RFC 7802: A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the Kerberos V Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism 中文翻译

URL : https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7802
标题 : RFC 7802
翻译类型 : 自动生成

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          S. Emery
Request for Comments: 7802                                        Oracle
Obsoletes: 4402                                              N. Williams
Category: Standards Track                                   Cryptonector
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               March 2016

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                          S. Emery
Request for Comments: 7802                                        Oracle
Obsoletes: 4402                                              N. Williams
Category: Standards Track                                   Cryptonector
ISSN: 2070-1721                                               March 2016

A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the Kerberos V Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism

Kerberos V通用安全服务应用程序接口（GSS-API）机制的伪随机函数（PRF）

Abstract

摘要

This document defines the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) for the Kerberos V mechanism for the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API), based on the PRF defined for the Kerberos V cryptographic framework, for keying application protocols given an established Kerberos V GSS-API security context.

本文档基于为Kerberos V加密框架定义的伪随机函数（PRF），为通用安全服务应用程序接口（GSS-API）的Kerberos V机制定义了伪随机函数（PRF），用于为给定Kerberos V GSS-API安全上下文的应用程序协议设置密钥。

This document obsoletes RFC 4402 and reclassifies that document as Historic. RFC 4402 starts the PRF+ counter at 1; however, a number of implementations start the counter at 0. As a result, the original specification would not be interoperable with existing implementations.

本文件淘汰RFC 4402，并将该文件重新分类为历史文件。RFC 4402在1处启动PRF+计数器；但是，许多实现从0开始计数器。因此，原始规范将无法与现有实现进行互操作。

Status of This Memo

关于下段备忘

This is an Internet Standards Track document.

这是一份互联网标准跟踪文件。

This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.

本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关互联网标准的更多信息，请参见RFC 5741第2节。

Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7802.

有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7802.

版权公告

This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   3.  Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   6.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   Appendix A.  Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1. Introduction

1. 介绍

This document specifies the Kerberos V GSS-API mechanism's [RFC4121] pseudo-random function corresponding to [RFC4401]. The function is a "PRF+" style construction. For more information, see [RFC4401], [RFC2743], [RFC2744], and [RFC4121].

本文档指定了与[RFC4401]对应的Kerberos V GSS-API机制的[RFC4121]伪随机函数。该功能为“PRF+”式结构。有关更多信息，请参阅[RFC4401]、[RFC2743]、[RFC2744]和[RFC4121]。

2. Conventions Used in This Document

2. 本文件中使用的公约

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。

3. Kerberos V GSS Mechanism PRF

3. Kerberos V GSS机制PRF

The GSS-API PRF [RFC4401] function for the Kerberos V mechanism [RFC4121] shall be the output of a PRF+ function based on the encryption type's PRF function keyed with the negotiated session key of the security context corresponding to the 'prf_key' input parameter of GSS_Pseudo_random().

Kerberos V机制[RFC4121]的GSS-API PRF[RFC4401]函数应是基于加密类型的PRF函数的PRF+函数的输出，该函数使用与GSS_Pseudo_random（）的“PRF_key”输入参数相对应的安全上下文的协商会话密钥进行键控。

This PRF+ MUST be keyed with the key indicated by the 'prf_key' input parameter as follows:

必须使用“PRF_键”输入参数指示的键输入该PRF+，如下所示：

o GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the acceptor (if any exists), or the sub-session asserted by the initiator (if any exists), or the Ticket's session key.

o GSS_C_PRF_KEY_FULL——使用由接受者断言的子会话密钥（如果存在），或由启动器断言的子会话密钥（如果存在），或票据的会话密钥。

o GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL -- use the sub-session key asserted by the initiator (if any exists) or the Ticket's session key.

o GSS_C_PRF_KEY_PARTIAL——使用发起者声明的子会话密钥（如果存在）或票据的会话密钥。

The PRF+ function is a simple counter-based extension of the Kerberos V pseudo-random function [RFC3961] for the encryption type of the security context's keys:

PRF+函数是Kerberos V伪随机函数[RFC3961]的一个简单的基于计数器的扩展，用于安全上下文密钥的加密类型：

         PRF+(K, L, S) = truncate(L, T0 || T1 || .. || Tn)

         PRF+(K, L, S) = truncate(L, T0 || T1 || .. || Tn)

Tn = pseudo-random(K, n || S)

Tn=伪随机（K，n|S）

where K is the key indicated by the 'prf_key' parameter, '||' is the concatenation operator, 'n' is encoded as a network byte order 32-bit unsigned binary number, truncate(L, S) truncates the input octet string S to length L, and pseudo-random() is the Kerberos V pseudo-random function [RFC3961].

