Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         D. Thaler
Request for Comments: 8065                                     Microsoft
Category: Informational                                    February 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         D. Thaler
Request for Comments: 8065                                     Microsoft
Category: Informational                                    February 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721

Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation-Layer Mechanisms




This document discusses how a number of privacy threats apply to technologies designed for IPv6 over various link-layer protocols, and it provides advice to protocol designers on how to address such threats in adaptation-layer specifications for IPv6 over such links.


Status of This Memo


This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.


This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

本文件是互联网工程任务组(IETF)的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查,并已被互联网工程指导小组(IESG)批准出版。并非IESG批准的所有文件都适用于任何级别的互联网标准;见RFC 7841第2节。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at


Copyright Notice


Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.

版权所有(c)2017 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents ( in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件,因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本,并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。

Table of Contents


   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses  . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Potential Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Short Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses  . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Potential Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Short Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
1. Introduction
1. 介绍

RFC 6973 [RFC6973] discusses privacy considerations for Internet protocols, and Section 5.2 of that document covers a number of privacy-specific threats. In the context of IPv6 addresses, Section 3 of [RFC7721] provides further elaboration on the applicability of the privacy threats.

RFC 6973[RFC6973]讨论了互联网协议的隐私注意事项,该文件的第5.2节涵盖了一些特定于隐私的威胁。关于IPv6地址,[RFC7721]第3节进一步阐述了隐私威胁的适用性。

When interface identifiers (IIDs) are generated without sufficient entropy compared to the link lifetime, devices and users can become vulnerable to the various threats discussed there, including:


o Correlation of activities over time, if the same identifier is used for traffic over period of time

o 活动随时间的相关性,如果同一标识符用于一段时间内的流量

o Location tracking, if the same interface identifier is used with different prefixes as a device moves between different networks

o 位置跟踪,当设备在不同网络之间移动时,如果相同的接口标识符使用不同的前缀

o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation, if the identifier helps identify a vendor or version or protocol and hence suggests what types of attacks to try

o 如果标识符有助于识别供应商、版本或协议,从而建议尝试何种类型的攻击,则可利用特定于设备的漏洞进行攻击

o Address scanning, which enables all of the above attacks by off-link attackers. (On some Non-Broadcast Multi-Access (NBMA) links where all nodes aren't already privy to all on-link addresses, address scans might also be done by on-link attackers; however, in most cases, address scans are not an interesting threat from on-link attackers and thus address scans generally apply only to routable addresses.)

o 地址扫描,使脱离链接的攻击者能够进行上述所有攻击。(在某些非广播多址(NBMA)链路上,如果所有节点都不知道所有链路上的地址,则链路上的攻击者也可能会进行地址扫描;但是,在大多数情况下,地址扫描不是链路上攻击者的一个有趣威胁,因此地址扫描通常只适用于可路由地址。)

For example, for links that may last for years, "enough" bits of entropy means at least 46 or so bits (see Section 2 for why) in a routable address; ideally all 64 bits of the IID should be used, although historically some bits have been excluded for reasons


discussed in [RFC7421]. Link-local addresses can also be susceptible to the same privacy threats from off-link attackers, since experience shows they are often leaked by upper-layer protocols such as SMTP, SIP, or DNS.


For these reasons, [RFC8064] recommends using an address generation scheme in [RFC7217], rather than addresses generated from a fixed link-layer address.


Furthermore, to mitigate the threat of correlation of activities over time on long-lived links, [RFC4941] specifies the notion of a "temporary" address to be used for transport sessions (typically locally initiated outbound traffic to the Internet) that should not be linkable to a more permanent identifier such as a DNS name, user name, or fixed link-layer address. Indeed, the default address selection rules [RFC6724] now prefer temporary addresses by default for outgoing connections. If a device needs to simultaneously support unlinkable traffic as well as traffic that is linkable to such a stable identifier, supporting simultaneous use of multiple addresses per device is necessary.


2. Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses
2. 全局地址中所需的熵量

In terms of privacy threats discussed in [RFC7721], the one with the need for the most entropy is address scans of routable addresses. To mitigate address scans, one needs enough entropy to make the probability of a successful address probe be negligible. Typically, this is measured in the length of time it would take to have a 50% probability of getting at least one hit. Address scans often rely on sending a packet such as a TCP SYN or ICMP Echo Request, then determining whether the reply is a) an ICMP unreachable error (if no host exists with that address), b) a TCP response or ICMP Echo Reply (if a host exists), or c) none of those, in which case nothing is known for certain.

