Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Blanchet
Request for Comments: 6885 Viagenie
Category: Informational A. Sullivan
ISSN: 2070-1721 Dyn, Inc.
March 2013
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Blanchet
Request for Comments: 6885 Viagenie
Category: Informational A. Sullivan
ISSN: 2070-1721 Dyn, Inc.
March 2013
Stringprep Revision and Problem Statement for the Preparation and Comparison of Internationalized Strings (PRECIS)
Stringprep修订版和问题陈述，用于准备和比较国际化字符串（PRECIS）
Abstract
摘要
If a protocol expects to compare two strings and is prepared only for those strings to be ASCII, then using Unicode code points in those strings requires they be prepared somehow. Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (here called IDNA2003) defined and used Stringprep and Nameprep. Other protocols subsequently defined Stringprep profiles. A new approach different from Stringprep and Nameprep is used for a revision of IDNA2003 (called IDNA2008). Other Stringprep profiles need to be similarly updated, or a replacement of Stringprep needs to be designed. This document outlines the issues to be faced by those designing a Stringprep replacement.
如果协议希望比较两个字符串，并且只准备将这些字符串设置为ASCII，那么在这些字符串中使用Unicode代码点需要以某种方式进行准备。定义并使用Stringprep和Nameprep对应用程序中的域名进行国际化（此处称为IDNA2003）。其他协议随后定义了Stringprep配置文件。IDNA2003（称为IDNA2008）的修订版使用了一种不同于Stringprep和Nameprep的新方法。其他Stringprep配置文件需要进行类似更新，或者需要设计Stringprep的替代品。本文件概述了设计Stringprep替代品的人员所面临的问题。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
本文件不是互联网标准跟踪规范；它是为了提供信息而发布的。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。并非IESG批准的所有文件都适用于任何级别的互联网标准；见RFC 5741第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6885.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6885.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2013 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Stringprep Profiles Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Major Topics for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Types of Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.2. Effect of Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Dealing with Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.1. Case Folding, Case Sensitivity, and Case
Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.2. Stringprep and NFKC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.3. Character Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.4. Prohibited Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.5. Internal Structure, Delimiters, and Special
Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.6. Restrictions Because of Glyph Similarity . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Where the Data Comes from and Where It Goes . . . . . . . 11
5.3.1. User Input and the Source of Protocol Elements . . . . 11
5.3.2. User Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3.3. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Considerations for Stringprep Replacement . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Classification of Stringprep Profiles . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Evaluation of Stringprep Profiles . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.1. iSCSI Stringprep Profile: RFC 3720, RFC 3721, RFC 3722 . . 19
B.2. SMTP/POP3/ManageSieve Stringprep Profiles: RFC 4954,
RFC 5034, RFC 5804 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.3. IMAP Stringprep Profiles for Usernames: RFC 4314, RFC
5738 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B.4. IMAP Stringprep Profiles for Passwords: RFC 5738 . . . . . 26
B.5. Anonymous SASL Stringprep Profiles: RFC 4505 . . . . . . . 28
B.6. XMPP Stringprep Profiles for Nodeprep: RFC 3920 . . . . . 30
B.7. XMPP Stringprep Profiles for Resourceprep: RFC 3920 . . . 31
B.8. EAP Stringprep Profiles: RFC 3748 . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Keywords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Stringprep Profiles Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
5. Major Topics for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1. Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.1. Types of Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.1.2. Effect of Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2. Dealing with Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.1. Case Folding, Case Sensitivity, and Case
Preservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.2. Stringprep and NFKC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2.3. Character Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.4. Prohibited Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.5. Internal Structure, Delimiters, and Special
Characters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.2.6. Restrictions Because of Glyph Similarity . . . . . . . 11
5.3. Where the Data Comes from and Where It Goes . . . . . . . 11
5.3.1. User Input and the Source of Protocol Elements . . . . 11
5.3.2. User Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.3.3. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Considerations for Stringprep Replacement . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Classification of Stringprep Profiles . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Evaluation of Stringprep Profiles . . . . . . . . . . 19
B.1. iSCSI Stringprep Profile: RFC 3720, RFC 3721, RFC 3722 . . 19
B.2. SMTP/POP3/ManageSieve Stringprep Profiles: RFC 4954,
RFC 5034, RFC 5804 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
B.3. IMAP Stringprep Profiles for Usernames: RFC 4314, RFC
5738 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
B.4. IMAP Stringprep Profiles for Passwords: RFC 5738 . . . . . 26
B.5. Anonymous SASL Stringprep Profiles: RFC 4505 . . . . . . . 28
B.6. XMPP Stringprep Profiles for Nodeprep: RFC 3920 . . . . . 30
B.7. XMPP Stringprep Profiles for Resourceprep: RFC 3920 . . . 31
B.8. EAP Stringprep Profiles: RFC 3748 . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (here called IDNA2003) [RFC3490] [RFC3491] [RFC3492] and [RFC3454] describes a mechanism for encoding Unicode labels that make up the Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs) as standard DNS labels. The labels were processed using a method called Nameprep [RFC3491] and Punycode [RFC3492]. That method was specific to IDNA2003 but is generalized as Stringprep [RFC3454]. The general mechanism is used by other protocols with similar needs but with different constraints than IDNA2003.
应用程序中的域名国际化（此处称为IDNA2003）[RFC3490][RFC3491][RFC3492]和[RFC3454]描述了将构成国际化域名（IDN）的Unicode标签编码为标准DNS标签的机制。使用名为Nameprep[RFC3491]和Punycode[RFC3492]的方法处理标签。该方法特定于IDNA2003，但被概括为Stringprep[RFC3454]。与IDNA2003相比，具有类似需求但具有不同约束的其他协议使用了通用机制。
Stringprep defines a framework within which protocols define their Stringprep profiles. Some known IETF specifications using Stringprep are listed below:
Stringprep定义了一个框架，协议在此框架内定义其Stringprep配置文件。使用Stringprep的一些已知IETF规范如下所示：
o The Nameprep profile [RFC3490] for use in Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs);
o 用于国际化域名（IDN）的Nameprep配置文件[RFC3490]；
o The Inter-Asterisk eXchange (IAX) using Nameprep [RFC5456];
o 使用Nameprep[RFC5456]的星号间交换（IAX）；
o NFSv4 [RFC3530] and NFSv4.1 [RFC5661];
o NFSv4[RFC3530]和NFSv4.1[RFC5661]；
o The Internet Small Computer System Interface (iSCSI) profile [RFC3722] for use in iSCSI names;
o 用于iSCSI名称的Internet小型计算机系统接口（iSCSI）配置文件[RFC3722]；
o The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748];
o 可扩展认证协议（EAP）[RFC3748]；
o The Nodeprep and Resourceprep profiles [RFC3920] (which was obsoleted by [RFC6120]) for use in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP), and the XMPP to Common Presence and Instant Messaging (CPIM) mapping [RFC3922] (the latter of these relies on the former);
o Nodeprep和Resourceprep配置文件[RFC3920]（已被[RFC6120]淘汰）用于可扩展消息和状态协议（XMPP），以及XMPP到公共状态和即时消息（CPIM）映射[RFC3922]（后者依赖于前者）；
o The Internationalized Resource Identifier (IRI) and URI in XMPP [RFC5122];
o XMPP[RFC5122]中的国际化资源标识符（IRI）和URI；
o The Policy MIB profile [RFC4011] for use in the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP);
o 用于简单网络管理协议（SNMP）的策略MIB配置文件[RFC4011]；
o Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC4279];
o 传输层安全（TLS）[RFC4279]；
o The Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) profile [RFC4518] for use with LDAP [RFC4511] and its authentication methods [RFC4513];
o 用于LDAP[RFC4511]及其身份验证方法[RFC4513]的轻型目录访问协议（LDAP）配置文件[RFC4518]；
o PKIX subject identification using LDAPprep [RFC4683];
o 使用LDAPprep[RFC4683]的PKIX主体识别；
o PKIX Certificate Revocation List (CRL) using LDAPprep [RFC5280];
o 使用LDAPprep[RFC5280]的PKIX证书撤销列表（CRL）；
o The Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) [RFC4422] and SASLprep profile [RFC4013] for use in SASL;
o 用于SASL的简单认证和安全层（SASL）[RFC4422]和SASLprep配置文件[RFC4013]；
o Plain SASL using SASLprep [RFC4616];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC4616]的普通SASL；
o SMTP Auth using SASLprep [RFC4954];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC4954]进行SMTP身份验证；
o The Post Office Protocol (POP3) Auth using SASLprep [RFC5034];
o 邮局协议（POP3）使用SASLprep[RFC5034]进行身份验证；
o TLS Secure Remote Password (SRP) using SASLprep [RFC5054];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC5054]的TLS安全远程密码（SRP）；
o SASL Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) using SASLprep [RFC5802];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC5802]的SASL盐渍质询响应认证机制（SCRAM）；
o Remote management of Sieve using SASLprep [RFC5804];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC5804]远程管理筛网；
o The Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) using SASLprep [RFC4643];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC4643]的网络新闻传输协议（NNTP）；
o IMAP4 using SASLprep [RFC4314];
o 使用SASLprep[RFC4314]的IMAP4；
o The trace profile [RFC4505] for use with the SASL ANONYMOUS mechanism;
o 用于SASL匿名机制的跟踪配置文件[RFC4505]；
o Internet Application Protocol Collation Registry [RFC4790];
o Internet应用程序协议整理注册表[RFC4790]；
o The unicode-casemap Unicode Collation [RFC5051].
o unicode casemap unicode排序规则[RFC5051]。
However, a review (see [78PRECIS]) of these protocol specifications found that they are very similar and can be grouped into a short number of classes. Moreover, many reuse the same Stringprep profile, such as the SASL one.
然而，对这些协议规范的审查（见[78PRECIS]）发现，它们非常相似，可以分为几个类别。此外，许多人重用相同的Stringprep配置文件，例如SASL配置文件。
IDNA2003 was replaced because of some limitations described in [RFC4690]. The new IDN specification, called IDNA2008 [RFC5890], [RFC5891], [RFC5892], [RFC5893] was designed based on the considerations found in [RFC5894]. One of the effects of IDNA2008 is that Nameprep and Stringprep are not used at all. Instead, an algorithm based on Unicode properties of code points is defined. That algorithm generates a stable and complete table of the supported Unicode code points for each Unicode version. This algorithm uses an inclusion-based approach, instead of the exclusion-based approach of Stringprep/Nameprep. That is, IDNA2003 created an explicit list of excluded or mapped-away characters; anything in Unicode 3.2 that was not so listed could be assumed to be allowed under the protocol.
由于[RFC4690]中描述的一些限制，IDNA2003被替换。新的IDN规范称为IDNA2008[RFC5890]、[RFC5891]、[RFC5892]、[RFC5893]是根据[RFC5894]中的考虑因素设计的。IDNA2008的影响之一是根本不使用Nameprep和Stringprep。相反，定义了基于代码点的Unicode属性的算法。该算法为每个Unicode版本生成一个稳定且完整的支持Unicode代码点表。该算法使用基于包含的方法，而不是基于排除的Stringprep/Nameprep方法。也就是说，IDNA2003创建了一个排除字符或映射字符的显式列表；Unicode 3.2中未列出的任何内容都可以被认为是协议允许的。
IDNA2008 begins instead from the assumption that code points are disallowed and then relies on Unicode properties to derive whether a given code point actually is allowed in the protocol.
IDNA2008从不允许代码点的假设开始，然后依赖Unicode属性来推导协议中是否允许给定的代码点。
This document lists the shortcomings and issues found by protocols listed above that defined Stringprep profiles. It also lists the requirements for any potential replacement of Stringprep.
