Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Pritikin
Request for Comments: 7894 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Category: Standards Track C. Wallace
ISSN: 2070-1721 Red Hound Software, Inc.
June 2016
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Pritikin
Request for Comments: 7894 Cisco Systems, Inc.
Category: Standards Track C. Wallace
ISSN: 2070-1721 Red Hound Software, Inc.
June 2016
Alternative Challenge Password Attributes for Enrollment over Secure Transport
用于通过安全传输注册的备选质询密码属性
Abstract
摘要
This document defines a set of new Certificate Signing Request attributes for use with the Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) protocol. These attributes provide disambiguation of the existing overloaded uses for the challengePassword attribute defined in "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0" (RFC 2985). Uses include the original certificate revocation password, common authentication password uses, and EST-defined linking of transport security identity.
本文档定义了一组新的证书签名请求属性，用于安全传输注册（EST）协议。这些属性消除了“PKCS#9：选定对象类和属性类型版本2.0”（RFC 2985）中定义的challengePassword属性的现有重载使用的歧义。使用包括原始证书吊销密码、通用身份验证密码使用以及EST定义的传输安全标识链接。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
这是一份互联网标准跟踪文件。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关互联网标准的更多信息，请参见RFC 7841第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7894.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7894.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2016 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Alternative Challenge Password Attributes .......................4
3.1. OTP Challenge Attribute ....................................4
3.2. Revocation Challenge Attribute .............................5
3.3. EST Identity Linking Attribute .............................5
4. Indicating Support for the Alternative Challenge Attributes .....6
5. Security Considerations .........................................6
6. IANA Considerations .............................................7
7. References ......................................................7
7.1. Normative References .......................................7
7.2. Informative References .....................................8
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module ..........................................9
Acknowledgements ..................................................10
Authors' Addresses ................................................10
1. Introduction ....................................................3
2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Alternative Challenge Password Attributes .......................4
3.1. OTP Challenge Attribute ....................................4
3.2. Revocation Challenge Attribute .............................5
3.3. EST Identity Linking Attribute .............................5
4. Indicating Support for the Alternative Challenge Attributes .....6
5. Security Considerations .........................................6
6. IANA Considerations .............................................7
7. References ......................................................7
7.1. Normative References .......................................7
7.2. Informative References .....................................8
Appendix A. ASN.1 Module ..........................................9
Acknowledgements ..................................................10
Authors' Addresses ................................................10
"PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0" [RFC2985] defined a challengePassword attribute that has been overloaded by modern protocol usage with the appropriate interpretation being provided by context rather than OID definition. PKCS #9 defines the challengePassword attribute as "a password by which an entity may request certificate revocation". The parsing and embedding of this attribute within Certificate Signing Requests is well supported by common PKI toolsets, but many workflows leverage this supported field as a one-time password for authentication. For example, this is codified in many Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) implementations as indicated by [SCEP]. Continuing this trend, Enrollment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] defines an additional semantic for the challengePassword attribute in Section 3.5, in order to provide a linking of the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) to the secure transport.
“PKCS#9:Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0”[RFC2985]定义了一个challengePassword属性，该属性因现代协议使用而过载，其适当解释由上下文而非OID定义提供。PKCS#9将challengePassword属性定义为“一个实体可以请求证书撤销的密码”。公共PKI工具集很好地支持在证书签名请求中解析和嵌入此属性，但许多工作流将此受支持字段用作身份验证的一次性密码。例如，这在许多简单证书注册协议（SCEP）实现中被编码，如[SCEP]所示。继续这一趋势，通过安全传输注册（EST）[RFC7030]为第3.5节中的challengePassword属性定义了一个附加语义，以便提供证书签名请求（CSR）到安全传输的链接。
Where the context of the protocol operation fully defined the proper semantic, and when only one use was required at a time, the overloading of this field did not cause difficulties. Implementation experience with EST has shown this to be a limitation though. There are plausible use cases where it is valuable to use either of the existing methods separately or in concert. For example, an EST server might require the client to authenticate itself using the existing client X.509 certificate as well as the user's username and password, and to include a one-time password within the CSR, all while maintaining identity linking to bind the CSR to the secure transport. The overloading of a single attribute type should not be the limiting factor for administrators attempting to meet their security requirements.
