open standards are not explicitly defined within the IETF. On the subject, [RFC2026] states the following: "Various national and international standards bodies, such as ANSI, ISO, IEEE, and ITU-T, develop a variety of protocol and service specifications that are similar to Technical


Specifications defined" at the IETF. "National and international groups also publish 'implementors' agreements' that are analogous to Applicability Statements, capturing a body of implementation-specific detail concerned with the practical application of their standards. All of these are considered to be 'open external standards' for the purposes of the Internet Standards Process." Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but does emphasize the importance of "open process": any interested person can participate in the work, know what is being decided, and make his or her voice heard on the issue. Part of this principle is the IETF's commitment to making its documents, WG mailing lists, attendance lists, and meeting minutes publicly available on the Internet.


Open standards are important, as they allow for permissionless innovation, which in turn is important for maintaining the freedom and ability to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that currently exist. It is at the heart of the Internet as we know it, and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful of the need for developing open standards.


All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be freely available and should provide reasonable protection against patent infringement claims, so that it can also be implemented in open-source or free software. Patents have often held back open standardization or have been used against those deploying open standards, particularly in the domain of cryptography [Newegg]. An exemption is sometimes made when a protocol that normatively relies on specifications produced by other SDOs that are not freely available is standardized. Patents in open standards or in normative references to other standards should have a patent disclosure [notewell], royalty-free licensing [patentpolicy], or some other form of reasonable protection. Reasonable patent protection should include, but is not limited to, cryptographic primitives.


Example: [RFC6108] describes a system deployed by Comcast, an ISP, for providing critical end-user notifications to web browsers. Such a notification system is being used to provide almost-immediate notifications to customers, such as warning them that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of malware or virus infection. There are other proprietary systems that can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology. In contrast to DPI, [RFC6108] describes a system that does not rely upon DPI and is instead based on open IETF standards and open-source applications.

示例:[RFC6108]描述了ISP Comcast部署的一个系统,用于向web浏览器提供关键的最终用户通知。这种通知系统被用来向客户提供几乎即时的通知,例如警告他们,他们的流量显示出表明恶意软件或病毒感染的模式。还有其他专有系统可以执行此类通知,但这些系统利用深度数据包检查(DPI)技术。与DPI不同,[RFC6108]描述了一个不依赖DPI的系统,而是基于开放IETF标准和开源应用程序。



- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

- 参与文化生活、艺术和科学的权利

6.2.8. Heterogeneity Support
6.2.8. 异质性支持



- Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design?

- 您的协议在设计上支持异构性吗?

- Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware?

- 您的协议是否允许多种类型的硬件?

- Does your protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols?

- 您的协议是否允许多种类型的应用程序协议?

- Is your protocol liberal in what it receives and handles?

- 您的协议在接收和处理内容方面是否自由?

- Will your protocol remain usable and open if the context changes?

- 如果上下文发生变化,您的协议是否仍然可用和开放?

- Does your protocol allow well-defined extension points? If so, do these extension points allow for open innovation?

- 您的协议是否允许定义良好的扩展点?如果是,这些扩展点是否允许开放式创新?

Explanation: [FIArch] notes the following: "The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many levels: devices and nodes, router scheduling algorithms and queue management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing, protocol versions and implementations, underlying link layers (e.g., point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, FDDI, etc.), in the traffic mix and in the levels of congestion at different times and places. Moreover, as the Internet is composed of autonomous organizations and internet service providers, each with their own separate policy concerns, there is a large heterogeneity of administrative domains and pricing structures." As a result, as also noted in [FIArch], the heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be supported by design.


Example: Heterogeneity is inevitable and needs to be supported by design. For example, multiple types of hardware must be allowed for transmission speeds differing by at least seven orders of magnitude, various computer word lengths, and hosts ranging from memory-starved microprocessors up to massively parallel supercomputers. As noted in [RFC1958], "Multiple types of application protocol must be allowed for, ranging from the simplest such as remote login up to the most complex such as distributed databases."




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to political participation

- 政治参与权

6.2.9. Anonymity
6.2.9. 匿名



- Did you have a look at [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols"), especially Section 6.1.1 of that document?

- 您是否看过[RFC6973](“互联网协议的隐私注意事项”),特别是该文件的第6.1.1节?

Explanation: "Anonymity" refers to the condition of an identity being unknown or concealed [RFC4949]. Even though full anonymity is hard to achieve, it is a non-binary concept. Making pervasive monitoring and tracking harder is important for many users as well as for the IETF [RFC7258]. Achieving a higher level of anonymity is an important feature for many end users, as it allows them different degrees of privacy online.


Example: Protocols often expose personal data; it is therefore important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts on privacy. A protocol that uses data that could help identify a sender (items of interest) should be protected from third parties. For instance, if one wants to hide the source/destination IP addresses of a packet, the use of IPsec in tunneling mode (e.g., inside a VPN) can help protect against third parties likely to eavesdrop packets exchanged between the tunnel endpoints.




- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

- Right to political participation

- 政治参与权

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

- Right to security

- 担保权

6.2.10. Pseudonymity
6.2.10. 笔名



- Have you considered [RFC6973] ("Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols"), especially Section 6.1.2 of that document?

- 您是否考虑过[RFC6973](“互联网协议的隐私考虑”),尤其是该文件的第6.1.2节?

- Does the protocol collect personally derived data?

- 协议是否收集个人派生的数据?

- Does the protocol generate or process anything that can be, or that can be tightly correlated with, personally identifiable information?

- 协议是否生成或处理任何可以或可以与个人身份信息紧密相关的信息?

- Does the protocol utilize data that is personally derived, i.e., derived from the interaction of a single person or from their device or address?

- 协议是否使用个人衍生的数据,即从单个人员的交互或他们的设备或地址衍生的数据?

- Does this protocol generate personally derived data? If so, how will that data be handled?

- 该协议是否生成个人派生的数据?如果是,将如何处理这些数据?

Explanation: Pseudonymity -- the ability to use a persistent identifier that is not immediately linked to one's offline identity -- is an important feature for many end users, as it allows them different degrees of disguised identity and privacy online.


Example: When designing a standard that exposes personal data, it is important to consider ways to mitigate the obvious impacts. While pseudonyms cannot easily be reverse-engineered -- for example, some early approaches used such techniques as simple hashing of IP addresses that could in turn be easily reversed by generating a hash for each potential IP address and comparing it to the pseudonym -- limiting the exposure of personal data remains important.


"Pseudonymity" means using a pseudonym instead of one's "real" name. There are many reasons for users to use pseudonyms -- for instance, to hide their gender; protect themselves against harassment; protect their families' privacy; frankly discuss sexuality; or develop an artistic or journalistic persona without retribution from an employer, (potential) customers, or social surroundings [geekfeminism]. The difference between anonymity and pseudonymity is that a pseudonym is often persistent. "Pseudonymity is strengthened when less personal data can be linked to the pseudonym; when the same pseudonym is used less often and across fewer contexts; and when independently chosen pseudonyms are more frequently used for new actions (making them, from an observer's or attacker's perspective, unlinkable)." [RFC6973]




- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

6.2.11. Accessibility
6.2.11. 可达性



- Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling environment for people who are not able-bodied?