本文档列出了上面列出的定义Stringprep概要文件的协议所发现的缺点和问题。它还列出了Stringprep任何潜在替代品的要求。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
This document uses various internationalization terms, which are defined and discussed in [RFC6365].
本文档使用各种国际化术语，这些术语在[RFC6365]中定义和讨论。
Additionally, this document defines the following keyword:
此外，本文档还定义了以下关键字：
PRECIS: Preparation and Comparison of Internationalized Strings
PRECIS：国际化字符串的准备和比较
A single Unicode code point in this memo is denoted by "U+" followed by four to six hexadecimal digits, as used in [Unicode61], Appendix A.
本备忘录中的单个Unicode代码点由“U+”表示，后跟四到六个十六进制数字，如附录A中的[Unicode 61]所示。
During IETF 77 (March 2010), a BOF discussed the current state of the protocols that have defined Stringprep profiles [NEWPREP]. The main conclusions from that discussion were as follows:
在IETF 77期间（2010年3月），BOF讨论了定义Stringprep配置文件[NEWPREP]的协议的当前状态。这次讨论的主要结论如下：
o Stringprep is bound to Version 3.2 of Unicode. Stringprep has not been updated to new versions of Unicode. Therefore, the protocols using Stringprep are stuck at Unicode 3.2, and their specifications need to be updated to support new versions of Unicode.
o Stringprep绑定到Unicode的3.2版。Stringprep尚未更新为Unicode的新版本。因此，使用Stringprep的协议停留在Unicode 3.2上，需要更新其规范以支持新版本的Unicode。
o The protocols would like to not be bound to a specific version of Unicode, but rather have better Unicode version agility in the way of IDNA2008. This is important partly because it is usually impossible for an application to require Unicode 3.2; the application gets whatever version of Unicode is available on the host.
o 这些协议不希望绑定到特定的Unicode版本，而是像IDNA2008那样具有更好的Unicode版本灵活性。这一点很重要，部分原因是应用程序通常不可能要求Unicode 3.2；应用程序获取主机上可用的任何Unicode版本。
o The protocols require better bidirectional support (bidi) than currently offered by Stringprep.
o 这些协议需要比Stringprep目前提供的更好的双向支持（bidi）。
o If the protocols are updated to use a new version of Stringprep or another framework, then backward compatibility is an important requirement. For example, Stringprep normalization is based on and profiles may use Unicode Normalization Form KC (NFKC) [UAX15], while IDNA2008 mostly uses Unicode Normalization Form C (NFC) [UAX15].
o 如果更新协议以使用新版本的Stringprep或其他框架，则向后兼容性是一项重要要求。例如，Stringprep规范化基于Unicode规范化表单KC（NFKC）[UAX15]，而IDNA2008主要使用Unicode规范化表单C（NFC）[UAX15]。
o Identifiers are passed between protocols. For example, the same username string of code points may be passed between SASL, XMPP, LDAP, and EAP. Therefore, a common set of rules or classes of strings are preferred over specific rules for each protocol. Without real planning in advance, many Stringprep profiles reuse other profiles, so this goal was accomplished by accident with Stringprep.
o 标识符在协议之间传递。例如，可以在SASL、XMPP、LDAP和EAP之间传递相同的用户名字符串代码点。因此，对于每个协议，一组通用的规则或字符串类优于特定的规则。由于没有事先进行真正的规划，许多Stringprep概要文件重用了其他概要文件，因此Stringprep意外地实现了这一目标。
Protocols that use Stringprep profiles use strings for different purposes:
使用Stringprep配置文件的协议将字符串用于不同的目的：
o XMPP uses a different Stringprep profile for each part of the XMPP address Jabber Identifier (JID): a localpart, which is similar to a username and used for authentication; a domainpart, which is a domain name; and a resourcepart, which is less restrictive than the localpart.
o XMPP为XMPP地址Jabber标识符（JID）的每个部分使用不同的Stringprep配置文件：localpart，类似于用户名，用于身份验证；domainpart，它是一个域名；还有一个resourcepart，它的限制性比localpart小。
o iSCSI uses a Stringprep profile for the names of protocol participants (called initiators and targets). The iSCSI Qualified Name (IQN) format of iSCSI names contains a reversed DNS domain name.
o iSCSI使用Stringprep配置文件作为协议参与者（称为启动器和目标）的名称。iSCSI名称的iSCSI限定名（IQN）格式包含反向DNS域名。
o SASL and LDAP use a Stringprep profile for usernames.
o SASL和LDAP对用户名使用Stringprep配置文件。
o LDAP uses a set of Stringprep profiles.
o LDAP使用一组Stringprep配置文件。
The apparent judgement of the BOF attendees [NEWPREP] was that it would be highly desirable to have a replacement of Stringprep, with similar characteristics to IDNA2008. That replacement should be defined so that the protocols could use internationalized strings without a lot of specialized internationalization work, since internationalization expertise is not available in the respective protocols or working groups. Accordingly, the IESG formed the PRECIS working group to undertake the task.
BOF与会者[NEWPREP]的明显判断是，非常希望更换Stringprep，其特征与IDNA2008相似。应该定义这种替换，以便协议可以使用国际化字符串，而无需进行大量专门的国际化工作，因为在相应的协议或工作组中没有国际化专业知识。因此，IESG成立了PRECIS工作组来承担这项任务。
Notwithstanding the desire evident in [NEWPREP] and the chartering of a working group, IDNA2008 may be a poor model for what other protocols ought to do, because it is designed to support an old protocol that is designed to operate on the scale of the entire Internet. Moreover, IDNA2008 is intended to be deployed without any
尽管[NEWPREP]和工作组章程中有明显的愿望，IDNA2008对于其他协议应该做什么来说可能是一个糟糕的模型，因为它被设计为支持一个旧协议，该协议被设计为在整个互联网的规模上运行。此外，IDNA2008计划在没有任何限制的情况下部署
change to the base DNS protocol. Other protocols may aim at deployment in more local environments, or may have protocol version negotiation built in.
更改为基本DNS协议。其他协议可能旨在在更多本地环境中部署，或者可能内置了协议版本协商。
This section provides an overview of major topics that a Stringprep replacement needs to address. The headings correspond roughly with categories under which known Stringprep-using protocol RFCs have been evaluated. For the details of those evaluations, see Appendix A.
本节概述了Stringprep替换需要解决的主要主题。标题大致与使用协议RFC评估已知Stringprep的类别相对应。有关这些评估的详细信息，请参见附录A。
Following [ID-COMP], it is possible to organize identifiers into three classes in respect of how they may be compared with one another:
在[ID-COMP]之后，可以根据标识符之间的比较方式将其分为三类：
Absolute Identifiers: Identifiers that can be compared byte-by-byte for equality.
绝对标识符：可以逐字节比较以获得相等性的标识符。
Definite Identifiers: Identifiers that have a well-defined comparison algorithm on which all parties agree.
明确标识符：具有明确定义的、各方都同意的比较算法的标识符。
Indefinite Identifiers: Identifiers that have no single comparison algorithm on which all parties agree.
不确定标识符：没有各方同意的单一比较算法的标识符。
Definite Identifiers include cases like the comparison of Unicode code points in different encodings: they do not match byte for byte but can all be converted to a single encoding which then does match byte for byte. Indefinite Identifiers are sometimes algorithmically comparable by well-specified subsets of parties. For more discussion of these categories, see [ID-COMP].
明确标识符包括不同编码中Unicode代码点的比较：它们不逐字节匹配，但可以全部转换为单个编码，然后逐字节匹配。不确定标识符有时在算法上可与指定的各方子集进行比较。有关这些类别的更多讨论，请参见[ID-COMP]。
The section on treating the existing known cases, Appendix A, uses the categories above.
附录A中关于处理现有已知病例的章节使用了上述类别。
The three classes of comparison style outlined in Section 5.1.1 may have different effects when applied. It is necessary to evaluate the effects if a comparison results in a false positive or a false negative, especially in terms of the consequences to security and usability.
第5.1.1节中概述的三类比较风格在应用时可能具有不同的效果。如果比较结果为假阳性或假阴性，则有必要评估效果，特别是在安全性和可用性方面。
This section outlines a range of issues having to do with characters in the target protocols, the ways in which IDNA2008 might be a good analogy to other protocols, and ways in which it might be a poor one.
本节概述了与目标协议中的字符有关的一系列问题，IDNA2008与其他协议的类比方式，以及IDNA2008与其他协议的类比方式。
In IDNA2003, labels are always mapped to lowercase before the Punycode transformation. In IDNA2008, there is no mapping at all: input is either a valid U-label or it is not. At the same time, uppercase characters are by definition not valid U-labels, because they fall into the Unstable category (category B) of [RFC5892].
在IDNA2003中，标签总是在Punycode转换之前映射为小写。在IDNA2008中，根本没有映射：输入要么是有效的U标签，要么不是。同时，根据定义，大写字符不是有效的U型标签，因为它们属于[RFC5892]的不稳定类别（类别B）。
If there are protocols that require case be preserved, then the analogy with IDNA2008 will break down. Accordingly, existing protocols are to be evaluated according to the following criteria:
如果有需要保留案例的协议，那么与IDNA2008的类比将被打破。因此，应根据以下标准评估现有协议：
1. Does the protocol use case folding? For all blocks of code points or just for certain subsets?
1. 协议是否使用案例折叠？是针对所有代码点块还是仅针对某些子集？
2. Is the system or protocol case-sensitive?
2. 系统或协议是否区分大小写？
3. Does the system or protocol preserve case?
3. 系统或协议是否保留案例？
Stringprep profiles may use normalization. If they do, they use NFKC [UAX15] (most profiles do). It is not clear that NFKC is the right normalization to use in all cases. In [UAX15], there is the following observation regarding Normalization Forms KC and KD: "It is best to think of these Normalization Forms as being like uppercase or lowercase mappings: useful in certain contexts for identifying core meanings, but also performing modifications to the text that may not always be appropriate." In general, it can be said that NFKC is more aggressive about finding matches between code points than NFC. For things like the spelling of users' names, NFKC may not be the best form to use. At the same time, one of the nice things about NFKC is that it deals with the width of characters that are otherwise similar, by canonicalizing half-width to full-width. This mapping step can be crucial in practice. A replacement for Stringprep depends on analyzing the different use profiles and considering whether NFKC or NFC is a better normalization for each profile.
Stringprep配置文件可以使用规范化。如果有，则使用NFKC[UAX15]（大多数配置文件都有）。目前尚不清楚NFKC是否适合在所有情况下使用。在[UAX15]中，关于规范化形式KC和KD有如下观察结果：“最好将这些规范化形式视为类似于大写或小写映射：在某些上下文中用于识别核心含义，但也对文本进行可能并不总是合适的修改。”，可以说，NFKC在查找代码点之间的匹配方面比NFC更积极。对于像用户名拼写这样的事情，NFKC可能不是最好的使用形式。同时，NFKC的一个优点是，它通过规范化半宽到全宽来处理其他方面相似的字符宽度。这一映射步骤在实践中可能至关重要。Stringprep的替换取决于分析不同的使用配置文件，并考虑NFKC或NFC是否是每个配置文件的更好标准化。
For the purposes of evaluating an existing example of Stringprep use, it is helpful to know whether it uses no normalization, NFKC, or NFC.
为了评估Stringprep使用的现有示例，了解它是否未使用规范化、NFKC或NFC是很有帮助的。
Along with the case mapping issues raised in Section 5.2.1, there is the question of whether some characters are mapped either to other characters or to nothing during Stringprep. [RFC3454], Section 3, outlines a number of characters that are mapped to nothing, and also permits Stringprep profiles to define their own mappings.
