Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 6490 APNIC
Category: Standards Track S. Weiler
ISSN: 2070-1721 SPARTA, Inc.
G. Michaelson
APNIC
S. Kent
BBN
February 2012
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 6490 APNIC
Category: Standards Track S. Weiler
ISSN: 2070-1721 SPARTA, Inc.
G. Michaelson
APNIC
S. Kent
BBN
February 2012
Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator
资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）信任锚定位器
Abstract
摘要
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).
本文档为资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）定义了信任锚定位器（TAL）。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
这是一份互联网标准跟踪文件。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关互联网标准的更多信息，请参见RFC 5741第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6490.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6490.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2012 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................2
2. Trust Anchor Locator ............................................2
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format ................................2
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations ............3
2.3. Example ....................................................4
3. Relying Party Use ...............................................5
4. Security Considerations .........................................5
5. Acknowledgments .................................................6
6. References ......................................................6
6.1. Normative References .......................................6
6.2. Informative References .....................................6
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology ................................................2
2. Trust Anchor Locator ............................................2
2.1. Trust Anchor Locator Format ................................2
2.2. TAL and Trust Anchor Certificate Considerations ............3
2.3. Example ....................................................4
3. Relying Party Use ...............................................5
4. Security Considerations .........................................5
5. Acknowledgments .................................................6
6. References ......................................................6
6.1. Normative References .......................................6
6.2. Informative References .....................................6
This document defines a Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480]. This format may be used to distribute trust anchor material using a mix of out-of-band and online means. Procedures used by Relying Parties (RPs) to verify RPKI signed objects SHOULD support this format to facilitate interoperability between creators of trust anchor material and RPs.
本文档为资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）[RFC6480]定义了信任锚定位器（TAL）。该格式可用于使用带外和在线混合方式分发信托锚材料。依赖方（RPs）用于验证RPKI签名对象的程序应支持此格式，以促进信任锚材料创建者和RPs之间的互操作性。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
This document does not propose a new format for trust anchor material. A trust anchor in the RPKI is represented by a self-signed X.509 Certification Authority (CA) certificate, a format commonly used in PKIs and widely supported by RP software. This document specifies a format for data used to retrieve and verify the authenticity of a trust anchor in a very simple fashion. That data is referred to as the TAL.
本文件并未提出信托锚材料的新格式。RPKI中的信任锚由自签名的X.509证书颁发机构（CA）证书表示，该证书是PKI中常用的格式，并得到RP软件的广泛支持。本文档以非常简单的方式指定用于检索和验证信任锚的真实性的数据格式。该数据称为TAL。
The motivation for defining the TAL is to enable selected data in the trust anchor to change, without needing to effect redistribution of the trust anchor per se. In the RPKI, certificates contain extensions that represent Internet Number Resources (INRs) [RFC3779]. The set of INRs associated with an entity likely will change over time. Thus, if one were to use the common PKI convention of
定义TAL的动机是使信任锚中的选定数据能够更改，而无需影响信任锚本身的重新分布。在RPKI中，证书包含表示Internet号码资源（INR）的扩展名[RFC3779]。与实体相关的INR集可能会随着时间的推移而变化。因此，如果要使用
distributing a trust anchor to RPs in a secure fashion, this procedure would need to be repeated whenever the INR set for the trust anchor changed. By distributing the TAL (in a secure fashion) instead of the trust anchor, this problem is avoided, i.e., the TAL is constant so long as the trust anchor's public key and its location do not change.
以安全的方式将信任锚点分发到RPs，每当信任锚点的INR设置发生更改时，都需要重复此过程。通过分发TAL（以安全的方式）而不是信任锚点，可以避免此问题，即只要信任锚点的公钥及其位置不变，TAL就会保持不变。
The TAL is analogous to the TrustAnchorInfo data structure [RFC5914] adopted as a PKIX standard. That standard could be used to represent the TAL, if one defined an rsync URI extension for that data structure. However, the TAL format was adopted by RPKI implementors prior to the PKIX trust anchor work, and the RPKI implementer community has elected to utilize the TAL format, rather than define the requisite extension. The community also prefers the simplicity of the ASCII encoding of the TAL versus the binary (ASN.1) encoding for TrustAnchorInfo.