当协议操作的上下文完全定义了适当的语义，并且一次只需要一次使用时，此字段的重载不会造成困难。EST的实施经验表明这是一个限制。有一些合理的用例，在这些用例中，单独使用或协同使用现有方法都是有价值的。例如，EST服务器可能要求客户端使用现有的客户端X.509证书以及用户的用户名和密码进行身份验证，并在CSR中包含一次性密码，同时保持身份链接以将CSR绑定到安全传输。单个属性类型的重载不应成为管理员试图满足其安全要求的限制因素。
This document defines the otpChallenge attribute for use when a one-time password (OTP) value within the CSR is a requirement. The revocationChallenge attribute is defined to allow disambiguated usage of the original challenge password attribute semantics for certificate revocation. The estIdentityLinking attribute is defined to reference existing EST challenge password semantics with no potential for confusion with legacy challenge password practices.
本文档定义了otpChallenge属性，以便在CSR中需要一次性密码（OTP）值时使用。revocationChallenge属性定义为允许在证书吊销时消除对原始质询密码属性语义的歧义。estIdentityLinking属性被定义为引用现有的EST质询密码语义，而不会与传统的质询密码实践相混淆。
The attributes defined in this specification supplement existing EST mechanisms and are not intended to displace current usage of any existing EST authentication mechanisms. Conveying the authentication value itself as an attribute may be preferable to using an HTTP or Transport Layer Security (TLS) password or other TLS authentication mechanism in environments where the certificate request processing component is removed from the HTTP/TLS termination point, for example, when a web application firewall is used.
本规范中定义的属性是对现有EST机制的补充，并不打算取代任何现有EST认证机制的当前使用。例如，当使用web应用防火墙时，在证书请求处理组件从HTTP/TLS终止点移除的环境中，将认证值本身作为属性传输可能比使用HTTP或传输层安全（TLS）密码或其他TLS认证机制更可取。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
The following sections describe three alternative challenge password attributes for use with EST [RFC7030]. Appendix A provides an ASN.1 module containing the new definitions.
以下各节描述了与EST[RFC7030]一起使用的三种备选质询密码属性。附录A提供了包含新定义的ASN.1模块。
Each attribute described below is defined as a DirectoryString with a maximum length of 255, which features several possible encoding options. Attribute values generated in accordance this document SHOULD use the PrintableString encoding whenever possible. If internationalization issues make this impossible, the UTF8String alternative SHOULD be used. Attribute processing systems MUST be able to recognize and process the PrintableString and UTF8String string types in DirectoryString values. Support for other string types is OPTIONAL.
下面描述的每个属性都定义为最大长度为255的DirectoryString，其中包含几个可能的编码选项。根据本文档生成的属性值应尽可能使用可打印字符串编码。如果国际化问题使这成为不可能，则应使用UTF8String替代方案。属性处理系统必须能够识别和处理DirectoryString值中的PrintableString和UTF8String类型。对其他字符串类型的支持是可选的。
The otpChallenge attribute is defined as a DirectoryString with a maximum length of 255. This is consistent with the challengePassword attribute as originally defined in PKCS #9 [RFC2985]. The otpChallenge attribute is identified by the id-aa-otpChallenge object identifier. This facilitates reuse of the existing challengePassword code by associating the new object identifiers with the existing parsing and generation code. This attribute provides a means of conveying a one-time password value as part of a CSR request. Generation, verification, storage, etc., of the value is not addressed by this specification. [RFC4226] and [RFC6238] define one-time password mechanisms that MAY be used with this attribute.