其中K是“prf_key”参数指示的键，| |是串联运算符，'n'编码为网络字节顺序32位无符号二进制数，truncate（L，S）将输入八位字节字符串S截断为长度L，pseudo-random（）是Kerberos V伪随机函数[RFC3961]。

The maximum output size of the Kerberos V mechanism's GSS-API PRF then is, necessarily, 2^32 times the output size of the pseudo-random() function for the encryption type of the given key.

Kerberos V机制的GSS-API PRF的最大输出大小必然是给定密钥加密类型的pseudo-random（）函数输出大小的2^32倍。

When the input size is longer than 2^14 octets as per [RFC4401] and exceeds an implementation's resources, then the mechanism MUST return GSS_S_FAILURE and GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG as the minor status code.

根据[RFC4401]的规定，当输入大小超过2^14个八位字节并超过实现的资源时，该机制必须返回GSS_s_FAILURE和GSS_KRB5_s_KG_input_TOO_作为次要状态代码。

4. IANA Considerations

4. IANA考虑

This document has no IANA considerations currently. If and when a relevant IANA registry of GSS-API symbols and constants is created, then the GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG minor status code should be added to such a registry.

本文件目前没有IANA考虑事项。如果创建了GSS-API符号和常量的相关IANA注册表，则应将GSS_KRB5_S_KG_INPUT_TOO_LONG次要状态代码添加到该注册表中。

5. Security Considerations

5. 安全考虑

Kerberos V encryption types' PRF functions use a key derived from contexts' session keys and should preserve the forward security properties of the mechanisms' key exchanges.

Kerberos V加密类型的PRF函数使用从上下文会话密钥派生的密钥，并应保留机制密钥交换的前向安全属性。

Legacy Kerberos V encryption types may be weak, particularly the single-DES encryption types.

遗留Kerberos V加密类型可能很弱，尤其是单一DES加密类型。

See also [RFC4401] for generic security considerations of GSS_Pseudo_random().

有关GSS_Pseudo_random（）的一般安全注意事项，请参见[RFC4401]。

See also [RFC3961] for generic security considerations of the Kerberos V cryptographic framework.

有关Kerberos V加密框架的一般安全注意事项，请参见[RFC3961]。

Use of Ticket session keys, rather than sub-session keys, when initiators and acceptors fail to assert sub-session keys, is dangerous as ticket reuse can lead to key reuse; therefore, initiators should assert sub-session keys always, and acceptors should assert sub-session keys at least when initiators fail to do so.

当发起者和接受者无法断言子会话密钥时，使用票据会话密钥而不是子会话密钥是危险的，因为票据重用可能导致密钥重用；因此，发起者应该始终声明子会话密钥，而接受者应该至少在发起者未能声明子会话密钥时声明子会话密钥。

The computational cost of computing this PRF+ may vary depending on the Kerberos V encryption types being used, but generally the computation of this PRF+ gets more expensive as the input and output octet string lengths grow (note that the use of a counter in the PRF+ construction allows for parallelization).

计算此PRF+的计算成本可能因使用的Kerberos V加密类型而异，但通常，随着输入和输出八位字节字符串长度的增长，此PRF+的计算成本会变得更高（请注意，在PRF+构造中使用计数器允许并行化）。

6. Normative References

6. 规范性引用文件

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，DOI 10.17487/RFC2119，1997年3月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, January 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2743>.

[RFC2743]Linn，J.，“通用安全服务应用程序接口版本2，更新1”，RFC 2743，DOI 10.17487/RFC2743，2000年1月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2743>.

[RFC2744] Wray, J., "Generic Security Service API Version 2 : C-bindings", RFC 2744, DOI 10.17487/RFC2744, January 2000, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2744>.

[RFC2744]Wray，J.，“通用安全服务API第2版：C-绑定”，RFC 2744，DOI 10.17487/RFC2744，2000年1月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2744>.

[RFC3961] Raeburn, K., "Encryption and Checksum Specifications for Kerberos 5", RFC 3961, DOI 10.17487/RFC3961, February 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3961>.

[RFC3961]Raeburn，K.，“Kerberos 5的加密和校验和规范”，RFC 3961，DOI 10.17487/RFC3961，2005年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3961>.

[RFC4121] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2", RFC 4121, DOI 10.17487/RFC4121, July 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4121>.

[RFC4121]Zhu，L.，Jaganathan，K.，和S.Hartman，“Kerberos版本5通用安全服务应用程序接口（GSS-API）机制：版本2”，RFC 4121，DOI 10.17487/RFC4121，2005年7月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4121>.

[RFC4401] Williams, N., "A Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) API Extension for the Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)", RFC 4401, DOI 10.17487/RFC4401, February 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4401>.

[RFC4401]Williams，N.，“通用安全服务应用程序接口（GSS-API）的伪随机函数（PRF）API扩展”，RFC 4401，DOI 10.17487/RFC4401，2006年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4401>.