除了第5.2.1节中提出的案例映射问题外，还有一个问题，即在Stringprep过程中，某些字符是映射到其他字符，还是映射到空。[RFC3454]第3节概述了许多映射为nothing的字符，并允许Stringprep配置文件定义它们自己的映射。
Along with case folding and other character mappings, many protocols have characters that are simply disallowed. For example, control characters and special characters such as "@" or "/" may be prohibited in a protocol.
除了大小写折叠和其他字符映射之外，许多协议都有一些根本不允许的字符。例如，协议中可能禁止使用控制字符和特殊字符，如“@”或“/”。
One of the primary changes of IDNA2008 is in the way it approaches Unicode code points, using the new inclusion-based approach (see Section 1).
IDNA2008的一个主要变化是它使用新的基于包含的方法接近Unicode代码点（参见第1节）。
Because of the default assumption in IDNA2008 that a code point is not allowed by the protocol, it has more than one class of "allowed by the protocol"; this is unlike IDNA2003. While some code points are disallowed outright, some are allowed only in certain contexts. The reasons for the context-dependent rules have to do with the way some characters are used. For instance, the ZERO WIDTH JOINER and ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER (ZWJ, U+200D and ZWNJ, U+200C) are allowed with contextual rules because they are required in some circumstances, yet are considered punctuation by Unicode and would therefore be DISALLOWED under the usual IDNA2008 derivation rules. The goal of IDNA2008 is to provide the widest repertoire of code points possible and consistent with the traditional DNS "LDH" (letters, digits, hyphen) rule (see [RFC0952]), trusting to the operators of individual zones to make sensible (and usually more restrictive) policies for their zones.
由于IDNA2008中默认假设协议不允许一个代码点，因此它有多个“协议允许”类；这与IDNA2003不同。虽然有些代码点是完全不允许的，但有些代码点仅在某些上下文中允许。上下文相关规则的原因与某些字符的使用方式有关。例如，零宽度连接符和零宽度非连接符（ZWJ，U+200D和ZWNJ，U+200C）可以与上下文规则一起使用，因为它们在某些情况下是必需的，但被Unicode视为标点符号，因此在通常的IDNA2008派生规则下是不允许的。IDNA2008的目标是提供尽可能广泛的代码点，并与传统的DNS“LDH”（字母、数字、连字符）规则（参见[RFC0952]）保持一致，相信各个区域的运营商能够为其区域制定合理的（通常是更严格的）政策。
IDNA2008 has a special problem with delimiters, because the delimiter "character" in the DNS wire format is not really part of the data. In DNS, labels are not separated exactly; instead, a label carries with it an indicator that says how long the label is. When the label is displayed in presentation format as part of a fully qualified domain name, the label separator FULL STOP, U+002E (.) is used to break up the labels. But because that label separator does not travel with the wire format of the domain name, there is no way to encode a different, "internationalized" separator in IDNA2008.
IDNA2008在分隔符方面有一个特殊问题，因为DNS wire格式中的分隔符“字符”实际上不是数据的一部分。在DNS中，标签没有完全分开；相反，标签上带有一个指示器，指示标签的长度。当标签以表示格式显示为完全限定域名的一部分时，标签分隔符句号U+002E（.）用于拆分标签。但由于标签分隔符不随域名的wire格式移动，所以无法在IDNA2008中编码不同的“国际化”分隔符。
Other protocols may include characters with similar special meaning within the protocol. Common characters for these purposes include FULL STOP, U+002E (.); COMMERCIAL AT, U+0040 (@); HYPHEN-MINUS, U+002D (-); SOLIDUS, U+002F (/); and LOW LINE, U+005F (_). The mere inclusion of such a character in the protocol is not enough for it to be considered similar to another protocol using the same character; instead, handling of the character must be taken into consideration as well.
其他协议可能包括协议中具有类似特殊含义的字符。用于这些目的的常用字符包括句号，U+002E（.）；商业电话：U+0040（@）；连字符减号，U+002D（-）；索利多金币，U+002F（/）；和低端，U+005F（3;）。仅仅在议定书中包含这样一个字符是不足以使它被视为与使用相同字符的另一个议定书相似的；相反，还必须考虑角色的处理。
An important issue to tackle here is whether it is valuable to map to or from these special characters as part of the Stringprep replacement. In some locales, the analogue to FULL STOP, U+002E is some other character, and users may expect to be able to substitute their normal stop for FULL STOP, U+002E. At the same time, there are predictability arguments in favor of treating identifiers with FULL STOP, U+002E in them just the way they are treated under IDNA2008.
这里要解决的一个重要问题是，作为Stringprep替换的一部分，映射这些特殊字符是否有价值。在某些地区，与句号U+002E类似的字符是其他字符，用户可能希望能够将其正常句号替换为句号U+002E。同时，有一些可预测性的论据支持用句号处理标识符，U+002E，就像IDNA2008中处理标识符一样。
Homoglyphs are similarly (or identically) rendered glyphs of different code points. For DNS names, homoglyphs may enable phishing. If a protocol requires some visual comparison by end-users, then the issue of homoglyphs is to be considered. In the DNS context, these issues are documented in [RFC5894] and [RFC4690]. However, IDNA2008 does not have a mechanism to deal with them, trusting DNS zone operators to enact sensible policies for the subset of Unicode they wish to support, given their user community. A similar policy/protocol split may not be desirable in every protocol.
同形符号是不同代码点的类似（或相同）渲染符号。对于DNS名称，同形符可以启用网络钓鱼。如果协议需要最终用户进行一些视觉比较，则应考虑同形文字问题。在DNS上下文中，这些问题记录在[RFC5894]和[RFC4690]中。然而，IDNA2008并没有一个机制来处理这些问题，它信任DNS区域运营商，根据他们的用户群体，为他们希望支持的Unicode子集制定合理的策略。在每个协议中可能不需要类似的策略/协议拆分。
Some protocol elements are provided by users, and others are not. Those that are not may presumably be subject to greater restrictions, whereas those that users provide likely need to permit the broadest range of code points. The following questions are helpful:
一些协议元素由用户提供，而另一些则不是。那些没有的可能会受到更大的限制，而那些用户提供的可能需要允许最广泛的代码点。以下问题很有帮助：
1. Do users input the strings directly?
1. 用户是否直接输入字符串？
2. If so, how? (keyboard, stylus, voice, copy-paste, etc.)
2. 如果是，怎么做？（键盘、手写笔、语音、复制粘贴等）
3. Where do we place the dividing line between user interface and protocol? (see [RFC5895])
3. 我们把用户界面和协议的分界线放在哪里？（参见[RFC5895]）
Just as only some protocol elements are expected to be entered directly by users, only some protocol elements are intended to be consumed directly by users. It is important to know how users are expected to be able to consume the protocol elements, because different environments present different challenges. An element that is only ever delivered as part of a vCard remains in machine-readable format, so the problem of visual confusion is not a great one. Is the protocol element published as part of a vCard, a web directory, on a business card, or on "the side of a bus"? Do users use the protocol element as an identifier (which means that they might enter it again in some other context)? (See also Section 5.2.6.)
正如只有一些协议元素预期由用户直接输入一样，只有一些协议元素预期由用户直接使用。了解用户期望如何使用协议元素很重要，因为不同的环境会带来不同的挑战。仅作为vCard的一部分交付的元素仍然是机器可读的格式，因此视觉混乱的问题并不严重。协议元素是作为vCard、web目录的一部分发布在名片上还是“总线一侧”？用户是否使用协议元素作为标识符（这意味着他们可能会在其他上下文中再次输入）？（另见第5.2.6节。）
Some strings are useful as part of the protocol but are not used as input to other operations (for instance, purely informative or descriptive text). Other strings are used directly as input to other operations (such as cryptographic hash functions), or are used together with other strings to (such as concatenating a string with some others to form a unique identifier).
有些字符串作为协议的一部分很有用，但不用作其他操作的输入（例如，纯信息性或描述性文本）。其他字符串直接用作其他操作（如加密哈希函数）的输入，或与其他字符串一起用于（如将字符串与其他字符串连接以形成唯一标识符）。
Strings often have a similar function in different protocols. For instance, many different protocols contain user identifiers or passwords. A single profile for all such uses might be desirable.
字符串在不同的协议中通常具有相似的功能。例如，许多不同的协议包含用户标识符或密码。所有此类用途的单一配置文件可能是可取的。
Often, a string in a protocol is effectively a protocol element from another protocol. For instance, different systems might use the same credentials database for authentication.
通常，协议中的字符串实际上是来自另一个协议的协议元素。例如，不同的系统可能使用相同的凭据数据库进行身份验证。
A Stringprep replacement that does anything more than just update Stringprep to the latest version of Unicode will probably entail some changes. It is important to identify the willingness of the protocol-using community to accept backwards-incompatible changes. By the same token, it is important to evaluate the desire of the community for features not available under Stringprep.
如果Stringprep的替代品不只是将Stringprep更新到最新版本的Unicode，则可能需要进行一些更改。重要的是确定协议使用社区是否愿意接受向后不兼容的更改。同样，评估社区对Stringprep下不可用功能的需求也很重要。
IDNA2008 uses an algorithm to derive the validity of a Unicode code point for use under IDNA2008. It does this by using the properties of each code point to test its validity.
IDNA2008使用一种算法来推导在IDNA2008下使用的Unicode代码点的有效性。它通过使用每个代码点的属性来测试其有效性。
This approach depends crucially on the idea that code points, once valid for a protocol profile, will not later be made invalid. That is not a guarantee currently provided by Unicode. Properties of code points may change between versions of Unicode. Rarely, such a change could cause a given code point to become invalid under a protocol profile, even though the code point would be valid with an earlier version of Unicode. This is not merely a theoretical possibility, because it has occurred [RFC6452].
这种方法主要取决于这样一种思想：代码点一旦对协议概要文件有效，以后就不会变得无效。这不是Unicode目前提供的保证。在Unicode版本之间，代码点的属性可能会更改。这种更改很少会导致给定的代码点在协议配置文件下无效，即使该代码点在早期版本的Unicode中是有效的。这不仅仅是一种理论上的可能性，因为它已经发生了[RFC6452]。
Accordingly, as in IDNA2008, a Stringprep replacement that intends to be Unicode version agnostic will need to work out a mechanism to address cases where incompatible changes occur because of new Unicode versions.
因此，正如在IDNA2008中一样，打算与Unicode版本无关的Stringprep替代品将需要制定一种机制来解决由于新Unicode版本而发生不兼容更改的情况。
The above suggests the following guidance:
以上建议如下：
o A Stringprep replacement should be defined.
o 应定义Stringprep替换。
o The replacement should take an approach similar to IDNA2008 (e.g., by using properties of code points instead of whitelisting of code points), in that it enables better Unicode agility.
o 替换应该采用类似于IDNA2008的方法（例如，通过使用代码点的属性而不是代码点的白名单），因为它可以实现更好的Unicode灵活性。
o Protocols share similar characteristics of strings. Therefore, defining internationalization preparation algorithms for the smallest set of string classes may be sufficient for most cases, providing coherence among a set of related protocols or protocols where identifiers are exchanged.
o 协议共享字符串的类似特征。因此，为最小的字符串类集定义国际化准备算法在大多数情况下可能就足够了，从而在一组相关协议或交换标识符的协议之间提供一致性。
o The sets of string classes need to be evaluated according to the considerations that make up the headings in Section 5
o 字符串类的集合需要根据构成第5节标题的考虑因素进行评估
o It is reasonable to limit scope to Unicode code points and rule the mapping of data from other character encodings outside the scope of this effort.
o 将范围限制在Unicode代码点上是合理的，并将来自此工作范围之外的其他字符编码的数据映射规则化。
o The replacement ought to at least provide guidance to applications using the replacement on how to handle protocol incompatibilities resulting from changes to Unicode. In an ideal world, the Stringprep replacement would handle the changes automatically, but it appears that such automatic handling would require magic and cannot be expected.
o 替换内容应至少为使用替换内容的应用程序提供指导，说明如何处理Unicode更改导致的协议不兼容。在理想情况下，Stringprep替换将自动处理更改，但这种自动处理似乎需要魔法，这是不可能的。
o Compatibility within each protocol between a technique that is Stringprep-based and the technique's replacement has to be considered very carefully.
o 必须非常仔细地考虑基于Stringprep的技术与该技术的替代品之间在每个协议中的兼容性。
Existing deployments already depend on Stringprep profiles. Therefore, a replacement must consider the effects of any new strategy on existing deployments. By way of comparison, it is worth noting that some characters were acceptable in IDNA labels under IDNA2003, but are not protocol-valid under IDNA2008 (and conversely); disagreement about what to do during the transition has resulted in different approaches to mapping. Different implementers may make different decisions about what to do in such cases; this could have interoperability effects. It is necessary to trade better support for different linguistic environments against the potential side effects of backward incompatibility.