otpChallenge属性定义为最大长度为255的DirectoryString。这与PKCS#9[RFC2985]中最初定义的challengePassword属性一致。otpChallenge属性由id aa otpChallenge对象标识符标识。通过将新的对象标识符与现有解析和生成代码关联，这有助于重用现有challengePassword代码。此属性提供了一种将一次性密码值作为CSR请求的一部分传递的方法。本规范不涉及值的生成、验证、存储等。[RFC4226]和[RFC6238]定义可与此属性一起使用的一次性密码机制。
ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-smime 56
}
otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge}
EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch
SINGLE VALUE TRUE
ID id-aa-otpChallenge
}
ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-smime 56
}
otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge}
EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch
SINGLE VALUE TRUE
ID id-aa-otpChallenge
}
The original PKCS #9 challengePassword field has been overloaded, and the common use is unclear. The revocationChallenge attribute defined here provides an unambiguous method of indicating the original PKCS #9 intent for this attribute type. The revocationChallenge attribute is identified by the id-aa-revocationChallenge object identifier. [RFC2985] discusses the original semantics for the PKCS #9 challenge password attribute.
原始PKCS#9 challengePassword字段已过载，通用性不清楚。此处定义的revocationChallenge属性提供了一种明确的方法，用于指示此属性类型的原始PKCS#9意图。revocationChallenge属性由id aa revocationChallenge对象标识符标识。[RFC2985]讨论PKCS#9质询密码属性的原始语义。
ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-smime 57
}
revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge}
EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch
SINGLE VALUE TRUE
ID id-aa-revocationChallenge
}
ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-smime 57
}
revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge}
EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch
SINGLE VALUE TRUE
ID id-aa-revocationChallenge
}
EST defines a mechanism for associating identity information from an authenticated TLS session with proof-of-possession information in a certificate request. The mechanism was labeled using the pkcs-9-at-challengePassword identifier from [RFC2985]. To avoid any confusion with the semantics described in [RFC2985] or any other specifications that similarly defined use of the PKCS #9 challenge password attribute for their own purposes, a new object identifier is defined here and associated with the semantics described in Section 3.5 of [RFC7030].
EST定义了一种机制，用于将经过身份验证的TLS会话中的身份信息与证书请求中的占有证明信息相关联。该机制使用[RFC2985]中的pkcs-9-at-challengePassword标识符进行标记。为避免与[RFC2985]中描述的语义或任何其他类似定义了PKCS#9质询密码属性用途的规范混淆，此处定义了一个新的对象标识符，并与[RFC7030]第3.5节中描述的语义相关联。
ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-smime 58
}
estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking}
EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch
SINGLE VALUE TRUE
ID id-aa-estIdentityLinking
}
ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-smime 58
}
estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= {
WITH SYNTAX DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking}
EQUALITY MATCHING RULE caseExactMatch
SINGLE VALUE TRUE
ID id-aa-estIdentityLinking
}
The EST server MUST indicate these attributes, as the particular use case requires, in every CSR Attributes Response. An EST server MAY send both the estIdentityLinking attribute and the challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] in a CSR Attributes Response to ensure support for legacy clients.
EST服务器必须在每个CSR属性响应中根据特定用例的要求指示这些属性。EST服务器可以在CSR属性响应中发送estIdentityLinking属性和challengePassword属性[RFC7030]，以确保对旧客户端的支持。
The client MUST include every indicated attribute for which it has values in the subsequent CSR. If a client sees an estIdentityLinking attribute in a CSR Attributes Response, it SHOULD prefer that and not include a challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] in the resulting CSR. EST clients that include an unsolicited estIdentityLinking attribute MAY also include the challengePassword attribute [RFC7030] to ensure support for legacy servers.
