RFC 8065: Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation-Layer Mechanisms 中文翻译

URL : https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8065
标题 : RFC 8065
翻译类型 : 自动生成

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         D. Thaler
Request for Comments: 8065                                     Microsoft
Category: Informational                                    February 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         D. Thaler
Request for Comments: 8065                                     Microsoft
Category: Informational                                    February 2017
ISSN: 2070-1721

Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Adaptation-Layer Mechanisms

IPv6适配层机制的隐私注意事项

Abstract

摘要

This document discusses how a number of privacy threats apply to technologies designed for IPv6 over various link-layer protocols, and it provides advice to protocol designers on how to address such threats in adaptation-layer specifications for IPv6 over such links.

本文档讨论了许多隐私威胁如何应用于各种链路层协议上的IPv6技术，并就如何在此类链路上的IPv6适配层规范中解决此类威胁向协议设计人员提供了建议。

Status of This Memo

关于下段备忘

This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.

本文件不是互联网标准跟踪规范；它是为了提供信息而发布的。

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.

本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。并非IESG批准的所有文件都适用于任何级别的互联网标准；见RFC 7841第2节。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8065.

有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8065.

版权公告

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses  . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Potential Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Short Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses  . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Potential Approaches  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Short Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9

1. Introduction

1. 介绍

RFC 6973 [RFC6973] discusses privacy considerations for Internet protocols, and Section 5.2 of that document covers a number of privacy-specific threats. In the context of IPv6 addresses, Section 3 of [RFC7721] provides further elaboration on the applicability of the privacy threats.

RFC 6973[RFC6973]讨论了互联网协议的隐私注意事项，该文件的第5.2节涵盖了一些特定于隐私的威胁。关于IPv6地址，[RFC7721]第3节进一步阐述了隐私威胁的适用性。

When interface identifiers (IIDs) are generated without sufficient entropy compared to the link lifetime, devices and users can become vulnerable to the various threats discussed there, including:

如果生成的接口标识符（IID）与链路寿命相比没有足够的熵，则设备和用户可能容易受到此处讨论的各种威胁的攻击，包括：

o Correlation of activities over time, if the same identifier is used for traffic over period of time

o 活动随时间的相关性，如果同一标识符用于一段时间内的流量

o Location tracking, if the same interface identifier is used with different prefixes as a device moves between different networks

o 位置跟踪，当设备在不同网络之间移动时，如果相同的接口标识符使用不同的前缀

o Device-specific vulnerability exploitation, if the identifier helps identify a vendor or version or protocol and hence suggests what types of attacks to try

o 如果标识符有助于识别供应商、版本或协议，从而建议尝试何种类型的攻击，则可利用特定于设备的漏洞进行攻击

o Address scanning, which enables all of the above attacks by off-link attackers. (On some Non-Broadcast Multi-Access (NBMA) links where all nodes aren't already privy to all on-link addresses, address scans might also be done by on-link attackers; however, in most cases, address scans are not an interesting threat from on-link attackers and thus address scans generally apply only to routable addresses.)

o 地址扫描，使脱离链接的攻击者能够进行上述所有攻击。（在某些非广播多址（NBMA）链路上，如果所有节点都不知道所有链路上的地址，则链路上的攻击者也可能会进行地址扫描；但是，在大多数情况下，地址扫描不是链路上攻击者的一个有趣威胁，因此地址扫描通常只适用于可路由地址。）

For example, for links that may last for years, "enough" bits of entropy means at least 46 or so bits (see Section 2 for why) in a routable address; ideally all 64 bits of the IID should be used, although historically some bits have been excluded for reasons

例如，对于可能持续数年的链路，熵的“足够”位意味着在可路由地址中至少46位左右（参见第2节了解原因）；理想情况下，应使用IID的所有64位，尽管历史上出于某些原因排除了某些位

discussed in [RFC7421]. Link-local addresses can also be susceptible to the same privacy threats from off-link attackers, since experience shows they are often leaked by upper-layer protocols such as SMTP, SIP, or DNS.

在[RFC7421]中讨论。链路本地地址也容易受到来自断开链路攻击者的相同隐私威胁，因为经验表明，它们经常被上层协议（如SMTP、SIP或DNS）泄漏。

For these reasons, [RFC8064] recommends using an address generation scheme in [RFC7217], rather than addresses generated from a fixed link-layer address.