- 您的协议是否旨在为身体不健全的人提供有利的环境?

- Have you looked at the W3C Web Accessibility Initiative [W3CAccessibility] for examples and guidance?

- 您看过W3C Web易访问性计划[W3CAccessibility]的示例和指南了吗?

Explanation: The Internet is fundamentally designed to work for all people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture, location, or physical or mental ability. When the Internet meets this goal, it is accessible to people with a diverse range of hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive abilities [W3CAccessibility]. Sometimes, in the design of protocols, websites, web technologies, or web tools, barriers that exclude people from using the Web are created.


Example: The HTML protocol as defined in [HTML5] specifically requires that (with a few exceptions) every image must have an "alt" attribute to ensure that images are accessible for people that cannot themselves decipher non-text content in web pages.




- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

- Right to education

- 受教育权

- Right to political participation

- 政治参与权

6.2.12. Localization
6.2.12. 本地化



- Does your protocol uphold the standards of internationalization?

- 您的协议是否坚持国际化标准?

- Have you taken any concrete steps towards localizing your protocol for relevant audiences?

- 您是否已采取任何具体步骤,将您的协议本地化以供相关受众使用?

Explanation: Per [W3Ci18nDef], "Localization refers to the adaptation of a product, application or document content to meet the language, cultural and other requirements of a specific target market (a 'locale')." It is also described as the practice of


translating an implementation to make it functional in a specific language or for users in a specific locale (see Section 6.2.5 ("Internationalization")).


Example: The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols and products are developed with a certain audience in mind; this audience often shares particular characteristics like knowing how to read and write in ASCII and knowing English. This limits the ability of a large part of the world's online population to use the Internet in a way that is culturally and linguistically accessible. An example of a protocol that has taken into account the view that individuals like to have access to data in their native language can be found in [RFC5646]; such a protocol would label the information content with an identifier for the language in which it is written and would allow information to be presented in more than one language.




- Right to non-discrimination

- 不受歧视的权利

- Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

- 参与文化生活、艺术和科学的权利

- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

6.2.13. Decentralization
6.2.13. 权力下放



- Can your protocol be implemented without one single point of control?

- 您的协议是否可以在没有单个控制点的情况下实现?

- If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a federated manner?

- 如果适用,您的协议能否以联邦方式部署?

- What is the potential for discrimination against users of your protocol?

- 您的协议用户可能受到哪些歧视?

- Can your protocol be used to negatively implicate users (e.g., incrimination, accusation)?

- 您的协议是否可用于对用户造成负面影响(例如,有罪、指控)?

- Does your protocol create additional centralized points of control?

- 您的协议是否创建了其他集中控制点?

Explanation: Decentralization is one of the central technical concepts of the architecture of networks and is embraced as such by the IETF [RFC3935]. It refers to the absence or minimization of centralized points of control -- "a feature that is assumed to


make it easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold" [Brown]. It also reduces issues surrounding single points of failure and distributes the network such that it continues to function if one or several nodes are disabled. With the commercialization of the Internet in the early 1990s, there has been a slow trend toward moving away from decentralization, to the detriment of any technical benefits that having a decentralized Internet otherwise provides.


Example: The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly susceptible to monitoring and censorship, from both governments and ISPs, as well as third (malicious) parties. The ability to monitor and censor is further enabled by increased centralization of the network, creating central infrastructure points that can be tapped into. The creation of P2P networks and the development of voice-over-IP protocols using P2P technology in combination with a distributed hash table (DHT) for scalability are examples of how protocols can preserve decentralization [Pouwelse].




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

6.2.14. Reliability
6.2.14. 可靠性



- Is your protocol fault tolerant?

- 你的协议是容错的吗?

- Does your protocol degrade gracefully?

- 您的协议是否优雅地降级?

- Can your protocol resist malicious degradation attempts?

- 您的协议能否抵御恶意降级尝试?

- Do you have a documented way to announce degradation?

- 您是否有记录在案的方式来宣布降级?

- Do you have measures in place for recovery or partial healing from failure?

- 您是否有从失败中恢复或部分治愈的措施?

- Can your protocol maintain dependability and performance in the face of unanticipated changes or circumstances?

- 面对意外的变化或情况,您的协议能否保持可靠性和性能?

Explanation: Reliability ensures that a protocol will execute its function consistently, be error resistant as described, and function without unexpected results. A system that is reliable degenerates gracefully and will have a documented way to announce degradation. It also has mechanisms to recover from failure


gracefully and, if applicable, to allow for partial healing. It is important here to draw a distinction between random degradation and malicious degradation. Many current attacks against TLS, for example, exploit TLS's ability to gracefully degrade to older cipher suites; from a functional perspective, this ability is good, but from a security perspective, it can be very bad. As with confidentiality, the growth of the Internet and fostering innovation in services depend on users having confidence and trust [RFC3724] in the network. For reliability, it is necessary that services notify users if packet delivery fails. In the case of real-time systems, the protocol needs to safeguard timeliness in addition to providing reliable delivery.


Example: In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport layer requires an indication that transport processing has successfully completed, such as the indication given by TCP's ACK message [RFC793] and not simply an indication from the IP layer that the packet arrived. Similarly, an application-layer protocol may require an application-specific acknowledgement that contains, among other things, a status code indicating the disposition of the request (see [RFC3724]).




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to security

- 担保权

6.2.15. Confidentiality
6.2.15. 保密性



- Does this protocol expose information related to identifiers or data? If so, does it do so to each of the other protocol entities (i.e., recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]?

- 此协议是否公开与标识符或数据相关的信息?如果是,它是否对其他每个协议实体(即接收方、中介和使能器)[RFC6973]都这样做?

- What options exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit the information shared with each entity?

- 协议实施者可以选择哪些选项来限制与每个实体共享的信息?

- What operational controls are available to limit the information shared with each entity?

- 有哪些操作控制措施可用于限制与每个实体共享的信息?

- What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via the protocol? If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the protocol?

- 在通过协议共享或公开个人数据或标识符之前,协议定义或要求哪些控制或同意机制?如果未规定此类机制或控制措施,是否预期控制和同意将在协议之外处理?

- Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different pieces of information with different recipients? If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators with such control?

- 协议是否为发起者提供了与不同接收者共享不同信息的方法?如果没有,是否存在协议之外的机制为启动器提供此类控制?

- Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit which information is shared with intermediaries? If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide users with such control?

- 协议是否为启动器提供了限制与中介共享哪些信息的方法?如果没有,是否存在协议之外的机制为用户提供此类控制?

