Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 6489 G. Michaelson
BCP: 174 APNIC
Category: Best Current Practice S. Kent
ISSN: 2070-1721 BBN
February 2012
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) G. Huston
Request for Comments: 6489 G. Michaelson
BCP: 174 APNIC
Category: Best Current Practice S. Kent
ISSN: 2070-1721 BBN
February 2012
Certification Authority (CA) Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）中的证书颁发机构（CA）密钥翻转
Abstract
摘要
This document describes how a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) performs a planned rollover of its key pair. This document also notes the implications of this key rollover procedure for relying parties (RPs). In general, RPs are expected to maintain a local cache of the objects that have been published in the RPKI repository, and thus the way in which a CA performs key rollover impacts RPs.
本文档描述了资源公钥基础结构（RPKI）中的证书颁发机构（CA）如何执行其密钥对的计划滚动。本文件还说明了这一关键过渡程序对依赖方（RPs）的影响。一般来说，RPs需要维护已在RPKI存储库中发布的对象的本地缓存，因此CA执行密钥翻转的方式会影响RPs。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This memo documents an Internet Best Current Practice.
本备忘录记录了互联网最佳实践。
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on BCPs is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。有关BCP的更多信息，请参见RFC 5741第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6489.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2012 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括简化的BSD许可证文本，如本规范第4.e节所述
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
如简化的BSD许可证所述，信托法律条款和许可证不提供任何担保。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology and Concepts ...................................2
2. CA Key Rollover Procedure .......................................3
3. Relying Party Requirements ......................................6
4. Reissuing Certificates and RPKI Signed Objects ..................7
4.1. CA Certificates ............................................7
4.2. RPKI Signed Objects ........................................7
5. Security Considerations .........................................8
6. Acknowledgements ................................................8
7. References ......................................................9
7.1. Normative References .......................................9
7.2. Informative References .....................................9
1. Introduction ....................................................2
1.1. Terminology and Concepts ...................................2
2. CA Key Rollover Procedure .......................................3
3. Relying Party Requirements ......................................6
4. Reissuing Certificates and RPKI Signed Objects ..................7
4.1. CA Certificates ............................................7
4.2. RPKI Signed Objects ........................................7
5. Security Considerations .........................................8
6. Acknowledgements ................................................8
7. References ......................................................9
7.1. Normative References .......................................9
7.2. Informative References .....................................9
This document describes an algorithm to be employed by a Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [RFC6480] to perform a rollover of its key pair.
本文档描述了资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）[RFC6480]中的证书颁发机构（CA）用于执行密钥对滚动的算法。
This document defines a conservative procedure for such entities to follow when performing a key rollover. This procedure is "conservative" in that the CA's actions in key rollover are not intended to disrupt the normal operation of relying parties (RPs) in maintaining a local cached version of the RPKI distributed repository. Using this procedure, RPs are in a position to be able to validate all authentic objects in the RPKI using the validation procedure described in [RFC6480] at all times.
本文件规定了此类实体在执行键翻转时应遵循的保守程序。此过程是“保守的”，因为CA在密钥翻转中的操作无意中断依赖方（RPs）在维护RPKI分布式存储库的本地缓存版本时的正常操作。使用此程序，RPs能够始终使用[RFC6480]中描述的验证程序验证RPKI中的所有真实对象。
It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts described in "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile" [RFC5280], "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers" [RFC3779], the profile for RPKI Certificates [RFC6487], and the RPKI repository structure [RFC6481] .
假设读者熟悉“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”[RFC5280]、“IP地址和AS标识符的X.509扩展”[RFC3779]、RPKI证书配置文件[RFC6487]和RPKI存储库结构[RFC6481]中描述的术语和概念 .
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
A CA in the RPKI is an entity that issues CA and end-entity (EE) certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). A CA instance is associated with a single key pair [RFC6487], implying that if key rollover is a regularly scheduled event, then, over time, there will be many CA instances. The implication in the context of key rollover is that, strictly speaking, a CA does not perform a key rollover per se. In order to perform the equivalent of a key rollover, the CA creates a "new" instance of itself, with a new key pair, and then effectively substitutes this "new" CA instance into the RPKI hierarchy in place of the "old" CA instance.
