Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Heer
Request for Comments: 6253 COMSYS, RWTH Aachen University
Updates: 5201 S. Varjonen
Category: Experimental Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
ISSN: 2070-1721 May 2011
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Heer
Request for Comments: 6253 COMSYS, RWTH Aachen University
Updates: 5201 S. Varjonen
Category: Experimental Helsinki Institute for Information Technology
ISSN: 2070-1721 May 2011
Host Identity Protocol Certificates
主机身份协议证书
Abstract
摘要
The Certificate (CERT) parameter is a container for digital certificates. It is used for carrying these certificates in Host Identity Protocol (HIP) control packets. This document specifies the CERT parameter and the error signaling in case of a failed verification. Additionally, this document specifies the representations of Host Identity Tags in X.509 version 3 (v3) and Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates.
Certificate（CERT）参数是数字证书的容器。它用于在主机身份协议（HIP）控制数据包中携带这些证书。本文件规定了验证失败时的CERT参数和错误信号。此外，本文档还规定了X.509版本3（v3）和简单公钥基础设施（SPKI）证书中主机标识标记的表示形式。
The concrete use of certificates, including how certificates are obtained, requested, and which actions are taken upon successful or failed verification, is specific to the scenario in which the certificates are used. Hence, the definition of these scenario-specific aspects is left to the documents that use the CERT parameter.
证书的具体使用，包括如何获取、请求证书以及在验证成功或失败时采取哪些操作，都是特定于使用证书的场景的。因此，这些场景特定方面的定义留给使用CERT参数的文档。
This document updates RFC 5201.
本文件更新了RFC 5201。
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for examination, experimental implementation, and evaluation.
本文件不是互联网标准跟踪规范；它是为检查、实验实施和评估而发布的。
This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
本文档为互联网社区定义了一个实验协议。本文件是互联网工程任务组（IETF）的产品。它代表了IETF社区的共识。它已经接受了公众审查，并已被互联网工程指导小组（IESG）批准出版。并非IESG批准的所有文件都适用于任何级别的互联网标准；见RFC 5741第2节。
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253.
有关本文件当前状态、任何勘误表以及如何提供反馈的信息，请访问http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6253.
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
版权所有（c）2011 IETF信托基金和确定为文件作者的人员。版权所有。
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
本文件受BCP 78和IETF信托有关IETF文件的法律规定的约束(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info)自本文件出版之日起生效。请仔细阅读这些文件，因为它们描述了您对本文件的权利和限制。从本文件中提取的代码组件必须包括信托法律条款第4.e节中所述的简化BSD许可证文本，并提供简化BSD许可证中所述的无担保。
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English.
本文件可能包含2008年11月10日之前发布或公开的IETF文件或IETF贡献中的材料。控制某些材料版权的人员可能未授予IETF信托允许在IETF标准流程之外修改此类材料的权利。在未从控制此类材料版权的人员处获得充分许可的情况下，不得在IETF标准流程之外修改本文件，也不得在IETF标准流程之外创建其衍生作品，除了将其格式化以RFC形式发布或将其翻译成英语以外的其他语言。
Digital certificates bind pieces of information to a public key by means of a digital signature and thus enable the holder of a private key to generate cryptographically verifiable statements. The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [RFC5201] defines a new cryptographic namespace based on asymmetric cryptography. The identity of each host is derived from a public key, allowing hosts to digitally sign data and issue certificates with their private key. This document specifies the CERT parameter, which is used to transmit digital certificates in HIP. It fills the placeholder specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC5201] and thus updates [RFC5201].
数字证书通过数字签名将信息绑定到公钥，从而使私钥持有者能够生成可加密验证的声明。主机标识协议（HIP）[RFC5201]基于非对称加密定义了一个新的加密命名空间。每个主机的标识都是从公钥派生的，允许主机对数据进行数字签名，并使用其私钥颁发证书。本文档指定了用于在HIP中传输数字证书的CERT参数。它填充[RFC5201]第5.2节中指定的占位符，从而更新[RFC5201]。
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“不建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照RFC 2119[RFC2119]中的说明进行解释。
The CERT parameter is a container for certain types of digital certificates. It does not specify any certificate semantics. However, it defines supplementary parameters that help HIP hosts to transmit semantically grouped CERT parameters in a more systematic way. The specific use of the CERT parameter for different use cases is intentionally not discussed in this document, because it is specific to a concrete use case. Hence, the use of the CERT parameter will be defined in the documents that use the CERT parameter.