TAL类似于作为PKIX标准采用的TrustAnchorInfo数据结构[RFC5914]。如果为该数据结构定义了rsync-URI扩展，那么该标准可以用来表示TAL。然而，在PKIX信任锚工作之前，RPKI实现者采用了TAL格式，RPKI实现者社区选择使用TAL格式，而不是定义必要的扩展。社区还更喜欢TAL的ASCII编码的简单性，而不是TrustAnchorInfo的二进制（ASN.1）编码。
The TAL is an ordered sequence of:
TAL是以下各项的有序序列：
1) An rsync URI [RFC5781], 2) A <CRLF> or <LF> line break, and 3) A subjectPublicKeyInfo [RFC5280] in DER format [X.509], encoded in Base64 (see Section 4 of [RFC4648]).
1) 一个rsync URI[RFC5781]，2）一个<CRLF>或<LF>换行符，3）一个DER格式[X.509]的subjectPublicKeyInfo[RFC5280]，用Base64编码（参见[RFC4648]的第4节）。
The rsync URI in the TAL MUST reference a single object. It MUST NOT reference a directory or any other form of collection of objects.
TAL中的rsync URI必须引用单个对象。它不能引用目录或任何其他形式的对象集合。
The referenced object MUST be a self-signed CA certificate that conforms to the RPKI certificate profile [RFC6487]. This certificate is the trust anchor in certification path discovery [RFC4158] and validation [RFC5280] [RFC3779].
引用的对象必须是符合RPKI证书配置文件[RFC6487]的自签名CA证书。此证书是证书路径发现[RFC4158]和验证[RFC5280][RFC3779]中的信任锚点。
The validity interval of this trust anchor SHOULD reflect the anticipated period of stability for the particular set of INRs that are associated with the putative trust anchor.
该信托锚的有效期应反映与假定信托锚相关的一组特定INR的预期稳定期。
The INR extension(s) of this trust anchor MUST contain a non-empty set of number resources. It MUST NOT use the "inherit" form of the INR extension(s). The INR set described in this certificate is the set of number resources for which the issuing entity is offering itself as a putative trust anchor in the RPKI [RFC6480].
此信任锚点的INR扩展必须包含一组非空的数字资源。不得使用INR扩展的“继承”形式。本证书中描述的INR集合是一组数字资源，发行实体在RPKI[RFC6480]中将自己作为假定的信任锚提供给这些资源。
The public key used to verify the trust anchor MUST be the same as the subjectPublicKeyInfo in the CA certificate and in the TAL.
用于验证信任锚的公钥必须与CA证书和TAL中的subjectPublicKeyInfo相同。
The trust anchor MUST contain a stable key. This key MUST NOT change when the certificate is reissued due to changes in the INR extension(s), when the certificate is renewed prior to expiration or for any reason other than a key change.
信任锚必须包含一个稳定的密钥。当因INR扩展名的更改、证书在到期前续订或密钥更改以外的任何原因重新颁发证书时，此密钥不得更改。
Because the public key in the TAL and the trust anchor MUST be stable, this motivates operation of that CA in an off-line mode. Thus the entity that issues the trust anchor SHOULD issue a subordinate CA certificate that contains the same INRs (via the use of the "inherit" option in the INR extensions of the subordinate certificate). This allows the entity that issues the trust anchor to keep the corresponding private key of this certificate off-line, while issuing all relevant child certificates under the immediate subordinate CA. This measure also allows the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) issued by that entity to be used to revoke the subordinate CA certificate in the event of suspected key compromise of this potentially more vulnerable online operational key pair.