客户机必须包括其在后续CSR中具有值的每个指定属性。如果客户机在CSR Attributes响应中看到estIdentityLinking属性，它应该更喜欢该属性，并且在结果CSR中不包括challengePassword属性[RFC7030]。包含未经请求的estIdentityLinking属性的EST客户端还可能包含challengePassword属性[RFC7030]，以确保对传统服务器的支持。
EST servers MUST evaluate each challenge attribute independently. All challenge attributes included by an EST client MUST be successfully processed by an EST server for a request to be considered valid. The EST server MAY ignore challenge attributes according to local policy, for example, if the EST client is an authenticated Registration Authority, the EST server may ignore the estIdentityLinking attribute within a CSR (see Section 3.7 of [RFC7030]). The EST server MAY refuse enrollment requests that are not encoded according to the policy of the Certification Authority (CA).
EST服务器必须独立评估每个质询属性。EST客户端包含的所有质询属性必须由EST服务器成功处理，请求才能被视为有效。EST服务器可以根据本地策略忽略质询属性，例如，如果EST客户端是经过身份验证的注册机构，则EST服务器可以忽略CSR中的estIdentityLinking属性（参见[RFC7030]第3.7节）。EST服务器可以拒绝未根据证书颁发机构（CA）的策略进行编码的注册请求。
In addition to the security considerations expressed in the EST specification [RFC7030], additional security considerations may be associated with the mechanism used to generate and verify the otpChallenge value. Where a one-time password is used, the security considerations expressed in "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm" [RFC4226] or "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm" [RFC6238] may be relevant. Similarly, the security considerations from [RFC2985] that apply to the challenge attribute are relevant as well.
除了EST规范[RFC7030]中表示的安全注意事项外，其他安全注意事项可能与用于生成和验证otpChallenge值的机制有关。在使用一次性密码的情况下，“HOTP:基于HMAC的一次性密码算法”[RFC4226]或“TOTP:基于时间的一次性密码算法”[RFC6238]中表达的安全注意事项可能是相关的。类似地，[RFC2985]中适用于质询属性的安全注意事项也是相关的。
Section 3 defines three attributes that have been assigned object identifiers in the "SMI Security for S/MIME Attributes (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2)" registry [RFC7107]:
第3节定义了“S/MIME属性的SMI安全性（1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.2）”注册表[RFC7107]中已分配对象标识符的三个属性：
Value Description Reference
-------- --------------------------------- ----------
56 id-aa-otpChallenge RFC 7894
57 id-aa-revocationChallenge RFC 7894
58 id-aa-estIdentityLinking RFC 7894
Value Description Reference
-------- --------------------------------- ----------
56 id-aa-otpChallenge RFC 7894
57 id-aa-revocationChallenge RFC 7894
58 id-aa-estIdentityLinking RFC 7894
Appendix A contains an ASN.1 module. A module identifier has been assigned in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module Identifier" registry [RFC7299].
附录A包含ASN.1模块。已在“PKIX模块标识符的SMI安全性”注册表[RFC7299]中分配模块标识符。
Value Description Reference
-------- --------------------------------- ----------
87 id-mod-EST-Alt-Challenge RFC 7894
Value Description Reference
-------- --------------------------------- ----------
87 id-mod-EST-Alt-Challenge RFC 7894
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，DOI 10.17487/RFC2119，1997年3月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2985] Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #9: Selected Object Classes and Attribute Types Version 2.0", RFC 2985, DOI 10.17487/RFC2985, November 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC2985]Nystrom，M.和B.Kaliski，“PKCS#9：选定对象类和属性类型版本2.0”，RFC 2985，DOI 10.17487/RFC2985，2000年11月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2985>.
[RFC5272] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)", RFC 5272, DOI 10.17487/RFC5272, June 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
[RFC5272]Schaad，J.和M.Myers，“CMS的证书管理（CMC）”，RFC 5272，DOI 10.17487/RFC5272，2008年6月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5272>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5280]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 5280，DOI 10.17487/RFC5280，2008年5月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC5912]Hoffman，P.和J.Schaad，“使用X.509（PKIX）的公钥基础设施的新ASN.1模块”，RFC 5912，DOI 10.17487/RFC5912，2010年6月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed., "Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030, DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7030]Pritikin，M.，Ed.，Yee，P.，Ed.，和D.Harkins，Ed.，“安全传输的注册”，RFC 7030，DOI 10.17487/RFC7030，2013年10月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC4226] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 4226, DOI 10.17487/RFC4226, December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4226>.