出于这些原因，[RFC8064]建议使用[RFC7217]中的地址生成方案，而不是从固定链路层地址生成的地址。

Furthermore, to mitigate the threat of correlation of activities over time on long-lived links, [RFC4941] specifies the notion of a "temporary" address to be used for transport sessions (typically locally initiated outbound traffic to the Internet) that should not be linkable to a more permanent identifier such as a DNS name, user name, or fixed link-layer address. Indeed, the default address selection rules [RFC6724] now prefer temporary addresses by default for outgoing connections. If a device needs to simultaneously support unlinkable traffic as well as traffic that is linkable to such a stable identifier, supporting simultaneous use of multiple addresses per device is necessary.

此外，为了缓解长期链路上活动随时间的相关性所带来的威胁，[RFC4941]规定了用于传输会话（通常是本地发起的互联网出站流量）的“临时”地址的概念，该地址不应链接到更永久的标识符，如DNS名称、用户名、，或固定链路层地址。事实上，默认地址选择规则[RFC6724]现在对于传出连接，默认情况下更倾向于使用临时地址。如果设备需要同时支持不可链接的通信量以及可链接到这种稳定标识符的通信量，则需要支持每个设备同时使用多个地址。

2. Amount of Entropy Needed in Global Addresses

2. 全局地址中所需的熵量

In terms of privacy threats discussed in [RFC7721], the one with the need for the most entropy is address scans of routable addresses. To mitigate address scans, one needs enough entropy to make the probability of a successful address probe be negligible. Typically, this is measured in the length of time it would take to have a 50% probability of getting at least one hit. Address scans often rely on sending a packet such as a TCP SYN or ICMP Echo Request, then determining whether the reply is a) an ICMP unreachable error (if no host exists with that address), b) a TCP response or ICMP Echo Reply (if a host exists), or c) none of those, in which case nothing is known for certain.

就[RFC7721]中讨论的隐私威胁而言，需要最大熵的是可路由地址的地址扫描。为了减少地址扫描，需要足够的熵使成功的地址探测概率可以忽略不计。通常，这是以获得至少一次命中的50%概率所需的时间长度来衡量的。地址扫描通常依赖于发送数据包，如TCP SYN或ICMP回显请求，然后确定回复是否为a）ICMP不可访问错误（如果不存在具有该地址的主机），b）TCP响应或ICMP回显回复（如果主机存在），或c）这些都不存在，在这种情况下，无法确定。

Many privacy-sensitive devices support a "stealth mode" as discussed in Section 5 of [RFC7288] or are behind a network firewall that will drop unsolicited inbound traffic (e.g., TCP SYNs, ICMP Echo Requests, etc.) and thus no TCP RST or ICMP Echo Reply will be sent. In such cases, and when the device does not listen on a well-known TCP or UDP port known to the scanner, the effectiveness of an address scan is limited by the ability to get ICMP unreachable errors, since the attacker can only infer the presence of a host based on the absence of an ICMP unreachable error.

许多隐私敏感设备支持[RFC7288]第5节中讨论的“隐形模式”，或者位于网络防火墙后面，该防火墙将丢弃未经请求的入站流量（例如TCP SYN、ICMP回显请求等），因此不会发送TCP RST或ICMP回显回复。在这种情况下，当设备未在扫描器已知的TCP或UDP端口上侦听时，地址扫描的有效性受到获取ICMP不可访问错误的能力的限制，因为攻击者只能根据不存在ICMP不可访问错误来推断主机的存在。

Generation of ICMP unreachable errors is typically rate limited to 2 per second (the default in routers such as Cisco routers running IOS 12.0 or later). Such a rate results in taking about a year to completely scan 26 bits of space.