CERT参数是特定类型数字证书的容器。它没有指定任何证书语义。但是，它定义了辅助参数，帮助HIP主机以更系统的方式传输语义分组的CERT参数。本文档有意不讨论CERT参数在不同用例中的具体使用，因为它是特定于具体用例的。因此，CERT参数的使用将在使用CERT参数的文档中定义。
The CERT parameter is covered and protected, when present, by the HIP SIGNATURE field and is a non-critical parameter.
CERT参数在存在时由HIP签名字段覆盖和保护，是一个非关键参数。
The CERT parameter can be used in all HIP packets. However, using it in the first Initiator (I1) packet is NOT RECOMMENDED, because it can increase the processing times of I1s, which can be problematic when processing storms of I1s. Each HIP control packet MAY contain multiple CERT parameters. These parameters MAY be related or unrelated. Related certificates are managed in Cert groups. A Cert group specifies a group of related CERT parameters that SHOULD be interpreted in a certain order (e.g., for expressing certificate chains). For grouping CERT parameters, the Cert group and the Cert count field MUST be set. Ungrouped certificates exhibit a unique Cert group field and set the Cert count to 1. CERT parameters with the same Cert group number in the group field indicate a logical grouping. The Cert count field indicates the number of CERT parameters in the group.
CERT参数可用于所有HIP数据包。但是，不建议在第一个启动器（I1）数据包中使用它，因为它会增加I1的处理时间，这在处理I1的风暴时可能会出现问题。每个HIP控制数据包可能包含多个CERT参数。这些参数可能相关，也可能无关。相关证书在证书组中管理。证书组指定一组相关的证书参数，这些参数应按特定顺序进行解释（例如，用于表示证书链）。对于分组证书参数，必须设置证书组和证书计数字段。未分组的证书显示唯一的证书组字段，并将证书计数设置为1。组字段中具有相同证书组编号的证书参数表示逻辑分组。Cert count字段表示组中的Cert参数数。
CERT parameters that belong to the same Cert group MAY be contained in multiple sequential HIP control packets. This is indicated by a higher Cert count than the amount of CERT parameters with matching Cert group fields in a HIP control packet. The CERT parameters MUST be placed in ascending order, within a HIP control packet, according to their Cert group field. Cert groups MAY only span multiple packets if the Cert group does not fit the packet. A HIP packet MUST NOT contain more than one incomplete Cert group that continues in the next HIP control packet.
属于同一证书组的证书参数可能包含在多个顺序HIP控制数据包中。这通过证书计数高于HIP控制数据包中具有匹配证书组字段的证书参数数量来表示。CERT参数必须按照其CERT组字段在HIP控制数据包中按升序排列。如果证书组不适合数据包，则证书组只能跨越多个数据包。HIP数据包不得包含多个在下一个HIP控制数据包中继续的不完整证书组。
The Cert ID acts as a sequence number to identify the certificates in a Cert group. The numbers in the Cert ID field MUST start from 1 up to Cert count.
证书ID用作序列号，用于标识证书组中的证书。证书ID字段中的数字必须从1开始到证书计数。
The Cert group and Cert ID namespaces are managed locally by each host that sends CERT parameters in HIP control packets.
证书组和证书ID命名空间由在HIP控制数据包中发送证书参数的每个主机本地管理。
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Cert group | Cert count | Cert ID | Cert type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Certificate /
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
/ | Padding |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type 768 Length Length in octets, excluding Type, Length, and Padding. Cert group Group ID grouping multiple related CERT parameters. Cert count Total count of certificates that are sent, possibly in several consecutive HIP control packets. Cert ID The sequence number for this certificate. Cert Type Indicates the type of the certificate. Padding Any Padding, if necessary, to make the TLV a multiple of 8 bytes.