就[RFC7721]中讨论的隐私威胁而言,需要最大熵的是可路由地址的地址扫描。为了减少地址扫描,需要足够的熵使成功的地址探测概率可以忽略不计。通常,这是以获得至少一次命中的50%概率所需的时间长度来衡量的。地址扫描通常依赖于发送数据包,如TCP SYN或ICMP回显请求,然后确定回复是否为a)ICMP不可访问错误(如果不存在具有该地址的主机),b)TCP响应或ICMP回显回复(如果主机存在),或c)这些都不存在,在这种情况下,无法确定。

Many privacy-sensitive devices support a "stealth mode" as discussed in Section 5 of [RFC7288] or are behind a network firewall that will drop unsolicited inbound traffic (e.g., TCP SYNs, ICMP Echo Requests, etc.) and thus no TCP RST or ICMP Echo Reply will be sent. In such cases, and when the device does not listen on a well-known TCP or UDP port known to the scanner, the effectiveness of an address scan is limited by the ability to get ICMP unreachable errors, since the attacker can only infer the presence of a host based on the absence of an ICMP unreachable error.

许多隐私敏感设备支持[RFC7288]第5节中讨论的“隐形模式”,或者位于网络防火墙后面,该防火墙将丢弃未经请求的入站流量(例如TCP SYN、ICMP回显请求等),因此不会发送TCP RST或ICMP回显回复。在这种情况下,当设备未在扫描器已知的TCP或UDP端口上侦听时,地址扫描的有效性受到获取ICMP不可访问错误的能力的限制,因为攻击者只能根据不存在ICMP不可访问错误来推断主机的存在。

Generation of ICMP unreachable errors is typically rate limited to 2 per second (the default in routers such as Cisco routers running IOS 12.0 or later). Such a rate results in taking about a year to completely scan 26 bits of space.

ICMP不可访问错误的生成速率通常限制为每秒2次(在运行IOS 12.0或更高版本的Cisco路由器等路由器中为默认值)。这样的速度导致大约需要一年时间才能完全扫描26位空间。

The actual math is as follows. Let 2^N be the number of devices on the subnet. Let 2^M be the size of the space to scan (i.e., M bits of entropy). Let S be the number of scan attempts. The formula for a 50% chance of getting at least one hit in S attempts is: P(at least one success) = 1 - (1 - 2^N/2^M)^S = 1/2. Assuming 2^M >> S, this simplifies to: S * 2^N/2^M = 1/2, giving S = 2^(M-N-1), or M = N + 1 + log_2(S). Using a scan rate of 2 per second, this results in the following rule of thumb:


      Bits of entropy needed =
         log_2(# devices per link) + log_2(seconds of link lifetime) + 2
      Bits of entropy needed =
         log_2(# devices per link) + log_2(seconds of link lifetime) + 2

For example, for a network with at most 2^16 devices on the same long-lived link, where the average lifetime of a link is 8 years (2^28 seconds) or less, this results in a need for at least 46 bits of entropy (16+28+2) so that an address scan would need to be sustained for longer than the lifetime of the link to have a 50% chance of getting a hit.


Although 46 bits of entropy may be enough to provide privacy in such cases, 59 or more bits of entropy would be needed if addresses are used to provide security against attacks such as spoofing, as CGAs [RFC3972] and HBAs [RFC5535] do, since attacks are not limited by ICMP rate limiting but by the processing power of the attacker. See those RFCs for more discussion.


If, on the other hand, the devices being scanned for respond to unsolicited inbound packets, then the address scan is not limited by the ICMP unreachable rate limit in routers, since an adversary can determine the presence of a host without them. In such cases, more bits of entropy would be needed to provide the same level of protection.


3. Potential Approaches
3. 潜在途径

The table below shows the number of bits of entropy currently available in various technologies:


      | Technology    | Reference                | Bits of Entropy    |
      | 802.15.4      | [RFC4944]                | 16+ or any EUI-64  |
      | Bluetooth LE  | [RFC7668]                | 48                 |
      | DECT ULE      | [DECT-ULE]               | 40 or any EUI-48   |
      | MS/TP         | [IPv6-over-MSTP]         | 7 or 64            |
      | ITU-T G.9959  | [RFC7428]                | 8                  |
      | NFC           | [IPv6-over-NFC]          | 5                  |
      | Technology    | Reference                | Bits of Entropy    |
      | 802.15.4      | [RFC4944]                | 16+ or any EUI-64  |
      | Bluetooth LE  | [RFC7668]                | 48                 |
      | DECT ULE      | [DECT-ULE]               | 40 or any EUI-48   |
      | MS/TP         | [IPv6-over-MSTP]         | 7 or 64            |
      | ITU-T G.9959  | [RFC7428]                | 8                  |
      | NFC           | [IPv6-over-NFC]          | 5                  |

Such technologies generally support either IEEE identifiers or so called "Short Addresses", or both, as link-layer addresses. We discuss each in turn.