ICMP不可访问错误的生成速率通常限制为每秒2次（在运行IOS 12.0或更高版本的Cisco路由器等路由器中为默认值）。这样的速度导致大约需要一年时间才能完全扫描26位空间。

The actual math is as follows. Let 2^N be the number of devices on the subnet. Let 2^M be the size of the space to scan (i.e., M bits of entropy). Let S be the number of scan attempts. The formula for a 50% chance of getting at least one hit in S attempts is: P(at least one success) = 1 - (1 - 2^N/2^M)^S = 1/2. Assuming 2^M >> S, this simplifies to: S * 2^N/2^M = 1/2, giving S = 2^(M-N-1), or M = N + 1 + log_2(S). Using a scan rate of 2 per second, this results in the following rule of thumb:

实际计算如下。设2^N为子网上的设备数。设2^M为要扫描的空间大小（即，熵的M位）。让我们来计算扫描尝试的次数。在S次尝试中至少命中一次的50%几率公式是：P（至少一次成功）=1-（1-2^N/2^M）^S=1/2。假设2^M>>S，这将简化为：S*2^N/2^M=1/2，给出S=2^（M-N-1）或M=N+1+log_2（S）。使用每秒2次的扫描速率，会产生以下经验法则：

      Bits of entropy needed =
         log_2(# devices per link) + log_2(seconds of link lifetime) + 2

      Bits of entropy needed =
         log_2(# devices per link) + log_2(seconds of link lifetime) + 2

For example, for a network with at most 2^16 devices on the same long-lived link, where the average lifetime of a link is 8 years (2^28 seconds) or less, this results in a need for at least 46 bits of entropy (16+28+2) so that an address scan would need to be sustained for longer than the lifetime of the link to have a 50% chance of getting a hit.

例如，对于同一长寿命链路上最多有2^16个设备的网络，其中链路的平均寿命为8年（2^28秒）或更短，这导致至少需要46位熵（16+28+2），因此地址扫描需要持续超过链路的寿命，才能有50%的命中率。

Although 46 bits of entropy may be enough to provide privacy in such cases, 59 or more bits of entropy would be needed if addresses are used to provide security against attacks such as spoofing, as CGAs [RFC3972] and HBAs [RFC5535] do, since attacks are not limited by ICMP rate limiting but by the processing power of the attacker. See those RFCs for more discussion.

虽然46位的熵可能足以在这种情况下提供隐私，但如果地址用于提供针对欺骗等攻击的安全性，则需要59位或更多的熵，正如CGA[RFC3972]和HBA[RFC5535]所做的那样，因为攻击不受ICMP速率限制，而是受攻击者处理能力的限制。更多讨论请参见这些RFC。

If, on the other hand, the devices being scanned for respond to unsolicited inbound packets, then the address scan is not limited by the ICMP unreachable rate limit in routers, since an adversary can determine the presence of a host without them. In such cases, more bits of entropy would be needed to provide the same level of protection.

另一方面，如果被扫描的设备对未经请求的入站数据包作出响应，则地址扫描不受路由器中ICMP不可到达速率限制的限制，因为对手可以在没有它们的情况下确定主机的存在。在这种情况下，需要更多的熵位来提供相同级别的保护。

3. Potential Approaches

3. 潜在途径

The table below shows the number of bits of entropy currently available in various technologies:

下表显示了目前各种技术中可用的熵位数：

      +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
      | Technology    | Reference                | Bits of Entropy    |
      +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
      | 802.15.4      | [RFC4944]                | 16+ or any EUI-64  |
      | Bluetooth LE  | [RFC7668]                | 48                 |
      | DECT ULE      | [DECT-ULE]               | 40 or any EUI-48   |
      | MS/TP         | [IPv6-over-MSTP]         | 7 or 64            |
      | ITU-T G.9959  | [RFC7428]                | 8                  |
      | NFC           | [IPv6-over-NFC]          | 5                  |
      +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+

      +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
      | Technology    | Reference                | Bits of Entropy    |
      +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+
      | 802.15.4      | [RFC4944]                | 16+ or any EUI-64  |
      | Bluetooth LE  | [RFC7668]                | 48                 |
      | DECT ULE      | [DECT-ULE]               | 40 or any EUI-48   |
      | MS/TP         | [IPv6-over-MSTP]         | 7 or 64            |
      | ITU-T G.9959  | [RFC7428]                | 8                  |
      | NFC           | [IPv6-over-NFC]          | 5                  |
      +---------------+--------------------------+--------------------+

Such technologies generally support either IEEE identifiers or so called "Short Addresses", or both, as link-layer addresses. We discuss each in turn.