键入768长度八位字节，不包括类型、长度和填充。证书组ID将多个相关证书参数分组。Cert count发送的证书总数，可能在几个连续的HIP控制数据包中。证书ID此证书的序列号。证书类型指示证书的类型。填充任何填充，如有必要，使TLV为8字节的倍数。
The certificates MUST use the algorithms defined in [RFC5201] as the signature and hash algorithms.
证书必须使用[RFC5201]中定义的算法作为签名和哈希算法。
The following certificate types are defined:
定义了以下证书类型：
+--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 |
| X.509 v3 | 1 |
| SPKI | 2 |
| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+
+--------------------------------+-------------+
| Cert format | Type number |
+--------------------------------+-------------+
| Reserved | 0 |
| X.509 v3 | 1 |
| SPKI | 2 |
| Hash and URL of X.509 v3 | 3 |
| Hash and URL of SPKI | 4 |
| LDAP URL of X.509 v3 | 5 |
| LDAP URL of SPKI | 6 |
| Distinguished Name of X.509 v3 | 7 |
| Distinguished Name of SPKI | 8 |
+--------------------------------+-------------+
The next sections outline the use of Host Identity Tags (HITs) in X.509 v3 and in Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) certificates. X.509 v3 certificates and the handling procedures are defined in [RFC5280]. The wire format for X.509 v3 is the Distinguished Encoding Rules format as defined in [X.690]. The SPKI, the handling procedures, and the formats are defined in [RFC2693].
下一节将概述X.509 v3和简单公钥基础设施（SPKI）证书中主机标识标记（HITs）的使用。[RFC5280]中定义了X.509 v3证书和处理程序。X.509 v3的wire格式是[X.690]中定义的可分辨编码规则格式。SPKI、处理程序和格式在[RFC2693]中定义。
Hash and Uniform Resource Locator (URL) encodings (3 and 4) are used as defined in Section 3.6 of [RFC5996]. Using hash and URL encodings results in smaller HIP control packets than by including the certificate(s), but requires the receiver to resolve the URL or check a local cache against the hash.
散列和统一资源定位器（URL）编码（3和4）如[RFC5996]第3.6节所述使用。与包含证书相比，使用哈希和URL编码会产生更小的HIP控制数据包，但要求接收方解析URL或根据哈希检查本地缓存。
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) URL encodings (5 and 6) are used as defined in [RFC4516]. Using LDAP URL encoding results in smaller HIP control packets but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache against the URL.
轻量级目录访问协议（LDAP）URL编码（5和6）按照[RFC4516]中的定义使用。使用LDAP URL编码会产生较小的HIP控制数据包，但要求接收方检索证书或根据URL检查本地缓存。
Distinguished Name (DN) encodings (7 and 8) are represented by the string representation of the certificate's subject DN as defined in [RFC4514]. Using the DN encoding results in smaller HIP control packets, but requires the receiver to retrieve the certificate or check a local cache against the DN.
可分辨名称（DN）编码（7和8）由[RFC4514]中定义的证书主题DN的字符串表示形式表示。使用DN编码会产生更小的HIP控制数据包，但要求接收方检索证书或根据DN检查本地缓存。
If needed, HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both in X.509 v3. HITs are represented as IPv6 addresses as defined in [RFC4843]. When the Host Identifier (HI) is used to sign the certificate, the respective HIT MUST be placed into the Issuer Alternative Name (IAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress as defined in [RFC5280]. When the certificate is issued for a HIP host, identified by a HIT and HI, the respective HIT MUST be placed into the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the GeneralName form iPAddress, and the full HI is presented as the subject's public key info as defined in [RFC5280].
如果需要，点击可以表示X.509 v3中的发行者、主题或两者。点击表示为[RFC4843]中定义的IPv6地址。当使用主机标识符（HI）对证书进行签名时，必须使用[RFC5280]中定义的通用名称格式iPAddress将相应的HIT放入颁发者备选名称（IAN）扩展名中。为HIP主机（由HIT和HI标识）颁发证书时，必须使用通用名称格式iPAddress将相应的HIT放入受试者备用名称（SAN）扩展中，完整HI显示为受试者的公钥信息，如[RFC5280]中所定义。
The following examples illustrate how HITs are presented as issuer and subject in the X.509 v3 extension alternative names.