RPKI中的CA是颁发CA和终端实体（EE）证书以及证书吊销列表（CRL）的实体。CA实例与单个密钥对相关联[RFC6487]，这意味着如果密钥翻转是一个定期安排的事件，那么随着时间的推移，将会有许多CA实例。严格来说，密钥翻转上下文中的含义是CA本身不执行密钥翻转。为了执行密钥翻转的等效操作，CA使用新密钥对创建自身的“新”实例，然后有效地将该“新”CA实例替换为RPKI层次结构中的“旧”CA实例。
Note that focus of this procedure is planned key rollover, not an emergency key rollover, e.g., promoted by a suspected or detected private key compromise. However, the procedure described here is applicable in emergency key rollover situations, with the exception of the "Staging Period" duration.
请注意，本程序的重点是计划的密钥翻转，而不是紧急密钥翻转，例如，由可疑或检测到的私钥泄露引起的翻转。但是，此处描述的程序适用于紧急钥匙翻车情况，但“过渡期”持续时间除外。
There are several considerations regarding this procedure that MUST be followed by a CA performing a key rollover operation. The critical consideration is that the RPKI has potential application in the area of control of routing integrity [RFC6480], and key rollover should not cause any transient hiatus in which an RP is led to incorrect conclusions regarding the authenticity of attestations made in the context of the RPKI. A CA cannot assume that all RPs will perform path validation and path discovery in the same fashion; therefore, the key rollover procedure MUST preserve the integrity of the CRL Distribution Points (CRLDP), Subject Information Access (SIA), and Authority Information Access (AIA) pointers in RPKI certificates.
执行密钥翻转操作的CA必须遵循有关此过程的几个注意事项。关键考虑因素是，RPKI在路由完整性控制领域[RFC6480]具有潜在应用，并且密钥翻转不应导致任何短暂中断，在该中断中，RP会导致关于在RPKI背景下所做证明的真实性的错误结论。CA不能假设所有RPs将以相同的方式执行路径验证和路径发现；因此，密钥翻转过程必须保持RPKI证书中CRL分发点（CRLDP）、主题信息访问（SIA）和权限信息访问（AIA）指针的完整性。
In the procedure described here, the CA creates a "new" CA instance, and has the associated new public key published in the form of a "new" CA certificate. While the "current" and "new" CA instances share a single repository publication point, each CA has its own CRL and its own manifest. Initially, the "new" CA publishes an empty CRL and a manifest that contains a single entry for the CRL. The "current" CA also maintains its published CRL and manifest at this repository publication point.
在这里描述的过程中，CA创建一个“新”CA实例，并以“新”CA证书的形式发布相关联的新公钥。虽然“当前”和“新”CA实例共享一个存储库发布点，但每个CA都有自己的CRL和清单。最初，“新”CA发布一个空CRL和一个包含CRL单个条目的清单。“当前”CA还在该存储库发布点维护其已发布的CRL和清单。
The CA performing key rollover waits for a period of time to afford every RP an opportunity to discover and retrieve this "new" CA certificate, and store it in its local RPKI repository cache instance. This period of time is termed the Staging Period. During this period, the CA will have a "new" CA instance, with no subordinate products, and a "current" CA instance that has issued all subordinate products. At the expiration of the Staging Period, the
执行密钥翻转的CA等待一段时间，以便为每个RP提供发现和检索此“新”CA证书的机会，并将其存储在其本地RPKI存储库缓存实例中。这段时间被称为过渡期。在此期间，CA将有一个“新”CA实例，没有任何附属产品，以及一个“当前”CA实例，该实例已发布所有附属产品。在暂存期到期时
"new" CA instance MUST replace all (valid) subordinate products of the "current" CA instance, overwriting the "current" subordinate products in the CA's repository publication point. When this process is complete, the "current" CA instance is retired, and the "new" CA instance becomes the "current" CA.
“新”CA实例必须替换“当前”CA实例的所有（有效）从属产品，覆盖CA的存储库发布点中的“当前”从属产品。此过程完成后，“当前”CA实例将失效，“新”CA实例将成为“当前”CA。
During the transition of the "current" and "new" CA instances, the "new" CA instance MUST reissue all subordinate products of the "current" CA. The procedure described here requires that, with the exception of manifests and CRLs, the reissued subordinate products be published using the same repository publication point object names, effectively overwriting the old objects with these reissued objects. The intent of this overwriting operation is to ensure that the AIA pointers of subordinate products at lower tiers in the RPKI hierarchy remain correct, and that CA key rollover does not require any associated actions by any subordinate CA.