这些技术通常支持IEEE标识符或所谓的“短地址”，或两者都支持，作为链路层地址。我们依次讨论每一个问题。

3.1. IEEE-Identifier-Based Addresses

3.1. IEEE基于标识符的地址

Some technologies allow the use of IEEE EUI-48 or EUI-64 identifiers or allow the use of an arbitrary 64-bit identifier. Using such an identifier to construct IPv6 addresses makes it easy to use the normal LOWPAN_IPHC encoding [RFC6282] with stateless compression, which allows such IPv6 addresses to be fully elided in common cases.

某些技术允许使用IEEE EUI-48或EUI-64标识符，或允许使用任意64位标识符。使用这样一个标识符来构造IPv6地址可以很容易地使用带有无状态压缩的普通LOWPAN_IPHC编码[RFC6282]，这使得在常见情况下可以完全省略此类IPv6地址。

Global addresses with interface identifiers formed from IEEE identifiers can have insufficient entropy to mitigate address scans unless the IEEE identifier itself has sufficient entropy and enough bits of entropy are carried over into the IPv6 address to sufficiently mitigate the threats. Privacy threats other than "Correlation over time" can be mitigated using per-network randomized link-layer addresses with enough entropy compared to the link lifetime. A number of such proposals can be found at <https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/documents>, and Section 10.8 of [BTCorev4.1] specifies one for Bluetooth. Using routable IPv6 addresses derived from such link-layer addresses would be roughly equivalent to those specified in [RFC7217].

具有由IEEE标识符形成的接口标识符的全局地址可能没有足够的熵来减轻地址扫描，除非IEEE标识符本身有足够的熵，并且有足够的熵位带入IPv6地址以充分减轻威胁。使用与链路寿命相比具有足够熵的每网络随机链路层地址，可以缓解除“随时间相关”之外的隐私威胁。许多这样的建议可以在<https://mentor.ieee.org/privecsg/documents>，并且[BTCorev4.1]的第10.8节指定了一个蓝牙。使用从此类链路层地址派生的可路由IPv6地址大致相当于[RFC7217]中指定的地址。

Correlation over time (for all addresses, not just routable addresses) can be mitigated if the link-layer address itself changes often enough, such as each time the link is established, if the link lifetime is short. For further discussion, see [RANDOM-ADDR].

如果链路层地址本身变化足够频繁，例如每次建立链路时，如果链路寿命较短，则可以缓解随时间的相关性（对于所有地址，而不仅仅是可路由地址）。有关进一步讨论，请参阅[RANDOM-ADDR]。

Another potential concern is that of efficiency, such as avoiding Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) altogether when IPv6 addresses are based on IEEE identifiers. Appendix A of [RFC4429] provides an analysis of address-collision probability based on the number of bits of entropy. A simple web search on "duplicate MAC addresses" will show that collisions do happen with MAC addresses; thus, based on the analysis in [RFC4429], using sufficient bits of entropy in random addresses can provide greater protection against collision than using MAC addresses.

另一个潜在的问题是效率问题，例如当IPv6地址基于IEEE标识符时，完全避免重复地址检测（DAD）。[RFC4429]的附录A提供了基于熵位数的地址冲突概率分析。在“重复MAC地址”上进行简单的web搜索将显示MAC地址确实发生冲突；因此，根据[RFC4429]中的分析，与使用MAC地址相比，在随机地址中使用足够的熵位可以提供更好的防冲突保护。

3.2. Short Addresses

3.2. 简短地址

A routable IPv6 address with an interface identifier formed from the combination of a "Short Address" and a set of well-known constant bits (such as padding with 0's) lacks sufficient entropy to mitigate address scanning unless the link lifetime is extremely short. Furthermore, an adversary could also use statistical methods to determine the size of the L2 address space and thereby make some inference regarding the underlying technology on a given link, and target further attacks accordingly.