3.1. IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses
3.1. IEEE基于标识符的地址

Some technologies allow the use of IEEE EUI-48 or EUI-64 identifiers or allow the use of an arbitrary 64-bit identifier. Using such an identifier to construct IPv6 addresses makes it easy to use the normal LOWPAN_IPHC encoding [RFC6282] with stateless compression, which allows such IPv6 addresses to be fully elided in common cases.

某些技术允许使用IEEE EUI-48或EUI-64标识符,或允许使用任意64位标识符。使用这样一个标识符来构造IPv6地址可以很容易地使用带有无状态压缩的普通LOWPAN_IPHC编码[RFC6282],这使得在常见情况下可以完全省略此类IPv6地址。

Global addresses with interface identifiers formed from IEEE identifiers can have insufficient entropy to mitigate address scans unless the IEEE identifier itself has sufficient entropy and enough bits of entropy are carried over into the IPv6 address to sufficiently mitigate the threats. Privacy threats other than "Correlation over time" can be mitigated using per-network randomized link-layer addresses with enough entropy compared to the link lifetime. A number of such proposals can be found at <>, and Section 10.8 of [BTCorev4.1] specifies one for Bluetooth. Using routable IPv6 addresses derived from such link-layer addresses would be roughly equivalent to those specified in [RFC7217].


Correlation over time (for all addresses, not just routable addresses) can be mitigated if the link-layer address itself changes often enough, such as each time the link is established, if the link lifetime is short. For further discussion, see [RANDOM-ADDR].


Another potential concern is that of efficiency, such as avoiding Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) altogether when IPv6 addresses are based on IEEE identifiers. Appendix A of [RFC4429] provides an analysis of address-collision probability based on the number of bits of entropy. A simple web search on "duplicate MAC addresses" will show that collisions do happen with MAC addresses; thus, based on the analysis in [RFC4429], using sufficient bits of entropy in random addresses can provide greater protection against collision than using MAC addresses.


3.2. Short Addresses
3.2. 简短地址

A routable IPv6 address with an interface identifier formed from the combination of a "Short Address" and a set of well-known constant bits (such as padding with 0's) lacks sufficient entropy to mitigate address scanning unless the link lifetime is extremely short. Furthermore, an adversary could also use statistical methods to determine the size of the L2 address space and thereby make some inference regarding the underlying technology on a given link, and target further attacks accordingly.


When Short Addresses are desired on links that are not guaranteed to have a short enough lifetime, the mechanism for constructing an IPv6 interface identifier from a Short Address could be designed to sufficiently mitigate the problem. For example, if all nodes on a given L2 network have a shared secret (such as the key needed to get on the layer-2 network), the 64-bit IID might be generated using a one-way hash that includes (at least) the shared secret together with the Short Address. The use of such a hash would result in the IIDs being spread out among the full range of IID address space, thus mitigating address scans while still allowing full stateless compression/elision.


For long-lived links, "temporary" addresses might even be generated in the same way by (for example) also including in the hash the Version Number from the Authoritative Border Router Option (Section 4.3 of [RFC6775]), if any. This would allow changing temporary addresses whenever the Version Number is changed, even if the set of prefix or context information is unchanged.


In summary, any specification using Short Addresses should carefully construct an IID generation mechanism so as to provide sufficient entropy compared to the link lifetime.