在“当前”和“新”CA实例的转换过程中，“新”CA实例必须重新发布“当前”CA的所有从属产品。此处描述的过程要求，除清单和CRL外，重新发布的从属产品使用相同的存储库发布点对象名称发布，使用这些重新发布的对象有效地覆盖旧对象。此覆盖操作的目的是确保RPKI层次结构中较低层的下级产品的AIA指针保持正确，并且CA密钥滚动不需要任何下级CA执行任何相关操作。
There are three CA states described here:
这里描述了三种CA状态：
CURRENT: The CURRENT CA is the active CA instance used to accept and process certificate issuance and revocation requests. The starting point for this algorithm is that the key of the CURRENT CA is to be rolled over.
当前：当前CA是用于接受和处理证书颁发和吊销请求的活动CA实例。该算法的起点是当前CA的密钥将被滚动。
NEW: The NEW CA is the CA instance that is being created. The NEW CA is not active, and thus does not accept nor process certificate issuance and revocation requests. The NEW CA SHOULD issue a CRL and an EE certificate in association with its manifest to provide a trivial, complete, and consistent instance of a CA.
新建：新CA是正在创建的CA实例。新CA不处于活动状态，因此不接受或处理证书颁发和吊销请求。新CA应该发布一个CRL和一个与其清单相关联的EE证书，以提供一个简单、完整和一致的CA实例。
OLD: The CA instance is in the process of being removed. An OLD CA instance is unable to process any certificate issuance and revocation requests. An OLD CA instance will continue to issue regularly scheduled CRLs and issue an EE certificate as part of the process of updating its manifest to reflect the updated CRL.
旧：CA实例正在被删除。旧CA实例无法处理任何证书颁发和吊销请求。旧CA实例将继续发出定期安排的CRL，并发出EE证书，作为更新其清单以反映更新的CRL过程的一部分。
To perform a key rollover operation, the CA MUST perform the following steps in the order given here. Unless specified otherwise each step SHOULD be performed without any intervening delay. The process MUST be run through to completion.
要执行密钥翻转操作，CA必须按照此处给出的顺序执行以下步骤。除非另有规定，否则每个步骤都应在没有任何中间延迟的情况下执行。这一过程必须贯穿始终。
1. Generate a new key pair for use by the NEW CA. Because the goal of this algorithm is key rollover, the key pair generated in this step MUST be different from the pair in use by the CURRENT CA.
1. 生成新的密钥对供新CA使用。由于此算法的目标是密钥滚动，因此此步骤中生成的密钥对必须与当前CA使用的密钥对不同。
2. Generate a certificate request with this key pair and pass the request to the CA that issued the CURRENT CA certificate. This request MUST include the same SIA extension that is present in the CURRENT CA certificate. This request, when satisfied, will result in the publication of the NEW CA certificate. This (NEW) CA certificate will contain a subject name selected by the issuer, which MUST be distinct from the subject name used in the CURRENT CA certificate. The Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) for the issuer of the NEW CA certificate will indicate the time frame within which a certificate request is expected to be processed.
2. 使用此密钥对生成证书请求，并将该请求传递给颁发当前CA证书的CA。此请求必须包含当前CA证书中存在的相同SIA扩展。满足此请求后，将发布新的CA证书。此（新）CA证书将包含由颁发者选择的使用者名称，该名称必须与当前CA证书中使用的使用者名称不同。新CA证书颁发者的证书实践声明（CPS）将指出预计处理证书申请的时间范围。
3. Publish the NEW CA's CRL and manifest.
3. 发布新CA的CRL和清单。
The steps involved here are:
这里涉及的步骤是：
- Wait for the issuer of the NEW CA to publish the NEW CA certificate.
- 等待新CA的颁发者发布新CA证书。
- As quickly as possible following the publication of the NEW CA certificate, use the key pair associated with the NEW CA to generate an initially empty CRL, and publish this CRL in the NEW CA's repository publication point. It is RECOMMENDED that the CRL for the NEW CA have a nextUpdate value that will cause the CRL to be replaced at the end of the Staging Period (see in Step 4 below).
- 发布新CA证书后，请尽快使用与新CA关联的密钥对生成初始为空的CRL，并在新CA的存储库发布点中发布此CRL。建议新CA的CRL具有nextUpdate值，该值将导致在过渡期结束时更换CRL（请参见下面的步骤4）。
- Generate a new key pair, and generate an associated EE certificate request with an AIA value of the NEW CA's repository publication point. Pass this EE certificate request to the NEW CA, and use the returned (single-use) EE certificate as the NEW CA's manifest EE certificate.