由“短地址”和一组众所周知的常量位（例如用0填充）组合而成的具有接口标识符的可路由IPv6地址缺少足够的熵来减轻地址扫描，除非链路生存期非常短。此外，对手还可以使用统计方法确定L2地址空间的大小，从而对给定链路上的底层技术进行推断，并相应地针对进一步的攻击。

When Short Addresses are desired on links that are not guaranteed to have a short enough lifetime, the mechanism for constructing an IPv6 interface identifier from a Short Address could be designed to sufficiently mitigate the problem. For example, if all nodes on a given L2 network have a shared secret (such as the key needed to get on the layer-2 network), the 64-bit IID might be generated using a one-way hash that includes (at least) the shared secret together with the Short Address. The use of such a hash would result in the IIDs being spread out among the full range of IID address space, thus mitigating address scans while still allowing full stateless compression/elision.

当在不保证具有足够短的生存期的链路上需要短地址时，可以设计用于从短地址构造IPv6接口标识符的机制来充分缓解该问题。例如，如果给定L2网络上的所有节点都具有共享密钥（例如进入第2层网络所需的密钥），则可以使用单向散列生成64位IID，该单向散列包括（至少）共享密钥和短地址。使用这种散列将导致IID分布在整个IID地址空间范围内，从而减少地址扫描，同时仍然允许完全无状态压缩/省略。

For long-lived links, "temporary" addresses might even be generated in the same way by (for example) also including in the hash the Version Number from the Authoritative Border Router Option (Section 4.3 of [RFC6775]), if any. This would allow changing temporary addresses whenever the Version Number is changed, even if the set of prefix or context information is unchanged.

对于长寿命链接，“临时”地址甚至可能以相同的方式生成（例如）在散列中还包括来自权威边界路由器选项（RFC6775的第4.3节）的版本号（如有）。这将允许在版本号更改时更改临时地址，即使前缀或上下文信息集不变。

In summary, any specification using Short Addresses should carefully construct an IID generation mechanism so as to provide sufficient entropy compared to the link lifetime.

总之，任何使用短地址的规范都应该仔细构造IID生成机制，以便与链路寿命相比提供足够的熵。

4. Recommendations

4. 建议

The following are recommended for adaptation-layer specifications:

以下是适配层规范的建议：

o Security (privacy) sections should say how address scans are mitigated. An address scan might be mitigated by having a link always be short-lived, by having a large number of bits of entropy in routable addresses, or by some combination thereof. Thus, a specification should explain what the maximum lifetime of a link is in practice and show how the number of bits of entropy is sufficient given that lifetime.

o 安全（隐私）部分应说明如何减轻地址扫描。地址扫描可以通过使链接总是短命的、在可路由地址中具有大量的熵位或者通过它们的一些组合来减轻。因此，规范应该解释实际链路的最大生存期是什么，并说明在给定生存期的情况下，熵的位数是如何足够的。

o Technologies should define a way to include sufficient bits of entropy in the IPv6 interface identifier, based on the maximum link lifetime. Specifying that randomized link-layer addresses can be used is one easy way to do so, for technologies that support such identifiers.

o 技术应该定义一种方法，根据最大链路寿命，在IPv6接口标识符中包含足够的熵位。对于支持这种标识符的技术来说，指定可以使用随机链路层地址是一种简单的方法。

o Specifications should not simply construct an IPv6 interface identifier by padding a Short Address with a set of other well-known constant bits, unless the link lifetime is guaranteed to be extremely short or the Short Address is allocated by the network (rather than being constant in the node). This also applies to link-local addresses if the same Short Address is used independent of network and is unique enough to allow location tracking.

o 规范不应简单地通过用一组其他众所周知的常量位填充短地址来构造IPv6接口标识符，除非链路寿命保证非常短，或者短地址由网络分配（而不是在节点中保持常量）。如果独立于网络使用相同的短地址，并且其唯一性足以允许位置跟踪，则这也适用于链路本地地址。

o Specifications should make sure that an IPv6 address can change over long periods of time. For example, the interface identifier might change each time a device connects to the network (if connections are short) or might change each day (if connections can be long). This is necessary to mitigate correlation over time.

o 规范应确保IPv6地址可以长时间更改。例如，接口标识符可能会在设备每次连接到网络时更改（如果连接较短），也可能每天更改（如果连接可能较长）。这对于缓解随时间变化的相关性是必要的。

o If a device can roam between networks and more than a few bits of entropy exist in the IPv6 interface identifier, then make sure that the interface identifier can vary per network as the device roams. This is necessary to mitigate location tracking.

o 如果设备可以在网络之间漫游，并且IPv6接口标识符中存在超过几位的熵，那么请确保接口标识符可以随设备漫游而随网络变化。这对于减少位置跟踪是必要的。

5. Security Considerations

5. 安全考虑

This entire document is about security considerations and how to specify possible mitigations.

