Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent
Request for Comments: 7382 D. Kong
BCP: 173 K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice BBN Technologies
ISSN: 2070-1721 April 2015
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent
Request for Comments: 7382 D. Kong
BCP: 173 K. Seo
Category: Best Current Practice BBN Technologies
ISSN: 2070-1721 April 2015
Template for a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for the Resource PKI (RPKI)
资源PKI（RPKI）的认证实践声明（CPS）模板
Abstract
摘要
This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), e.g., a resource allocation registry or an ISP.
本文档包含一个模板，用于为属于资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）的组织（例如，资源分配注册中心或ISP）创建认证实践声明（CPS）。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
本备忘录记录了互联网最佳实践。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关BCP的更多信息，请参见RFC 5741第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7382.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2015 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
Table of Contents
目录
Preface ............................................................8
1. Introduction ....................................................9
1.1. Overview ..................................................10
1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
3.1. Naming ....................................................15
3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
Trademarks .........................................16
3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17
Preface ............................................................8
1. Introduction ....................................................9
1.1. Overview ..................................................10
1.2. Document Name and Identification ..........................10
1.3. PKI Participants ..........................................11
1.3.1. Certification Authorities ..........................11
1.3.2. Registration Authorities ...........................11
1.3.3. Subscribers ........................................11
1.3.4. Relying Parties ....................................11
1.3.5. Other Participants .................................12
1.4. Certificate Usage .........................................12
1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses .......................12
1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses ........................12
1.5. Policy Administration .....................................12
1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document ............12
1.5.2. Contact Person .....................................12
1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy ..12
1.5.4. CPS Approval Procedures ............................13
1.6. Definitions and Acronyms ..................................13
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities ....................14
2.1. Repositories ..............................................14
2.2. Publication of Certification Information ..................14
2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication ..........................14
2.4. Access Controls on Repositories ...........................15
3. Identification and Authentication ..............................15
3.1. Naming ....................................................15
3.1.1. Types of Names .....................................15
3.1.2. Need for Names to Be Meaningful ....................15
3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers ...........15
3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms ..........15
3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names ................................16
3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of
Trademarks .........................................16
3.2. Initial Identity Validation ...............................16
3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key ..........16
3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity ............16
3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity ..............17
3.2.4. Non-verified Subscriber Information ................17
3.2.5. Validation of Authority ............................17
3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation ........................17
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
Routine Re-key .....................................18
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
Re-key after Revocation ............................18
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
4.2.1. Performing Identification and
Authentication Functions ...........................19
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
Issuance of Certificate ............................20
4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................22
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Renewal Certificate ................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................22
4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................23
3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests .....18
3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for
Routine Re-key .....................................18
3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for
Re-key after Revocation ............................18
3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request ..18
4. Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements ................18
4.1. Certificate Application ...................................18
4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application ...........18
4.1.2. Enrollment Process and Responsibilities ............19
4.2. Certificate Application Processing ........................19
4.2.1. Performing Identification and
Authentication Functions ...........................19
4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications ..19
4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications ...........19
4.3. Certificate Issuance ......................................19
4.3.1. CA Actions during Certificate Issuance .............19
4.3.2. Notification to Subscriber by the CA of
Issuance of Certificate ............................20
4.3.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.4. Certificate Acceptance ....................................20
4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance ........20
4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA ...........20
4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................20
4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage ............................20
4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage .......20
4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage .....21
4.6. Certificate Renewal .......................................21
4.6.1. Circumstance for Certificate Renewal ...............21
4.6.2. Who May Request Renewal ............................21
4.6.3. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests ............22
4.6.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................22
4.6.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Renewal Certificate ................................22
4.6.6. Publication of the Renewal Certificate by the CA ...22
4.6.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................22
4.7. Certificate Re-key ........................................22
4.7.1. Circumstance for Certificate Re-key ................22
4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key ..23
4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests ..........23
4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to
Subscriber .........................................23
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................23
4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
Certificate ........................................24
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................24
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
Revocation Request .................................25
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
Parties ............................................25
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27
4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a
Re-keyed Certificate ...............................23
4.7.6. Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA ..23
4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................23
4.8. Certificate Modification ..................................23
4.8.1. Circumstance for Certificate Modification ..........23
4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification ...........24
4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests .......24
4.8.4. Notification of Modified Certificate
Issuance to Subscriber .............................24
4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified
Certificate ........................................24
4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA ..24
4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the
CA to Other Entities ...............................24
4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....................25
4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation .......................25
4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation .........................25
4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request ...................25
4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period ....................25
4.9.5. Time within Which CA Must Process the
Revocation Request .................................25
4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying
Parties ............................................25
4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency .............................26
4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs ...........................26
4.10. Certificate Status Services ..............................26
5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls .................26
5.1. Physical Controls .........................................26
5.1.1. Site Location and Construction .....................26
5.1.2. Physical Access ....................................26
5.1.3. Power and Air Conditioning .........................26
5.1.4. Water Exposures ....................................26
5.1.5. Fire Prevention and Protection .....................26
5.1.6. Media Storage ......................................26
5.1.7. Waste Disposal .....................................26
5.1.8. Off-Site Backup ....................................26
5.2. Procedural Controls .......................................27
5.2.1. Trusted Roles ......................................27
5.2.2. Number of Persons Required per Task ................27
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication for Each Role ....27
5.2.4. Roles Requiring Separation of Duties ...............27
5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
Requirements .......................................27
5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
External) [OMITTED] ................................29
5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
Checking ...........................................30
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
Usage Field) .......................................30
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls ......................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
Cryptographic Module ...............................31
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32
5.3. Personnel Controls ........................................27
5.3.1. Qualifications, Experience, and Clearance
Requirements .......................................27
5.3.2. Background Check Procedures ........................27
5.3.3. Training Requirements ..............................27
5.3.4. Retraining Frequency and Requirements ..............27
5.3.5. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence ................27
5.3.6. Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions .................27