- Is it expected that users will have relationships that govern the use of the information (contractual or otherwise) with those who operate these intermediaries?

- 是否预期用户将与这些中介机构的运营商建立管理信息使用(合同或其他)的关系?

- Does the protocol prefer encryption over cleartext operation?

- 协议是否更喜欢加密而不是明文操作?

- Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to express individuals' preferences to recipients or intermediaries with regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of their personal data?

- 该协议是否为发起人提供了方式,以表达个人在收集、使用或披露个人数据方面对接收人或中介的偏好?

Explanation: "Confidentiality" refers to keeping a user's data secret from unintended listeners [BCP72]. The growth of the Internet depends on users having confidence that the network protects their personal data [RFC1984].


Example: Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire content of the communication available to the idealized attacker along their path [RFC7624]. Following the advice in [RFC3365], most such protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the payload for confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider deployment. A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035], as DNSSEC [RFC4033] does not have confidentiality as a requirement. This implies that, in the absence of changes to the protocol as presently under development in the IETF's DNS Private Exchange (DPRIVE) Working Group, all DNS queries and answers generated by the activities of any protocol are available to the attacker. When store-and-forward protocols are used (e.g., SMTP [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this data subject to observation by an attacker that has compromised these intermediaries, unless the data is encrypted end to end by the application-layer protocol or the implementation uses an encrypted store for this data [RFC7624].




- Right to privacy

- 隐私权

- Right to security

- 担保权

6.2.16. Integrity
6.2.16. 诚实正直



- Does your protocol maintain, assure, and/or verify the accuracy of payload data?

- 您的协议是否维护、确保和/或验证有效负载数据的准确性?

- Does your protocol maintain and assure the consistency of data?

- 您的协议是否维护并确保数据的一致性?

- Does your protocol in any way allow the data to be (intentionally or unintentionally) altered?

- 您的协议是否允许(有意或无意)更改数据?

Explanation: "Integrity" refers to the maintenance and assurance of the accuracy and consistency of data to ensure that it has not been (intentionally or unintentionally) altered.


Example: Integrity verification of data is important for preventing vulnerabilities and attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks. These attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle and changing the content of the data. In practice, this looks as follows:


Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Corinne forges and sends a message to Bob, impersonating Alice. Bob cannot see that the data from Alice was altered by Corinne. Corinne intercepts and alters the communication as it is sent between Alice and Bob. Corinne is able to control the communication content.




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to security

- 担保权

6.2.17. Authenticity
6.2.17. 真实性



- Do you have sufficient measures in place to confirm the truth of an attribute of an entity or of a single piece of data?

- 您是否有足够的措施来确认实体或单个数据的属性的真实性?

- Can attributes get garbled along the way (see Section 6.2.4 ("Security"))?

- 属性是否会在过程中被混淆(参见第6.2.4节(“安全”)?

- If relevant, have you implemented IPsec, DNSSEC, HTTPS, and other standard security best practices?

- 如果相关,您是否实施了IPsec、DNSSEC、HTTPS和其他标准安全最佳实践?

Explanation: Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from the source it claims to come from. This is important for preventing (1) certain attacks or (2) unauthorized access to, and use of, data.


Example: Authentication of data is important for preventing vulnerabilities and attacks such as man-in-the-middle attacks. These attacks happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle and posing as both parties. In practice, this looks as follows:


Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Alice sends data to Bob. Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob. Corinne reads and alters the message to Bob. Bob cannot see that the data did not come from Alice but instead came from Corinne.


When there is proper authentication, the scenario would be as follows:


Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Alice sends data to Bob. Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob. Corinne reads and alters the message to Bob. Bob can see that the data did not come from Alice but instead came from Corinne.




- Right to privacy

- 隐私权

- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to security

- 担保权

6.2.18. Adaptability
6.2.18. 适应性



- Is your protocol written in such a way that it would be easy for other protocols to be developed on top of it or to interact with it?

- 您的协议是以这样一种方式编写的,即在它之上开发其他协议或与之交互是很容易的吗?

- Does your protocol impact permissionless innovation (see Section 6.2.1 ("Connectivity") above)?

- 您的协议是否影响无许可创新(见上文第6.2.1节(“连接”)?

Explanation: Adaptability is closely interrelated with permissionless innovation; both maintain the freedom and ability to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that currently exist. Permissionless innovation is at the heart of the Internet as we know it. To maintain the Internet's fundamentally open nature and ensure that it can continue to develop, we need to be mindful of the impact of protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless innovation.


Example: WebRTC generates audio and/or video data. In order to ensure that WebRTC can be used in different locations by different parties, it is important that standard JavaScript APIs be developed to support applications from different voice service providers. Multiple parties will have similar capabilities; in order to ensure that all parties can build upon existing standards, these standards need to be adaptable and allow for permissionless innovation.

示例:WebRTC生成音频和/或视频数据。为了确保WebRTC可以由不同的方在不同的位置使用,开发标准JavaScript API以支持来自不同语音服务提供商的应用程序非常重要。多方将具有类似的能力;为了确保各方都能在现有标准的基础上发展,这些标准需要具有适应性,并允许无许可创新。



- Right to education

- 受教育权

- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

6.2.19. Outcome Transparency
6.2.19. 成果透明度



- Are the effects of your protocol fully and easily comprehensible, including with respect to unintended consequences of protocol choices?

- 您的协议的影响是否完全且易于理解,包括协议选择的意外后果?

Explanation: Certain technical choices may have unintended consequences.


Example: Lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and negative externalities; spam is an example. Lack of data that could be used for billing and accounting can lead to so-called "free" arrangements that obscure the actual costs and distribution of the costs -- for example, (1) the barter arrangements that are commonly used for Internet interconnection and (2) the commercial exploitation of personal data for targeted advertising, which is the most common funding model for the so-called "free" services such as search engines and social networks.




- Right to freedom of expression

- 言论自由权

- Right to privacy

- 隐私权

- Right to freedom of assembly and association

- 集会和结社自由权

- Right to access to information

- 获得信息的权利

7. Security Considerations
7. 安全考虑

As this document discusses research, there are no security considerations.


8. IANA Considerations
8. IANA考虑

This document does not require any IANA actions.


9. Research Group Information
9. 研究组信息

The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations Research Group is located at the email address <>. Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the list are provided at <>.

IRTF人权议定书考虑研究小组的讨论列表位于电子邮件地址<>. 有关该组的信息以及如何订阅该列表的信息,请参见<>.

Archives of the list can be found at <>.


10. Informative References
10. 资料性引用

[Ababil] Danchev, D., "Dissecting 'Operation Ababil' - an OSINT Analysis", September 2012, < 2012/09/dissecting-operation-ababil-osint.html>.

[Ababil]Danchev,D.,“解剖‘Ababil手术’——一项OSINT分析”,2012年9月< 2012/09/dissecting operation ababil osint.html>。

[Abbate] Abbate, J., "Inventing the Internet", MIT Press, 2000, <>.