整个文档都是关于安全注意事项以及如何指定可能的缓解措施。

6. Informative References

6. 资料性引用

[BTCorev4.1] Bluetooth, "Specification of the Bluetooth System", Covered Core Package version: 4.1, December 2013, <https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/ DownloadDoc.ashx?doc_id=282159>.

[BTCorev4.1]蓝牙，“蓝牙系统规范”，涵盖的核心包版本：4.11913年12月<https://www.bluetooth.org/DocMan/handlers/ 下载doc.ashx？doc_id=282159>。

[DECT-ULE] Mariager, P., Petersen, J., Ed., Shelby, Z., Van de Logt, M., and D. Barthel, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over DECT Ultra Low Energy", draft-ietf-6lo-dect-ule-09, Work in Progress, December 2016.

[DECT-ULE]Mariager，P.，Petersen，J.，Ed.，Shelby，Z.，Van de Logt，M.，和D.Barthel，“通过DECT超低能量传输IPv6数据包”，草案-ietf-6lo-DECT-ULE-09，正在进行的工作，2016年12月。

[IPv6-over-MSTP] Lynn, K., Ed., Martocci, J., Neilson, C., and S. Donaldson, "Transmission of IPv6 over MS/TP Networks", draft-ietf-6lo-6lobac-06, Work in Progress, October 2016.

[IPv6 over MSTP]Lynn，K.，Ed.，Martocci，J.，Neilson，C.，和S.Donaldson，“通过MS/TP网络传输IPv6”，草案-ietf-6lo-6lobac-06，正在进行的工作，2016年10月。

[IPv6-over-NFC] Choi, Y-H., Hong, Y-G., Youn, J-S., Kim, D-K., and J-H. Choi, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Near Field Communication", draft-ietf-6lo-nfc-05, Work in Progress, October 2016.

[IPv6 over NFC]Choi，Y-H.，Hong，Y-G.，Youn，J-S.，Kim，D-K.，和J-H.Choi，“通过近场通信传输IPv6数据包”，草案-ietf-6lo-NFC-05，正在进行的工作，2016年10月。

[RANDOM-ADDR] Huitema, C., "Implications of Randomized Link Layers Addresses for IPv6 Address Assignment", draft-huitema-6man-random-addresses-03, Work in Progress, March 2016.

[RANDOM-ADDR]Huitema，C.，“随机链路层地址对IPv6地址分配的影响”，draft-Huitema-6man-RANDOM-Addresses-03，正在进行的工作，2016年3月。

[RFC3972] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC 3972, DOI 10.17487/RFC3972, March 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.

[RFC3972]Aura，T.，“加密生成地址（CGA）”，RFC 3972，DOI 10.17487/RFC3972，2005年3月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3972>.

[RFC4429] Moore, N., "Optimistic Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) for IPv6", RFC 4429, DOI 10.17487/RFC4429, April 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429>.

[RFC4429]Moore，N.，“IPv6的乐观重复地址检测（DAD）”，RFC 4429，DOI 10.17487/RFC4429，2006年4月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4429>.

[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.

[RFC4941]Narten，T.，Draves，R.，和S.Krishnan，“IPv6中无状态地址自动配置的隐私扩展”，RFC 4941，DOI 10.17487/RFC49411907年9月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.

[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.

[RFC4944]黑山，G.，Kushalnagar，N.，Hui，J.，和D.Culler，“通过IEEE 802.15.4网络传输IPv6数据包”，RFC 4944，DOI 10.17487/RFC4944，2007年9月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.

[RFC5535] Bagnulo, M., "Hash-Based Addresses (HBA)", RFC 5535, DOI 10.17487/RFC5535, June 2009, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5535>.