由于TAL中的公钥和信任锚必须是稳定的，因此这会促使CA以脱机模式运行。因此，发出信任锚的实体应发出包含相同INR的从属CA证书（通过在从属证书的INR扩展中使用“继承”选项）。这允许发出信任锚的实体离线保留此证书的相应私钥，同时在直接下级CA下发出所有相关子证书。此措施还允许证书吊销列表（CRL）由该实体颁发，用于在怀疑此可能更易受攻击的在线操作密钥对的密钥泄露时撤销从属CA证书。
The trust anchor MUST be published at a stable URI. When the trust anchor is reissued for any reason, the replacement CA certificate MUST be accessible using the same URI.
信任锚必须以稳定的URI发布。由于任何原因重新发布信任锚点时，必须使用相同的URI访问替换CA证书。
Because the trust anchor is a self-signed certificate, there is no corresponding CRL that can be used to revoke it, nor is there a manifest [RFC6486] that lists this certificate.
由于信任锚点是自签名证书，因此没有相应的CRL可用于撤销它，也没有列出此证书的清单[RFC6486]。
If an entity wishes to withdraw a self-signed CA certificate as a putative trust anchor for any reason, including key rollover, the entity MUST remove the object from the location referenced in the TAL.
如果实体出于任何原因（包括密钥翻转）希望撤回自签名CA证书作为假定的信任锚，则该实体必须从TAL中引用的位置移除该对象。
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
rsync://rpki.example.org/rpki/hedgehog/root.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAovWQL2lh6knDx
GUG5hbtCXvvh4AOzjhDkSHlj22gn/1oiM9IeDATIwP44vhQ6L/xvuk7W6
Kfa5ygmqQ+xOZOwTWPcrUbqaQyPNxokuivzyvqVZVDecOEqs78q58mSp9
nbtxmLRW7B67SJCBSzfa5XpVyXYEgYAjkk3fpmefU+AcxtxvvHB5OVPIa
BfPcs80ICMgHQX+fphvute9XLxjfJKJWkhZqZ0v7pZm2uhkcPx1PMGcrG
ee0WSDC3fr3erLueagpiLsFjwwpX6F+Ms8vqz45H+DKmYKvPSstZjCCq9
aJ0qANT9OtnfSDOS+aLRPjZryCNyvvBHxZXqj5YCGKtwIDAQAB
In order to use the TAL to retrieve and validate a (putative) trust anchor, an RP SHOULD:
为了使用TAL检索和验证（假定的）信任锚，RP应：
1. Retrieve the object referenced by the URI contained in the TAL.
1. 检索TAL中包含的URI引用的对象。
2. Confirm that the retrieved object is a current, self-signed RPKI CA certificate that conforms to the profile as specified in [RFC6487].
2. 确认检索到的对象是符合[RFC6487]中指定的配置文件的当前自签名RPKI CA证书。
3. Confirm that the public key in the TAL matches the public key in the retrieved object.
3. 确认TAL中的公钥与检索到的对象中的公钥匹配。
4. Perform other checks, as deemed appropriate (locally), to ensure that the RP is willing to accept the entity publishing this self-signed CA certificate to be a trust anchor. These checks apply to the validity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI, relating to all resources described in the INR extension of this certificate.
4. 执行其他适当的检查（本地），以确保RP愿意接受发布此自签名CA证书的实体作为信任锚。这些检查适用于在RPKI背景下进行的认证的有效性，涉及本证书INR扩展部分中描述的所有资源。
An RP SHOULD perform these functions for each instance of TAL that it is holding for this purpose every time the RP performs a re-synchronization across the local repository cache. In any case, an RP also SHOULD perform these functions prior to the expiration of the locally cached copy of the retrieved trust anchor referenced by the TAL.
每次RP跨本地存储库缓存执行重新同步时，RP都应为此目的对其持有的每个TAL实例执行这些功能。在任何情况下，RP也应该在TAL引用的检索到的信任锚的本地缓存副本过期之前执行这些功能。
Compromise of a trust anchor private key permits unauthorized parties to masquerade as a trust anchor, with potentially severe consequences. Reliance on an inappropriate or incorrect trust anchor has similar potentially severe consequences.
