Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 7730 APNIC
Obsoletes: 6490 S. Weiler
Category: Standards Track Parsons
ISSN: 2070-1721 G. Michaelson
APNIC
S. Kent
BBN
January 2016
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 7730 APNIC
Obsoletes: 6490 S. Weiler
Category: Standards Track Parsons
ISSN: 2070-1721 G. Michaelson
APNIC
S. Kent
BBN
January 2016
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator
资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）信任锚定位器
Abstract
摘要
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document obsoletes RFC 6490 by adding support for multiple URIs in a TAL.
本文档为资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）定义了信任锚定位器（TAL）。本文档通过在TAL中添加对多个URI的支持，淘汰了RFC 6490。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
这是一份互联网标准跟踪文件。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关互联网标准的更多信息，请参见RFC 5741第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7730.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2016 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2016 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . 3
2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Trust Anchor Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations . . . . . 3
2.3. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Relying Party Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. This format may be used to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of out-of-band and online means. Procedures used by Relying Parties (RPs) to verify RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to facilitate interoperability between creators of trust anchor material and RPs. This document obsoletes RFC 6490 by adding support for multiple URIs in a TAL.
本文档为资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）[RFC6480]定义了信任锚定位器（TAL）。该格式可用于使用带外和在线混合方式分发信托锚材料。依赖方（RPs）用于验证RPKI签名对象的程序应支持此格式，以促进信任锚材料创建者和RPs之间的互操作性。本文档通过在TAL中添加对多个URI的支持，淘汰了RFC 6490。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
This document does not propose a new format for trust anchor material. A trust anchor in the RPKI is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate, a format commonly used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software. This document specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data is referred to as the TAL.
本文件并未提出信托锚材料的新格式。RPKI中的信任锚由自签名的X.509证书颁发机构（CA）证书表示，该证书是PKI中常用的格式，并得到RP软件的广泛支持。本文档以非常简单的方式指定用于检索和验证信任锚的真实性的数据格式。该数据称为TAL。
The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the trust anchor to change, without needing to effect redistribution of the trust anchor per se. In the RPKI, certificates contain
定义TAL的动机是使信任锚中的选定数据能够更改，而无需影响信任锚本身的重新分布。在RPKI中，证书包含
extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779]. The set of INRs associated with an entity acting as a trust anchor is likely to change over time. Thus, if one were to use the common PKI convention of distributing a trust anchor to RPs in a secure fashion, then this procedure would need to be repeated whenever the INR set for the entity acting as a trust anchor changed. By distributing the TAL (in a secure fashion), instead of distributing the trust anchor, this problem is avoided, i.e., the TAL is constant so long as the trust anchor's public key and its location do not change.
表示Internet号码资源（INR）的扩展[RFC3779]。与作为信托锚的实体相关的INR集可能会随着时间的推移而变化。因此，如果要使用以安全方式向RPs分发信任锚的公共PKI约定，则每当为充当信任锚的实体设置的INR发生变化时，都需要重复此过程。通过分发TAL（以安全的方式），而不是分发信任锚点，可以避免此问题，即只要信任锚点的公钥及其位置不变，TAL就会保持不变。
The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure specified in [RFC5914], which is on the Standards Track. That specification could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and the RPKI implementer community has elected to utilize the TAL format, rather than define the requisite extension. The community also prefers the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL, versus the binary (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo.
TAL类似于[RFC5914]中规定的TrustAnchorInfo数据结构，该数据结构处于标准轨道上。如果为该数据结构定义了rsync URI扩展，那么该规范可以用来表示TAL。然而，在PKIX信任锚工作之前，RPKI实现者采用了TAL格式，RPKI实现者社区选择使用TAL格式，而不是定义必要的扩展。社区还更喜欢TAL的ASCII编码的简单性，而不是TrustAnchorInfo的二进制（ASN.1）编码。
The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
TAL是以下各项的有序序列：
1) a URI section,
1) URI部分，
2) a <CRLF> or <LF> line break,
2) 一个<CRLF>或<LF>断线，
3) a subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]). To avoid long lines, <CRLF> or <LF> line breaks MAY be inserted into the Base64-encoded string.
3) DER格式[X.509]的subjectPublicKeyInfo[RFC5280]，以Base64编码（见[RFC4648]第4节）。为了避免长行，可以将<CRLF>或<LF>换行符插入Base64编码字符串中。
where the URI section is comprised of one of more of the ordered sequence of:
其中，URI部分由以下有序序列中的一个或多个组成：
1.1) an rsync URI [RFC5781],
1.1）rsync URI[RFC5781]，
1.2) a <CRLF> or <LF> line break.
1.2）一个<CRLF>或<LF>断线。
Each rsync URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST NOT reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects.
TAL中的每个rsync URI必须引用单个对象。它不能引用目录或任何其他形式的对象集合。
The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate is the trust anchor in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and validation [RFC5280] [RFC3779].