5.3.7. Independent Contractor Requirements ................27
5.3.8. Documentation Supplied to Personnel ................27
5.4. Audit Logging Procedures ..................................28
5.4.1. Types of Events Recorded ...........................28
5.4.2. Frequency of Processing Log ........................28
5.4.3. Retention Period for Audit Log .....................28
5.4.4. Protection of Audit Log ............................28
5.4.5. Audit Log Backup Procedures ........................28
5.4.6. Audit Collection System (Internal vs.
External) [OMITTED] ................................29
5.4.7. Notification to Event-Causing Subject [OMITTED] ....29
5.4.8. Vulnerability Assessments ..........................29
5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED] ................................29
5.6. Key Changeover ............................................29
5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery ..........................29
5.8. CA or RA Termination ......................................29
6. Technical Security Controls ....................................29
6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation ......................29
6.1.1. Key Pair Generation ................................29
6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber .................30
6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer ..........30
6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties ..........30
6.1.5. Key Sizes ..........................................30
6.1.6. Public Key Parameter Generation and Quality
Checking ...........................................30
6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key
Usage Field) .......................................30
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module
Engineering Controls ......................................31
6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls ........31
6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control ......31
6.2.3. Private Key Escrow .................................31
6.2.4. Private Key Backup .................................31
6.2.5. Private Key Archival ...............................31
6.2.6. Private Key Transfer into or from a
Cryptographic Module ...............................31
6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module ........31
6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key ...................32
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
Pair Usage Periods .................................32
6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
9.1. Fees ......................................................34
9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
Confidential Information ...........................34
9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
Information ........................................34
9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
Administrative Process .............................35
9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35
6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key .................32
6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key ..................32
6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating .......................32
6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management ......................32
6.3.1. Public Key Archival ................................32
6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key
Pair Usage Periods .................................32
6.4. Activation Data ...........................................32
6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation ........32
6.4.2. Activation Data Protection .........................32
6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data ...................33
6.5. Computer Security Controls ................................33
6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls .............................33
6.6.1. System Development Controls ........................33
6.6.2. Security Management Controls .......................33
6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls .......................33
6.7. Network Security Controls .................................33
6.8. Time-Stamping .............................................33
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles ...................................33
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments .........................34
9. Other Business and Legal Matters ...............................34
9.1. Fees ......................................................34
9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees ...............34
9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees [OMITTED] ..................34
9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access
Fees [OMITTED] .....................................34
9.1.4. Fees for Other Services (if Applicable) ............34
9.1.5. Refund Policy ......................................34
9.2. Financial Responsibility ..................................34
9.2.1. Insurance Coverage .................................34
9.2.2. Other Assets .......................................34
9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities ....34
9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information ...................34
9.3.1. Scope of Confidential Information ..................34
9.3.2. Information Not within the Scope of
Confidential Information ...........................34
9.3.3. Responsibility to Protect Confidential
Information ........................................34
9.4. Privacy of Personal Information ...........................34
9.4.1. Privacy Plan .......................................34
9.4.2. Information Treated as Private .....................35
9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private .....................35
9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information ......35
9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information ......35
9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or
Administrative Process .............................35
9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances .........35
9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
Rights) ...........................................36
9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
10. Security Considerations .......................................36
11. References ....................................................37
11.1. Normative References .....................................37
11.2. Informative References ...................................37
Acknowledgments ...................................................38
Authors' Addresses ................................................38
9.5. Intellectual Property Rights (if Applicable) ..............35
9.6. Representations and Warranties ............................35
9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties ..................35
9.6.2. Subscriber Representations and Warranties ..........35
9.6.3. Relying Party Representations and Warranties .......35
9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties .................................35
9.8. Limitations of Liability ..................................35
9.9. Indemnities ...............................................35
9.10. Term and Termination .....................................35
9.10.1. Term ..............................................35
9.10.2. Termination .......................................35
9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival ................35
9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants ..35
9.12. Amendments ...............................................35
9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment ...........................35
9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period .................35
9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions ............................35
9.14. Governing Law ............................................35
9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law ...........................36
9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions .................................36
9.16.1. Entire Agreement ..................................36
9.16.2. Assignment ........................................36
9.16.3. Severability ......................................36
9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorneys' Fees and Waiver of
Rights) ...........................................36
9.16.5. Force Majeure .....................................36
10. Security Considerations .......................................36
11. References ....................................................37
11.1. Normative References .....................................37
11.2. Informative References ...................................37
Acknowledgments ...................................................38
Authors' Addresses ................................................38
Preface
前言
This RFC contains text intended for use as a template as designated below by the markers <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT>. Such Template Text is subject to the provisions of Section 9(b) of the Trust Legal Provisions.
此RFC包含拟用作模板的文本，如下所示，由标记<BEGIN template text>和<END template text>指定。该模板文本受《信托法律条款》第9（b）节规定的约束。
This document contains a template to be used for creating a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for an organization that is part of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). (Throughout this document, the term "organization" is used broadly, e.g., the entity in question might be a business unit of a larger organization.)
本文档包含一个模板，用于为作为资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）一部分的组织创建认证实践声明（CPS）。（在本文件中，“组织”一词被广泛使用，例如，相关实体可能是较大组织的业务部门。）
There is no expectation that a CPS will be published as an RFC. An organization will publish the CPS in a manner appropriate for access by the users of the RPKI, e.g., on the organization's web site. As a best current practice, organizations are expected to use this template instead of creating one from scratch. This template contains both text that SHOULD appear in all Certification Practice Statements and places for text specific to the organization in question (indicated by <text in angle brackets>).
不期望CPS将作为RFC发布。组织将以适合RPKI用户访问的方式发布CPS，例如在组织的网站上。作为当前的最佳实践，希望组织使用此模板，而不是从头开始创建模板。此模板包含应出现在所有认证实践声明中的文本以及特定于相关组织的文本位置（由<尖括号中的文本>表示）。
The user of this document should:
本文件的用户应：
1. Extract the text between the <BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT> and <END TEMPLATE TEXT> delimiters.
1. 提取<BEGIN TEMPLATE text>和<END TEMPLATE text>分隔符之间的文本。
2. Replace the instructions between the angle brackets with the required information.
2. 用所需信息替换尖括号之间的说明。
This document has been generated to complement the Certificate Policy (CP) for the RPKI [RFC6484]. Like RFC 6484, it is based on the template specified in RFC 3647 [RFC3647]. A number of sections contained in the template were omitted from this CPS because they did not apply to this PKI. However, we have retained the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC to facilitate comparison with the section numbering scheme employed in that RFC and in RFC 6484.
生成本文档是为了补充RPKI[RFC6484]的证书策略（CP）。与RFC 6484一样，它基于RFC 3647[RFC3647]中指定的模板。此CPS中省略了模板中包含的许多部分，因为它们不适用于此PKI。但是，我们保留了该RFC中采用的章节编号方案，以便于与该RFC和RFC 6484中采用的章节编号方案进行比较。
Conventions Used in This Document:
本文件中使用的约定：
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
<BEGIN TEMPLATE TEXT>
<开始模板文本>
<Create a title page saying, e.g., "<Name of organization> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)" with date, author, etc.>
<创建一个标题页，说明日期、作者等，例如“<组织名称>资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）认证实践声明”>
<Create a table of contents.>
<创建目录。>
This document is the Certification Practice Statement (CPS) of <name of organization>. It describes the practices employed by the <name of organization> Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC6484] for the RPKI.
本文件是<name of organization>的认证实践声明（CPS）。它描述了<name of organization>证书颁发机构（CA）在资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）中采用的实践。这些实践是根据RPKI证书政策（CP）[RFC6484]的要求定义的。
The RPKI is designed to support validation of claims by current holders of Internet Number Resources (INRs) (Section 1.6) in accordance with the records of the organizations that act as CAs in this PKI. The ability to verify such claims is essential to ensuring the unique, unambiguous distribution of these resources.
RPKI旨在支持互联网号码资源（INR）的当前持有人根据本PKI中充当CA的组织的记录对索赔进行验证（第1.6节）。核实此类索赔的能力对于确保这些资源的独特、明确分配至关重要。
This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy below the RIRs for INR distribution. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
此PKI与现有INR分发层次结构平行。这些资源由互联网分配号码管理局（IANA）分配给区域互联网注册中心（RIR）。在一些地区，国家互联网登记处（NIR）在印度卢比分配的RIR之下形成了一个层级。Internet服务提供商（ISP）和网络订阅者在注册表下形成附加层。
Conventions Used in This Document:
本文件中使用的约定：
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
This CPS describes:
本CPS描述了：
o Participants
o 参与者
o Publication of the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
o 发布证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）
o How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed, and revoked
o 如何颁发、管理、重新设置密钥、续订和吊销证书
o Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
o 设施管理（物理安全、人员、审计等）
o Key management
o 密钥管理
o Audit procedures
o 审计程序
o Business and legal issues
o 商业和法律问题
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see [RFC6480] for more details):
此PKI包含几种类型的证书（有关更多详细信息，请参阅[RFC6480]）：
o CA certificates for each organization distributing INRs and for each subscriber INR holder.
o 分发INR的每个组织和每个订户INR持有人的CA证书。
o End-entity (EE) certificates for organizations to use to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects (see definition in Section 1.6).
o 组织用于验证RPKI签名对象数字签名的终端实体（EE）证书（见第1.6节中的定义）。
o In the future, the PKI also may include end-entity certificates in support of access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.
o 将来，PKI还可能包括终端实体证书，以支持存储库系统的访问控制，如第2.4节所述。
The name of this document is "<Name of organization> Certification Practice Statement for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)". <If this document is available via the Internet, the CA can provide the URI for the CPS here. It SHOULD be the same URI as the URI that appears as a policy qualifier in the CA certificate for the CA, if the CA elects to make use of that feature.>
本文件的名称为“<name of organization>资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）认证实践声明”<如果此文档可通过Internet获得，CA可以在此处提供CP的URI。如果CA选择使用该功能，则该URI应与作为CA的CA证书中的策略限定符出现的URI相同。>
Note that in a PKI the term "subscriber" refers to an individual or organization that is a subject of a certificate issued by a CA. The term is used in this fashion throughout this document, without qualification, and should not be confused with the networking use of the term to refer to an individual or organization that receives service from an ISP. In such cases, the term "network subscriber" will be used. Also note that, for brevity, this document always refers to PKI participants as organizations or entities, even though some of them are individuals.