信任锚私钥的泄露允许未经授权的各方伪装成信任锚，并可能带来严重后果。依赖不适当或不正确的信托锚也会产生类似的潜在严重后果。
This TAL does not directly provide a list of resources covered by the referenced self-signed CA certificate. Instead, the RP is referred to the trust anchor itself and the INR extension(s) within this certificate. This provides necessary operational flexibility, but it also allows the certificate issuer to claim to be authoritative for any resource. Relying parties should either have great confidence in the issuers of such certificates that they are configuring as trust anchors, or they should issue their own self-signed certificate as a trust anchor and, in doing so, impose constraints on the subordinate certificates. For more information on this approach, see [TA-MGMT].
此TAL不直接提供引用的自签名CA证书所涵盖的资源列表。相反，RP指的是信任锚本身和本证书中的INR扩展。这提供了必要的操作灵活性，但也允许证书颁发者声明对任何资源具有权威性。依赖方要么对其配置为信任锚的此类证书的颁发者非常信任，要么应将其自己的自签名证书作为信任锚颁发，并在这样做时对从属证书施加约束。有关此方法的更多信息，请参阅[TA-MGMT]。
This approach to trust anchor material was originally described by Robert Kisteleki.
这种信任锚材料的方法最初由Robert Kisteleki描述。
The authors acknowledge the contributions of Rob Austein and Randy Bush, who assisted with earlier draft versions of this document and with helpful review comments.
作者感谢Rob Austein和Randy Bush的贡献，他们协助起草了本文件的早期版本，并提出了有益的审查意见。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，1997年3月。
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3779]Lynn，C.，Kent，S.，和K.Seo，“IP地址和AS标识符的X.509扩展”，RFC 3779，2004年6月。
[RFC4648] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings", RFC 4648, October 2006.
[RFC4648]Josefsson，S.，“Base16、Base32和Base64数据编码”，RFC4648，2006年10月。
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5280]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 52802008年5月。
[RFC5781] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5781]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 52802008年5月。
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
[RFC6487]Huston，G.，Michaelson，G.，和R.Loomans，“X.509 PKIX资源证书的配置文件”，RFC 6487，2012年2月。
[X.509] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.509: The Directory - Authentication Framework", 2000.
[X.509]ITU-T，“建议X.509：目录认证框架”，2000年。
[RFC4158] Cooper, M., Dzambasow, Y., Hesse, P., Joseph, S., and R. Nicholas, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certification Path Building", RFC 4158, September 2005.
[RFC4158]Cooper，M.，Dzambasow，Y.，Hesse，P.，Joseph，S.，和R.Nicholas，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施：认证路径构建”，RFC 4158，2005年9月。
[RFC5914] Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Trust Anchor Format", RFC 5914, June 2010.
[RFC5914]Housley，R.，Ashmore，S.，和C.Wallace，“信任锚格式”，RFC 59142010年6月。
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6480]Lepinski，M.和S.Kent，“支持安全互联网路由的基础设施”，RFC 6480，2012年2月。
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski, "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6486, February 2012.
[RFC6486]Austein，R.，Huston，G.，Kent，S.，和M.Lepinski，“资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）清单”，RFC 64862012年2月。
[TA-MGMT] Reynolds, M. and S. Kent, "Local Trust Anchor Management for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", Work in Progress, December 2011.
[TA-MGMT]Reynolds，M.和S.Kent，“资源公钥基础设施的本地信任锚管理”，正在进行的工作，2011年12月。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Geoff Huston APNIC
杰夫·休斯顿呼吸暂停
EMail: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
EMail: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Samuel Weiler SPARTA, Inc. 7110 Samuel Morse Drive Columbia, Maryland 21046 USA
塞缪尔·韦勒·斯巴达公司，美国马里兰州哥伦比亚塞缪尔·莫尔斯大道7110号，邮编：21046
EMail: weiler@tislabs.com
EMail: weiler@tislabs.com
George Michaelson APNIC
乔治·迈克尔森呼吸暂停综合征
EMail: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
EMail: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton St. Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies美国马萨诸塞州剑桥莫尔顿街10号，邮编02138
EMail: kent@bbn.com
EMail: kent@bbn.com