- 生成一个新密钥对，并生成一个关联的EE证书请求，其AIA值为新CA的存储库发布点。将此EE证书请求传递给新CA，并使用返回的（一次性）EE证书作为新CA的清单EE证书。
- Generate a manifest containing the new CA's CRL as the only entry, and sign it with the private key associated with the manifest EE certificate. Publish the manifest at the NEW CA's repository publication point.
- 生成包含新CA的CRL作为唯一条目的清单，并使用与清单EE证书关联的私钥对其进行签名。在新CA的存储库发布点发布清单。
- Destroy the private key associated with the manifest EE certificate.
- 销毁与清单EE证书关联的私钥。
4. The NEW CA enters a Staging Period. The duration of the Staging Period is determined by the CA, but it SHOULD be no less than 24 hours. The Staging Period is intended to afford an opportunity for all RPs to download the NEW CA certificate prior to publication of certificates, CRLs, and RPKI signed objects under the NEW CA. During the Staging Period, the NEW CA SHOULD reissue, but not publish, all of the products that
4. 新CA进入一个过渡期。过渡期的持续时间由CA确定，但不得少于24小时。暂存期旨在为所有RPs提供一个在新CA下发布证书、CRL和RPKI签名对象之前下载新CA证书的机会。在暂存期内，新CA应重新发布但不发布
were issued under the CURRENT CA. This includes all CA certificates, EE certificates, and RPKI signed objects. Section 4 describes how each reissued product relates to the product that it replaces. During the Staging Period, the CURRENT CA SHOULD continue to accept and process certificate issuance requests and MUST continue to accept and process certificate revocation requests. If any certificates are issued by the CURRENT CA during the Staging Period, they MUST be reissued under the NEW CA during this period. Any certificates that are revoked under the CURRENT CA MUST NOT be reissued under the NEW CA. As noted above, in the case of an emergency key rollover, a CA will decide whether the 24 hour minimal Staging Period interval is appropriate, or if a shorter Staging Period is needed. As the Staging Period imposes no additional burden on Relying Parties, there is no stipulated or recommended maximum Staging Period.
是在当前CA下颁发的。这包括所有CA证书、EE证书和RPKI签名对象。第4节描述了每个重新发行的产品如何与其所替换的产品相关。在转移期间，当前CA应继续接受和处理证书颁发请求，并且必须继续接受和处理证书吊销请求。如果在过渡期间由当前CA颁发任何证书，则必须在此期间根据新CA重新颁发证书。在当前CA下吊销的任何证书不得在新CA下重新颁发。如上所述，在紧急密钥翻转的情况下，CA将决定24小时最短暂存期间隔是否合适，或者是否需要更短的暂存期。由于过渡期不会对依赖方造成额外负担，因此没有规定或建议的最长过渡期。
5. Upon expiration of the Staging Period, the NEW CA MUST publish the signed products that have been reissued under the NEW CA, replacing the corresponding products issued under the CURRENT CA at the NEW CA's repository publication point. This replacement is implied by the file naming requirements imposed by [RFC6481] for these signed products. The trivial manifest for the NEW CA (which contained only one entry, for the NEW CA's CRL) is replaced by a manifest listing all of these reissued, signed products. At this point, the CURRENT CA becomes the OLD CA, and the NEW CA becomes the CURRENT CA. Use the OLD CA to issue a manifest that lists only the OLD CA's CRL. It is anticipated that this step is very brief, perhaps a few minutes in duration, because the CA has reissued all of the signed products during the Staging Period. Nonetheless, it is desirable that the activities performed in this step be viewed as atomic by RPs.
5. 在过渡期到期后，新CA必须发布已根据新CA重新发布的签名产品，并在新CA的存储库发布点替换根据当前CA发布的相应产品。[RFC6481]对这些签名产品规定的文件命名要求暗示了这种替换。新CA的普通清单（对于新CA的CRL，它只包含一个条目）被列出所有这些重新发布、已签名产品的清单所取代。此时，当前CA变为旧CA，新CA变为当前CA。使用旧CA发出仅列出旧CA的CRL的清单。预计该步骤非常简短，可能持续几分钟，因为CA已在过渡期内重新发布了所有已签名的产品。尽管如此，希望RPs将此步骤中执行的活动视为原子活动。
6. Generate a certificate revocation request for the OLD CA certificate and submit it to the issuer of that certificate. When the OLD CA certificate is revoked, the CRL for the OLD CA is removed from the repository, along with the manifest for the OLD CA. The private key for the OLD CA is destroyed.