现有部署已依赖于Stringprep配置文件。因此，替换必须考虑任何新策略对现有部署的影响。通过比较，值得注意的是，一些字符在IDNA2003下的IDNA标签中是可接受的，但在IDNA2008下是无效的（反之亦然）；在过渡期间对做什么的分歧导致了不同的映射方法。在这种情况下，不同的实施者可能会做出不同的决定；这可能会产生互操作性影响。有必要为不同的语言环境提供更好的支持，以对抗向后不兼容的潜在副作用。
This document merely states what problems are to be solved and does not define a protocol. There are undoubtedly security implications of the particular results that will come from the work to be completed. Moreover, the Stringprep Security Considerations [RFC3454] Section applies. See also the analysis in the subsections of Appendix B, below.
本文件仅说明需要解决的问题，未定义协议。毫无疑问，将要完成的工作所产生的特定结果会对安全产生影响。此外，Stringprep安全注意事项[RFC3454]部分适用。另见下文附录B小节中的分析。
This document is the product of the PRECIS IETF Working Group, and participants in that working group were helpful in addressing issues with the text.
本文件是PRECIS IETF工作组的成果，该工作组的参与者有助于解决文本中的问题。
Specific contributions came from David Black, Alan DeKok, Simon Josefsson, Bill McQuillan, Alexey Melnikov, Peter Saint-Andre, Dave Thaler, and Yoshiro Yoneya.
具体贡献来自大卫·布莱克、艾伦·德科克、西蒙·约瑟夫森、比尔·麦克奎伦、阿列克谢·梅尔尼科夫、彼得·圣安德烈、戴夫·泰勒和Yoseya。
Dave Thaler provided the "buckets" insight in Section 5.1.1, central to the organization of the problem.
Dave Thaler在第5.1.1节（问题组织的核心部分）中提供了“桶”的见解。
Evaluations of Stringprep profiles that are included in Appendix B were done by David Black, Alexey Melnikov, Peter Saint-Andre, and Dave Thaler.
David Black、Alexey Melnikov、Peter Saint Andre和Dave Thaler对附录B中包含的Stringprep概要文件进行了评估。
[78PRECIS] Blanchet, M., "PRECIS Framework", Proceedings of IETF 78, July 2010, <http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/ slides/precis-2.pdf>.
[78PRECIS]Blanchet，M.，“PRECIS框架”，IETF第78卷，2010年7月<http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/78/ 幻灯片/precis-2.pdf>。
[ID-COMP] Thaler, D., Ed., "Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security Purposes", Work in Progress, March 2013.
[ID-COMP]Thaler，D.，Ed.，“出于安全目的的标识符比较问题”，正在进行的工作，2013年3月。
[NEWPREP] "Newprep BoF Meeting Minutes", March 2010, <http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/77/minutes/ newprep.txt>.
[NEWPREP]“NEWPREP BoF会议纪要”，2010年3月<http://www.ietf.org/proceedings/77/minutes/ newprep.txt>。
[RFC0952] Harrenstien, K., Stahl, M., and E. Feinler, "DoD Internet host table specification", RFC 952, October 1985.
[RFC0952]Harrenstien，K.，Stahl，M.和E.Feinler，“国防部互联网主机表规范”，RFC 952，1985年10月。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，1997年3月。
[RFC3454] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", RFC 3454, December 2002.
[RFC3454]Hoffman，P.和M.Blanchet，“国际化弦的准备（“stringprep”）”，RFC 3454，2002年12月。
[RFC3490] Faltstrom, P., Hoffman, P., and A. Costello, "Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3490, March 2003.
[RFC3490]Faltstrom，P.，Hoffman，P.，和A.Costello，“应用程序中的域名国际化（IDNA）”，RFC 34902003年3月。
[RFC3491] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)", RFC 3491, March 2003.
[RFC3491]Hoffman，P.和M.Blanchet，“Nameprep：国际化域名（IDN）的Stringprep配置文件”，RFC 3491，2003年3月。
[RFC3492] Costello, A., "Punycode: A Bootstring encoding of Unicode for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA)", RFC 3492, March 2003.
[RFC3492]Costello，A.，“Punycode：应用程序中国际化域名的Unicode引导字符串编码（IDNA）”，RFC 3492，2003年3月。
[RFC3530] Shepler, S., Callaghan, B., Robinson, D., Thurlow, R., Beame, C., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System (NFS) version 4 Protocol", RFC 3530, April 2003.
[RFC3530]Shepler，S.，Callaghan，B.，Robinson，D.，Thurlow，R.，Beame，C.，Eisler，M.，和D.Noveck，“网络文件系统（NFS）版本4协议”，RFC 3530，2003年4月。
[RFC3722] Bakke, M., "String Profile for Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI) Names", RFC 3722, April 2004.
[RFC3722]Bakke，M.，“互联网小型计算机系统接口（iSCSI）名称的字符串配置文件”，RFC 3722，2004年4月。
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC3748]Aboba，B.，Blunk，L.，Vollbrecht，J.，Carlson，J.，和H.Levkowetz，“可扩展身份验证协议（EAP）”，RFC 3748，2004年6月。
[RFC3920] Saint-Andre, P., Ed., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 3920, October 2004.
[RFC3920]Saint Andre，P.，Ed.“可扩展消息和状态协议（XMPP）：核心”，RFC 3920，2004年10月。
[RFC3922] Saint-Andre, P., "Mapping the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) to Common Presence and Instant Messaging (CPIM)", RFC 3922, October 2004.
[RFC3922]Saint Andre，P.，“将可扩展消息和状态协议（XMPP）映射到公共状态和即时消息（CPIM）”，RFC 3922，2004年10月。
[RFC4011] Waldbusser, S., Saperia, J., and T. Hongal, "Policy Based Management MIB", RFC 4011, March 2005.
[RFC4011]Waldbusser，S.，Saperia，J.，和T.Hongal，“基于策略的管理MIB”，RFC40112005年3月。
[RFC4013] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names and Passwords", RFC 4013, February 2005.
[RFC4013]Zeilenga，K.，“SASLprep：用户名和密码的Stringprep配置文件”，RFC40113，2005年2月。
[RFC4279] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005.
[RFC4279]Eronen，P.和H.Tschofenig，“用于传输层安全（TLS）的预共享密钥密码套件”，RFC 4279，2005年12月。
[RFC4314] Melnikov, A., "IMAP4 Access Control List (ACL) Extension", RFC 4314, December 2005.
[RFC4314]Melnikov，A.，“IMAP4访问控制列表（ACL）扩展”，RFC 4314，2005年12月。
[RFC4422] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)", RFC 4422, June 2006.
[RFC4422]Melnikov，A.和K.Zeilenga，“简单身份验证和安全层（SASL）”，RFC 4422，2006年6月。
[RFC4505] Zeilenga, K., "Anonymous Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4505, June 2006.
[RFC4505]Zeilenga，K.，“匿名简单身份验证和安全层（SASL）机制”，RFC4505，2006年6月。
[RFC4511] Sermersheim, J., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): The Protocol", RFC 4511, June 2006.
[RFC4511]Sermersheim，J.，“轻量级目录访问协议（LDAP）：协议”，RFC4511，2006年6月。
[RFC4513] Harrison, R., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): Authentication Methods and Security Mechanisms", RFC 4513, June 2006.
[RFC4513]Harrison，R.，“轻量级目录访问协议（LDAP）：认证方法和安全机制”，RFC4513，2006年6月。
[RFC4518] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): Internationalized String Preparation", RFC 4518, June 2006.
[RFC4518]Zeilenga，K.，“轻量级目录访问协议（LDAP）：国际化字符串准备”，RFC4518，2006年6月。
[RFC4616] Zeilenga, K., "The PLAIN Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Mechanism", RFC 4616, August 2006.
[RFC4616]Zeilenga，K.，“简单认证和安全层（SASL）机制”，RFC4616，2006年8月。
[RFC4643] Vinocur, J. and K. Murchison, "Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) Extension for Authentication", RFC 4643, October 2006.
[RFC4643]Vinocur，J.和K.Murchison，“用于认证的网络新闻传输协议（NNTP）扩展”，RFC 46432006年10月。
[RFC4683] Park, J., Lee, J., Lee, H., Park, S., and T. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Subject Identification Method (SIM)", RFC 4683, October 2006.
[RFC4683]Park，J.，Lee，J.，Lee，H.，Park，S.，和T.Polk，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施主体识别方法（SIM）”，RFC 4683，2006年10月。
[RFC4690] Klensin, J., Faltstrom, P., Karp, C., and IAB, "Review and Recommendations for Internationalized Domain Names (IDNs)", RFC 4690, September 2006.
[RFC4690]Klensin，J.，Faltstrom，P.，Karp，C.，和IAB，“国际化域名（IDN）的审查和建议”，RFC 46902006年9月。
[RFC4790] Newman, C., Duerst, M., and A. Gulbrandsen, "Internet Application Protocol Collation Registry", RFC 4790, March 2007.
[RFC4790]Newman，C.，Duerst，M.，和A.Gulbrandsen，“互联网应用协议整理注册表”，RFC 47902007年3月。
[RFC4954] Siemborski, R. and A. Melnikov, "SMTP Service Extension for Authentication", RFC 4954, July 2007.
[RFC4954]Siemborski，R.和A.Melnikov，“用于身份验证的SMTP服务扩展”，RFC 49542007年7月。
[RFC5034] Siemborski, R. and A. Menon-Sen, "The Post Office Protocol (POP3) Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) Authentication Mechanism", RFC 5034, July 2007.
[RFC5034]Siemborski，R.和A.Menon Sen，“邮局协议（POP3）简单认证和安全层（SASL）认证机制”，RFC 5034，2007年7月。
[RFC5051] Crispin, M., "i;unicode-casemap - Simple Unicode Collation Algorithm", RFC 5051, October 2007.
[RFC5051]Crispin，M.，“i；unicode案例图-简单unicode排序算法”，RFC 5051，2007年10月。
[RFC5054] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavrogiannopoulos, N., and T. Perrin, "Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS Authentication", RFC 5054, November 2007.
[RFC5054]Taylor，D.，Wu，T.，Mavrogiannopoulos，N.，和T.Perrin，“使用安全远程密码（SRP）协议进行TLS身份验证”，RFC 5054，2007年11月。
[RFC5122] Saint-Andre, P., "Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)", RFC 5122, February 2008.
[RFC5122]Saint Andre，P.，“可扩展消息和状态协议（XMPP）的国际化资源标识符（IRI）和统一资源标识符（URI）”，RFC 5122，2008年2月。
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5280]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 52802008年5月。
[RFC5456] Spencer, M., Capouch, B., Guy, E., Miller, F., and K. Shumard, "IAX: Inter-Asterisk eXchange Version 2", RFC 5456, February 2010.