[RFC5535]Bagnulo，M.，“基于哈希的地址（HBA）”，RFC 5535，DOI 10.17487/RFC55352009年6月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5535>.

[RFC6282] Hui, J., Ed., and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams over IEEE 802.15.4-Based Networks", RFC 6282, DOI 10.17487/RFC6282, September 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.

[RFC6282]Hui，J.，Ed.，和P.Thubert，“基于IEEE 802.15.4的网络上IPv6数据报的压缩格式”，RFC 6282，DOI 10.17487/RFC6282，2011年9月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6282>.

[RFC6724] Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown, "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.

[RFC6724]Thaler，D.，Ed.，Draves，R.，Matsumoto，A.，和T.Chown，“互联网协议版本6（IPv6）的默认地址选择”，RFC 6724，DOI 10.17487/RFC67242012年9月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.

[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.

[RFC6775]Shelby，Z.，Ed.，Chakrabarti，S.，Nordmark，E.，和C.Bormann，“低功率无线个人区域网络（6LoWPANs）上IPv6邻居发现优化”，RFC 6775，DOI 10.17487/RFC67752012年11月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.

[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J., Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973, DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

[RFC6973]Cooper，A.，Tschofenig，H.，Aboba，B.，Peterson，J.，Morris，J.，Hansen，M.，和R.Smith，“互联网协议的隐私考虑”，RFC 6973，DOI 10.17487/RFC6973，2013年7月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

[RFC7217] Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217, DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.

[RFC7217]Gont，F.“使用IPv6无状态地址自动配置（SLAAC）生成语义不透明接口标识符的方法”，RFC 7217，DOI 10.17487/RFC72172014年4月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.

[RFC7288] Thaler, D., "Reflections on Host Firewalls", RFC 7288, DOI 10.17487/RFC7288, June 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7288>.

[RFC7288]Thaler，D.，“关于主机防火墙的思考”，RFC 7288，DOI 10.17487/RFC7288，2014年6月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7288>.

[RFC7421] Carpenter, B., Ed., Chown, T., Gont, F., Jiang, S., Petrescu, A., and A. Yourtchenko, "Analysis of the 64-bit Boundary in IPv6 Addressing", RFC 7421, DOI 10.17487/RFC7421, January 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>.

[RFC7421]Carpenter，B.，Ed.，Chown，T.，Gont，F.，Jiang，S.，Petrescu，A.，和A.Yourtchenko，“IPv6寻址中64位边界的分析”，RFC 7421，DOI 10.17487/RFC7421，2015年1月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7421>.

[RFC7428] Brandt, A. and J. Buron, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over ITU-T G.9959 Networks", RFC 7428, DOI 10.17487/RFC7428, February 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>.

[RFC7428]Brandt，A.和J.Buron，“通过ITU-T G.9959网络传输IPv6数据包”，RFC 7428，DOI 10.17487/RFC7428，2015年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7428>.

[RFC7668] Nieminen, J., Savolainen, T., Isomaki, M., Patil, B., Shelby, Z., and C. Gomez, "IPv6 over BLUETOOTH(R) Low Energy", RFC 7668, DOI 10.17487/RFC7668, October 2015, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7668>.

[RFC7668]Nieminen，J.，Savolainen，T.，Isomaki，M.，Patil，B.，Shelby，Z.，和C.Gomez，“蓝牙（R）低能量IPv6”，RFC 7668，DOI 10.17487/RFC7668，2015年10月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7668>.

[RFC7721] Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms", RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

[RFC7721]Cooper，A.，Gont，F.，和D.Thaler，“IPv6地址生成机制的安全和隐私考虑”，RFC 7721，DOI 10.17487/RFC7721，2016年3月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

[RFC8064] Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu, "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers", RFC 8064, February 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>.

[RFC8064]Gont，F.，Cooper，A.，Thaler，D.，和W.Liu，“关于稳定IPv6接口标识符的建议”，RFC 8064，2017年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>.

Author's Address

作者地址

Dave Thaler Microsoft One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052 United States of America

Dave Thaler Microsoft One Microsoft Way Redmond，WA 98052美利坚合众国

   Email: dthaler@microsoft.com

   Email: dthaler@microsoft.com