请注意，在PKI中，术语“订阅者”指的是CA颁发的证书的主体个人或组织。本文件中以这种方式使用该术语，没有任何限制，而且不应与“网络”一词的用法混淆，该词指的是从ISP接收服务的个人或组织。在这种情况下，将使用术语“网络订户”。还请注意，为简洁起见，本文件始终将PKI参与者称为组织或实体，即使其中一些人是个人。
<Describe the CAs that you will operate for the RPKI. One approach is to operate two CAs: one designated "offline" and the other designated "production". The offline CA is the top-level CA for the <name of organization> portion of the RPKI. It provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the production CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus, the offline CA issues certificates only to instances of the production CA, and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the production CA. The production CA is used to issue RPKI certificates to <name of organization> members, to whom INRs have been distributed.>
<描述您将为RPKI操作的CAs。一种方法是运行两个CA：一个指定为“离线”，另一个指定为“生产”。脱机CA是RPKI的<name of organization>部分的顶级CA。它提供了安全的撤销和恢复功能，以防生产CA受损或变得不可用。因此，脱机CA仅向生产CA的实例颁发证书，而其颁发的CRL仅用于吊销颁发给生产CA的证书。生产CA用于向已向其分发INR的<name of organization>成员颁发RPKI证书。>
<Describe how the Registration Authority (RA) function is handled for the CA(s) that you operate. The RPKI does not require establishment or use of a separate Registration Authority in addition to the CA function. The RA function MUST be provided by the same entity operating as a CA, e.g., entities listed in Section 1.3.1. An entity acting as a CA in this PKI already has a formal relationship with each organization to which it distributes INRs. These organizations already perform the RA function implicitly, since they already assume responsibility for distributing INRs.>
<描述如何为您运营的CA处理注册机构（RA）功能。RPKI不要求在CA职能之外设立或使用单独的注册机构。RA功能必须由与CA相同的实体提供，例如第1.3.1节中列出的实体。在该PKI中充当CA的实体已经与向其分发INR的每个组织建立了正式关系。这些组织已经隐式地履行了RA职能，因为它们已经承担了分发INR的责任。>
Organizations receiving INR allocations from this CA are subscribers in the RPKI.
从该CA接收INR分配的组织是RPKI中的订户。
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See Section 1.6 for the definition of an RPKI-signed object.)
依赖根据本PKI颁发的证书或RPKI签名对象行事的实体或个人为依赖方。依赖方可能是也可能不是此PKI中的订户。（有关RPKI签名对象的定义，请参见第1.6节。）
<Specify one or more entities that operate a repository holding certificates, CRLs, and other RPKI-signed objects issued by this organization, and provide a URL for the repository.>
<指定一个或多个实体来操作存储库，存储该组织颁发的证书、CRL和其他RPKI签名对象，并提供存储库的URL。>
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorization in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs.
根据该层次结构颁发的证书用于授权，以支持对印度卢比当前持有量的索赔进行验证。
Additional uses of the certificates, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under RFC 6484.
根据RFC 6484，与上述基本目标一致的证书的额外使用也是允许的。
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure, e.g., access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4. Such uses also are permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
根据此PKI颁发的一些证书可用于支持此基础设施的运行，例如，如第2.4节所述的存储库系统的访问控制。RPKI证书政策也允许此类使用。
Any uses other than those described in Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.
禁止使用第1.4.1节所述以外的任何用途。
This CPS is administered by <name of organization>. <Include the
mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>
This CPS is administered by <name of organization>. <Include the
mailing address, email address, and similar contact info here.>
<Insert organization contact info here.>
<在此处插入组织联系信息。>
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
不适用。在此PKI中颁发证书的每个组织都在证明INR已分发给证书中公钥对应的私钥持有人。发布组织与执行分发的组织相同；因此，它们在本约束的准确性方面具有权威性。
Not applicable. Each organization issuing a certificate in this PKI is attesting to the distribution of INRs to the holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. The issuing organizations are the same organizations as the ones that perform the distribution; hence, they are authoritative with respect to the accuracy of this binding.
不适用。在此PKI中颁发证书的每个组织都在证明INR已分发给证书中公钥对应的私钥持有人。发布组织与执行分发的组织相同；因此，它们在本约束的准确性方面具有权威性。
BPKI Business PKI. A BPKI is an optional additional PKI used by an organization to identify members to whom RPKI certificates can be issued. If a BPKI is employed by a CA, it may have its own CP, separate from the RPKI CP.
BPKI商业PKI。BPKI是一种可选的附加PKI，组织使用它来标识可以向其颁发RPKI证书的成员。如果一个BPKI由CA使用，它可能有自己的CP，独立于RPKI CP。
CP Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. The CP for the RPKI is [RFC6484].
CP证书策略。CP是一组命名规则，指示证书对具有通用安全要求的特定社区和/或应用程序类别的适用性。RPKI的CP为[RFC6484]。
CPS Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates.
CPS认证实践声明。CPS是规定认证机构在颁发证书时采用的做法的文件。
Distribution of INRs A process of distribution of the INRs along the respective number hierarchy. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organizations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers.
INR的分布INR沿相应数字层次分布的过程。IANA将IP地址块和自治系统号（ASN）分配给五个区域互联网注册中心（RIR）。RIR将较小的地址块和自主系统号分发给其服务区域内的组织，这些组织反过来将IP地址分发给其客户。
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to RIRs.
IANA互联网分配号码管理局。IANA负责互联网协议寻址系统和用于路由互联网流量的ASN的全球协调。IANA将印度卢比分配给RIR。
INRs Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely:
INRs互联网号码资源。INR是三个协议参数集的数值，即：
o IP version 4 addresses,
o IP版本4地址，
o IP version 6 addresses, and
o IP版本6地址，以及
o Identifiers used in Internet inter-domain routing, currently Border Gateway Protocol-4 ASNs.
o Internet域间路由中使用的标识符，目前为边界网关协议-4 ASN。
ISP Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organization managing and selling Internet services to other organizations.
ISP互联网服务提供商。ISP是一个管理互联网服务并向其他组织销售互联网服务的组织。
NIR National Internet Registry. An NIR is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the tree scheme used to manage INR distribution.
国家互联网注册处。NIR是一个组织，负责管理区域互联网注册所覆盖的部分地缘政治区域的印度卢比分配。NIR在用于管理INR分布的树状方案中形成可选的第二层。
RIR Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organization that manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area.
RIR区域互联网注册处。RIR是一个管理地缘政治区域印度卢比分布的组织。
RPKI-signed object An RPKI-signed object is a digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such an object by a Standards Track RFC. An RPKI-signed object can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims of current holdings of INRs takes place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC6486] and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) [RFC6482].
RPKI签名对象RPKI签名对象是由标准跟踪RFC声明为此类对象的数字签名数据对象（证书或CRL除外）。RPKI签名的对象可以使用在此PKI下颁发的证书进行验证。这些数据结构的内容和格式取决于对目前持有的印度卢比的债权进行确认的背景。这些对象的示例包括存储库清单[RFC6486]和路由来源授权（ROA）[RFC6482]。
As per the CP, certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, to enable them to validate this data.
根据CP，证书、CRL和RPKI签名对象必须可供所有依赖方下载，以使其能够验证此数据。
The <name of organization> RPKI CA will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects via a repository that is accessible via <insert IETF-designated protocol name here> at <insert URL here>. This repository will conform to the structure described in [RFC6481].
<name of organization>RPKI CA将通过一个存储库发布证书、CRL和RPKI签名对象，该存储库可通过<insert URL here>处的<insert IETF specified protocol name here>访问。该存储库将符合[RFC6481]中描述的结构。
<Name of organization> will publish certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects issued by it to a repository that operates as part of a worldwide distributed system of RPKI repositories.