[Adrian] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P., Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D., Thome, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E., Zanella-Beguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice", Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 5-17, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, October 2015.

[Adrian]Adrian,D.,Bhargavan,K.,Durumeric,Z.,Gaudry,P.,Green,M.,Halderman,J.,Heninger,N.,Springall,D.,Thome,E.,Valenta,L.,VanderSloot,B.,Wustrow,E.,Zanella Beguelin,S.,P.Zimmermann,“不完美的前向保密:赫尔曼在实践中的失败之处”,第22届ACM SIGSAC计算机和通信安全会议记录,第5-17页,DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707,2015年10月。

[Alshalan-etal] Alshalan, A., Pisharody, S., and D. Huang, "A Survey of Mobile VPN Technologies", IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, Volume 18, Issue 2, pp. 1177-1196, DOI 10.1109/COMST.2015.2496624, 2016, < document/7314859/?arnumber=7314859>.

[Alshalan etal]Alshalan,A.,Pisharody,S.和D.Huang,“移动VPN技术调查”,IEEE通信调查与教程,第18卷,第2期,第1177-1196页,DOI 10.1109/COMST.2015.2496624,2016< 文档/7314859/?arnumber=7314859>。

[APIP] Naylor, D., Mukerjee, M., and P. Steenkiste, "Balancing accountability and privacy in the network", SIGCOMM '14, Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on SIGCOMM, pp. 75-86, DOI 10.1145/2740070.2626306, October 2014, <>.

[APIP]Naylor,D.,Mukerjee,M.,和P.Steenkiste,“平衡网络中的责任和隐私”,SIGCOMM'14,2014年ACM会议记录,关于SIGCOMM,第75-86页,DOI 10.1145/2740070.2626306,2014年10月<>.

[Appelbaum] Appelbaum, J., Gibson, A., Goetz, J., Kabisch, V., Kampf, L., and L. Ryge, "NSA targets the privacy-conscious", 2014, < nsa230_page-1.html>.

[Appelbaum]Appelbaum,J.,Gibson,A.,Goetz,J.,Kabisch,V.,Kampf,L.,和L.Ryge,“NSA针对隐私意识”,2014年< nsa230_page-1.html>。

[ars] Anderson, N., "P2P researchers: use a blocklist or you will be tracked... 100% of the time", October 2007, < p2p-researchers-use-a-blocklist-or-you-will-be-tracked-100-of-the-time/>.

[ars]Anderson,N.,“P2P研究人员:使用阻止列表,否则你将被跟踪…100%的时间”,2007年10月< p2p-resears-use-a-blocklist-or-you-will-tracked-100-of-time/>。

[Aryan-etal] Aryan, S., Aryan, H., and J. Alex Halderman, "Internet Censorship in Iran: A First Look", 2013, <>.

[Aryan etal]Aryan,S.,Aryan,H.,和J.Alex Halderman,“伊朗的互联网审查:第一眼”,2013年<>.

[Babbie] Babbie, E., "The Basics of Social Research", Cengage, Belmont, CA, 2017.


[BBC-wikileaks] BBC, "Whistle-blower site taken offline", February 2008, <>.


[BCP72] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552, July 2003, <>.

[BCP72]Rescorla,E.和B.Korver,“关于安全考虑的RFC文本编写指南”,BCP 72,RFC 3552,2003年7月<>.

[Benkler] Benkler, Y., "The Wealth of Networks - How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom", Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2006, <>.


[Berners-Lee] Berners-Lee, T. and M. Fischetti, "Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web", HarperCollins, p. 208, 1999.

[Berners Lee]Berners Lee,T.和M.Fischetti,“编织网络:万维网的原始设计和最终命运”,HarperCollins,p。208, 1999.

[BernersLeeHalpin] Berners-Lee, T. and H. Halpin, "Internet Access is a Human Right", 2012, < publications/def-timbl-halpin.pdf>.

[BernersLeeHalpin]Berners Lee,T.和H.Halpin,“互联网接入是一项人权”,2012年< 出版物/def timbl halpin.pdf>。

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[HORNET] Chen, C., Asoni, D., Barrera, D., Danezis, G., and A. Perrig, "HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer", CCS '15, Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 1441-1454, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813628, October 2015, <>.

[HORNET]Chen,C.,Asoni,D.,Barrera,D.,Danezis,G.,和A.Perrig,“HORNET:网络层的高速洋葱路由”,CCS'15,第22届ACM SIGSAC计算机和通信安全会议记录,第1441-1454页,DOI 10.1145/2810103.28136282015年10月<>.

[HTML5] Hickson, I., Ed., Berjon, R., Ed., Faulkner, S., Ed., Leithead, T., Ed., Navara, E., Ed., O'Connor, E., Ed., and S. Pfeiffer, Ed., "HTML5", W3C Recommendation, October 2014, <>.


[ICCPR] United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights", 1966, < CCPR.aspx>.

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联合国大会,《经济、社会、文化权利国际公约》,1966年< CESCR.aspx>。

[Insinuator] Schiess, N., "Vulnerabilities & attack vectors of VPNs (Pt 1)", August 2013, < vulnerabilities-attack-vectors-of-vpns-pt-1/>.

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[IRP] Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition, "10 Internet Rights & Principles", 2017, <>.


[Jabri] Jabri, V., "Discourses on violence: conflict analysis reconsidered", Manchester University Press, 1996.


[Kaye] Kaye, D., "Freedom of expression and the private sector in the digital age", 2016, < FreedomOpinion/Pages/Privatesectorinthedigitalage.aspx>.

[Kaye]Kaye,D.,“数字时代的言论自由和私营部门”,2016年< FreedomOpinion/Pages/Privatesectorinthedigitalage.aspx>。

[King] King, C., "Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars", Chapter 8 of "Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World", United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C., 2007.


[Lessig] Lessig, L., "Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0 ('Codev2')", Basic Books, New York, 2006, <>.


[Marcak] Marcak, B., Weaver, N., Dalek, J., Ensafi, R., Fifield, D., McKune, S., Rey, A., Scott-Railton, J., Deibert, R., and V. Paxson, "China's Great Cannon", April 2015, <>.

[Marcak]Marcak,B.,Weaver,N.,Dalek,J.,Ensafi,R.,Fifield,D.,McKune,S.,Rey,A.,Scott Railton,J.,Deibert,R.,和V.Paxson,“中国的大炮”,2015年4月<>.

[Marquis-Boire] Marquis-Boire, M., "Schrodinger's Cat Video and the Death of Clear-Text", August 2014, < 2014/08/cat-video-and-the-death-of-clear-text/>.

[Marquis Boire]Marquis Boire,M.,“薛定谔猫视频与明文之死”,2014年8月< 2014/08/cat视频与明文之死/>。

[Meyer] Meyer, J., "Defining and Evaluating Resilience: A Performability Perspective", presentation at International Workshop on Performability Modeling of Computer and Communication Systems, September 2009.