[RFC5456]Spencer，M.，Capouch，B.，Guy，E.，Miller，F.，和K.Shumard，“IAX:星号间交换版本2”，RFC 54562010年2月。
[RFC5661] Shepler, S., Eisler, M., and D. Noveck, "Network File System (NFS) Version 4 Minor Version 1 Protocol", RFC 5661, January 2010.
[RFC5661]Shepler，S.，Eisler，M.，和D.Noveck，“网络文件系统（NFS）版本4次要版本1协议”，RFC 56612010年1月。
[RFC5802] Newman, C., Menon-Sen, A., Melnikov, A., and N. Williams, "Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) SASL and GSS-API Mechanisms", RFC 5802, July 2010.
[RFC5802]Newman，C.，Menon Sen，A.，Melnikov，A.，和N.Williams，“盐渍挑战响应认证机制（SCRAM）SASL和GSS-API机制”，RFC 5802，2010年7月。
[RFC5804] Melnikov, A. and T. Martin, "A Protocol for Remotely Managing Sieve Scripts", RFC 5804, July 2010.
[RFC5804]Melnikov，A.和T.Martin，“远程管理筛选脚本的协议”，RFC 58042010年7月。
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", RFC 5890, August 2010.
[RFC5890]Klensin，J.，“应用程序的国际化域名（IDNA）：定义和文档框架”，RFC 58902010年8月。
[RFC5891] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA): Protocol", RFC 5891, August 2010.
[RFC5891]Klensin，J.，“应用程序中的国际化域名（IDNA）：协议”，RFC 58912010年8月。
[RFC5892] Faltstrom, P., "The Unicode Code Points and Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)", RFC 5892, August 2010.
[RFC5892]Faltstrom，P.，“Unicode代码点和应用程序的国际化域名（IDNA）”，RFC 58922010年8月。
[RFC5893] Alvestrand, H. and C. Karp, "Right-to-Left Scripts for Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA)", RFC 5893, August 2010.
[RFC5893]Alvestrand，H.和C.Karp，“应用程序国际化域名（IDNA）的从右到左脚本”，RFC 58932010年8月。
[RFC5894] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Background, Explanation, and Rationale", RFC 5894, August 2010.
[RFC5894]Klensin，J.“应用程序的国际化域名（IDNA）：背景、解释和基本原理”，RFC 58942010年8月。
[RFC5895] Resnick, P. and P. Hoffman, "Mapping Characters for Internationalized Domain Names in Applications (IDNA) 2008", RFC 5895, September 2010.
[RFC5895]Resnick，P.和P.Hoffman，“应用程序中国际化域名的映射字符（IDNA）2008”，RFC 58952010年9月。
[RFC6120] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core", RFC 6120, March 2011.
[RFC6120]Saint Andre，P.，“可扩展消息和状态协议（XMPP）：核心”，RFC61202011年3月。
[RFC6365] Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365, September 2011.
[RFC6365]Hoffman，P.和J.Klensin，“IETF国际化中使用的术语”，BCP 166，RFC 6365，2011年9月。
[RFC6452] Faltstrom, P. and P. Hoffman, "The Unicode Code Points and Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA) - Unicode 6.0", RFC 6452, November 2011.
[RFC6452]Faltstrom，P.和P.Hoffman，“应用程序的Unicode码点和国际化域名（IDNA）-Unicode 6.0”，RFC 6452，2011年11月。
[UAX15] "Unicode Standard Annex #15: Unicode Normalization Forms", UAX 15, September 2009.
[UAX15]“Unicode标准附件#15：Unicode规范化表单”，UAX 15，2009年9月。
[Unicode61] The Unicode Consortium. The Unicode Standard, Version 6.1.0, (Mountain View, CA: The Unicode Consortium, 2012. ISBN 978-1-936213-02-3). <http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode6.1.0/>.
[Unicode 61]Unicode联盟。Unicode标准，版本6.1.0，（加利福尼亚州山景城：Unicode联盟，2012年。ISBN 978-1-936213-02-3）<http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode6.1.0/>.
A number of the known cases of Stringprep use were evaluated during the preparation of this document. The known cases are here described in two ways. The types of identifiers the protocol uses is first called out in the ID type column (from Section 5.1.1) using the short forms "a" for Absolute, "d" for Definite, and "i" for Indefinite. Next, there is a column that contains an "i" if the protocol string comes from user input, an "o" if the protocol string becomes user-facing output, "b" if both are true, and "n" if neither is true.
在编写本文件的过程中，对许多已知的Stringprep使用案例进行了评估。这里以两种方式描述已知的情况。协议使用的标识符类型首先在ID类型列（第5.1.1节）中调用，使用缩写形式“a”表示绝对值，“d”表示确定值，“i”表示不确定值。接下来，如果协议字符串来自用户输入，则有一列包含“i”；如果协议字符串成为面向用户的输出，则有一列包含“o”；如果两者都为真，则有一列包含“b”；如果两者都不为真，则有一列包含“n”。
+------+--------+-------+
| RFC | IDtype | User? |
+------+--------+-------+
| 3722 | a | b |
| 3748 | - | - |
| 3920 | a,d | b |
| 4505 | a | i |
| 4314 | a,d | b |
| 4954 | a,d | b |
| 5034 | a,d | b |
| 5804 | a,d | b |
+------+--------+-------+
+------+--------+-------+
| RFC | IDtype | User? |
+------+--------+-------+
| 3722 | a | b |
| 3748 | - | - |
| 3920 | a,d | b |
| 4505 | a | i |
| 4314 | a,d | b |
| 4954 | a,d | b |
| 5034 | a,d | b |
| 5804 | a,d | b |
+------+--------+-------+
Table 1
表1
This section is a summary of evaluation of Stringprep profiles that was done to get a good understanding of the usage of Stringprep. This summary is by no means normative nor the actual evaluations themselves. A template was used for reviewers to get a coherent view of all evaluations.
本节总结了Stringprep配置文件的评估，这些评估是为了更好地了解Stringprep的使用。这一总结既不是规范性的，也不是实际的评价本身。评审员使用了一个模板，以获得所有评价的一致视图。
Description: An iSCSI session consists of an initiator (i.e., host or server that uses storage) communicating with a target (i.e., a storage array or other system that provides storage). Both the iSCSI initiator and target are named by iSCSI names. The iSCSI Stringprep profile is used for iSCSI names.
说明：iSCSI会话由与目标（即存储阵列或提供存储的其他系统）通信的启动器（即使用存储的主机或服务器）组成。iSCSI启动器和目标都以iSCSI名称命名。iSCSI Stringprep配置文件用于iSCSI名称。
How it is used: iSCSI initiators and targets (see above). They can also be used to identify SCSI ports (these are software entities in the iSCSI protocol, not hardware ports) and iSCSI logical units (storage volumes), although both are unusual in practice.
使用方式：iSCSI启动器和目标（见上文）。它们还可用于标识SCSI端口（这些端口是iSCSI协议中的软件实体，而不是硬件端口）和iSCSI逻辑单元（存储卷），尽管两者在实践中并不常见。
What entities create these identifiers? Generally, a human user (1) configures an automated system (2) that generates the names. Advance configuration of the system is required due to the embedded use of external unique identifier (from the DNS or IEEE).
哪些实体创建这些标识符？通常，人工用户（1）配置生成名称的自动系统（2）。由于嵌入式使用外部唯一标识符（来自DNS或IEEE），因此需要提前配置系统。
How is the string input in the system? Keyboard and copy-paste are common. Copy-paste is common because iSCSI names are long enough to be problematic for humans to remember, causing use of email, sneaker-net, text files, etc., to avoid mistype mistakes.
字符串在系统中是如何输入的？键盘和复制粘贴是常见的。复制粘贴很常见，因为iSCSI名称的长度足以让人难以记住，从而导致使用电子邮件、运动鞋网络、文本文件等来避免键入错误。
Where do we place the dividing line between user interface and protocol? The iSCSI protocol requires that all internationalization string preparation occur in the user interface. The iSCSI protocol treats iSCSI names as opaque identifiers that are compared byte-by-byte for equality. iSCSI names are generally not checked for correct formatting by the protocol.
我们把用户界面和协议的分界线放在哪里？iSCSI协议要求在用户界面中进行所有国际化字符串准备。iSCSI协议将iSCSI名称视为不透明标识符，逐字节进行比较以确保相等。协议通常不会检查iSCSI名称的格式是否正确。
What entities enforce the rules? There are no iSCSI-specific enforcement entities, although the use of unique identifier information in the names relies on DNS registrars and the IEEE Registration Authority.
哪些实体执行这些规则？虽然名称中唯一标识符信息的使用依赖于DNS注册商和IEEE注册机构，但没有特定于iSCSI的实施实体。
Comparison: Byte-by-byte.
比较：逐字节。
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Case folding is required for the code blocks specified in RFC 3454, Table B.2. The overall iSCSI naming system (UI + protocol) is case-insensitive.
箱子折叠、灵敏度、保存：RFC 3454表B.2中规定的代码块需要箱子折叠。整个iSCSI命名系统（UI+协议）不区分大小写。
What is the impact if the comparison results in a false positive? Potential access to the wrong storage.
如果比较结果为假阳性，会产生什么影响？对错误存储的潜在访问。
- If the initiator has no access to the wrong storage, an authentication failure is the probable result.
- 如果启动器无法访问错误的存储，则可能导致身份验证失败。
- If the initiator has access to the wrong storage, the resulting misidentification could result in use of the wrong data and possible corruption of stored data.
- 如果启动器访问了错误的存储器，由此产生的错误识别可能会导致使用错误的数据，并可能损坏存储的数据。
What is the impact if the comparison results in a false negative? Denial of authorized storage access.
如果比较结果为假阴性，会产生什么影响？拒绝授权存储访问。
What are the security impacts? iSCSI names may be used as the authentication identities for storage systems. Comparison problems could result in authentication problems, although note that authentication failure ameliorates some of the false positive cases.
安全影响是什么？iSCSI名称可以用作存储系统的身份验证标识。比较问题可能会导致身份验证问题，但请注意，身份验证失败会改善一些误报情况。
Normalization: NFKC, as specified by RFC 3454.
规范化：NFKC，由RFC 3454规定。
Mapping: Yes, as specified by Table B.1 in RFC 3454.
映射：是，如RFC 3454中表B.1所规定。
Disallowed Characters: Only the following characters are allowed: - ASCII dash, dot, colon - ASCII lowercase letters and digits - Unicode lowercase characters as specified by RFC 3454. All other characters are disallowed.
不允许的字符：只允许以下字符：-ASCII破折号、点、冒号-ASCII小写字母和数字-RFC 3454指定的Unicode小写字符。不允许使用所有其他字符。
Which other strings or identifiers are these most similar to? None -- iSCSI names are unique to iSCSI.
这些字符串或标识符最类似于哪些其他字符串或标识符？无--iSCSI名称对于iSCSI是唯一的。
Are these strings or identifiers sometimes the same as strings or identifiers from other protocols? No.
这些字符串或标识符有时是否与其他协议中的字符串或标识符相同？不
Does the identifier have internal structure that needs to be respected? Yes. ASCII dot, dash, and colon are used for internal name structure. These are not reserved characters, in that they can occur in the name in locations other than those used for structuring purposes (e.g., only the first occurrence of a colon character is structural, others are not).
标识符是否具有需要遵守的内部结构？对ASCII点、破折号和冒号用于内部名称结构。这些字符不是保留字符，因为它们可以出现在名称中用于结构化目的以外的位置（例如，只有第一次出现的冒号字符是结构化字符，其他字符不是）。
How are users exposed to these strings? How are they published? iSCSI names appear in server and storage system configuration interfaces. They also appear in system logs.