以下示例说明了在X.509 v3扩展名备选名称中，如何将点击显示为发行人和主题。
Format of X509v3 extensions: X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name: IP Address:hit-of-issuer X509v3 Subject Alternative Name: IP Address:hit-of-subject
X509v3扩展名格式：X509v3发行人备选名称：IP地址：发行人命中率X509v3主题备选名称：IP地址：主题命中率
Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Example X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:14:6cf:fae7:bb79:bf78:7d64:c056
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1c:5a14:26de:a07c:385b:de35:60e3
Appendix B shows a full example of an X.509 v3 certificate with HIP content.
附录B显示了包含HIP内容的X.509 v3证书的完整示例。
As another example, consider a managed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) environment in which the peers have certificates that are anchored in (potentially different) managed trust chains. In this scenario, the certificates issued to HIP hosts are signed by intermediate Certification Authorities (CAs) up to a root CA. In this example, the managed PKI environment is neither HIP aware, nor can it be configured to compute HITs and include them in the certificates.
作为另一个例子，考虑托管公钥基础设施（PKI）环境，其中对等体具有锚定在（可能不同的）托管信任链中的证书。在此场景中，颁发给HIP主机的证书由中间证书颁发机构（CA）签署，直至根CA。在本例中，托管PKI环境既不支持HIP，也不能配置为计算命中并将其包含在证书中。
When HIP communications are established, the HIP hosts not only need to send their identity certificates (or pointers to their certificates), but also the chain of intermediate CAs (or pointers to the CAs) up to the root CA, or to a CA that is trusted by the remote peer. This chain of certificates MUST be sent in a Cert group as specified in Section 2. The HIP peers validate each other's certificates and compute peer HITs based on the certificate public keys.
建立HIP通信时，HIP主机不仅需要发送其身份证书（或指向其证书的指针），还需要将中间CA链（或指向CA的指针）发送到根CA，或发送到远程对等方信任的CA。此证书链必须按照第2节的规定以证书组的形式发送。HIP对等方验证彼此的证书，并根据证书公钥计算对等方命中率。
When using SPKI certificates to transmit information related to HIP hosts, HITs need to be enclosed within the certificates. HITs can represent an issuer, a subject, or both. In the following, we define the representation of those identifiers for SPKI given as S-expressions. Note that the S-expressions are only the human-readable representation of SPKI certificates. Full HIs are presented in the public key sequences of SPKI certificates.
当使用SPKI证书传输与HIP主机相关的信息时，需要在证书中包含HIT。点击可以代表发行人、主题或两者。在下面，我们将SPKI的这些标识符的表示定义为S表达式。请注意，S表达式只是SPKI证书的可读表示形式。完整HI在SPKI证书的公钥序列中显示。
As an example, the Host Identity Tag of a host is expressed as follows:
例如，主机的主机标识标签表示如下：
Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)
Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)
Format: (hash hit hit-of-host)
Example: (hash hit 2001:13:724d:f3c0:6ff0:33c2:15d8:5f50)
Appendix A shows a full example of a SPKI certificate with HIP content.
附录A显示了包含HIP内容的SPKI证书的完整示例。
Revocation of X.509 v3 certificates is handled as defined in Section 5 of [RFC5280]. Revocation of SPKI certificates is handled as defined in Section 5 of [RFC2693].
X.509 v3证书的撤销按照[RFC5280]第5节的规定进行处理。SPKI证书的撤销按照[RFC2693]第5节的规定进行处理。
If the Initiator does not send the certificate that the Responder requires, the Responder may take actions (e.g., reject the connection). The Responder MAY signal this to the Initiator by sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED.
如果启动器未发送响应程序所需的证书，响应程序可能会采取措施（例如，拒绝连接）。响应者可以通过发送HIP NOTIFY消息（需要通知参数error type CREDENTIALS）。
If the verification of a certificate fails, a verifier MAY signal this to the provider of the certificate by sending a HIP NOTIFY message with NOTIFICATION parameter error type INVALID_CERTIFICATE.