4. Recommendations
4. 建议

The following are recommended for adaptation-layer specifications:


o Security (privacy) sections should say how address scans are mitigated. An address scan might be mitigated by having a link always be short-lived, by having a large number of bits of entropy in routable addresses, or by some combination thereof. Thus, a specification should explain what the maximum lifetime of a link is in practice and show how the number of bits of entropy is sufficient given that lifetime.

o 安全(隐私)部分应说明如何减轻地址扫描。地址扫描可以通过使链接总是短命的、在可路由地址中具有大量的熵位或者通过它们的一些组合来减轻。因此,规范应该解释实际链路的最大生存期是什么,并说明在给定生存期的情况下,熵的位数是如何足够的。

o Technologies should define a way to include sufficient bits of entropy in the IPv6 interface identifier, based on the maximum link lifetime. Specifying that randomized link-layer addresses can be used is one easy way to do so, for technologies that support such identifiers.

o 技术应该定义一种方法,根据最大链路寿命,在IPv6接口标识符中包含足够的熵位。对于支持这种标识符的技术来说,指定可以使用随机链路层地址是一种简单的方法。

o Specifications should not simply construct an IPv6 interface identifier by padding a Short Address with a set of other well-known constant bits, unless the link lifetime is guaranteed to be extremely short or the Short Address is allocated by the network (rather than being constant in the node). This also applies to link-local addresses if the same Short Address is used independent of network and is unique enough to allow location tracking.

o 规范不应简单地通过用一组其他众所周知的常量位填充短地址来构造IPv6接口标识符,除非链路寿命保证非常短,或者短地址由网络分配(而不是在节点中保持常量)。如果独立于网络使用相同的短地址,并且其唯一性足以允许位置跟踪,则这也适用于链路本地地址。

o Specifications should make sure that an IPv6 address can change over long periods of time. For example, the interface identifier might change each time a device connects to the network (if connections are short) or might change each day (if connections can be long). This is necessary to mitigate correlation over time.

o 规范应确保IPv6地址可以长时间更改。例如,接口标识符可能会在设备每次连接到网络时更改(如果连接较短),也可能每天更改(如果连接可能较长)。这对于缓解随时间变化的相关性是必要的。

o If a device can roam between networks and more than a few bits of entropy exist in the IPv6 interface identifier, then make sure that the interface identifier can vary per network as the device roams. This is necessary to mitigate location tracking.

o 如果设备可以在网络之间漫游,并且IPv6接口标识符中存在超过几位的熵,那么请确保接口标识符可以随设备漫游而随网络变化。这对于减少位置跟踪是必要的。

5. Security Considerations
5. 安全考虑

This entire document is about security considerations and how to specify possible mitigations.


6. Informative References
6. 资料性引用

[BTCorev4.1] Bluetooth, "Specification of the Bluetooth System", Covered Core Package version: 4.1, December 2013, < DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=282159>.

[BTCorev4.1]蓝牙,“蓝牙系统规范”,涵盖的核心包版本:4.11913年12月< 下载doc.ashx?doc_id=282159>。

[DECT-ULE] Mariager, P., Petersen, J., Ed., Shelby, Z., Van de Logt, M., and D. Barthel, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over DECT Ultra Low Energy", draft-ietf-6lo-dect-ule-09, Work in Progress, December 2016.

[DECT-ULE]Mariager,P.,Petersen,J.,Ed.,Shelby,Z.,Van de Logt,M.,和D.Barthel,“通过DECT超低能量传输IPv6数据包”,草案-ietf-6lo-DECT-ULE-09,正在进行的工作,2016年12月。

[IPv6-over-MSTP] Lynn, K., Ed., Martocci, J., Neilson, C., and S. Donaldson, "Transmission of IPv6 over MS/TP Networks", draft-ietf-6lo-6lobac-06, Work in Progress, October 2016.

[IPv6 over MSTP]Lynn,K.,Ed.,Martocci,J.,Neilson,C.,和S.Donaldson,“通过MS/TP网络传输IPv6”,草案-ietf-6lo-6lobac-06,正在进行的工作,2016年10月。

[IPv6-over-NFC] Choi, Y-H., Hong, Y-G., Youn, J-S., Kim, D-K., and J-H. Choi, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Near Field Communication", draft-ietf-6lo-nfc-05, Work in Progress, October 2016.

[IPv6 over NFC]Choi,Y-H.,Hong,Y-G.,Youn,J-S.,Kim,D-K.,和J-H.Choi,“通过近场通信传输IPv6数据包”,草案-ietf-6lo-NFC-05,正在进行的工作,2016年10月。

[RANDOM-ADDR] Huitema, C., "Implications of Randomized Link Layers Addresses for IPv6 Address Assignment", draft-huitema-6man-random-addresses-03, Work in Progress, March 2016.


[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, <>.

[RFC3972]Aura,T.,“加密生成地址(CGA)”,RFC 3972,DOI 10.17487/RFC3972,2005年3月<>.