<Name of organization>将向作为全球分布式RPKI存储库系统一部分运行的存储库发布由其颁发的证书、CRL和RPKI签名对象。
<Describe here your procedures for publication (to the global repository system) of the certificates, CRLs, and RPKI-signed objects that you issue. If you choose to outsource publication of PKI data, you still need to provide this information for relying parties. This MUST include the period of time within which a certificate will be
<在此描述您发布的证书、CRL和RPKI签名对象的发布（到全局存储库系统）过程。如果您选择将PKI数据的发布外包，则仍然需要向依赖方提供此信息。这必须包括证书的有效期
published after the CA issues the certificate, and the period of time within which a CA will publish a CRL with an entry for a revoked certificate, after the CA revokes that certificate.>
在CA颁发证书后发布，以及CA撤销该证书后，CA将发布带有已撤销证书条目的CRL的时间段。>
The <name of organization> CA will publish its CRL prior to the nextUpdate value in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.
<name of organization>CA将在CA先前发布的计划CRL中的nextUpdate值之前发布其CRL。
<Describe the access controls used by the organization to ensure that only authorized parties can modify repository data, and any controls used to mitigate denial-of-service attacks against the repository. If the organization offers repository services to its subscribers, then describe here the protocol(s) that it supports for publishing signed objects from subscribers.>
<描述组织为确保只有授权方可以修改存储库数据而使用的访问控制，以及用于减轻对存储库的拒绝服务攻击的任何控制。如果组织向其订阅者提供存储库服务，请在此处描述它支持的用于从订阅者发布签名对象的协议。>
The subject of each certificate issued by this organization is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by <name of organization>. Optionally, the serialNumber attribute may be included along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish among successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
该组织颁发的每个证书的主题由X.500可分辨名称（DN）标识。可分辨名称将由单个通用名称（CN）属性组成，该属性的值由<name of organization>生成。可选地，serialNumber属性可以与公共名称一起包括（以形成终端相对可分辨名称集），以区分与同一实体关联的证书的连续实例。
The Subject name in each certificate SHOULD NOT be "meaningful", in the conventional, human-readable sense. The rationale here is that these certificates are used for authorization in support of applications that make use of attestations of INR holdings. They are not used to identify subjects.
每个证书中的主题名称不应具有传统的、人类可读的“意义”。这里的理由是，这些证书用于授权，以支持使用INR控股公司认证的应用。它们不用于识别受试者。
Although Subject names in certificates issued by this organization SHOULD NOT be meaningful and may appear "random", anonymity is not a function of this PKI; thus, no explicit support for this feature is provided.
虽然该组织颁发的证书中的主体名称不应有意义，可能看起来是“随机的”，但匿名性不是该PKI的功能；因此，没有提供对此功能的明确支持。
None
没有一个
<Name of organization> certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that these Subject names be unique throughout the PKI, to facilitate certificate path discovery, such uniqueness is not required, nor is it enforced through technical means. <Name of organization> generates Subject names to minimize the chances that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name. Specifically, <insert Subject name generation description here, or cite RFC 6487>.
<Name of organization>认证其颁发的证书中唯一的主题名称。虽然希望这些主体名称在整个PKI中是唯一的，但为了方便证书路径发现，不需要这种唯一性，也不通过技术手段强制执行这种唯一性<组织名称>生成主题名称，以最小化RPKI中两个实体被分配相同名称的可能性。具体而言，<在此处插入主题名称生成说明，或引用RFC 6487>。
Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, <name of organization> makes no provision either to recognize or to authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.
由于主题名称不具有意义，<name of organization>未规定识别或验证商标、服务标志等。
<Describe the method whereby each subscriber will be required to demonstrate proof-of-possession (PoP) of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate, prior to certificate issuance.>
<描述在颁发证书之前，要求每个订户证明拥有证书中公钥对应的私钥的方法。>
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the organizational identity of subscribers. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of distributions of INRs as represented in <name of organization> records.
在此PKI下颁发的证书不能证明订阅者的组织身份。但是，向认购人颁发证书的方式应能保持《组织名称》记录中所述INR分布的准确性。
<Describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that each RPKI certificate that is issued accurately reflects your records with regard to the organization to which you have distributed (or sub-distributed) the INRs identified in the certificate. For example, a BPKI certificate could be used to authenticate a certificate request that serves as a link to the <name of organization> subscriber database that maintains the INR distribution records. The certificate request could be matched against the database record for the subscriber in question, and an RPKI certificate would be issued only if the INRs requested were a subset of those held by the subscriber. The specific procedures employed for this purpose should be commensurate with any you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution.>
<描述将用于确保颁发的每个RPKI证书准确反映您在向其分发（或再分发）证书中标识的INR的组织方面的记录的程序。例如，BPKI证书可用于验证证书请求，该证书请求用作维护INR分发记录的<name of organization>订户数据库的链接。证书请求可以与相关订阅者的数据库记录相匹配，并且只有当请求的INR是订阅者持有的INR的子集时，才会颁发RPKI证书。为此目的而采用的具体程序应与您在维护INR分配时已经采用的任何程序相称。>
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a subscriber. However, <name of organization> maintains contact information for each subscriber in support of certificate renewal, re-key, and revocation.
根据此PKI颁发的证书不能证明订户的个人身份。但是，<name of organization>维护每个订阅者的联系信息，以支持证书续订、重新设置密钥和吊销。
<Describe the procedures that are used to identify at least one individual as a representative of each subscriber. This is done in support of issuance, renewal, and revocation of the certificate issued to the organization. For example, one might say "The <name of organization> BPKI (see Section 3.2.6) issues certificates that MUST be used to identify individuals who represent <name of organization> subscribers." The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives for INR holders. Note that this authentication is solely for use by you in dealing with the organizations to which you distribute (or sub-distribute) INRs and thus MUST NOT be relied upon outside of this CA/subscriber relationship.>
<描述用于确定至少一个人作为每个订户代表的程序。这样做是为了支持颁发、续订和撤销颁发给组织的证书。例如，有人可能会说“BPKI（见第3.2.6节）<name of organization>BPKI发布的证书必须用于识别代表<name of organization>订阅者的个人。”该程序应与您在认证个人为INR持有人代表时已经采用的程序相称。请注意，此身份验证仅供您在与您分发（或再分发）INR的组织打交道时使用，因此不得依赖于此CA/订户关系之外的组织。>
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate policy except for Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions [RFC6487].
除主题信息访问（SIA）扩展[RFC6487]外，根据本证书策略颁发的证书中不包含未经验证的订户数据。
<Describe the procedures used to verify that an individual claiming to represent a subscriber is authorized to represent that subscriber in this context. For example, one could say "Only an individual to whom a BPKI certificate (see Section 3.2.6) has been issued may request issuance of an RPKI certificate. Each certificate issuance request is verified using the BPKI." The procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in authenticating individuals as representatives of subscribers.>
<描述用于验证声称代表订户的个人是否有权在此上下文中代表该订户的程序。例如，可以说“只有获得BPKI证书（见第3.2.6节）的个人可以请求颁发RPKI证书。每个证书颁发请求都使用BPKI进行验证。”这些程序应与您在认证个人为认购人代表时已经采用的程序相称。>
The RPKI is neither intended nor designed to interoperate with any other PKI. <If you operate a separate, additional PKI for business purposes, e.g., a BPKI, then describe (or reference) how the BPKI is used to authenticate subscribers and to enable them to manage their resource distributions.>
RPKI既不是为了也不是为了与任何其他PKI互操作而设计的<如果您出于业务目的操作单独的附加PKI，例如BPKI，请描述（或参考）如何使用BPKI对订阅者进行身份验证并使他们能够管理其资源分发。>
<Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>
<Describe the conditions under which routine re-key is required and the manner by which it is requested. Describe the procedures that are used to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the legitimate holder of the certificate to be re-keyed. State the approach for establishing PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate routine re-key requests.>translate error, please retry
<Describe the procedures used to ensure that an organization requesting a re-key after revocation is the legitimate holder of the INRs in the certificate being re-keyed. This MUST also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the new public key. If you operate a BPKI, describe how that BPKI is used to authenticate re-key requests. With respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records.>
<描述用于确保撤销后请求重新密钥的组织是重新密钥证书中INR的合法持有人的程序。这还必须包括用于验证与新公钥对应的私钥的PoP的方法。如果您操作BPKI，请描述如何使用该BPKI对重设密钥请求进行身份验证。关于用户认证，程序应与您在维护INR分发记录时已经采用的程序相称。>
<Describe the procedures used by an RPKI subscriber to make a revocation request. Describe the manner by which it is ensured that the subscriber requesting revocation is the subject of the certificate (or an authorized representative thereof) to be revoked. Note that there may be different procedures for the case where the legitimate subject still possesses the original private key as opposed to the case when it no longer has access to that key. These procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of subscriber records.>
<描述RPKI订户发出撤销请求所使用的过程。描述如何确保请求撤销的认购人是要撤销的证书（或其授权代表）的主体。请注意，对于合法主体仍然拥有原始私钥的情况，可能会有不同的程序，而不是当合法主体不再能够访问该私钥时。这些程序应与您在维护用户记录时已采用的程序相称。>
Any subscriber in good standing who holds INRs distributed by <name of organization> may submit a certificate application to this CA. (The exact meaning of "in good standing" is in accordance with the policy of <name of organization>.)