6. 为旧CA证书生成证书吊销请求，并将其提交给该证书的颁发者。当旧CA证书被吊销时，旧CA的CRL将与旧CA的清单一起从存储库中删除。旧CA的私钥将被销毁。
This procedure defines a Staging Period for CAs performing a key rollover operation. This period is defined as a period no shorter than 24 hours.
此过程定义CA执行密钥翻转操作的暂存期。该期限定义为不少于24小时的期限。
RPs who maintain a local cache of the distributed RPKI repository MUST perform a local cache synchronization operation against the distributed RPKI repository at regular intervals of no longer than 24 hours.
维护分布式RPKI存储库的本地缓存的RPs必须以不超过24小时的定期间隔对分布式RPKI存储库执行本地缓存同步操作。
This section provides rules a CA MUST use when it reissues subordinate certificates and RPKI signed objects [RFC6488] as part of the key rollover process. Note that CRLs and manifests are not reissued, per se. They are generated for each CA instance. A manifest catalogues the contents of a publication point relative to a CA instance. A CRL lists revoked certificates relative to a CA instance. Key rollover processing for CRLs and manifests is described above, in Section 3.
本节提供CA在密钥滚动过程中重新颁发从属证书和RPKI签名对象[RFC6488]时必须使用的规则。请注意，CRL和舱单本身并没有重新发布。它们是为每个CA实例生成的。清单对发布点相对于CA实例的内容进行编目。CRL列出与CA实例相关的已吊销证书。CRL和舱单的关键滚动处理如上文第3节所述。
When a CA, as part of the key rollover process, reissues a CA certificate, it copies all of the field and extension values from the old certificate into the new certificate. The only exceptions to this rule are that the notBefore value MAY be set to the current date and time, and the certificate serial number MAY change. Because the reissued CA certificate is issued by a different CA instance, it is not a requirement that the certificate serial number change in the reissued certificate. Nonetheless, the CA MUST ensure that each certificate issued under a specific CA instance (a distinct name and key) contains a unique serial number.
当CA作为密钥滚动过程的一部分重新颁发CA证书时，它会将旧证书中的所有字段和扩展值复制到新证书中。此规则的唯一例外是notBefore值可能设置为当前日期和时间，并且证书序列号可能会更改。由于重新颁发的CA证书是由不同的CA实例颁发的，因此不要求重新颁发的证书中的证书序列号发生更改。尽管如此，CA必须确保在特定CA实例（不同的名称和密钥）下颁发的每个证书都包含唯一的序列号。
An RPKI signed object is a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) signed-data object, containing an EE certificate and a payload (content) [RFC6488]. When a key rollover occurs, the EE certificate for the RPKI signed object MUST be reissued, under the key of the NEW CA. A CA MAY choose to treat this EE certificate the same way that it deals with CA certificates, i.e., to copy over all fields and extensions, and MAY change only the notBefore date and the serial number. If the CA adopts this approach, then the new EE certificate is inserted into the CMS wrapper, but the signed context remains the same. (If the signing time or binary signing time values in the CMS wrapper are non-null, they MAY be updated to reflect the current time.) Alternatively, the CA MAY elect to generate a new key pair for this EE certificate. If it does so, the object content MUST be resigned under the private key corresponding to the EE certificate. In this case, the EE certificate MUST contain a new public key and a new notBefore value, and it MAY contain a new notAfter value, but all other field and extension values, other than those relating to the
RPKI签名对象是加密消息语法（CMS）签名数据对象，包含EE证书和有效负载（内容）[RFC6488]。发生密钥翻转时，必须在新CA的密钥下重新颁发RPKI签名对象的EE证书。CA可以选择以处理CA证书的相同方式处理此EE证书，即复制所有字段和扩展，并且只能更改notBefore日期和序列号。如果CA采用这种方法，那么新的EE证书将插入CMS包装器，但签名的上下文保持不变。（如果CMS包装中的签名时间或二进制签名时间值不为空，则可以更新它们以反映当前时间。）或者，CA可以选择为此EE证书生成新密钥对。如果这样做，则必须在与EE证书对应的私钥下放弃对象内容。在这种情况下，EE证书必须包含一个新的公钥和一个新的notBefore值，并且它可能包含一个新的notAfter值，但所有其他字段和扩展值（与证书相关的字段和扩展值除外）
digital signature and its associated certificate validation path, remain unchanged. If the signing time or binary signing time values in the CMS wrapper are non-null, they MAY be updated to reflect the current time.