[RFC4429] Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) for IPv6", RFC 4429, DOI 10.17487/RFC4429, April 2006, <>.

[RFC4429]Moore,N.,“IPv6的乐观重复地址检测(DAD)”,RFC 4429,DOI 10.17487/RFC4429,2006年4月<>.

[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, <>.

[RFC4941]Narten,T.,Draves,R.,和S.Krishnan,“IPv6中无状态地址自动配置的隐私扩展”,RFC 4941,DOI 10.17487/RFC49411907年9月<>.

[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007, <>.

[RFC4944]黑山,G.,Kushalnagar,N.,Hui,J.,和D.Culler,“通过IEEE 802.15.4网络传输IPv6数据包”,RFC 4944,DOI 10.17487/RFC4944,2007年9月<>.

[RFC5535] Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535, DOI 10.17487/RFC5535, June 2009, <>.

[RFC5535]Bagnulo,M.,“基于哈希的地址(HBA)”,RFC 5535,DOI 10.17487/RFC55352009年6月<>.

[RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed., and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282, DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011, <>.

[RFC6282]Hui,J.,Ed.,和P.Thubert,“基于IEEE 802.15.4的网络上IPv6数据报的压缩格式”,RFC 6282,DOI 10.17487/RFC6282,2011年9月<>.

[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, <>.

[RFC6724]Thaler,D.,Ed.,Draves,R.,Matsumoto,A.,和T.Chown,“互联网协议版本6(IPv6)的默认地址选择”,RFC 6724,DOI 10.17487/RFC67242012年9月<>.

[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012, <>.

[RFC6775]Shelby,Z.,Ed.,Chakrabarti,S.,Nordmark,E.,和C.Bormann,“低功率无线个人区域网络(6LoWPANs)上IPv6邻居发现优化”,RFC 6775,DOI 10.17487/RFC67752012年11月<>.

[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <>.

[RFC6973]Cooper,A.,Tschofenig,H.,Aboba,B.,Peterson,J.,Morris,J.,Hansen,M.,和R.Smith,“互联网协议的隐私考虑”,RFC 6973,DOI 10.17487/RFC6973,2013年7月<>.

[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, <>.

[RFC7217]Gont,F.“使用IPv6无状态地址自动配置(SLAAC)生成语义不透明接口标识符的方法”,RFC 7217,DOI 10.17487/RFC72172014年4月<>.

[RFC7288] Thaler, D., "Reflections on Host Firewalls", RFC 7288, DOI 10.17487/RFC7288, June 2014, <>.

[RFC7288]Thaler,D.,“关于主机防火墙的思考”,RFC 7288,DOI 10.17487/RFC7288,2014年6月<>.

[RFC7421] Carpenter, B., Ed., Chown, T., Gont, F., Jiang, S., Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421, DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, January 2015, <>.

[RFC7421]Carpenter,B.,Ed.,Chown,T.,Gont,F.,Jiang,S.,Petrescu,A.,和A.Yourtchenko,“IPv6寻址中64位边界的分析”,RFC 7421,DOI 10.17487/RFC7421,2015年1月<>.

[RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015, <>.

[RFC7428]Brandt,A.和J.Buron,“通过ITU-T G.9959网络传输IPv6数据包”,RFC 7428,DOI 10.17487/RFC7428,2015年2月<>.

[RFC7668] Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B., Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "IPv6 over BLUETOOTH(R) Low Energy", RFC 7668, DOI 10.17487/RFC7668, October 2015, <>.

[RFC7668]Nieminen,J.,Savolainen,T.,Isomaki,M.,Patil,B.,Shelby,Z.,和C.Gomez,“蓝牙(R)低能量IPv6”,RFC 7668,DOI 10.17487/RFC7668,2015年10月<>.

[RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016, <>.

[RFC7721]Cooper,A.,Gont,F.,和D.Thaler,“IPv6地址生成机制的安全和隐私考虑”,RFC 7721,DOI 10.17487/RFC7721,2016年3月<>.

[RFC8064] Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu, "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers", RFC 8064, February 2017, <>.

[RFC8064]Gont,F.,Cooper,A.,Thaler,D.,和W.Liu,“关于稳定IPv6接口标识符的建议”,RFC 8064,2017年2月<>.

Author's Address


Dave Thaler Microsoft One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 United States of America

Dave Thaler Microsoft One Microsoft Way Redmond,WA 98052美利坚合众国