如果证书验证失败，验证器可以通过发送带有通知参数error type INVALID_certificate的HIP NOTIFY消息向证书提供程序发出此信号。
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ -----
NOTIFICATION PARAMETER - ERROR TYPES Value
------------------------------------ -----
CREDENTIALS_REQUIRED 48
所需证件48
The Responder is unwilling to set up an association, as the Initiator did not send the needed credentials.
响应者不愿意建立关联，因为发起方没有发送所需的凭据。
INVALID_CERTIFICATE 50
无效的\u证书50
Sent in response to a failed verification of a certificate. Notification Data MAY contain n groups of 2 octets (n calculated from the NOTIFICATION parameter length), in order Cert group and Cert ID of the Certificate parameter that caused the failure.
为响应证书验证失败而发送。通知数据可能包含2个八位字节的n组（n根据通知参数长度计算），顺序为导致故障的证书参数的Cert group和Cert ID。
This document defines the CERT parameter for the Host Identity Protocol [RFC5201]. This parameter is defined in Section 2 with type 768. The parameter type number is also defined in [RFC5201].
本文档定义了主机标识协议[RFC5201]的CERT参数。该参数在第2节中定义为768类型。[RFC5201]中还定义了参数类型编号。
The CERT parameter has an 8-bit unsigned integer field for different certificate types, for which IANA has created and now maintains a new sub-registry entitled "HIP Certificate Types" under the "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters". Initial values for the Certificate type registry are given in Section 2. New values for the Certificate types from the unassigned space are assigned through IETF Review.
CERT参数有一个用于不同证书类型的8位无符号整数字段，IANA已为其创建并在“主机标识协议（HIP）参数”下维护一个名为“HIP证书类型”的新子注册表。第2节给出了证书类型注册表的初始值。来自未分配空间的证书类型的新值通过IETF评审分配。
In Section 6, this document defines two new types for the "NOTIFY Message Types" sub-registry under "Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Parameters".
在第6节中，本文件为“主机标识协议（HIP）参数”下的“通知消息类型”子注册表定义了两种新类型。
Certificate grouping allows the certificates to be sent in multiple consecutive packets. This might allow similar attacks, as IP-layer fragmentation allows, for example, the sending of fragments in the wrong order and skipping some fragments to delay or stall packet processing by the victim in order to use resources (e.g., CPU or memory). Hence, hosts SHOULD implement mechanisms to discard certificate groups with outstanding certificates if state space is scarce.
证书分组允许在多个连续数据包中发送证书。这可能允许类似的攻击，因为IP层碎片允许，例如，以错误的顺序发送碎片，并跳过一些碎片，以延迟或暂停受害者的数据包处理，从而使用资源（例如，CPU或内存）。因此，如果状态空间不足，主机应该实现丢弃具有未完成证书的证书组的机制。
Checking of the URL and LDAP entries might allow denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, where the target host may be subjected to bogus work.
检查URL和LDAP条目可能会允许拒绝服务（DoS）攻击，目标主机可能会受到伪造工作的攻击。
Security considerations for SPKI certificates are discussed in [RFC2693] and for X.509 v3 in [RFC5280].
[RFC2693]和[RFC5280]中讨论了SPKI证书的安全注意事项。
The authors would like to thank A. Keranen, D. Mattes, M. Komu, and T. Henderson for the fruitful conversations on the subject. D. Mattes most notably contributed the non-HIP aware use case in Section 3.
作者要感谢A.Keranen、D.Mattes、M.Komu和T.Henderson就这一主题进行的富有成效的对话。D.Mattes在第3节中对非髋关节感知用例的贡献最为显著。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，1997年3月。
[RFC2693] Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R., Thomas, B., and T. Ylonen, "SPKI Certificate Theory", RFC 2693, September 1999.
[RFC2693]Ellison，C.，Frantz，B.，Lampson，B.，Rivest，R.，Thomas，B.，和T.Ylonen，“SPKI证书理论”，RFC 26931999年9月。
[RFC4514] Zeilenga, K., Ed., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): String Representation of Distinguished Names", RFC 4514, June 2006.