持有<组织名称>发行的INR的任何信誉良好的认购人可向本CA提交证书申请。（信誉良好”的确切含义符合<组织名称>的政策）
<Describe your enrollment process for issuing certificates both for initial deployment of the PKI and as an ongoing process. Note that most of the certificates in this PKI are issued as part of your normal business practices, as an adjunct to INR distribution, and thus a separate application to request a certificate may not be necessary. If so, reference should be made to where these practices are documented.>
<描述您为首次部署PKI和作为一个持续过程颁发证书的注册过程。请注意，此PKI中的大多数证书都是作为正常业务实践的一部分颁发的，作为INR分发的一个附件，因此可能不需要单独申请证书。如果是，应参考记录这些实践的地方。>
<Describe the certificate request/response processing that you will employ. You should make use of existing standards for certificate application processing (see [RFC6487]).>
<描述您将采用的证书请求/响应处理。您应该使用现有的证书申请处理标准（请参阅[RFC6487]）。>
<Describe your practices for identification and authentication of certificate applicants. Often, existing practices employed by you to identify and authenticate organizations can be used as the basis for issuance of certificates to these subscribers. Reference can be made to documentation of such existing practices.>
<描述您对证书申请人的识别和认证做法。通常，您用于识别和验证组织的现有实践可以用作向这些订阅者颁发证书的基础。可参考此类现有实践的文件。>
<Describe your practices for approval or rejection of applications, and refer to documentation of existing business practices relevant to this process. Note that according to the CP, certificate applications will be approved based on the normal business practices of the entity operating the CA, based on the CA's records of subscribers. The CP also says that each CA will follow the procedure specified in Section 3.2.1 to verify that the requester holds the private key corresponding to the public key that will be bound to the certificate the CA issues to the requester.>
<描述您批准或拒绝申请的做法，并参考与此流程相关的现有业务做法的文档。请注意，根据CP，证书申请将根据CA运营实体的正常业务惯例以及CA的订户记录进行批准。CP还表示，每个CA将按照第3.2.1节规定的程序验证请求者是否持有与公钥对应的私钥，该公钥将绑定到CA向请求者颁发的证书。>
<Specify here your expected time frame for processing certificate applications.>
<在此指定处理证书申请的预期时间范围。>
<Describe your procedures for issuance and publication of a certificate.>
<描述您签发和发布证书的程序。>
<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. <Describe here your procedures for notifying a subscriber when a certificate has been published.>
<Name of organization>将在证书发布时通知订阅方<在此描述您在发布证书时通知订阅者的过程。>
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a certificate is published.>
<在此描述证书发布时将收到通知的任何其他实体。>
When a certificate is issued, the <name of organization> CA will publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. <This may be done without subscriber review and acceptance. State your policy with respect to subscriber certificate acceptance here.>
颁发证书时，<name of organization>CA将其发布到存储库并通知订阅者<这可以在没有订户审查和验收的情况下完成。在此处说明您关于接受用户证书的政策。>
Certificates will be published at <insert repository URL here> once issued, following the conduct described in Section 4.4.1. This will be done within <specify the time frame within which the certificate will be placed in the repository and the subscriber will be notified>. <Describe any additional procedures with respect to publication of the certificate here.>
证书发布后，将按照第4.4.1节所述的行为在<insert repository URL here>发布。这将在<指定将证书放入存储库并通知订阅者的时间范围>内完成<请在此说明与证书发布相关的任何附加程序。>
<Describe here any other entities that will be notified when a certificate is published.>
<在此描述证书发布时将收到通知的任何其他实体。>
A summary of the use model for the RPKI is provided below.
下面提供了RPKI使用模型的摘要。
The certificates issued by <name of organization> to subordinate INR holders are CA certificates. The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs.
<name of organization>向下属INR持有人颁发的证书为CA证书。与这些证书相关联的私钥用于签署从属（CA或EE）证书和CRL。
The primary relying parties in this PKI are organizations that use RPKI EE certificates to verify RPKI-signed objects. Relying parties are referred to Section 4.5.2 of [RFC6484] for additional guidance with respect to acts of reliance on RPKI certificates.
此PKI中的主要依赖方是使用RPKI EE证书验证RPKI签名对象的组织。关于依赖RPKI证书的行为，请参考[RFC6484]第4.5.2节，以获取更多指南。
As per RFC 6484, a certificate will be processed for renewal based on its expiration date or a renewal request from the certificate Subject. The request may be implicit, a side effect of renewing a resource holding agreement, or explicit. If <name of organization> initiates the renewal process based on the certificate expiration date, then <name of organization> will notify the subscriber <insert the period of advance warning, e.g., "2 weeks in advance of the expiration date", or the general policy, e.g., "in conjunction with notification of service expiration">. The validity interval of the new (renewed) certificate will overlap that of the previous certificate by <insert length of overlap period, e.g., 1 week>, to ensure uninterrupted coverage.
根据RFC 6484，证书将根据其到期日期或证书主体的续期请求进行续期处理。该请求可能是隐式的，也可能是续签资源持有协议的副作用，也可能是显式的。如果<name of organization>根据证书到期日启动续订流程，则<name of organization>将通知订阅者<插入提前警告期，例如“到期日前2周”，或一般政策，例如“与服务到期通知一起”>。新（更新）证书的有效期间隔将与前一证书的有效期间隔重叠<插入重叠期长度，例如1周>，以确保不间断覆盖。
Certificate renewal will incorporate the same public key as the previous certificate, unless the private key has been reported as compromised (see Section 4.9.1). If a new key pair is being used, the stipulations of Section 4.7 will apply.
除非私钥被报告为泄露（见第4.9.1节），否则证书续订将包含与先前证书相同的公钥。如果正在使用新的密钥对，则第4.7节的规定将适用。
The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the renewal process. <For the case of the subscriber, describe the procedures that will be used to ensure that the requester is the legitimate holder of the INRs in the certificate being renewed. This MUST also include the method employed for verifying PoP of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate being renewed or the new public key if the public key is being changed. With respect to authentication of the subscriber, the procedures should be commensurate with those you already employ in the maintenance of INR distribution records. If you operate a BPKI for this, describe how that business-based PKI is used to authenticate renewal requests, and refer to Section 3.2.6.>
订阅者或<name of organization>可以启动续订流程<对于订阅者的情况，描述将用于确保申请者是被续签证书中INR的合法持有人的程序。这还必须包括用于验证与正在更新的证书中的公钥对应的私钥的PoP的方法，或者如果正在更改公钥，则验证新公钥的PoP的方法。关于用户认证，程序应与您在维护INR分发记录时已经采用的程序相称。如果您为此操作BPKI，请描述基于业务的PKI如何用于验证续订请求，并参考第3.2.6节。>
<Describe your procedures for handling certificate renewal requests. Describe how you verify that the requester is the subscriber or is authorized by the subscriber, and that the certificate in question has not been revoked.>
<描述您处理证书续订请求的程序。描述您如何验证请求者是否为订阅者或由订阅者授权，以及相关证书是否未被吊销。>
<Name of organization> will notify the subscriber when the certificate is published. <Describe your procedure for notification of new certificate issuance to the subscriber. This should be consistent with Section 4.3.2.>
<Name of organization>将在证书发布时通知订阅方<描述您向订户发出新证书的通知程序。这应与第4.3.2节一致。>
See Section 4.4.1. <If you employ a different policy from that specified in Section 4.4.1, describe it here.>
见第4.4.1节<如果您采用的政策与第4.4.1节中规定的政策不同，请在此说明。>
See Section 4.4.2.