[Mueller] Mueller, M., "Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance", MIT Press, DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014595.001.0001, 2010, <>.

[Mueller]Mueller,M.,“网络与国家:互联网治理的全球政治”,麻省理工学院出版社,DOI 10.7551/mitpress/9780262014595.001.0001,2010年<>.

[Musiani] Musiani, F., "Giants, Dwarfs and Decentralized Alternatives to Internet-based Services: An Issue of Internet Governance", Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture, 10(1), pp. 81-94, DOI 10.16997/wpcc.214, 2015, < articles/10.16997/wpcc.214/>.

[Musiani]Musiani,F.,“互联网服务的巨人、矮人和分散替代品:互联网治理问题”,威斯敏斯特通讯与文化论文,10(1),第81-94页,DOI 10.16997/wpcc.2142015< 第10.16997/wpcc.214/>条。

[Namecoin] Namecoin, "Namecoin", 2015, <>.


[NATusage] Maier, G., Schneider, F., and A. Feldmann, "NAT usage in Residential Broadband networks", PAM: International Conference on Passive and Active Network Measurement Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 6579, Springer, Berlin and Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19260-9_4, 2011, < NATusage11.pdf>.

[NATusage]Maier,G.,Schneider,F.,和A.Feldmann,“住宅宽带网络中的NAT使用”,PAM:被动和主动网络测量国际会议《计算机科学讲义》,第6579卷,柏林和海德堡斯普林格,DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-19260-9)42011年, < NATusage11.pdf>。

[NETmundial] NETmundial, "NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement", April 2014, < uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf>.

[网讯]网讯,“网讯多方利益相关者声明”,2014年4月< 上传/2014/04/NETmundial Multistakeholder Document.pdf>。

[Newegg] Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites the history of encryption", November 2013, <>.


[notewell] IETF, "Note Well", 2015, <>.


[patentpolicy] Weitzner, D., Ed., "W3C Patent Policy", World Wide Web Consortium, February 2004, <>.


[Penney] Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use", 2016, < papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769645>.

[Penney]Penney,J.,“冷效应:在线监控和维基百科使用”,2016年< 论文.cfm?摘要=2769645>。

[Peterson] Peterson, A., Gellman, B., and A. Soltani, "Yahoo to make SSL encryption the default for Webmail users. Finally.", October 2013, < news/the-switch/wp/2013/10/14/ yahoo-to-make-ssl-encryption-the-default-for-webmail-users-finally/?utm_term=.a17eca45ddfe>.

[Peterson]Peterson,A.,Gellman,B.,和A.Soltani,“雅虎将SSL加密作为网络邮件用户的默认设置。最后”,2013年10月< news/the switch/wp/2013/10/14/yahoo最终将ssl加密设置为webmail用户的默认设置/?utm_term=.a17eca45ddfe>。

[PETS2015VPN] Perta, V., Barbera, M., Tyson, G., Haddadi, H., and A. Mei, "A Glance through the VPN Looking Glass: IPv6 Leakage and DNS Hijacking in Commercial VPN clients", DOI 10.1515/popets-2015-0006, 2015, < PETS2015VPN.pdf>.

[PETS2015 VPN]Perta,V.,Barbera,M.,Tyson,G.,Haddadi,H.,和A.Mei,“通过VPN窥镜的一瞥:商业VPN客户端中的IPv6泄漏和DNS劫持”,DOI 10.1515/popets-2015-0006,2015<>。

[Pidgin] js and Pidgin Developers, "[XMPP] Invisible mode violating standard", 2007, <>.


[Pouwelse] Pouwelse, J., Ed., "Media without censorship (CensorFree) scenarios", Work in Progress, draft-pouwelse-censorfree-scenarios-02, October 2012.


[Rachovitsa] Rachovitsa, A., "Engineering and lawyering privacy by design: understanding online privacy both as a technical and an international human rights issue", International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Volume 24, Issue 4, pp. 374-399, DOI 10.1093/ijlit/eaw012, December 2016, < article/24/4/374/2566975/ Engineering-and-lawyering-privacy-by-design>.

[Rachovitsa]Rachovitsa,A.,“设计的工程和律师隐私:将在线隐私理解为技术和国际人权问题”,《国际法律和信息技术杂志》,第24卷,第4期,第374-399页,DOI 10.1093/ijlit/eaw012,2016年12月, < article/24/4/374/2566975/设计的工程和律师隐私>。

[RFC760] Postel, J., "DoD standard Internet Protocol", RFC 760, DOI 10.17487/RFC0760, January 1980, <>.

[RFC760]Postel,J.,“国防部标准互联网协议”,RFC 760,DOI 10.17487/RFC0760,1980年1月<>.

[RFC791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791, DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981, <>.

[RFC791]Postel,J.,“互联网协议”,STD 5,RFC 791,DOI 10.17487/RFC07911981年9月<>.

[RFC793] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, RFC 793, DOI 10.17487/RFC0793, September 1981, <>.

[RFC793]Postel,J.,“传输控制协议”,标准7,RFC 793,DOI 10.17487/RFC0793,1981年9月<>.

[RFC894] Hornig, C., "A Standard for the Transmission of IP Datagrams over Ethernet Networks", STD 41, RFC 894, DOI 10.17487/RFC0894, April 1984, <>.

[RFC894]Hornig,C.,“通过以太网传输IP数据报的标准”,STD 41,RFC 894,DOI 10.17487/RFC0894,1984年4月<>.

[RFC1035] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035, November 1987, <>.

[RFC1035]Mockapetris,P.,“域名-实现和规范”,STD 13,RFC 1035,DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,1987年11月<>.

[RFC1122] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers", STD 3, RFC 1122, DOI 10.17487/RFC1122, October 1989, <>.

[RFC1122]Braden,R.,Ed.“互联网主机的要求-通信层”,STD 3,RFC 1122,DOI 10.17487/RFC1122,1989年10月<>.

[RFC1958] Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996, <>.

[RFC1958]Carpenter,B.,Ed.,“互联网的架构原则”,RFC 1958,DOI 10.17487/RFC19581996年6月<>.

[RFC1984] IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984, DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996, <>.

[RFC1984]IAB和IESG,“IAB和IESG关于加密技术和互联网的声明”,BCP 200,RFC 1984,DOI 10.17487/RFC1984,1996年8月<>.

[RFC2026] Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996, <>.

[RFC2026]Bradner,S.,“互联网标准过程——第3版”,BCP 9,RFC 2026,DOI 10.17487/RFC2026,1996年10月<>.

[RFC2277] Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277, January 1998, <>.

[RFC2277]Alvestrand,H.,“IETF字符集和语言政策”,BCP 18,RFC 2277,DOI 10.17487/RFC2277,1998年1月<>.

[RFC2775] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", RFC 2775, DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000, <>.