[RFC4514]Zeilenga，K.，Ed.“轻量级目录访问协议（LDAP）：可分辨名称的字符串表示”，RFC4514，2006年6月。
[RFC4516] Smith, M., Ed., and T. Howes, "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP): Uniform Resource Locator", RFC 4516, June 2006.
[RFC4516]Smith，M.，Ed.，和T.Howes，“轻量级目录访问协议（LDAP）：统一资源定位器”，RFC4516，2006年6月。
[RFC4843] Nikander, P., Laganier, J., and F. Dupont, "An IPv6 Prefix for Overlay Routable Cryptographic Hash Identifiers (ORCHID)", RFC 4843, April 2007.
[RFC4843]Nikander，P.，Laganier，J.，和F.Dupont，“覆盖可路由加密哈希标识符（RAYD）的IPv6前缀”，RFC 4843，2007年4月。
[RFC5201] Moskowitz, R., Nikander, P., Jokela, P., Ed., and T. Henderson, "Host Identity Protocol", RFC 5201, April 2008.
[RFC5201]Moskowitz，R.，Nikander，P.，Jokela，P.，Ed.，和T.Henderson，“主机身份协议”，RFC 52012008年4月。
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, May 2008.
[RFC5280]Cooper，D.，Santesson，S.，Farrell，S.，Boeyen，S.，Housley，R.，和W.Polk，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 52802008年5月。
[RFC5996] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", RFC 5996, September 2010.
[RFC5996]Kaufman，C.，Hoffman，P.，Nir，Y.，和P.Eronen，“互联网密钥交换协议版本2（IKEv2）”，RFC 59962010年9月。
[X.690] ITU-T, "Recommendation X.690 (2002) | ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002, Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", July 2002.
[X.690]ITU-T，“建议X.690（2002）| ISO/IEC 8825-1:2002，信息技术-ASN.1编码规则：基本编码规则（BER）、规范编码规则（CER）和区分编码规则（DER）规范”，2002年7月。
This section shows an SPKI certificate with encoded HITs. The example has been indented for readability.
本节显示了带有编码命中的SPKI证书。为了便于阅读，该示例已缩进。
(sequence (public_key (rsa-pkcs1-sha1 (e #010001#) (n |yDwznOwX0w+zvQbpWoTnfWrUPLKW2NFrpXbsIcH/QBSLb k1RKTZhLasFwvtSHAjqh220W8gRiQAGIqKplyrDEqSrJp OdIsHIQ8BQhJAyILWA1Sa6f5wAnWozDfgdXoKLNdT8ZNB mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=| ) ) ) (cert (issuer (hash hit 2001:15:2453:698a:9aa:253a:dcb5:981e) ) (subject (hash hit 2001:12:ccd6:4715:72a3:2ab1:77e4:4acc) ) (not-before "2011-01-12_13:43:09") (not-after "2011-01-22_13:43:09") ) (signature (hash sha1 |h5fC8HUMATTtK0cjYqIgeN3HCIMA|) |u8NTRutINI/AeeZgN6bngjvjYPtVahvY7MhGfenTpT7MCgBy NoZglqH5Cy2vH6LrQFYWx0MjWoYwHKimEuBKCNd4TK6hrCyAI CIDJAZ70TyKXgONwDNWPOmcc3lFmsih8ezkoBseFWHqRGISIm MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=| ) )
（序列（公钥rsa-pkcs1-sha1（e#010001#））（n | yDwznOwX0w+zvqbPwoTnWrupKw2nFrpxBsich/QBSLb k1rktzhlasfWvtshajqH220w8griqgiqpryrdeq8bqhjayilwa1s6f5wanwwwzdxOzdxoklndt8znb mzluPiw4ozc78p6MHElH75Hm3yHaWxT+s83M=ý））（发卡机构：2001:6915:DC8a:8a:8a主题）（hash hit 2001:12:ccd6:4715:72a3:2ab1:77e4:4acc）（不在“2011-01-12_13:43:09”之前）（不在“2011-01-22_13:43:09”之后）（签名（hash sha1 | h5fc8humattk0cjyqigen3cima |）| Ngzglqh5cy2vh6lqfywx0Mjwoyhkimubkcnd4tk6hrcyai cidjaz70tykxgonwwpomc3lfmsih8ezkobsefwhqrgisim MLdeaMciP4lVfxPY2AQKdMrBc=|）的ntrutini/aeezgn6bngjvvvvvvy7mhgfentpt7mcg
This section shows a X.509 v3 certificate with encoded HITs.