[RFC4226]M'Raihi，D.，Bellare，M.，Hoornaert，F.，Naccache，D.，和O.Ranen，“HOTP：基于HMAC的一次性密码算法”，RFC 4226，DOI 10.17487/RFC4226，2005年12月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4226>.
[RFC6238] M'Raihi, D., Machani, S., Pei, M., and J. Rydell, "TOTP: Time-Based One-Time Password Algorithm", RFC 6238, DOI 10.17487/RFC6238, May 2011, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>.
[RFC6238]M'Raihi，D.，Machani，S.，Pei，M.，和J.Rydell，“TOTP：基于时间的一次性密码算法”，RFC 6238，DOI 10.17487/RFC6238，2011年5月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6238>.
[RFC7107] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the S/MIME Mail Security Working Group", RFC 7107, DOI 10.17487/RFC7107, January 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7107>.
[RFC7107]Housley，R.，“S/MIME邮件安全工作组的对象标识符注册表”，RFC 7107，DOI 10.17487/RFC7107，2014年1月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7107>.
[RFC7299] Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX Working Group", RFC 7299, DOI 10.17487/RFC7299, July 2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[RFC7299]Housley，R.，“PKIX工作组的对象标识符注册表”，RFC 7299，DOI 10.17487/RFC7299，2014年7月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7299>.
[SCEP] Gutmann, P. and M. Pritikin, "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol", Work in Progress, draft-gutmann-scep-02, March 2016.
[SCEP]Gutmann，P.和M.Pritikin，“简单证书注册协议”，正在进行的工作，草稿-Gutmann-SCEP-022016年3月。
The following ASN.1 module includes the definitions to support usage of the attributes defined in this specification. Modules from [RFC5912] are imported (the original Standards Track source for the imported structures is [RFC5280] and [RFC5272]).
以下ASN.1模块包括支持使用本规范中定义的属性的定义。从[RFC5912]导入模块（导入结构的原始标准轨道源为[RFC5280]和[RFC5272]）。
Mod-EST-Alt-Challenge {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 87
}
Mod-EST-Alt-Challenge {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 87
}
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
DirectoryString{}
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)
}
DirectoryString{}
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)
}
ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)
};
ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 {
iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)
};
ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 56
}
otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge}
COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-otpChallenge
}
ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 57
}
revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge}
COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-revocationChallenge
}
ub-aa-otpChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-otpChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 56
}
otpChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-otpChallenge}
COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-otpChallenge
}
ub-aa-revocationChallenge INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-revocationChallenge OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 57
}
revocationChallenge ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-revocationChallenge}
COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-revocationChallenge
}
ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 58
}
estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking}
COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-estIdentityLinking
}
END
ub-aa-est-identity-linking INTEGER ::= 255
id-aa-estIdentityLinking OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) aa(2) 58
}
estIdentityLinking ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE DirectoryString {ub-aa-est-identity-linking}
COUNTS MIN 1 MAX 1
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-estIdentityLinking
}
END
Acknowledgements
致谢
Thanks to Jim Schaad, Dan Harkins, Phil Scheffler, Geoff Beier, Mike Jenkins, and Deb Cooley for their feedback.
感谢Jim Schaad、Dan Harkins、Phil Scheffler、Geoff Beier、Mike Jenkins和Deb Cooley的反馈。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Max Pritikin Cisco Systems, Inc. 510 McCarthy Drive Milpitas, CA 95035 United States
Max Pritikin Cisco Systems，Inc.美国加利福尼亚州米尔皮塔斯麦卡锡大道510号，邮编95035
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Email: pritikin@cisco.com
Carl Wallace Red Hound Software, Inc.
卡尔·华莱士红猎犬软件公司。
Email: carl@redhoundsoftware.com
Email: carl@redhoundsoftware.com