Appendix A. Test Vectors

附录A.测试向量

Here are some test vectors from the MIT implementation provided by Greg Hudson. Test cases used include input string lengths of 0 and 61 bytes, and an output length of 44 bytes. 61 bytes of input is just enough to produce a partial second MD5 or SHA1 hash block with the four-byte counter prefix. 44 bytes of output requires two full and one partial RFC 3961 PRF output for all existing enctypes. All keys were randomly generated.

下面是Greg Hudson提供的MIT实现中的一些测试向量。使用的测试用例包括0和61字节的输入字符串长度，以及44字节的输出长度。61个字节的输入刚好足以生成一个带有四字节计数器前缀的部分第二个MD5或SHA1哈希块。44字节的输出需要两个完整的RFC 3961 PRF输出和一个部分RFC 3961 PRF输出，用于所有现有的ENC类型。所有密钥都是随机生成的。

   Enctype: des-cbc-crc
   Key: E607FE9DABB57AE0
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 803C4121379FC4B87CE413B67707C4632EBED2C6D6B7
           2A55E878836E35E21600D915D590DED5B6D77BB30A1F

   Enctype: des-cbc-crc
   Key: E607FE9DABB57AE0
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 803C4121379FC4B87CE413B67707C4632EBED2C6D6B7
           2A55E878836E35E21600D915D590DED5B6D77BB30A1F

   Enctype: des-cbc-crc
   Key: 54758316B6257A75
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 279E4105F7ADC9BD6EF28ABE31D89B442FE0058388BA
           33264ACB5729562DC637950F6BD144B654BE7700B2D6

   Enctype: des-cbc-crc
   Key: 54758316B6257A75
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 279E4105F7ADC9BD6EF28ABE31D89B442FE0058388BA
           33264ACB5729562DC637950F6BD144B654BE7700B2D6

   Enctype: des3-cbc-sha1
   Key: 70378A19CD64134580C27C0115D6B34A1CF2FEECEF9886A2
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 9F8D127C520BB826BFF3E0FE5EF352389C17E0C073D9
           AC4A333D644D21BA3EF24F4A886D143F85AC9F6377FB

   Enctype: des3-cbc-sha1
   Key: 70378A19CD64134580C27C0115D6B34A1CF2FEECEF9886A2
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 9F8D127C520BB826BFF3E0FE5EF352389C17E0C073D9
           AC4A333D644D21BA3EF24F4A886D143F85AC9F6377FB

   Enctype: des3-cbc-sha1
   Key: 3452A167DF1094BA1089E0A20E9E51ABEF1525922558B69E
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 6BF24FABC858F8DD9752E4FCD331BB831F238B5BE190
           4EEA42E38F7A60C588F075C5C96A67E7F8B7BD0AECF4

   Enctype: des3-cbc-sha1
   Key: 3452A167DF1094BA1089E0A20E9E51ABEF1525922558B69E
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 6BF24FABC858F8DD9752E4FCD331BB831F238B5BE190
           4EEA42E38F7A60C588F075C5C96A67E7F8B7BD0AECF4

   Enctype: rc4-hmac
   Key: 3BB3AE288C12B3B9D06B208A4151B3B6
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 9AEA11A3BCF3C53F1F91F5A0BA2132E2501ADF5F3C28
           3C8A983AB88757CE865A22132D6100EAD63E9E291AFA

   Enctype: rc4-hmac
   Key: 3BB3AE288C12B3B9D06B208A4151B3B6
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 9AEA11A3BCF3C53F1F91F5A0BA2132E2501ADF5F3C28
           3C8A983AB88757CE865A22132D6100EAD63E9E291AFA

   Enctype: rc4-hmac
   Key: 6DB7B33A01BD2B72F7655CB7B3D5FA0B
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: CDA9A544869FC84873B692663A82AFDA101C8611498B
           A46138B01E927C9B95EEC953B562807434037837DDDF

   Enctype: rc4-hmac
   Key: 6DB7B33A01BD2B72F7655CB7B3D5FA0B
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: CDA9A544869FC84873B692663A82AFDA101C8611498B
           A46138B01E927C9B95EEC953B562807434037837DDDF

   Enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: 6C742096EB896230312B73972FA28B5D
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 94208D982FC1BB7778128BDD77904420B45C9DA699F3
           117BCE66E39602128EF0296611A6D191A5828530F20F

   Enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: 6C742096EB896230312B73972FA28B5D
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 94208D982FC1BB7778128BDD77904420B45C9DA699F3
           117BCE66E39602128EF0296611A6D191A5828530F20F

   Enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: FA61138C109D834A477D24C7311BE6DA
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 0FAEDF0F842CC834FEE750487E1B622739286B975FE5
           B7F45AB053143C75CA0DF5D3D4BBB80F6A616C7C9027