见第4.4.2节。
See Section 4.4.3.
见第4.4.3节。
As per RFC 6484, re-key of a certificate will be performed only when required, based on:
根据RFC 6484，仅在需要时根据以下条件对证书重新加密：
1. knowledge or suspicion of compromise or loss of the associated private key, or
1. 知道或怀疑相关私钥泄露或丢失，或
2. the expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair
2. 关联密钥对的加密生存期到期
If a certificate is revoked to replace the RFC 3779 extensions, the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key, not a new key.
如果吊销证书以替换RFC 3779扩展，则替换证书将包含相同的公钥，而不是新密钥。
If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked.
如果重新密钥是基于可疑的泄露，则先前的证书将被吊销。
Only the holder of a certificate may request a re-key. In addition, <name of organization> may initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report. <If the subscriber (certificate Subject) requests the re-key, describe how authentication is effected, e.g., using the <name of registry> BPKI. Describe how a compromise report received from other than a subscriber is verified.>
只有证书持有人可以请求重新加密。此外，<name of organization>可根据已验证的泄露报告启动重新加密<如果订户（证书主体）请求重新注册，请描述如何进行身份验证，例如，使用<name of registry>BPKI。描述如何验证从非订户处收到的妥协报告。>
<Describe your process for handling re-keying requests. As per the RPKI CP, this should be consistent with the process described in Section 4.3, so reference can be made to that section.>
<描述您处理重新键入请求的过程。根据RPKI CP，这应与第4.3节中描述的过程一致，因此可参考该节。>
<Describe your policy for notifying the subscriber regarding availability of the new re-keyed certificate. This should be consistent with the notification process for any new certificate issuance (see Section 4.3.2).>
<描述您通知订阅者新密钥证书可用性的策略。这应与任何新证书颁发的通知流程一致（见第4.3.2节）。>
When a re-keyed certificate is issued, the CA will publish it in the repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.
颁发重新设置密钥的证书时，CA将在存储库中发布该证书并通知订阅者。见第4.4.1节。
<Describe your policy regarding publication of the new certificate. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>
<描述您关于发布新证书的政策。这应与任何新证书的发布流程一致（见第4.4.2节）。>
See Section 4.4.3.
见第4.4.3节。
As per RFC 6484, modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to the RFC 3779 extension values or the SIA extension in a certificate. A subscriber can request a certificate modification when this information in a currently valid certificate has changed, as a result of changes in the INR holdings of the subscriber, or as a result of change of the repository publication point data.
根据RFC 6484，对证书进行修改，以实现对证书中RFC 3779扩展值或SIA扩展的更改。当当前有效证书中的此信息因订阅者INR持有量的变化或存储库发布点数据的变化而发生变化时，订阅者可以请求修改证书。
If a subscriber is to receive a distribution of INRs in addition to a current distribution, and if the subscriber does not request that a new certificate be issued containing only these additional INRs, then this is accomplished through a certificate modification. When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is issued. The new certificate will contain the same public key and the same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the incidental information corrected and/or the INR distribution expanded. When previously distributed INRs are to be removed from a certificate, then the old certificate will be revoked and a new certificate (reflecting the new distribution) issued.
如果订阅者在当前分发之外还将收到INR分发，并且如果订阅者不要求颁发仅包含这些额外INR的新证书，则这可以通过证书修改来实现。批准证书修改后，将颁发新证书。新证书将包含与原始证书相同的公钥和过期日期，但附带信息已更正和/或INR分发已扩展。如果要从证书中删除以前分发的INR，则旧证书将被吊销，并颁发新证书（反映新分发）。
The subscriber or <name of organization> may initiate the certificate modification process. <For the case of the subscriber, state here what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the modification.>
订阅者或<组织名称>可以启动证书修改过程<对于订户，在此说明将采取哪些步骤来验证请求修改的实体的身份和授权。>
<Describe your procedures for verification of the modification request and procedures for the issuance of a new certificate. These should be consistent with the processes described in Sections 4.2 and 4.3.1.>
<描述您的修改请求验证程序和新证书颁发程序。这些应与第4.2节和第4.3.1节中描述的过程一致。>
<Describe your procedure for notifying the subscriber about the issuance of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with the notification process for any new certificate (see Section 4.3.2).>
<描述您通知订阅者已颁发修改证书的过程。这应与任何新证书的通知流程一致（见第4.3.2节）。>
When a modified certificate is issued, <name of organization> will publish it to the repository and notify the subscriber. See Section 4.4.1.
颁发修改后的证书时，<name of organization>将其发布到存储库并通知订阅者。见第4.4.1节。
<Describe your procedure for publication of a modified certificate. This should be consistent with the publication process for any new certificate (see Section 4.4.2).>
<描述发布修改后的证书的过程。这应与任何新证书的发布流程一致（见第4.4.2节）。>
See Section 4.4.3.
见第4.4.3节。
As per RFC 6484, certificates can be revoked for several reasons. Either <name of organization> or the subject may choose to end the relationship expressed in the certificate, thus creating cause to revoke the certificate. If one or more of the INRs bound to the public key in the certificate are no longer associated with the subject, that too constitutes a basis for revocation. A certificate also may be revoked due to loss or compromise of the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate. Finally, a certificate may be revoked in order to invalidate data signed by the private key associated with that certificate.
根据RFC 6484的规定，证书可因多种原因被撤销。<name of organization>或主体可以选择终止证书中表示的关系，从而导致撤销证书。如果证书中绑定到公钥的一个或多个INR不再与主体关联，这也构成撤销的基础。证书也可能由于与证书中的公钥对应的私钥丢失或泄露而被吊销。最后，可以撤销证书，以便使由与该证书相关联的私钥签名的数据无效。
The subscriber or <name of organization> may request a revocation. <For the case of the subscriber, describe what steps will be taken to verify the identity and authorization of the entity requesting the revocation.>
订阅者或<组织名称>可以请求撤销<对于订阅者，描述将采取哪些步骤来验证请求撤销的实体的身份和授权。>
<Describe your process for handling a certificate revocation request. This should include:
<描述您处理证书吊销请求的过程。这应包括：
o Procedure to be used by the subscriber to request a revocation.
o 订阅服务器用于请求撤销的过程。
o Procedure for notification of the subscriber when the revocation is initiated by <name of organization>.>
o 由<name of organization>发起撤销时通知订户的过程
A subscriber is required to request revocation as soon as possible after the need for revocation has been identified.
用户需要在确定需要撤销后尽快请求撤销。
<Describe your policy on the time period within which you will process a revocation request.>
<描述您处理撤销请求的时间段的政策。>
As per RFC 6484, a relying party is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the certificate, whenever the relying party validates a certificate.
根据RFC 6484，当依赖方验证证书时，依赖方负责从证书颁发者处获取并检查最新的预定CRL。
<State the CRL issuance frequency for the CRLs that you publish.> Each CRL contains a nextUpdate value, and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. <Name of organization> will set the nextUpdate value when it issues a CRL, to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued.
<说明您发布的CRL的CRL发布频率。>每个CRL都包含一个nextUpdate值，新的CRL将在该时间或之前发布<组织名称>将在发布CRL时设置nextUpdate值，以指示下一个计划CRL何时发布。
A CRL will be published to the repository system within <state the maximum latency> after generation.
CRL将在生成后<state the maximum latency>内发布到存储库系统。
<Name of organization> does not support the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP). <Name of organization> issues CRLs.