用户如何暴露于这些字符串？它们是如何出版的？iSCSI名称显示在服务器和存储系统配置界面中。它们也出现在系统日志中。
Is the string / identifier used as input to other operations? Effectively, no. The rarely used port and logical unit names involve concatenation, which effectively extends a unique iSCSI name for a target to uniquely identify something within that target.
字符串/标识符是否用作其他操作的输入？实际上不是。很少使用的端口和逻辑单元名称涉及连接，这有效地扩展了目标的唯一iSCSI名称，以唯一地标识该目标中的某些内容。
How much tolerance for change from existing Stringprep approach? Good tolerance; the community would prefer that internationalization experts solve internationalization problems.
对现有Stringprep方法的变更有多大的容忍度？耐受性好；社区更希望国际化专家解决国际化问题。
How strong a desire for change (e.g., for Unicode agility)? Unicode agility is desired, in principle, as long as nothing significant breaks.
对改变的渴望有多强烈（例如Unicode敏捷性）？原则上，只要没有明显的中断，Unicode的灵活性是需要的。
B.2. SMTP/POP3/ManageSieve Stringprep Profiles: RFC 4954, RFC 5034, RFC 5804
B.2. SMTP/POP3/ManageSeeve Stringprep配置文件：RFC 4954、RFC 5034、RFC 5804
Description: Authorization identity (user identifier) exchanged during SASL authentication: AUTH (SMTP/POP3) or AUTHENTICATE (ManageSieve) command.
描述：在SASL身份验证期间交换的授权标识（用户标识符）：AUTH（SMTP/POP3）或AUTHENTICATE（managesive）命令。
How It's Used: Used for proxy authorization, e.g., to [lawfully] impersonate a particular user after a privileged authentication.
如何使用：用于代理授权，例如，在特权身份验证后[合法]模拟特定用户。
Who Generates It: - Typically generated by email system administrators using some tools/conventions, sometimes from some backend database. - In some setups, human users can register their own usernames (e.g., webmail self-registration).
由谁生成：-通常由电子邮件系统管理员使用某些工具/约定生成，有时从某些后端数据库生成。-在某些设置中，人类用户可以注册自己的用户名（例如，webmail自注册）。
User Input Methods: - typing or selecting from a list - copy and paste - voice input - in configuration files or on the command line
用户输入方法：-在配置文件或命令行中键入或从列表中选择-复制和粘贴-语音输入
Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., gateway service) on registration of account.
强制执行：服务器/附加服务（例如网关服务）在注册帐户时强制执行的规则。
Comparison Method: "Type 1" (byte-for-byte) or "Type 2" (compare by a common algorithm that everyone agrees on (e.g., normalize and then compare the result byte-by-byte).
比较方法：“类型1”（逐字节）或“类型2”（通过每个人都同意的通用算法进行比较（例如，规范化，然后逐字节比较结果）。
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Most likely case-sensitive. Exact requirements on case-sensitivity/case-preservation depend on a specific implementation, e.g., an implementation might treat all user identifiers as case-insensitive (or case-insensitive for US-ASCII subset only).
折叠、区分大小写、保存：最可能区分大小写。区分大小写/保留大小写的确切要求取决于特定的实现，例如，一个实现可能会将所有用户标识符视为不区分大小写（或仅对US-ASCII子集不区分大小写）。
Impact of Comparison: False positives: an unauthorized user is allowed email service access (login). False negatives: an authorized user is denied email service access.
比较的影响：误报：允许未经授权的用户访问电子邮件服务（登录）。错误否定：授权用户被拒绝访问电子邮件服务。
Normalization: NFKC (as per RFC 4013).
标准化：NFKC（根据RFC 4013）。
Mapping: (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for the full list) Non-ASCII spaces are mapped to space, etc.
映射：（完整列表见RFC 4013第2节）非ASCII空格映射到空格等。
Disallowed Characters: (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for the full list) Unicode Control characters, etc.
不允许的字符：（完整列表见RFC 4013第2节）Unicode控制字符等。
String Classes: Simple username. See Section 2 of RFC 4013 for details on restrictions. Note that some implementations allow spaces in these. While implementations are not required to use a specific format, an authorization identity frequently has the same format as an email address (and Email Address Internationalization (EAI) email address in the future), or as a left hand side of an email address. Note: whatever is recommended for SMTP/POP/
字符串类：简单用户名。有关限制的详细信息，请参见RFC 4013第2节。请注意，有些实现允许在其中使用空格。虽然实现不需要使用特定格式，但授权标识通常与电子邮件地址（以及将来的电子邮件地址国际化（EAI）电子邮件地址）或电子邮件地址的左侧格式相同。注意：SMTP/POP的建议值/
ManageSieve authorization identity should also be used for IMAP authorization identities, as IMAP/POP3/SMTP/ManageSieve are frequently implemented together.
ManageSeeve授权标识还应用于IMAP授权标识，因为IMAP/POP3/SMTP/ManageSeeve经常一起实现。
Internal Structure: None
内部结构：无
User Output: Unlikely, but possible. For example, if it is the same as an email address.
用户输出：不太可能，但可能。例如，如果它与电子邮件地址相同。
Operations: Sometimes concatenated with other data and then used as input to a cryptographic hash function.
操作：有时与其他数据连接，然后用作加密哈希函数的输入。
How much tolerance for change from existing Stringprep approach? Not sure.
对现有Stringprep方法的变更有多大的容忍度？不确定。
Background Information: In RFC 5034, when describing the POP3 AUTH command:
背景信息：在RFC 5034中，描述POP3 AUTH命令时：
The authorization identity generated by the SASL exchange is a simple username, and SHOULD use the SASLprep profile (see [RFC4013]) of the StringPrep algorithm (see [RFC3454]) to prepare these names for matching. If preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string (unless it was transmitted as the empty string), the server MUST fail the authentication.
SASL交换生成的授权标识是一个简单的用户名，应该使用StringPrep算法（参见[RFC3454]）的SASLprep配置文件（参见[RFC4013]）来准备这些名称以进行匹配。如果授权标识的准备失败或导致空字符串（除非它作为空字符串传输），则服务器必须使身份验证失败。
In RFC 4954, when describing the SMTP AUTH command:
在RFC 4954中，描述SMTP AUTH命令时：
The authorization identity generated by this [SASL] exchange is a "simple username" (in the sense defined in [SASLprep]), and both client and server SHOULD (*) use the [SASLprep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm to prepare these names for transmission or comparison. If preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string (unless it was transmitted as the empty string), the server MUST fail the authentication.
此[SASL]交换生成的授权标识是一个“简单用户名”（在[SASLprep]中定义的含义），客户端和服务器都应（*）使用[StringPrep]算法的[SASLprep]配置文件来准备这些名称以供传输或比较。如果授权标识的准备失败或导致空字符串（除非它作为空字符串传输），则服务器必须使身份验证失败。
(*) Note: Future revision of this specification may change this requirement to MUST. Currently, the SHOULD is used in order to avoid breaking the majority of existing implementations.
（*）注：本规范的未来版本可能会将此要求更改为“必须”。目前，使用SHOULD是为了避免破坏大多数现有实现。
In RFC 5804, when describing the ManageSieve AUTHENTICATE command:
在RFC 5804中，在描述ManageSieve AUTHENTICATE命令时：
The authorization identity generated by this [SASL] exchange is a "simple username" (in the sense defined in [SASLprep]), and both client and server MUST use the [SASLprep] profile of the [StringPrep] algorithm to prepare these names for transmission or comparison. If preparation of the authorization identity fails or results in an empty string (unless it was transmitted as the empty string), the server MUST fail the authentication.
此[SASL]交换生成的授权标识是一个“简单用户名”（在[SASLprep]中定义的含义），客户端和服务器都必须使用[StringPrep]算法的[SASLprep]配置文件来准备这些名称以供传输或比较。如果授权标识的准备失败或导致空字符串（除非它作为空字符串传输），则服务器必须使身份验证失败。
Evaluation Note: These documents have 2 types of strings (usernames and passwords), so there are two separate templates.
评估说明：这些文档有两种类型的字符串（用户名和密码），因此有两个单独的模板。
Description: "username" parameter to the IMAP LOGIN command, identifiers in IMAP Access Control List (ACL) commands. Note that any valid username is also an IMAP ACL identifier, but IMAP ACL identifiers can include other things like the name of a group of users.
说明：IMAP登录命令的“用户名”参数，IMAP访问控制列表（ACL）命令中的标识符。请注意，任何有效的用户名也是IMAP ACL标识符，但IMAP ACL标识符可以包括其他内容，如一组用户的名称。
How It's Used: Used for authentication (Usernames), or in IMAP Access Control Lists (Usernames or Group names).
如何使用：用于身份验证（用户名）或IMAP访问控制列表（用户名或组名）。
Who Generates It: - Typically generated by email system administrators using some tools/conventions, sometimes from some backend database. - In some setups, human users can register own usernames (e.g., webmail self-registration).
由谁生成：-通常由电子邮件系统管理员使用某些工具/约定生成，有时从某些后端数据库生成。-在某些设置中，人类用户可以注册自己的用户名（例如，webmail自注册）。
User Input Methods: - typing or selecting from a list - copy and paste - voice input - in configuration files or on the command line
用户输入方法：-在配置文件或命令行中键入或从列表中选择-复制和粘贴-语音输入
Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., gateway service) on registration of account.
强制执行：服务器/附加服务（例如网关服务）在注册帐户时强制执行的规则。
Comparison Method: "Type 1" (byte-for-byte) or "Type 2" (compare by a common algorithm that everyone agrees on (e.g., normalize and then compare the result byte-by-byte).
比较方法：“类型1”（逐字节）或“类型2”（通过每个人都同意的通用算法进行比较（例如，规范化，然后逐字节比较结果）。
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Most likely case-sensitive. Exact requirements on case-sensitivity/case-preservation depend on a specific implementation, e.g., an implementation might treat all user identifiers as case-insensitive (or case-insensitive for US-ASCII subset only).
折叠、区分大小写、保存：最可能区分大小写。区分大小写/保留大小写的确切要求取决于特定的实现，例如，一个实现可能会将所有用户标识符视为不区分大小写（或仅对US-ASCII子集不区分大小写）。
Impact of Comparison: False positives: an unauthorized user is allowed IMAP access (login), privileges improperly granted (e.g., access to a specific mailbox, ability to manage ACLs for a mailbox). False negatives: an authorized user is denied IMAP access, unable to use granted privileges (e.g., access to a specific mailbox, ability to manage ACLs for a mailbox).
比较的影响：误报：允许未经授权的用户进行IMAP访问（登录），不正确地授予特权（例如，访问特定邮箱，管理邮箱ACL的能力）。错误否定：授权用户被拒绝IMAP访问，无法使用授予的权限（例如，访问特定邮箱、管理邮箱ACL的能力）。
Normalization: NFKC (as per RFC 4013)
标准化：NFKC（根据RFC 4013）
Mapping: (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for the full list) Non-ASCII spaces are mapped to space.
映射：（有关完整列表，请参见RFC 4013的第2节）非ASCII空格映射到空格。
Disallowed Characters: (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for the full list) Unicode Control characters, etc.
不允许的字符：（完整列表见RFC 4013第2节）Unicode控制字符等。
String Classes: Simple username. See Section 2 of RFC 4013 for details on restrictions. Note that some implementations allow spaces in these. While IMAP implementations are not required to use a specific format, an IMAP username frequently has the same format as an email address (and EAI email address in the future), or as a left hand side of an email address. Note: whatever is recommended for the IMAP username should also be used for ManageSieve, POP3 and SMTP authorization identities, as IMAP/POP3/ SMTP/ManageSieve are frequently implemented together.