   Enctype: aes128-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: FA61138C109D834A477D24C7311BE6DA
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 0FAEDF0F842CC834FEE750487E1B622739286B975FE5
           B7F45AB053143C75CA0DF5D3D4BBB80F6A616C7C9027

   Enctype: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: 08FCDAFD5832611B73BA7B497FEBFF8C954B4B58031CAD9B977C3B8C25192FD6
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: E627EFC14EF5B6D629F830C7109DEA0D3D7D36E8CD57
           A1F301C5452494A1928F05AFFBEE3360232209D3BE0D

   Enctype: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: 08FCDAFD5832611B73BA7B497FEBFF8C954B4B58031CAD9B977C3B8C25192FD6
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: E627EFC14EF5B6D629F830C7109DEA0D3D7D36E8CD57
           A1F301C5452494A1928F05AFFBEE3360232209D3BE0D

   Enctype: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: F5B68B7823D8944F33F41541B4E4D38C9B2934F8D16334A796645B066152B4BE
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 112F2B2D878590653CCC7DE278E9F0AA46FA5A380B62
           59F774CB7C134FCD37F61A50FD0D9F89BF8FE1A6B593

   Enctype: aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96
   Key: F5B68B7823D8944F33F41541B4E4D38C9B2934F8D16334A796645B066152B4BE
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 112F2B2D878590653CCC7DE278E9F0AA46FA5A380B62
           59F774CB7C134FCD37F61A50FD0D9F89BF8FE1A6B593

   Enctype: camellia128-cts-cmac
   Key: 866E0466A178279A32AC0BDA92B72AEB
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 97FBB354BF341C3A160DCC86A7A910FDA824601DF677
           68797BACEEBF5D250AE929DEC9760772084267F50A54

   Enctype: camellia128-cts-cmac
   Key: 866E0466A178279A32AC0BDA92B72AEB
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 97FBB354BF341C3A160DCC86A7A910FDA824601DF677
           68797BACEEBF5D250AE929DEC9760772084267F50A54

   Enctype: camellia128-cts-cmac
   Key: D4893FD37DA1A211E12DD1E03E0F03B7
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 1DEE2FF126CA563A2A2326B9DD3F0095013257414C83
           FAD4398901013D55F367C82681186B7B2FE62F746BA4

   Enctype: camellia128-cts-cmac
   Key: D4893FD37DA1A211E12DD1E03E0F03B7
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: 1DEE2FF126CA563A2A2326B9DD3F0095013257414C83
           FAD4398901013D55F367C82681186B7B2FE62F746BA4

   Enctype: camellia256-cts-cmac
   Key: 203071B1AE77BD3D6FCE70174AF95C225B1CED46B35CF52B6479EFEB47E6B063
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 9B30020634C10FDA28420CEE7B96B70A90A771CED43A
           D8346554163E5949CBAE2FB8EF36AFB6B32CE75116A0

   Enctype: camellia256-cts-cmac
   Key: 203071B1AE77BD3D6FCE70174AF95C225B1CED46B35CF52B6479EFEB47E6B063
   Input: (empty string)
   Output: 9B30020634C10FDA28420CEE7B96B70A90A771CED43A
           D8346554163E5949CBAE2FB8EF36AFB6B32CE75116A0

   Enctype: camellia256-cts-cmac
   Key: A171AD582C1AFBBAD52ABD622EE6B6A14D19BF95C6914B2BA40FFD99A88EC660
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: A47CBB6E104DCC77E4DB48A7A474B977F2FB6A7A1AB6
           52317D50508AE72B7BE2E4E4BA24164E029CBACF786B

   Enctype: camellia256-cts-cmac
   Key: A171AD582C1AFBBAD52ABD622EE6B6A14D19BF95C6914B2BA40FFD99A88EC660
   Input: ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz123456789
   Output: A47CBB6E104DCC77E4DB48A7A474B977F2FB6A7A1AB6
           52317D50508AE72B7BE2E4E4BA24164E029CBACF786B

Acknowledgements

致谢

This document is an update to RFC 4402, which was authored by Nico Williams. Greg Hudson has provided the test vectors based on MIT's implementation.

本文档是对Nico Williams编写的RFC 4402的更新。Greg Hudson提供了基于MIT实现的测试向量。

Authors' Addresses

作者地址

Shawn Emery Oracle Corporation 500 Eldorado Blvd Bldg 1 Broomfield, CO 78727 United States

美国科罗拉多州布鲁姆菲尔德1号埃尔多拉多大道500号肖恩埃默里甲骨文公司，邮编78727

   EMail: shawn.emery@oracle.com

   EMail: shawn.emery@oracle.com

Nicolas Williams Cryptonector, LLC

Nicolas Williams Cryptonector有限责任公司

   EMail: nico@cryptonector.com

   EMail: nico@cryptonector.com