<Name of organization>不支持联机证书状态协议（OCSP）或基于服务器的证书验证协议（SCVP）<组织名称>发布CRL。
<As per RFC 6484, describe the physical controls that you employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>
<根据RFC 6484，描述您用于证书管理的物理控制。这些应与INR分配管理中使用的一致。>
<As per RFC 6484, describe the procedural security controls that you employ for certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>
<根据RFC 6484，描述您用于证书管理的过程安全控制。这些应与INR分配管理中使用的一致。>
<As per RFC 6484, describe the personnel security controls that you employ for individuals associated with certificate management. These should be commensurate with those used in the management of INR distribution.>
<根据RFC 6484，描述您为与证书管理相关的个人使用的人员安全控制。这些应与INR分配管理中使用的一致。>
<As per the CP, describe in the following sections the details of how you implement audit logging.>
<根据CP，在以下章节中描述如何实施审计日志记录的详细信息。>
Audit records will be generated for the basic operations of the Certification Authority computing equipment. Audit records will include the date, time, responsible user or process, and summary content data relating to the event. Auditable events include:
将为认证机构计算设备的基本操作生成审计记录。审核记录将包括日期、时间、负责用户或流程，以及与事件相关的摘要内容数据。可审核事件包括：
o Access to CA computing equipment (e.g., logon, logout)
o 访问CA计算设备（例如登录、注销）
o Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g., certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)
o 收到请求CA操作的消息（例如，证书请求、证书撤销请求、泄露通知）
o Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
o 证书创建、修改、吊销或续订操作
o Posting of any material to a repository
o 将任何材料过帐到存储库
o Any attempts to change or delete audit data
o 任何更改或删除审核数据的尝试
o Key generation
o 密钥生成
o Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
o CA的软件和/或配置更新
o Clock adjustments
o 时钟调整
<List here any additional types of events that will be audited.>
<在此列出将要审核的任何其他类型的事件。>
<Describe your procedures for review of audit logs.>
<描述审核日志的审核程序。>
<Describe your policies for retention of audit logs.>
<描述您保留审核日志的策略。>
<Describe your policies for protection of the audit logs.>
<描述您的审核日志保护策略。>
<Describe your policies for backup of the audit logs.>
<描述您的审核日志备份策略。>
<Describe any vulnerability assessments that you will apply (or have already applied) to the PKI subsystems. This should include whether such assessments have taken place and any procedures or plans to perform or repeat/reassess vulnerabilities in the future.>
<描述您将（或已经）应用于PKI子系统的任何漏洞评估。这应包括是否进行了此类评估，以及将来执行或重复/重新评估漏洞的任何程序或计划。>
The <name of organization> CA certificate will contain a validity period that is at least as long as that of any certificate being issued under that certificate. When <name of organization> CA changes keys, it will follow the procedures described in [RFC6489].
<name of organization>CA证书的有效期至少与根据该证书颁发的任何证书的有效期相同。当<name of organization>CA更改密钥时，它将遵循[RFC6489]中描述的过程。
<Describe your plans for dealing with CA key compromise and how you plan to continue/restore operation of your RPKI CA in the event of a disaster.>
<描述您处理CA密钥泄露的计划，以及您计划如何在发生灾难时继续/恢复RPKI CA的操作。>
<Describe your policy for management of your CA's INR distributions in case of its own termination.>
<描述您在CA自身终止时管理其INR分配的政策。>
This section describes the security controls used by <name of organization>.
本节介绍<name of organization>使用的安全控件。
<Describe the procedures used to generate the CA key pair and, if applicable, key pairs for subscribers. In most instances, public-key pairs will be generated by the subscriber, i.e., the organization receiving the distribution of INRs. However, your procedures may include one for generating key pairs on behalf of your subscribers if they so request.>
<描述用于为订阅者生成CA密钥对和（如果适用）密钥对的过程。在大多数情况下，公钥对将由订户生成，即接收INR分发的组织。但是，如果订阅者要求，您的过程可能包括代表订阅者生成密钥对的过程。>
<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include providing key pair generation services for subscribers, describe the means by which private keys are delivered to subscribers in a secure fashion. Otherwise, say this is not applicable.>
<如果第6.1.1节中的程序包括为订户提供密钥对生成服务，请描述以安全方式向订户交付私钥的方法。否则，请说明这不适用。>
<Describe the procedures that will be used to deliver a subscriber's public keys to the <name of organization> RPKI CA. These procedures MUST ensure that the public key has not been altered during transit and that the subscriber possesses the private key corresponding to the transferred public key.> See RFC 6487 for details.
<描述将用于向<组织名称>RPKI CA交付订户公钥的程序。这些程序必须确保公钥在传输过程中未被更改，并且订户拥有与传输的公钥相对应的私钥。>有关详细信息，请参阅RFC 6487。
CA public keys for all entities (other than trust anchors) are contained in certificates issued by other CAs and will be published to the RPKI repository system. Relying parties will download these certificates from this system. Public key values and associated data for (putative) trust anchors will be distributed out of band and accepted by relying parties on the basis of locally defined criteria, e.g., embedded in path validation software that will be made available to the Internet community.
所有实体（信任锚除外）的CA公钥包含在其他CA颁发的证书中，并将发布到RPKI存储库系统。依赖方将从此系统下载这些证书。（假定）信任锚的公钥值和相关数据将在带外分发，并由依赖方根据本地定义的标准接受，例如，嵌入将提供给互联网社区的路径验证软件中。
The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].
此PKI中使用的密钥大小如[RFC6485]中所述。
The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC6485].
本PKI中使用的公钥算法和参数如[RFC6485]所述。
<If the procedures in Section 6.1.1 include subscriber key pair generation, EITHER insert here text specifying that the subscriber is responsible for performing checks on the quality of its key pair and saying that <name of organization> is not responsible for performing such checks for subscribers OR describe the procedures used by the CA for checking the quality of these subscriber key pairs.>
<如果第6.1.1节中的程序包括用户密钥对生成，在此处插入文本，说明订阅者负责检查其密钥对的质量，并说明<组织名称>不负责对订阅者执行此类检查，或者说明CA用于检查这些订阅者密钥对质量的程序。>
The KeyUsage extension bit values employed in RPKI certificates are specified in [RFC6487].
[RFC6487]中指定了RPKI证书中使用的KeyUsage扩展位值。
6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
6.2. 私钥保护和加密模块工程控制
<Describe the standards and controls employed for the CA cryptographic module, e.g., it was evaluated under FIPS 140-2/3, at level 2 or 3. See [FIPS] for details.>
<描述CA加密模块采用的标准和控制，例如，根据FIPS 140-2/3在2级或3级对其进行评估。有关详细信息，请参见[FIPS]
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.">
<If you choose to use multi-person controls to constrain access to
your CA's private keys, then insert the following text. "There will
be private key <insert here n> out of <insert here m> multi-person
control.">
<No private key escrow procedures are required for the RPKI, but if the CA chooses to employ escrow, state so here.>
<RPKI不需要私钥托管程序，但如果CA选择使用托管，请在此处说明。>
<Describe the procedures used for backing up your CA's private key. The following aspects should be included. (1) The copying should be done under the same multi-party control as is used for controlling the original private key. (2) At least one copy should be kept at an off-site location for disaster recovery purposes.>
<描述用于备份CA私钥的过程。应包括以下几个方面。（1） 复制应在与控制原始私钥相同的多方控制下进行。（2） 至少应在非现场位置保存一份副本，以便进行灾难恢复。>
See Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.
见第6.2.3节和第6.2.4节。
The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs"> will be generated by the cryptographic module specified in Section 6.2.1. The private keys will never leave the module except in encrypted form for backup and/or transfer to a new module.
<name of organization>production CA>的私钥将由第6.2.1节中指定的加密模块生成。如果合适，将“production CA”更改为“production and offline CAs”。私钥将永远不会离开模块，除非以加密形式进行备份和/或传输到新模块。
The private key for the <name of organization> production CA <if appropriate, change "production CA" to "production and offline CAs"> will be stored in the cryptographic module. It will be protected from unauthorized use <say how here>.