字符串类：简单用户名。有关限制的详细信息，请参见RFC 4013第2节。请注意，有些实现允许在其中使用空格。虽然IMAP实现不需要使用特定格式，但IMAP用户名通常与电子邮件地址（以及将来的EAI电子邮件地址）或电子邮件地址的左侧格式相同。注意：IMAP用户名的推荐值也应用于ManageSeeve、POP3和SMTP授权标识，因为IMAP/POP3/SMTP/ManageSeeve经常一起实现。
Internal Structure: None.
内部结构：无。
User Output: Unlikely, but possible. For example, if it is the same as an email address, access control lists (e.g. in IMAP ACL extension), both when managing membership and listing membership of existing access control lists. Often shows up as mailbox names (under Other Users IMAP namespace).
用户输出：不太可能，但可能。例如，如果它与电子邮件地址相同，则在管理成员资格和列出现有访问控制列表的成员资格时，访问控制列表（例如在IMAP ACL扩展中）。通常显示为邮箱名称（在其他用户IMAP命名空间下）。
Operations: Sometimes concatenated with other data and then used as input to a cryptographic hash function.
操作：有时与其他数据连接，然后用作加密哈希函数的输入。
How much tolerance for change from existing Stringprep approach? Not sure. Non-ASCII IMAP usernames are currently prohibited by IMAP (RFC 3501). However, they are allowed when used in IMAP ACL extension.
对现有Stringprep方法的变更有多大的容忍度？不确定。IMAP（RFC 3501）目前禁止使用非ASCII IMAP用户名。但是，在IMAP ACL扩展中使用时，它们是允许的。
Description: "Password" parameter to the IMAP LOGIN command.
说明：IMAP登录命令的“密码”参数。
How It's Used: Used for authentication (Passwords).
如何使用：用于身份验证（密码）。
Who Generates It: Either generated by email system administrators using some tools/conventions, or specified by the human user.
由谁生成：由电子邮件系统管理员使用某些工具/约定生成，或由人工用户指定。
User Input Methods: - typing or selecting from a list - copy and paste - voice input - in configuration files or on the command line
用户输入方法：-在配置文件或命令行中键入或从列表中选择-复制和粘贴-语音输入
Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., gateway service or backend database) on registration of account.
强制执行：服务器/附加服务（例如网关服务或后端数据库）在注册帐户时强制执行的规则。
Comparison Method: "Type 1" (byte-for-byte).
比较方法：“类型1”（逐字节）。
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: Most likely case-sensitive.
折叠、区分大小写、保存：最可能区分大小写。
Impact of Comparison: False positives: an unauthorized user is allowed IMAP access (login). False negatives: an authorized user is denied IMAP access.
比较的影响：误报：允许未经授权的用户进行IMAP访问（登录）。错误否定：授权用户被拒绝IMAP访问。
Normalization: NFKC (as per RFC 4013).
标准化：NFKC（根据RFC 4013）。
Mapping: (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for the full list) Non-ASCII spaces are mapped to space.
映射：（有关完整列表，请参见RFC 4013的第2节）非ASCII空格映射到空格。
Disallowed Characters: (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for the full list) Unicode Control characters, etc.
不允许的字符：（完整列表见RFC 4013第2节）Unicode控制字符等。
String Classes: Currently defined as "simple username" (see Section 2 of RFC 4013 for details on restrictions); however, this is likely to be a different class from usernames. Note that some implementations allow spaces in these. Password in all email related protocols should be treated in the same way. Same passwords are frequently shared with web, IM, and etc. applications.
字符串类：当前定义为“简单用户名”（有关限制的详细信息，请参阅RFC 4013第2节）；然而，这可能是一个不同于用户名的类。请注意，有些实现允许在其中使用空格。所有电子邮件相关协议中的密码都应以相同的方式处理。相同的密码经常与web、IM等应用程序共享。
Internal Structure: None.
内部结构：无。
User Output: Text of email messages (e.g. in "you forgot your password" email messages), web page / directory, side of the bus / in ads -- possible.
用户输出：电子邮件的文本（例如，“您忘记密码了”电子邮件中的文本）、网页/目录、汽车侧面/广告中的文本——可能。
Operations: Sometimes concatenated with other data and then used as input to a cryptographic hash function. Frequently stored as is, or hashed.
操作：有时与其他数据连接，然后用作加密哈希函数的输入。经常按原样存储或散列。
How much tolerance for change from existing Stringprep approach? Not sure. Non-ASCII IMAP passwords are currently prohibited by IMAP (RFC 3501); however, they are likely to be in widespread use.
对现有Stringprep方法的变更有多大的容忍度？不确定。IMAP（RFC 3501）目前禁止使用非ASCII IMAP密码；然而，它们很可能被广泛使用。
Background Information: RFC 5738, Section 5 ("UTF8=USER Capability"):
背景信息：RFC 5738，第5节（“UTF8=用户能力”）：
If the "UTF8=USER" capability is advertised, that indicates the server accepts UTF-8 user names and passwords and applies SASLprep [RFC4013] to both arguments of the LOGIN command. The server MUST reject UTF-8 that fails to comply with the formal syntax in RFC 3629 [RFC3629] or if it encounters Unicode characters listed in Section 2.3 of SASLprep RFC 4013 [RFC4013].
如果公布了“UTF8=USER”功能，则表示服务器接受UTF-8用户名和密码，并将SASLprep[RFC4013]应用于LOGIN命令的两个参数。如果UTF-8不符合RFC 3629[RFC3629]中的正式语法，或者遇到SASLprep RFC 4013[RFC4013]第2.3节中列出的Unicode字符，则服务器必须拒绝该UTF-8。
RFC 4314, Section 3 ("Access control management commands and responses"):
RFC 4314第3节（“访问控制管理命令和响应”）：
Servers, when processing a command that has an identifier as a parameter (i.e., any of SETACL, DELETEACL, and LISTRIGHTS commands), SHOULD first prepare the received identifier using "SASLprep" profile [SASLprep] of the "stringprep" algorithm [Stringprep]. If the preparation of the identifier fails or results in an empty string, the server MUST refuse to perform the command with a BAD response. Note that Section 6 recommends additional identifier's verification steps.
服务器在处理以标识符作为参数的命令（即SETACL、DELETEACL和LISTRIGHTS命令中的任何一个）时，应首先使用“stringprep”算法[stringprep]的“SASLprep”配置文件[SASLprep]准备收到的标识符。如果标识符的准备失败或导致空字符串，服务器必须拒绝执行错误响应的命令。注意，第6节建议了额外的标识符验证步骤。
RFC 4314, Section 6 ("Security Considerations"):
RFC 4314第6节（“安全考虑”）：
This document relies on [SASLprep] to describe steps required to perform identifier canonicalization (preparation). The preparation algorithm in SASLprep was specifically designed such that its output is canonical, and it is well-formed. However, due to an anomaly [PR29] in the specification of Unicode normalization, canonical equivalence is not guaranteed for a select few character sequences. Identifiers prepared with SASLprep can be stored and returned by an ACL server. The anomaly affects ACL manipulation and evaluation of identifiers containing the selected character sequences. These sequences, however, do not appear in well-formed text. In order to address this problem, an ACL server MAY reject identifiers containing sequences described in [PR29] by sending the tagged
本文档依赖于[SASLprep]来描述执行标识符规范化（准备）所需的步骤。SASLprep中的准备算法是专门设计的，因此其输出是规范的，并且格式良好。然而，由于Unicode规范化规范中存在异常[PR29]，无法保证选定的几个字符序列的规范等价性。使用SASLprep准备的标识符可以由ACL服务器存储和返回。该异常会影响ACL操作和对包含选定字符序列的标识符的评估。但是，这些序列不会出现在格式良好的文本中。为了解决这个问题，ACL服务器可以通过发送标记的标识符来拒绝包含[PR29]中描述的序列的标识符
BAD response. This is in addition to the requirement to reject identifiers that fail SASLprep preparation as described in Section 3.
反应不好。除此之外，还要求拒绝未通过SASLprep准备的标识符，如第3节所述。
Description: RFC 4505 defines a "trace" field:
说明：RFC 4505定义了一个“跟踪”字段：
Comparison: this field is not intended for comparison (only used for logging)
比较：此字段不用于比较（仅用于日志记录）
Case folding; case-sensitivity, preserve case: No case folding/ case-sensitive
箱子折叠；区分大小写，保留大小写：无大小写折叠/区分大小写
Do users input the strings directly? Yes. Possibly entered in configuration UIs, or on a command line. Can also be stored in configuration files. The value can also be automatically generated by clients (e.g., a fixed string is used, or a user's email address).
用户是否直接输入字符串？对可能在配置UI中或在命令行中输入。也可以存储在配置文件中。该值也可以由客户端自动生成（例如，使用固定字符串或用户的电子邮件地址）。
How users input strings? Keyboard/voice, stylus (pick from a list). Copy-paste - possibly.
用户如何输入字符串？键盘/语音、手写笔（从列表中选择）。复制粘贴-可能。
Normalization: None.
正常化：无。
Disallowed Characters: Control characters are disallowed. (See Section 3 of RFC 4505).
不允许的字符：不允许使用控制字符。（参见RFC 4505第3节）。
Which other strings or identifiers are these most similar to? RFC 4505 says that the trace "should take one of two forms: an Internet email address, or an opaque string that does not contain the '@' (U+0040) character and that can be interpreted by the system administrator of the client's domain". In practice, this is a free-form text, so it belongs to a different class from "email address" or "username".
这些字符串或标识符最类似于哪些其他字符串或标识符？RFC 4505表示，跟踪“应采用两种形式之一：Internet电子邮件地址或不包含“@”（U+0040）字符且可由客户端域的系统管理员解释的不透明字符串”。实际上，这是一个自由格式的文本，因此它与“电子邮件地址”或“用户名”属于不同的类别。
Are these strings or identifiers sometimes the same as strings or identifiers from other protocols (e.g., does an IM system sometimes use the same credentials database for authentication as an email system)? Yes: see above. However, there is no strong need to keep them consistent in the future.
这些字符串或标识符有时是否与其他协议中的字符串或标识符相同（例如，IM系统有时是否使用与电子邮件系统相同的凭据数据库进行身份验证）？是：见上文。然而，在未来没有强烈的必要保持它们的一致性。
How are users exposed to these strings, how are they published? No. However, the value can be seen in server logs.
用户是如何接触这些字符串的，它们是如何发布的？否。但是，该值可以在服务器日志中看到。
Impacts of false positives and false negatives: False positive: a user can be confused with another user. False negative: two distinct users are treated as the same user. But note that the trace field is not authenticated, so it can be easily falsified.
误报和漏报的影响：误报：用户可能会与其他用户混淆。假阴性：两个不同的用户被视为同一用户。但是请注意，跟踪字段没有经过身份验证，因此很容易伪造。
Tolerance of changes in the community: The community would be flexible.
容忍社区的变化：社区将是灵活的。
Delimiters: No internal structure, but see comments above about frequent use of email addresses.
分隔符：没有内部结构，但请参阅上面关于频繁使用电子邮件地址的注释。
Background Information: RFC 4505, Section 2 ("The Anonymous Mechanism"):
背景资料：RFC 4505，第2节（“匿名机制”）：
The mechanism consists of a single message from the client to the server. The client may include in this message trace information in the form of a string of [UTF-8]-encoded [Unicode] characters prepared in accordance with [StringPrep] and the "trace" stringprep profile defined in Section 3 of this document. The trace information, which has no semantical value, should take one of two forms: an Internet email address, or an opaque string that does not contain the '@' (U+0040) character and that can be interpreted by the system administrator of the client's domain. For privacy reasons, an Internet email address or other information identifying the user should only be used with permission from the user.