引用的对象必须是符合RPKI证书配置文件[RFC6487]的自签名CA证书。此证书是证书路径发现[RFC4158]和验证[RFC5280][RFC3779]中的信任锚点。
The validity interval of this trust anchor SHOULD reflect the anticipated period of stability of the particular set of INRs that are associated with the putative trust anchor.
该信托锚的有效期应反映与假定信托锚相关的一组特定INR的预期稳定期。
The INR extension(s) of this trust anchor MUST contain a non-empty set of number resources. It MUST NOT use the "inherit" form of the INR extension(s). The INR set described in this certificate is the set of number resources for which the issuing entity is offering itself as a putative trust anchor in the RPKI [RFC6480].
此信任锚点的INR扩展必须包含一组非空的数字资源。不得使用INR扩展的“继承”形式。本证书中描述的INR集合是一组数字资源，发行实体在RPKI[RFC6480]中将自己作为假定的信任锚提供给这些资源。
The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL.
用于验证信任锚的公钥必须与CA证书和TAL中的subjectPublicKeyInfo相同。
The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key. This key MUST NOT change when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration, or for any reason other than a key change.
信任锚必须包含一个稳定的密钥。由于INR扩展名的更改、证书在到期前续订或密钥更改以外的任何原因重新颁发证书时，不得更改此密钥。
Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an offline mode. Thus, the entity that issues the trust anchor SHOULD issue a subordinate CA certificate that contains the same INRs (via the use of the "inherit" option in the INR extensions of the subordinate certificate). This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to keep the corresponding private key of this certificate offline, while issuing all relevant child certificates under the immediate subordinate CA. This measure also allows the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) issued by that entity to be used to revoke the subordinate CA certificate in the event of suspected key compromise of this online operational key pair that is potentially more vulnerable.
因为TAL中的公钥和信任锚点必须是稳定的，这会促使CA在脱机模式下运行。因此，发出信任锚的实体应发出包含相同INR的从属CA证书（通过在从属证书的INR扩展中使用“继承”选项）。这允许发出信任锚的实体保持此证书的相应私钥脱机，同时在直接下级CA下发出所有相关子证书。此措施还允许证书吊销列表（CRL）由该实体颁发，用于在该在线操作密钥对可能更易受攻击的可疑密钥泄露事件中撤销从属CA证书。
The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust anchor is reissued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate MUST be accessible using the same URI.
信任锚必须以稳定的URI发布。由于任何原因重新发布信任锚点时，必须使用相同的URI访问替换CA证书。
Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate.
由于信任锚点是自签名证书，因此没有相应的CRL可用于撤销它，也没有列出此证书的清单[RFC6486]。
If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a putative trust anchor, for any reason, including key rollover, the entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the TAL.
如果实体出于任何原因（包括密钥翻转）希望撤回自签名CA证书作为假定的信任锚，则该实体必须从TAL中引用的位置移除该对象。
Where the TAL contains two or more rsync URIs, then the same self-signed CA certificate MUST be found at each referenced location. In order to increase operational resilience, it is RECOMMENDED that the domain name parts of each of these URIs resolve to distinct IP
如果TAL包含两个或多个rsync URI，则必须在每个引用位置找到相同的自签名CA证书。为了提高操作弹性，建议将每个URI的域名部分解析为不同的IP地址
addresses that are used by a diverse set of repository publication points, and these IP addresses be included in distinct Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) objects signed by different CAs.
由一组不同的存储库发布点使用的地址，这些IP地址包含在由不同CA签名的不同路由源授权（ROA）对象中。
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) trust anchor, an RP SHOULD:
为了使用TAL检索和验证（假定的）信任锚，RP应：
1. Retrieve the object referenced by (one of) the URI(s) contained in the TAL.
1. 检索TAL中包含的URI引用的对象。
2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in [RFC6487].
2. 确认检索到的对象是符合[RFC6487]中指定的配置文件的当前自签名RPKI CA证书。
3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in the retrieved object.
3. 确认TAL中的公钥与检索到的对象中的公钥匹配。
4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor. These tests apply to the validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this certificate.
4. 执行其他适当的检查（本地），以确保RP愿意接受发布此自签名CA证书的实体作为信任锚。这些测试适用于与本证书INR扩展部分中描述的所有资源相关的RPKI背景下所做证明的有效性。
An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a resynchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the TAL.
每次RP跨本地存储库缓存执行重新同步时，RP都应为此目的对其持有的每个TAL实例执行这些功能。在任何情况下，RP也应该在TAL引用的检索到的信任锚的本地缓存副本过期之前执行这些功能。
In the case where a TAL contains multiple URIs, an RP MAY use a locally defined preference rule to select the URI to retrieve the self-signed RPKI CA certificate that is to be used as a trust anchor. Some examples are:
在TAL包含多个URI的情况下，RP可以使用本地定义的首选项规则来选择URI以检索要用作信任锚的自签名RPKI CA证书。例如：
o Using the order provided in the TAL o Selecting the URI randomly from the available list o Creating a prioritized list of URIs based on RP-specific parameters, such as connection establishment delay
o 使用talo中提供的顺序从可用列表中随机选择URI o基于RP特定参数（例如连接建立延迟）创建URI的优先级列表
If the connection to the preferred URI fails, or the retrieved CA certificate public key does not match the TAL public key, the RP SHOULD retrieve the CA certificate from the next URI, according to the local preference ranking of URIs.