<name of organization>production CA的私钥<如果合适，将“production CA”更改为“production and offline CA”>将存储在加密模块中。它将受到保护，不被未经授权的使用<say how here>。
<Describe the mechanisms and data used to activate your CA's private key.>
<描述用于激活CA私钥的机制和数据。>
<Describe the process and procedure for private key deactivation here.>
<在此描述私钥停用的过程和过程。>
<Describe the method used for destroying your CA's private key, e.g., when it is superseded. This will depend on the particular module.>
<描述用于销毁CA私钥的方法，例如，当它被取代时。这将取决于特定模块。>
<Describe the rating of the cryptographic module used by the CA, if applicable.>
<描述CA使用的加密模块的等级（如果适用）。>
<Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public keys. If keys are not archived, say so. If they are, describe the archive processes and procedures.>
<由于此PKI不支持不可否认性，因此无需存档公钥。如果密钥未存档，请说明。如果是，请描述归档流程和程序。>
The <name of organization> CA's key pair will have a validity interval of <insert number of years>. <These key pairs and certificates should have reasonably long validity intervals, e.g., 10 years, to minimize the disruption caused by key changeover. Note that the CA's key lifetime is under the control of its issuer, so the CPS MUST reflect the key lifetime imposed by the issuer.>
<name of organization>CA的密钥对的有效期为<insert number of years><这些密钥对和证书应具有相当长的有效期间隔，例如10年，以尽量减少密钥转换造成的中断。请注意，CA的密钥生存期由其颁发者控制，因此CP必须反映颁发者施加的密钥生存期。>
<Describe how activation data for your CA will be generated.>
<描述如何生成CA的激活数据。>
Activation data for the CA private key will be protected by <describe your procedures here>.
CA私钥的激活数据将受到<Description your procedures here>的保护。
<Add here any details you wish to provide with regard to the activation data for your CA. If there are none, say "None".>
<在此添加您希望提供的有关CA激活数据的任何详细信息。如果没有，请说“无”。>
<Describe your security requirements for the computers used to support this PKI, e.g., requirements for authenticated logins, audit capabilities, etc. These requirements should be commensurate with those used for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
<描述您对用于支持此PKI的计算机的安全要求，例如，对经过身份验证的登录、审核功能等的要求。这些要求应与用于管理INR分发的计算机的要求相称。>
<Describe any system development controls that apply to the PKI systems, e.g., use of Trusted System Development Methodology (TSDM).>
<描述适用于PKI系统的任何系统开发控制，例如，使用可信系统开发方法（TSDM）。>
<Describe the security management controls that will be used for the RPKI software and equipment employed by the CA. These security measures should be commensurate with those used for the systems used by the CAs for managing and distributing INRs.>
<描述CA使用的RPKI软件和设备将使用的安全管理控制措施。这些安全措施应与CAs用于管理和分发INR的系统的安全措施相称。>
<Describe how the equipment (hardware and software) used for RPKI functions will be procured, installed, maintained, and updated. This should be done in a fashion commensurate with the way in which equipment for the management and distribution of INRs is handled.>
<描述如何采购、安装、维护和更新用于RPKI功能的设备（硬件和软件）。这应以与INR管理和分配设备的处理方式相称的方式进行。>
<Describe the network security controls that will be used for CA operation. These should be commensurate with the network security controls employed for the computers used for managing distribution of INRs.>
<描述将用于CA操作的网络安全控制。这些应与用于管理INR分发的计算机所采用的网络安全控制相称。>
The RPKI does not make use of time-stamping.
RPKI不使用时间戳。
See [RFC6487].
见[RFC6487]。
<List here any audit and other assessments used to ensure the security of the administration of INRs. These are sufficient for the RPKI systems. However, additional forms of security assessments are a good idea and should be listed if performed.>
<在此列出用于确保印度卢比管理安全的任何审计和其他评估。这些对于RPKI系统来说已经足够了。但是，附加形式的安全评估是一个好主意，如果执行，应将其列出。>
<The sections below are optional. Fill them in as appropriate for your organization. The CP says that CAs should cover Sections 9.1 to 9.11 and 9.13 to 9.16, although not every CA will choose to do so. Note that the manner in which you manage your business and legal matters for this PKI should be commensurate with the way in which you manage business and legal matters for the distribution of INRs.>
<以下部分是可选的。根据您所在组织的情况填写。CP表示，CA应涵盖第9.1至9.11节和第9.13至9.16节，尽管并非每个CA都会选择这样做。请注意，您为本PKI管理业务和法律事务的方式应与您为分发INR管理业务和法律事务的方式相称。>
<END TEMPLATE TEXT>
<结束模板文本>
The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
依赖方对证书中包含的约束的信任程度取决于几个因素。这些因素包括
o the practices followed by the Certification Authority (CA) in authenticating the subject
o 认证机构（CA）在认证主体时遵循的实践
o the CA's operating policy, procedures, and technical security controls, including the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private key)
o CA的操作政策、程序和技术安全控制，包括订户的责任范围（例如，保护私钥）
o the stated responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of liability)
o CA规定的责任和责任条款和条件（例如，保证、保证免责声明和责任限制）
This document provides a framework to address the technical, procedural, personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and revocation are done in a secure manner. Specifically, the following sections are oriented towards ensuring the secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository, subscriber systems, and relying party systems:
本文档提供了一个框架，用于解决证书颁发机构、注册机构、存储库、订阅者和依赖方加密模块的技术、程序、人员和物理安全方面的问题，以确保证书生成、发布、续订、重新设置密钥、使用、，并以安全的方式进行撤销。具体而言，以下章节旨在确保PKI实体（如CA、RA、存储库、订户系统和依赖方系统）的安全运行：
Section 3 ("Identification and Authentication" (I&A)) Section 4 ("Certificate Life Cycle Operational Requirements") Section 5 ("Facility, Management, and Operational Controls") Section 6 ("Technical Security Controls") Section 7 ("Certificate and CRL Profiles") Section 8 ("Compliance Audit and Other Assessments")
第3节（“识别和认证”（I&A））第4节（“证书生命周期运营要求”）第5节（“设施、管理和运营控制”）第6节（“技术安全控制”）第7节（“证书和CRL档案”）第8节（“合规性审计和其他评估”）
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，1997年3月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6484] Kent, S., Kong, D., Seo, K., and R. Watro, "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 173, RFC 6484, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
[RFC6484]Kent，S.，Kong，D.，Seo，K.，和R.Watro，“资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）的证书政策（CP）”，BCP 173，RFC 6484，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6484>.
[RFC6485] Huston, G., "The Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6485, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/ info/rfc6485>.
[RFC6485]Huston，G.“用于资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）的算法和密钥大小的配置文件”，RFC 6485，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/ 信息/rfc6485>。
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6487]Huston，G.，Michaelson，G.，和R.Loomans，“X.509 PKIX资源证书的配置文件”，RFC 6487，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-3 (FIPS-140-3), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Work in Progress.
[FIPS]联邦信息处理标准出版物140-3（FIPS-140-3），“加密模块的安全要求”，国家标准与技术研究所信息技术实验室，正在进行中。
[RFC3647] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework", RFC 3647, November 2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
[RFC3647]Chokhani，S.，Ford，W.，Sabett，R.，Merrill，C.，和S.Wu，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施证书政策和认证实践框架”，RFC 3647，2003年11月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647>.
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6480]Lepinski，M.和S.Kent，“支持安全互联网路由的基础设施”，RFC 64802012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6480>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6481]Huston，G.，Loomans，R.，和G.Michaelson，“资源证书存储库结构的配置文件”，RFC 64812012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6482]Lepinski，M.，Kent，S.，和D.Kong，“路线原产地授权（ROA）的概要”，RFC 64822012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6486]Austein，R.，Huston，G.，Kent，S.，和M.Lepinski，“资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）清单”，RFC 64862012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent, "Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", BCP 174, RFC 6489, February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.
[RFC6489]Huston，G.，Michaelson，G.，和S.Kent，“资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）中的证书颁发机构（CA）密钥滚动”，BCP 174，RFC 6489，2012年2月<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489>.
Acknowledgments
致谢
The authors would like to thank Matt Lepinski for help with the formatting, Ron Watro for assistance with the editing, and other members of the SIDR working group for reviewing this document.
作者要感谢Matt Lepinski对格式的帮助，Ron Watro对编辑的帮助，以及SIDR工作组的其他成员对本文件的审查。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
美国马萨诸塞州剑桥莫尔顿街10号Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 02138
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
EMail: skent@bbn.com
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
EMail: skent@bbn.com
Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
美国马萨诸塞州剑桥莫尔顿街10号Derrick Kong BBN Technologies 02138
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
EMail: dkong@bbn.com
Phone: +1 (617) 873-1951
EMail: dkong@bbn.com
Karen Seo BBN Technologies 10 Moulton Street Cambridge, MA 02138 United States
美国马萨诸塞州剑桥莫尔顿街10号Karen Seo BBN Technologies 02138
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
EMail: kseo@bbn.com
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3152
EMail: kseo@bbn.com