[RFC2775]Carpenter,B.,“互联网透明度”,RFC 2775,DOI 10.17487/RFC2775,2000年2月<>.

[RFC3022] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP Network Address Translator (Traditional NAT)", RFC 3022, DOI 10.17487/RFC3022, January 2001, <>.

[RFC3022]Srisuresh,P.和K.Egevang,“传统IP网络地址转换器(传统NAT)”,RFC 3022,DOI 10.17487/RFC3022,2001年1月<>.

[RFC3365] Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61, RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002, <>.

[RFC3365]Schiller,J.,“互联网工程任务组标准协议的强大安全要求”,BCP 61,RFC 3365,DOI 10.17487/RFC3365,2002年8月<>.

[RFC3439] Bush, R. and D. Meyer, "Some Internet Architectural Guidelines and Philosophy", RFC 3439, DOI 10.17487/RFC3439, December 2002, <>.

[RFC3439]Bush,R.和D.Meyer,“一些互联网架构指南和哲学”,RFC 3439,DOI 10.17487/RFC3439,2002年12月<>.

[RFC3536] Hoffman, P., "Terminology Used in Internationalization in the IETF", RFC 3536, DOI 10.17487/RFC3536, May 2003, <>.

[RFC3536]Hoffman,P.,“IETF国际化中使用的术语”,RFC 3536,DOI 10.17487/RFC3536,2003年5月<>.

[RFC3724] Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724, DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004, <>.

[RFC3724]Kempf,J.,Ed.,Austein,R.,Ed.,和IAB,“中间崛起和端到端的未来:对互联网架构演变的思考”,RFC 3724DOI 10.17487/RFC37242004年3月<>.

[RFC3935] Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF", BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004, <>.

[RFC3935]Alvestrand,H.,“IETF的使命声明”,BCP 95,RFC 3935,DOI 10.17487/RFC3935,2004年10月<>.

[RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, <>.

[RFC4033]Arends,R.,Austein,R.,Larson,M.,Massey,D.,和S.Rose,“DNS安全介绍和要求”,RFC 4033,DOI 10.17487/RFC4033,2005年3月<>.

[RFC4084] Klensin, J., "Terminology for Describing Internet Connectivity", BCP 104, RFC 4084, DOI 10.17487/RFC4084, May 2005, <>.

[RFC4084]Klensin,J.,“描述互联网连接的术语”,BCP 104,RFC 4084,DOI 10.17487/RFC4084,2005年5月<>.

[RFC4101] Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101, DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005, <>.

[RFC4101]Rescorla,E.和IAB,“编写协议模型”,RFC 4101,DOI 10.17487/RFC4101,2005年6月<>.

[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, <>.

[RFC4941]Narten,T.,Draves,R.,和S.Krishnan,“IPv6中无状态地址自动配置的隐私扩展”,RFC 4941,DOI 10.17487/RFC49411907年9月<>.

[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2", FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007, <>.

[RFC4949]Shirey,R.,“互联网安全词汇表,第2版”,FYI 36,RFC 4949,DOI 10.17487/RFC4949,2007年8月<>.

[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, <>.

[RFC5246]Dierks,T.和E.Rescorla,“传输层安全(TLS)协议版本1.2”,RFC 5246,DOI 10.17487/RFC5246,2008年8月<>.

[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321, DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008, <>.

[RFC5321]Klensin,J.,“简单邮件传输协议”,RFC 5321DOI 10.17487/RFC5321,2008年10月<>.

[RFC5646] Phillips, A., Ed., and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646, September 2009, <>.

[RFC5646]Phillips,A.,Ed.,和M.Davis,Ed.,“识别语言的标签”,BCP 47,RFC 5646,DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,2009年9月<>.

[RFC5694] Camarillo, G., Ed., and IAB, "Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Architecture: Definition, Taxonomies, Examples, and Applicability", RFC 5694, DOI 10.17487/RFC5694, November 2009, <>.

[RFC5694]Camarillo,G.,Ed.,和IAB,“对等(P2P)架构:定义、分类、示例和适用性”,RFC 5694,DOI 10.17487/RFC56942009年11月<>.

[RFC5944] Perkins, C., Ed., "IP Mobility Support for IPv4, Revised", RFC 5944, DOI 10.17487/RFC5944, November 2010, <>.

[RFC5944]Perkins,C.,Ed.,“IPv4的IP移动性支持,修订版”,RFC 5944,DOI 10.17487/RFC59442010年11月<>.

[RFC6101] Freier, A., Karlton, P., and P. Kocher, "The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Protocol Version 3.0", RFC 6101, DOI 10.17487/RFC6101, August 2011, <>.

[RFC6101]Freier,A.,Karlton,P.,和P.Kocher,“安全套接字层(SSL)协议版本3.0”,RFC 6101,DOI 10.17487/RFC6101,2011年8月<>.

[RFC6108] Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B. Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design", RFC 6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011, <>.

[RFC6108]Chung,C.,Kasyanov,A.,Livingood,J.,Mody,N.,和B.Van Liue,“康卡斯特的网络通知系统设计”,RFC 6108,DOI 10.17487/RFC6108,2011年2月<>.

[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, DOI 10.17487/RFC6120, March 2011, <>.

[RFC6120]Saint Andre,P.,“可扩展消息和状态协议(XMPP):核心”,RFC 6120,DOI 10.17487/RFC6120,2011年3月<>.

[RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011, <>.

[RFC6365]Hoffman,P.和J.Klensin,“IETF国际化中使用的术语”,BCP 166,RFC 6365,DOI 10.17487/RFC6365,2011年9月<>.

[RFC6698] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August 2012, <>.

[RFC6698]Hoffman,P.和J.Schlyter,“基于DNS的命名实体认证(DANE)传输层安全(TLS)协议:TLSA”,RFC 6698,DOI 10.17487/RFC6698,2012年8月<>.

[RFC6701] Farrel, A. and P. Resnick, "Sanctions Available for Application to Violators of IETF IPR Policy", RFC 6701, DOI 10.17487/RFC6701, August 2012, <>.

[RFC6701]Farrel,A.和P.Resnick,“适用于违反IETF知识产权政策者的制裁”,RFC 6701,DOI 10.17487/RFC6701,2012年8月<>.

[RFC6797] Hodges, J., Jackson, C., and A. Barth, "HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS)", RFC 6797, DOI 10.17487/RFC6797, November 2012, <>.

[RFC6797]Hodges,J.,Jackson,C.,和A.Barth,“HTTP严格传输安全(HSTS)”,RFC 6797,DOI 10.17487/RFC6797,2012年11月<>.

[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <>.

[RFC6973]Cooper,A.,Tschofenig,H.,Aboba,B.,Peterson,J.,Morris,J.,Hansen,M.,和R.Smith,“互联网协议的隐私考虑”,RFC 6973,DOI 10.17487/RFC6973,2013年7月<>.