如果与首选URI的连接失败，或者检索到的CA证书公钥与TAL公钥不匹配，RP应根据URI的本地首选项排序从下一个URI检索CA证书。
Compromise of a trust anchor private key permits unauthorized parties to masquerade as a trust anchor, with potentially severe consequences. Reliance on an inappropriate or incorrect trust anchor has similar potentially severe consequences.
信任锚私钥的泄露允许未经授权的各方伪装成信任锚，并可能带来严重后果。依赖不适当或不正确的信托锚也会产生类似的潜在严重后果。
This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this certificate. This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for any resource. Relying parties should either have great confidence in the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate certificates.
此TAL不直接提供引用的自签名CA证书所涵盖的资源列表。相反，RP指的是信任锚本身和本证书中的INR扩展。这提供了必要的操作灵活性，但也允许证书颁发者声明对任何资源具有权威性。依赖方要么对其配置为信任锚的此类证书的颁发者非常信任，要么应将其自己的自签名证书作为信任锚颁发，并在这样做时对从属证书施加约束。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，DOI 10.17487/RFC2119，1997年3月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, DOI 10.17487/RFC3779, June 2004, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC3779]Lynn，C.，Kent，S.，和K.Seo，“IP地址和AS标识符的X.509扩展”，RFC 3779，DOI 10.17487/RFC3779，2004年6月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779>.
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC4648]Josefsson，S.，“Base16、Base32和Base64数据编码”，RFC 4648，DOI 10.17487/RFC4648，2006年10月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5280]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 5280，DOI 10.17487/RFC5280，2008年5月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5781] Weiler, S., Ward, D., and R. Housley, "The rsync URI Scheme", RFC 5781, DOI 10.17487/RFC5781, February 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.
[RFC5781]Weiler，S.，Ward，D.，和R.Housley，“rsync URI方案”，RFC 5781，DOI 10.17487/RFC5781，2010年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5781>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/RFC6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6487]Huston，G.，Michaelson，G.，和R.Loomans，“X.509 PKIX资源证书的配置文件”，RFC 6487，DOI 10.17487/RFC6487，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[X.509] ITU-T, "The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T Recommendation X.509, ISO/IEC 9594-8, October 2012.
[X.509]ITU-T，“目录：公钥和属性证书框架”，ITU-T建议X.509，ISO/IEC 9594-8，2012年10月。
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, DOI 10.17487/RFC4158, September 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>.
[RFC4158]Cooper，M.，Dzambasow，Y.，Hesse，P.，Joseph，S.，和R.Nicholas，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施：认证路径构建”，RFC 4158，DOI 10.17487/RFC4158，2005年9月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4158>.
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Format", RFC 5914, DOI 10.17487/RFC5914, June 2010, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC5914]Housley，R.，Ashmore，S.，和C.Wallace，“信任锚格式”，RFC 5914，DOI 10.17487/RFC59142010年6月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5914>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, DOI 10.17487/RFC6480, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6480]Lepinski，M.和S.Kent，“支持安全互联网路由的基础设施”，RFC 6480，DOI 10.17487/RFC6480，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6486]Austein，R.，Huston，G.，Kent，S.，和M.Lepinski，“资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）清单”，RFC 6486，DOI 10.17487/RFC6486，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
Acknowledgments
致谢
This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by Robert Kisteleki.
这种信任锚材料的方法最初由Robert Kisteleki描述。
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy Bush, who assisted with drafting this document and with helpful review comments.
作者感谢Rob Austein和Randy Bush的贡献，他们协助起草了本文件并提出了有益的评论意见。
The authors acknowledge with work of Roque Gagliano, Terry Manderson, and Carlos Martinez Cagnazzo in developing the ideas behind the inclusion of multiple URIs in the TAL.
作者感谢Roque Gagliano、Terry Manderson和Carlos Martinez Cagnazo在开发TAL中包含多个URI背后的想法方面所做的工作。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Geoff Huston APNIC
杰夫·休斯顿呼吸暂停
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Email: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Samuel Weiler Parsons 7110 Samuel Morse Drive Columbia, MD 21046 United States
塞缪尔·韦勒·帕森斯7110美国马里兰州哥伦比亚塞缪尔·莫尔斯大道21046号
Email: weiler@tislabs.com
Email: weiler@tislabs.com
George Michaelson APNIC
乔治·迈克尔森呼吸暂停综合征
Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Email: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton St. Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies美国马萨诸塞州剑桥莫尔顿街10号，邮编02138
Email: kent@bbn.com
Email: kent@bbn.com