该机制由从客户端到服务器的单个消息组成。客户机可在该消息中包括按照[StringPrep]和本文件第3节中定义的“trace”StringPrep配置文件准备的[UTF-8]编码的[Unicode]字符字符串形式的跟踪信息。没有语义值的跟踪信息应采用两种形式之一：Internet电子邮件地址或不包含“@”（U+0040）字符且可由客户端域的系统管理员解释的不透明字符串。出于隐私原因，互联网电子邮件地址或其他识别用户的信息只能在获得用户许可的情况下使用。
RFC 4505, Section 3 ('The "trace" Profile of "Stringprep"'): This section defines the "trace" profile of [StringPrep]. This profile is designed for use with the SASL ANONYMOUS Mechanism. Specifically, the client is to prepare the <message> production in accordance with this profile.
RFC 4505第3节（“Stringprep”的“跟踪”配置文件）：本节定义了[Stringprep]的“跟踪”配置文件。此配置文件设计用于SASL匿名机制。具体而言，客户应根据此配置文件准备<message>产品。
The character repertoire of this profile is Unicode 3.2 [Unicode].
此配置文件的字符集为Unicode 3.2[Unicode]。
No mapping is required by this profile.
此配置文件不需要任何映射。
No Unicode normalization is required by this profile.
此配置文件不需要Unicode规范化。
The list of unassigned code points for this profile is that provided in Appendix A of [StringPrep]. Unassigned code points are not prohibited.
此配置文件的未分配代码点列表见[StringPrep]的附录A。不禁止未指定的代码点。
Characters from the following tables of [StringPrep] are prohibited:
禁止使用[StringPrep]下表中的字符：
- C.2.1 (ASCII control characters) - C.2.2 (Non-ASCII control characters) - C.3 (Private use characters) - C.4 (Non-character code points) - C.5 (Surrogate codes) - C.6 (Inappropriate for plain text) - C.8 (Change display properties are deprecated) - C.9 (Tagging characters)
- C.2.1（ASCII控制字符）-C.2.2（非ASCII控制字符）-C.3（专用字符）-C.4（非字符代码点）-C.5（代理代码）-C.6（不适用于纯文本）-C.8（不推荐更改显示属性）-C.9（标记字符）
No additional characters are prohibited.
不禁止使用其他字符。
This profile requires bidirectional character checking per Section 6 of [StringPrep].
此配置文件需要按照[StringPrep]第6节进行双向字符检查。
Description: Localpart of JabberID ("JID"), as in:
localpart@domainpart/resourcepart
Description: Localpart of JabberID ("JID"), as in:
localpart@domainpart/resourcepart
How It's Used:
- Usernames (e.g., stpeter@jabber.org)
- Chatroom names (e.g., precis@jabber.ietf.org)
- Publish-subscribe nodes
- Bot names
How It's Used:
- Usernames (e.g., stpeter@jabber.org)
- Chatroom names (e.g., precis@jabber.ietf.org)
- Publish-subscribe nodes
- Bot names
Who Generates It: - Typically, end users via an XMPP client - Sometimes created in an automated fashion
生成它的人：-通常是通过XMPP客户端的最终用户-有时是以自动方式创建的
User Input Methods: - typing - copy and paste - voice input - clicking a URI/IRI
用户输入方法：-键入-复制和粘贴-语音输入-单击URI/IRI
Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., chatroom service) on registration of account, creation of room, etc.
强制执行：服务器/附加服务（如聊天室服务）在注册帐户、创建聊天室等方面强制执行的规则。
Comparison Method: "Type 2" (common algorithm)
比较方法：“类型2”（通用算法）
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: - Strings are always folded to lowercase - Case is not preserved
大小写折叠、敏感度、保留：-字符串始终折叠为小写-不保留大小写
Impact of Comparison: False positives: - unable to authenticate at server (or authenticate to wrong account) - add wrong person to buddy list - join the wrong chatroom - improperly grant privileges (e.g., chatroom admin) - subscribe to wrong pubsub node - interact with wrong bot - allow communication with blocked entity
比较的影响：误报：-无法在服务器上进行身份验证（或验证到错误的帐户）-将错误的人添加到好友列表-加入错误的聊天室-不正确地授予特权（例如，聊天室管理员）-订阅错误的pubsub节点-与错误的bot交互-允许与被阻止的实体通信
False negatives: - unable to authenticate - unable to add someone to buddy list - unable to join desired chatroom - unable to use granted privileges (e.g., chatroom admin) - unable to subscribe to desired pubsub node - unable to interact with desired bot - disallow communication with unblocked entity
错误否定：-无法进行身份验证-无法将某人添加到好友列表-无法加入所需聊天室-无法使用授予的权限（例如聊天室管理员）-无法订阅所需pubsub节点-无法与所需bot交互-不允许与未阻止的实体通信
Normalization: NFKC
标准化：NFKC
Mapping: Spaces are mapped to nothing
映射：空间映射为空
Disallowed Characters: ",&,',/,:,<,>,@
Disallowed Characters: ",&,',/,:,<,>,@
String Classes: - Often similar to generic username - Often similar to localpart of email address - Sometimes same as localpart of email address
字符串类：-通常类似于通用用户名-通常类似于电子邮件地址的localpart-有时与电子邮件地址的localpart相同
Internal Structure: None
内部结构：无
User Output: - vCard - email signature - web page / directory - text of message (e.g., in a chatroom)
用户输出：-vCard-电子邮件签名-网页/目录-消息文本（例如，在聊天室中）
Operations: Sometimes concatenated with other data and then used as input to a cryptographic hash function
操作：有时与其他数据连接，然后用作加密哈希函数的输入
Description:
- Resourcepart of JabberID ("JID"), as in:
localpart@domainpart/resourcepart
- Typically free-form text
Description:
- Resourcepart of JabberID ("JID"), as in:
localpart@domainpart/resourcepart
- Typically free-form text
How It's Used:
- Device / session names (e.g., stpeter@jabber.org/Home)
- Nicknames (e.g., precis@jabber.ietf.org/StPeter)
How It's Used:
- Device / session names (e.g., stpeter@jabber.org/Home)
- Nicknames (e.g., precis@jabber.ietf.org/StPeter)
Who Generates It: - Often human users via an XMPP client - Often generated in an automated fashion by client or server
谁生成它：-通常是通过XMPP客户端的人类用户-通常由客户端或服务器以自动方式生成
User Input Methods: - typing - copy and paste - voice input - clicking a URI/IRI
用户输入方法：-键入-复制和粘贴-语音输入-单击URI/IRI
Enforcement: Rules enforced by server / add-on service (e.g., chatroom service) on account login, joining a chatroom, etc.
强制执行：服务器/附加服务（如聊天室服务）在帐户登录、加入聊天室等时强制执行的规则。
Comparison Method: "Type 2" (byte-for-byte)
比较方法：“类型2”（逐字节）
Case Folding, Sensitivity, Preservation: - Strings are never folded - Case is preserved
大小写折叠、灵敏度、保留：-字符串从不折叠-大小写保留
Impact of Comparison: False positives: - interact with wrong device (e.g., for file transfer or voice call) - interact with wrong chatroom participant - improperly grant privileges (e.g., chatroom moderator) - allow communication with blocked entity False negatives: - unable to choose desired chatroom nickname - unable to use granted privileges (e.g., chatroom moderator) - disallow communication with unblocked entity
比较的影响：误报：-与错误的设备交互（例如，用于文件传输或语音呼叫）-与错误的聊天室参与者交互-不正确地授予特权（例如，聊天室主持人）-允许与被阻止的实体通信误报：-无法选择所需的聊天室昵称-无法使用授予的特权（例如聊天室主持人）-不允许与未被阻止的实体进行通信
Normalization: NFKC
标准化：NFKC
Mapping: Spaces are mapped to nothing
映射：空间映射为空
Disallowed Characters: None
不允许的字符：无
String Classes: Basically a free-form identifier
字符串类：基本上是一个自由形式的标识符
Internal Structure: None
内部结构：无
User Output: - text of message (e.g., in a chatroom) - device names often not exposed to human users
用户输出：-消息文本（例如，在聊天室中）-设备名称通常不向人类用户公开
Operations: Sometimes concatenated with other data and then used as input to a cryptographic hash function
操作：有时与其他数据连接，然后用作加密哈希函数的输入
Description: RFC 3748, Section 5, references Stringprep, but the WG did not agree with the text (was added by IESG) and there are no known implementations that use Stringprep. The main problem with that text is that the use of strings is a per-method concept, not a generic EAP concept and so RFC 3748 itself does not really use Stringprep, but individual EAP methods could. As such, the answers to the template questions are mostly not applicable, but a few answers are universal across methods. The list of IANA registered EAP methods is at <http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml>.
描述：RFC 3748，第5节，参考了Stringprep，但工作组不同意该文本（由IESG添加），并且没有使用Stringprep的已知实现。该文本的主要问题是字符串的使用是每个方法的概念，而不是通用的EAP概念，因此RFC 3748本身并不真正使用Stringprep，但单个EAP方法可以。因此，模板问题的答案大多不适用，但有几个答案是跨方法通用的。IANA注册的EAP方法列表位于<http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xml>.
Comparison Methods: n/a (per-method)
比较方法：不适用（每种方法）
Case Folding, Case-Sensitivity, Case Preservation: n/a (per-method)
案例折叠、案例敏感性、案例保留：不适用（每种方法）
Impact of comparison: A false positive results in unauthorized network access (and possibly theft of service if some else is billed). A false negative results in lack of authorized network access (no connectivity).
比较的影响：误报会导致未经授权的网络访问（如果其他人付费，则可能导致服务被盗）。假阴性会导致缺少授权的网络访问（无连接）。
User input: n/a (per-method)
用户输入：不适用（每种方法）
Normalization: n/a (per-method)
标准化：不适用（每种方法）
Mapping: n/a (per-method)
映射：不适用（每种方法）
Disallowed characters: n/a (per-method)
不允许的字符：不适用（每个方法）
String classes: Although some EAP methods may use a syntax similar to other types of identifiers, EAP mandates that the actual values must not be assumed to be identifiers usable with anything else.
字符串类：尽管某些EAP方法可能使用与其他类型标识符类似的语法，但EAP要求不得假设实际值是可用于任何其他类型的标识符。
Internal structure: n/a (per-method)
内部结构：不适用（每种方法）
User output: Identifiers are never human displayed except perhaps as they're typed by a human.
用户输出：标识符永远不会显示为人工输入，除非可能是由人工输入的。
Operations: n/a (per-method)
操作：不适用（每种方法）
Community considerations: There is no resistance to change for the base EAP protocol (as noted, the WG didn't want the existing text). However, actual use of Stringprep, if any, within specific EAP methods may have resistance. It is currently unknown whether any EAP methods use Stringprep.
社区注意事项：基本EAP协议的变更没有阻力（如前所述，工作组不希望现有文本）。但是，在特定EAP方法中实际使用Stringprep（如有）可能会产生阻力。目前尚不清楚是否有EAP方法使用Stringprep。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Marc Blanchet Viagenie 246 Aberdeen Quebec, QC G1R 2E1 Canada
Marc Blanchet Viagenie 246魁北克省阿伯丁市，QC G1R 2E1加拿大
EMail: Marc.Blanchet@viagenie.ca
URI: http://viagenie.ca
EMail: Marc.Blanchet@viagenie.ca
URI: http://viagenie.ca
Andrew Sullivan Dyn, Inc. 150 Dow St Manchester, NH 03101 U.S.A.
安德鲁·沙利文·戴恩公司，美国新罕布什尔州曼彻斯特道街150号，邮编：03101。
EMail: asullivan@dyn.com
EMail: asullivan@dyn.com