[RFC7230] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", RFC 7230, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7230]Fielding,R.,Ed.,和J.Reschke,Ed.,“超文本传输协议(HTTP/1.1):消息语法和路由”,RFC 7230,DOI 10.17487/RFC7230,2014年6月<>.

[RFC7231] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", RFC 7231, DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7231]Fielding,R.,Ed.,和J.Reschke,Ed.,“超文本传输协议(HTTP/1.1):语义和内容”,RFC 7231,DOI 10.17487/RFC72312014年6月<>.

[RFC7232] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Conditional Requests", RFC 7232, DOI 10.17487/RFC7232, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7232]Fielding,R.,Ed.,和J.Reschke,Ed.,“超文本传输协议(HTTP/1.1):条件请求”,RFC 7232,DOI 10.17487/RFC72322014年6月<>.

[RFC7233] Fielding, R., Ed., Lafon, Y., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Range Requests", RFC 7233, DOI 10.17487/RFC7233, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7233]Fielding,R.,Ed.,Lafon,Y.,Ed.,和J.Reschke,Ed.,“超文本传输协议(HTTP/1.1):范围请求”,RFC 7233,DOI 10.17487/RFC7233,2014年6月<>.

[RFC7234] Fielding, R., Ed., Nottingham, M., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Caching", RFC 7234, DOI 10.17487/RFC7234, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7234]Fielding,R.,Ed.,Nottingham,M.,Ed.,和J.Reschke,Ed.,“超文本传输协议(HTTP/1.1):缓存”,RFC 7234,DOI 10.17487/RFC72342014年6月<>.

[RFC7235] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication", RFC 7235, DOI 10.17487/RFC7235, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7235]Fielding,R.,Ed.,和J.Reschke,Ed.,“超文本传输协议(HTTP/1.1):认证”,RFC 7235,DOI 10.17487/RFC7235,2014年6月<>.

[RFC7236] Reschke, J., "Initial Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Authentication Scheme Registrations", RFC 7236, DOI 10.17487/RFC7236, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7236]Reschke,J,“初始超文本传输协议(HTTP)认证方案注册”,RFC 7236,DOI 10.17487/RFC7236,2014年6月<>.

[RFC7237] Reschke, J., "Initial Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Method Registrations", RFC 7237, DOI 10.17487/RFC7237, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7237]Reschke,J,“初始超文本传输协议(HTTP)方法注册”,RFC 7237,DOI 10.17487/RFC7237,2014年6月<>.

[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May 2014, <>.

[RFC7258]Farrell,S.和H.Tschofenig,“普遍监控是一种攻击”,BCP 188,RFC 7258,DOI 10.17487/RFC7258,2014年5月<>.

[RFC7469] Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April 2015, <>.

[RFC7469]Evans,C.,Palmer,C.,和R.Sleevi,“HTTP的公钥锁定扩展”,RFC 7469,DOI 10.17487/RFC7469,2015年4月<>.

[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540, DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, <>.

[RFC7540]Belshe,M.,Paon,R.,和M.Thomson,编辑,“超文本传输协议版本2(HTTP/2)”,RFC 7540,DOI 10.17487/RFC7540,2015年5月<>.

[RFC7574] Bakker, A., Petrocco, R., and V. Grishchenko, "Peer-to-Peer Streaming Peer Protocol (PPSPP)", RFC 7574, DOI 10.17487/RFC7574, July 2015, <>.

[RFC7574]Bakker,A.,Petrocco,R.,和V.Grishchenko,“对等流媒体对等协议(PPSP)”,RFC 7574,DOI 10.17487/RFC7574,2015年7月<>.

[RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T., Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann, "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624, DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015, <>.

[RFC7624]Barnes,R.,Schneier,B.,Jennings,C.,Hardie,T.,Trammell,B.,Huitema,C.,和D.Borkmann,“面对普遍监视的保密性:威胁模型和问题陈述”,RFC 7624,DOI 10.17487/RFC76242015年8月<>.

[RFC7626] Bortzmeyer, S., "DNS Privacy Considerations", RFC 7626, DOI 10.17487/RFC7626, August 2015, <>.

[RFC7626]Bortzmeyer,S.,“DNS隐私注意事项”,RFC 7626,DOI 10.17487/RFC7626,2015年8月<>.

[RFC7725] Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles", RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016, <>.

[RFC7725]Bray,T.,“报告法律障碍的HTTP状态代码”,RFC 7725,DOI 10.17487/RFC77252016年2月<>.

[RFC7754] Barnes, R., Cooper, A., Kolkman, O., Thaler, D., and E. Nordmark, "Technical Considerations for Internet Service Blocking and Filtering", RFC 7754, DOI 10.17487/RFC7754, March 2016, <>.

[RFC7754]Barnes,R.,Cooper,A.,Kolkman,O.,Thaler,D.,和E.Nordmark,“互联网服务阻塞和过滤的技术考虑”,RFC 7754,DOI 10.17487/RFC7754,2016年3月<>.

[RFC7858] Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D., and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May 2016, <>.

[RFC7858]Hu,Z.,Zhu,L.,Heidemann,J.,Mankin,A.,Wessels,D.,和P.Hoffman,“DNS传输层安全规范(TLS)”,RFC 7858,DOI 10.17487/RFC7858,2016年5月<>.

[RFC8164] Nottingham, M. and M. Thomson, "Opportunistic Security for HTTP/2", RFC 8164, DOI 10.17487/RFC8164, May 2017, <>.

[RFC8164]诺丁汉,M.和M.汤姆森,“HTTP/2的机会主义安全”,RFC 8164,DOI 10.17487/RFC8164,2017年5月<>.

[RFC8179] Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179, DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, May 2017, <>.

[RFC8179]Bradner,S.和J.Contreras,“IETF技术中的知识产权”,BCP 79,RFC 8179,DOI 10.17487/RFC8179,2017年5月<>.

[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, <>.

[RFC8200]Deering,S.和R.Hinden,“互联网协议,第6版(IPv6)规范”,STD 86,RFC 8200,DOI 10.17487/RFC8200,2017年7月<>.

[Rideout] Rideout, A., "Making security easier", July 2008, < making-security-easier.html>.

[Rideout]Rideout,A.,“使安全更容易”,2008年7月< 简化安全性。html>。

[Ritchie] Ritchie, J. and J. Lewis, "Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers", SAGE Publishing, London, 2003, < Qualitative-Research-Practice-Students-Researchers/ dp/0761971106>.

[Ritchie]Ritchie,J.和J.Lewis,“定性研究实践:社会科学学生和研究人员指南”,SAGE出版社,伦敦,2003年< 定性研究实习学生研究人员/dp/0761971106>。

[RSF] Reporters Without Borders (RSF), "Syria using 34 Blue Coat servers to spy on Internet users", January 2016, < syria-using-34-blue-coat-servers-spy-internet-users>.