本节显示了带有编码命中的X.509 v3证书。
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com
Validity
Not Before: Mar 11 09:01:39 2011 GMT
Not After : Mar 21 09:01:39 2011 GMT
Subject: CN=Example subject host, DC=example, DC=com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:c0:db:38:50:8e:63:ed:96:ea:c6:c4:ec:a3:36:
62:e2:28:e9:74:9c:f5:2f:cb:58:0e:52:54:60:b5:
fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:
18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:
09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:
fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:
98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:
df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:
9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:13:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:
a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:
30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:
f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:
4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:
e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:
04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:
57:29
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 0 (0x0)
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: CN=Example issuing host, DC=example, DC=com
Validity
Not Before: Mar 11 09:01:39 2011 GMT
Not After : Mar 21 09:01:39 2011 GMT
Subject: CN=Example subject host, DC=example, DC=com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:c0:db:38:50:8e:63:ed:96:ea:c6:c4:ec:a3:36:
62:e2:28:e9:74:9c:f5:2f:cb:58:0e:52:54:60:b5:
fa:98:87:0d:22:ab:d8:6a:61:74:a9:ee:0b:ae:cd:
18:6f:05:ab:69:66:42:46:00:a2:c0:0c:3a:28:67:
09:cc:52:27:da:79:3e:67:d7:d8:d0:7c:f1:a1:26:
fa:38:8f:73:f5:b0:20:c6:f2:0b:7d:77:43:aa:c7:
98:91:7e:1e:04:31:0d:ca:94:55:20:c4:4f:ba:b1:
df:d4:61:9d:dd:b9:b5:47:94:6c:06:91:69:30:42:
9c:0a:8b:e3:00:ce:49:ab:e3
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:13:8d83:41c5:dc9f:38ed:e742:7281
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
IP Address:2001:1c:6e02:d3e0:9b90:8417:673e:99db
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
83:68:b4:38:63:a6:ae:57:68:e2:4d:73:5d:8f:11:e4:ba:30:
a0:19:ca:86:22:e9:6b:e9:36:96:af:95:bd:e8:02:b9:72:2f:
30:a2:62:ac:b2:fa:3d:25:c5:24:fd:8d:32:aa:01:4f:a5:8a:
f5:06:52:56:0a:86:55:39:2b:ee:7a:7b:46:14:d7:5d:15:82:
4d:74:06:ca:b7:8c:54:c1:6b:33:7f:77:82:d8:95:e1:05:ca:
e2:0d:22:1d:86:fc:1c:c4:a4:cf:c6:bc:ab:ec:b8:2a:1e:4b:
04:7e:49:9c:8f:9d:98:58:9c:63:c5:97:b5:41:94:f7:ef:93:
57:29
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Tobias Heer Chair of Communication and Distributed Systems - COMSYS RWTH Aachen University Ahornstrasse 55 Aachen Germany
Tobias Heer通信和分布式系统主席-COMSYS RWTH亚琛大学阿霍恩斯特拉斯55亚琛德国
Phone: +49 241 80 20 776
EMail: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
URI: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/tobias-heer/
Phone: +49 241 80 20 776
EMail: heer@cs.rwth-aachen.de
URI: http://www.comsys.rwth-aachen.de/team/tobias-heer/
Samu Varjonen Helsinki Institute for Information Technology Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b Helsinki Finland
Samu Varjonen赫尔辛基信息技术研究所Gustaf Haellstroemin katu 2b芬兰赫尔辛基
EMail: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi
URI: http://www.hiit.fi
EMail: samu.varjonen@hiit.fi
URI: http://www.hiit.fi