数字签名及其关联的证书验证路径保持不变。如果CMS包装中的签名时间或二进制签名时间值不为空，则可能会更新它们以反映当前时间。
As noted in Sections 2.1.6.4.3 and 2.1.6.4.4 of [RFC6488], the presence or absence of the signing-time and/or the binary-signing-time attribute MUST NOT affect the validity of the RPKI signed object.
如[RFC6488]第2.1.6.4.3节和第2.1.6.4.4节所述，签名时间和/或二进制签名时间属性的存在或不存在不得影响RPKI签名对象的有效性。
No key should be used forever. The longer a key is in use, the greater the probability that it will have been compromised through carelessness, accident, espionage, or cryptanalysis. Infrequent key rollover increases the risk that the rollover procedures will not be followed to the appropriate level of precision, increasing the risk of operational failure of some form in the key rollover process. Regular scheduling of key rollover is generally considered to be a part of a prudent key management practice. However, key rollover does impose additional operational burdens on both the CA and the population of RPs.
任何钥匙都不应该永远使用。密钥使用的时间越长，由于疏忽、事故、间谍活动或密码分析而被泄露的可能性就越大。不频繁的关键翻车增加了翻车程序无法达到适当精度水平的风险，增加了关键翻车过程中某种形式的操作故障的风险。定期安排密钥翻转通常被认为是审慎密钥管理实践的一部分。然而，关键点的转移确实给CA和RPs人口带来了额外的运营负担。
These considerations imply that in choosing lifetimes for the keys it manages, a CA should balance security and operational impact (on RPs). A CA should perform key rollover at regularly scheduled intervals. These intervals should be frequent enough to minimize the risks associated with key compromise (noted above) and to maintain local operational proficiency with respect to the key rollover process. However, key lifetimes should be sufficiently long so that the (system-wide) load associated with key rollover events (across the entire RPKI) does not impose an excessive burden upon the population of RPs. RPs are encouraged to maintain an accurate local cache of the current state of the RPKI, which implies frequent queries to the RPKI repository system to detect changes. When a CA rekeys, it changes many signed objects, thus impacting all RPs.
这些考虑意味着，在为其管理的密钥选择生命周期时，CA应该平衡安全性和操作影响（对RPs）。CA应定期执行密钥翻转。这些间隔应足够频繁，以将与关键折衷（如上所述）相关的风险降至最低，并保持当地对关键过渡过程的操作熟练度。但是，密钥生命周期应足够长，以便与密钥翻转事件（整个RPKI）相关的（系统范围）负载不会对RPs的总体造成过度负担。鼓励RPs维护RPKI当前状态的准确本地缓存，这意味着频繁查询RPKI存储库系统以检测更改。当CA重新设置密钥时，它会更改许多已签名对象，从而影响所有RP。
The authors would like to acknowledge the review comments of Tim Bruijnzeels and Sean Turner in preparing this document.
作者希望感谢Tim Bruijnzeels和Sean Turner在编写本文件时的评论意见。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，1997年3月。
[RFC3779] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers", RFC 3779, June 2004.
[RFC3779]Lynn，C.，Kent，S.，和K.Seo，“IP地址和AS标识符的X.509扩展”，RFC 3779，2004年6月。
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5280]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 52802008年5月。
[RFC6480] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", RFC 6480, February 2012.
[RFC6480]Lepinski，M.和S.Kent，“支持安全互联网路由的基础设施”，RFC 6480，2012年2月。
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, February 2012.
[RFC6481]Huston，G.，Loomans，R.，和G.Michaelson，“资源证书存储库结构的配置文件”，RFC 64812012年2月。
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, February 2012.
[RFC6487]Huston，G.，Michaelson，G.，和R.Loomans，“X.509 PKIX资源证书的配置文件”，RFC 6487，2012年2月。
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)", RFC 6488, February 2012.
[RFC6488]Lepinski，M.，Chi，A.，和S.Kent，“资源公钥基础设施（RPKI）的签名对象模板”，RFC 6488，2012年2月。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Geoff Huston APNIC
杰夫·休斯顿呼吸暂停
EMail: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
EMail: gih@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
George Michaelson APNIC
乔治·迈克尔森呼吸暂停综合征
EMail: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
EMail: ggm@apnic.net
URI: http://www.apnic.net
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies 10 Moulton St. Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Stephen Kent BBN Technologies美国马萨诸塞州剑桥莫尔顿街10号，邮编02138
EMail: kent@bbn.com
EMail: kent@bbn.com