[RSF]记者无国界组织(RSF),“叙利亚使用34台Blue Coat服务器监视互联网用户”,2016年1月< 叙利亚-using-34-blue-coat-servers-spy-internet-users>。

[Saltzer] Saltzer, J., Reed, D., and D. Clark, "End-to-End Arguments in System Design", ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS), Volume 2, Number 4, pp. 277-288, DOI 10.1145/357401.357402, November 1984.

[Saltzer]Saltzer,J.,Reed,D.,和D.Clark,“系统设计中的端到端参数”,ACM计算机系统交易(TOCS),第2卷,第4号,第277-288页,DOI 10.1145/357401.357402,1984年11月。

[Sandvine] Sandvine, "Sandvine: Over 70% Of North American Traffic Is Now Streaming Video And Audio", December 2015, < of-north-american-traffic-is-now-streaming-video-and-audio.html>.

[Sandvine]Sandvine,“Sandvine:70%以上的北美流量现在是流媒体视频和音频”,2015年12月< 现在,北美的大部分流量都是流式视频和音频.html>。

[Schillace] Schillace, S., "Default https access for Gmail", January 2010, < default-https-access-for-gmail.html>.

[Schillace]Schillace,S.,“Gmail默认https访问”,2010年1月< gmail.html>的默认https访问权限。

[Schneier] Schneier, B., "Attacking Tor: how the NSA targets users' online anonymity", October 2013, < tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity>.

[Schneier]Schneier,B.“攻击Tor:NSA如何针对用户的在线匿名性”,2013年10月< tor攻击nsa用户在线匿名>。

[SPIEGEL] SPIEGEL, "Prying Eyes - Inside the NSA's War on Internet Security", December 2014, < inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html>.

[明镜]明镜,“窥探的眼睛——美国国家安全局的网络安全战争”,2014年12月< inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html>。

[sslstrip] Marlinspike, M., "Software >> sslstrip", 2011, <>.


[techyum] Violet, "Official - Link Shortener Seized by Libyan Government", October 2010, < official-vb-ly-link-shortener-seized-by-libyan-government/>.

[techyum]Violet,“利比亚政府扣押的官方-vb.ly链接缩短器”,2010年10月< 利比亚政府抓获官方vb ly link shortener/>。

[TorProject] The Tor Project, "Anonymity Online", 2006, <>.


[torrentfreak1] Van der Sar, E., "Is Your ISP Messing With BitTorrent Traffic? Find Out", January 2014, <>.

[torrentfreak1]Van der Sar,E.,“你的ISP正在干扰BitTorrent流量吗?找出答案”,2014年1月<>.

[torrentfreak2] Andy, "Lawyers Sent 109,000 Piracy Threats in Germany During 2013", March 2014, < lawyers-sent-109000-piracy-threats-in-germany-during-2013-140304/>.

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[Ververis]Ververis,V.,Kargiotakis,G.,Filasto,A.,Fabian,B.,和A.Alexandros,“理解互联网审查政策:希腊案例”,第五届USENIX互联网自由开放通信研讨会(FOCI),2015年8月15日< conference/foci15/foci15文件ververis update.pdf>。

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[wikileaks] Sladek, T. and E. Broese, "Market Survey: Detection & Filtering Solutions to Identify File Transfer of Copyright Protected Content for Warner Bros. and movielabs", 2011, < EANTC-Survey-1.5-unsecured.pdf>.

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[WSJ] Sonne, P. and M. Coker, "Firms Aided Libyan Spies", The Wall Street Journal, August 2011, < SB10001424053111904199404576538721260166388>.

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[WynsbergheMoura] Nguyen, B., Ed., van Wynsberghe, A., van Wynsberghe, A., and G. Moreira Moura, "The concept of embedded values and the example of internet security", June 2013, <>.

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A special thanks to all members of the HRPC Research Group who contributed to this document. The following deserve a special mention:


- Joana Varon for helping draft the first iteration of the methodology and previous drafts, and for directing the film "Net of Rights" and working on the interviews at IETF 92 in Dallas.

- Joana Varon帮助起草了第一次迭代的方法和之前的草稿,导演了电影《权利网》,并在达拉斯IETF 92上进行了采访。

- Daniel Kahn Gillmor (dkg) for helping with the first iteration of the glossary (Section 2) as well as a lot of technical guidance, support, and language suggestions.

- Daniel Kahn Gillmor(dkg)帮助完成词汇表的第一次迭代(第2节),以及许多技术指导、支持和语言建议。

- Claudio Guarnieri for writing the first iterations of the case studies on VPNs, HTTP, and P2P.

- Claudio Guarnieri撰写了VPN、HTTP和P2P案例研究的第一次迭代。

- Will Scott for writing the first iterations of the case studies on DNS, IP, and XMPP.

- Will Scott感谢他撰写DNS、IP和XMPP案例研究的第一次迭代。

- Avri Doria for proposing writing a glossary in the first place, help with writing the initial proposals and Internet-Drafts, her reviews, and her contributions to the glossary.

- Avri Doria首先建议编写词汇表,帮助编写初始建议和互联网草案,她的评论,以及她对词汇表的贡献。

Thanks also to Stephane Bortzmeyer, John Curran, Barry Shein, Joe Hall, Joss Wright, Harry Halpin, and Tim Sammut, who made a lot of excellent suggestions, many of which found their way directly into the text. We want to thank Amelia Andersdotter, Stephen Farrell, Stephane Bortzmeyer, Shane Kerr, Giovane Moura, James Gannon, Alissa Cooper, Andrew Sullivan, S. Moonesamy, Roland Bless, and Scott Craig for their reviews and for testing the HRPC guidelines in the wild. We would also like to thank Molly Sauter, Arturo Filasto, Nathalie Marechal, Eleanor Saitta, Richard Hill, and all others who provided input on this document or the conceptualization of the idea. Thanks to Edward Snowden for his comments at IETF 93 in Prague regarding the impact of protocols on the rights of users.

还要感谢斯蒂芬·博茨迈耶、约翰·科伦、巴里·谢恩、乔·霍尔、乔斯·赖特、哈里·哈尔平和蒂姆·桑穆特,他们提出了许多非常好的建议,其中许多建议直接进入了文本。我们要感谢Amelia Andersdotter、Stephen Farrell、Stephane Bortzmeyer、Shane Kerr、Giovan Moura、James Gannon、Alissa Cooper、Andrew Sullivan、S.Moonesay、Roland Bless和Scott Craig的评论和在野外测试HRPC指南。我们还要感谢Molly Sauter、Arturo Filasto、Nathalie Marechal、Eleanor Saita、Richard Hill和所有其他为本文件或想法概念化提供意见的人。感谢Edward Snowden在布拉格IETF 93上就协议对用户权利的影响发表的评论。

Authors' Addresses


Niels ten Oever ARTICLE 19

Niels ten Oever第19条


Corinne Cath Oxford Internet Institute