Network Working Group D. Forsberg
Request for Comments: 5191 Nokia
Category: Standards Track Y. Ohba, Ed.
Toshiba
B. Patil
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
A. Yegin
Samsung
May 2008
Network Working Group D. Forsberg
Request for Comments: 5191 Nokia
Category: Standards Track Y. Ohba, Ed.
Toshiba
B. Patil
H. Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
A. Yegin
Samsung
May 2008
Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)
承载网络访问身份验证的协议（PANA）
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
本文件规定了互联网社区的互联网标准跟踪协议，并要求进行讨论和提出改进建议。有关本协议的标准化状态和状态，请参考当前版本的“互联网官方协议标准”（STD 1）。本备忘录的分发不受限制。
Abstract
摘要
This document defines the Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA), a network-layer transport for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enable network access authentication between clients and access networks. In EAP terms, PANA is a UDP-based EAP lower layer that runs between the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator.
本文档定义了用于承载网络访问身份验证（PANA）的协议，这是一种可扩展身份验证协议（EAP）的网络层传输，用于在客户端和访问网络之间实现网络访问身份验证。在EAP术语中，PANA是一个基于UDP的EAP底层，运行在EAP对等方和EAP验证器之间。
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Specification of Requirements ..............................4
2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Protocol Overview ...............................................6
4. Protocol Details ................................................7
4.1. Authentication and Authorization Phase .....................7
4.2. Access Phase ..............................................11
4.3. Re-Authentication Phase ...................................11
4.4. Termination Phase .........................................13
5. Processing Rules ...............................................13
5.1. Fragmentation .............................................13
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission ........................14
5.3. PANA Security Association .................................15
5.4. Message Authentication ....................................17
5.5. Message Validity Check ....................................17
5.6. PaC Updating Its IP Address ...............................19
5.7. Session Lifetime ..........................................19
6. Message Format .................................................20
6.1. IP and UDP Headers ........................................20
6.2. PANA Message Header .......................................20
6.3. AVP Format ................................................22
7. PANA Messages ..................................................24
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) ..............................27
7.2. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) ...................................28
7.3. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) ....................................28
7.4. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) ............................28
7.5. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) .............................29
7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) ...........................29
7.7. PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) ............................29
8. AVPs in PANA ...................................................29
8.1. AUTH AVP ..................................................30
8.2. EAP-Payload AVP ...........................................30
8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP ...................................31
8.4. Key-Id AVP ................................................31
8.5. Nonce AVP .................................................31
8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP .........................................32
8.7. Result-Code AVP ...........................................32
8.8. Session-Lifetime AVP ......................................32
8.9. Termination-Cause AVP .....................................33
9. Retransmission Timers ..........................................33
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters ................35
10. IANA Considerations ...........................................35
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number .....................................36
10.2. PANA Message Header ......................................36
10.2.1. Message Type ......................................36
10.2.2. Flags .............................................36
1. Introduction ....................................................3
1.1. Specification of Requirements ..............................4
2. Terminology .....................................................4
3. Protocol Overview ...............................................6
4. Protocol Details ................................................7
4.1. Authentication and Authorization Phase .....................7
4.2. Access Phase ..............................................11
4.3. Re-Authentication Phase ...................................11
4.4. Termination Phase .........................................13
5. Processing Rules ...............................................13
5.1. Fragmentation .............................................13
5.2. Sequence Number and Retransmission ........................14
5.3. PANA Security Association .................................15
5.4. Message Authentication ....................................17
5.5. Message Validity Check ....................................17
5.6. PaC Updating Its IP Address ...............................19
5.7. Session Lifetime ..........................................19
6. Message Format .................................................20
6.1. IP and UDP Headers ........................................20
6.2. PANA Message Header .......................................20
6.3. AVP Format ................................................22
7. PANA Messages ..................................................24
7.1. PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) ..............................27
7.2. PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) ...................................28
7.3. PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) ....................................28
7.4. PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) ............................28
7.5. PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) .............................29
7.6. PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) ...........................29
7.7. PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) ............................29
8. AVPs in PANA ...................................................29
8.1. AUTH AVP ..................................................30
8.2. EAP-Payload AVP ...........................................30
8.3. Integrity-Algorithm AVP ...................................31
8.4. Key-Id AVP ................................................31
8.5. Nonce AVP .................................................31
8.6. PRF-Algorithm AVP .........................................32
8.7. Result-Code AVP ...........................................32
8.8. Session-Lifetime AVP ......................................32
8.9. Termination-Cause AVP .....................................33
9. Retransmission Timers ..........................................33
9.1. Transmission and Retransmission Parameters ................35
10. IANA Considerations ...........................................35
10.1. PANA UDP Port Number .....................................36
10.2. PANA Message Header ......................................36
10.2.1. Message Type ......................................36
10.2.2. Flags .............................................36
10.3. AVP Header ...............................................36
10.3.1. AVP Code ..........................................37
10.3.2. Flags .............................................37
10.4. AVP Values ...............................................37
10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values ............................37
10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values ......................38
11. Security Considerations .......................................38
11.1. General Security Measures ................................38
11.2. Initial Exchange .........................................40
11.3. EAP Methods ..............................................40
11.4. Cryptographic Keys .......................................40
11.5. Per-Packet Ciphering .....................................41
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication ..................................41
11.7. Liveness Test ............................................41
11.8. Early Termination of a Session ...........................42
12. Acknowledgments ...............................................42
13. References ....................................................42
13.1. Normative References .....................................42
13.2. Informative References ...................................43
10.3. AVP Header ...............................................36
10.3.1. AVP Code ..........................................37
10.3.2. Flags .............................................37
10.4. AVP Values ...............................................37
10.4.1. Result-Code AVP Values ............................37
10.4.2. Termination-Cause AVP Values ......................38
11. Security Considerations .......................................38
11.1. General Security Measures ................................38
11.2. Initial Exchange .........................................40
11.3. EAP Methods ..............................................40
11.4. Cryptographic Keys .......................................40
11.5. Per-Packet Ciphering .....................................41
11.6. PAA-to-EP Communication ..................................41
11.7. Liveness Test ............................................41
11.8. Early Termination of a Session ...........................42
12. Acknowledgments ...............................................42
13. References ....................................................42
13.1. Normative References .....................................42
13.2. Informative References ...................................43
Providing secure network access service requires access control based on the authentication and authorization of the clients and the access networks. Client-to-network authentication provides parameters that are needed to police the traffic flow through the enforcement points. A protocol is needed to carry authentication methods between the client and the access network.
提供安全的网络访问服务需要基于客户端和访问网络的身份验证和授权进行访问控制。客户端到网络身份验证提供了监控通过实施点的流量所需的参数。在客户端和接入网络之间需要一个协议来承载身份验证方法。
The scope of this work is identified as designing a network-layer transport for network access authentication methods. The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC3748] provides such authentication methods. In other words, PANA carries EAP, which can carry various authentication methods. By the virtue of enabling the transport of EAP above IP, any authentication method that can be carried as an EAP method is made available to PANA and hence to any link-layer technology. There is a clear division of labor between PANA (an EAP lower layer), EAP, and EAP methods as described in [RFC3748].
这项工作的范围被确定为为网络访问认证方法设计网络层传输。可扩展认证协议（EAP）[RFC3748]提供了此类认证方法。换句话说，PANA携带EAP，EAP可以携带各种身份验证方法。由于能够在IP上传输EAP，任何可作为EAP方法携带的身份验证方法都可用于PANA，从而可用于任何链路层技术。PANA（EAP下层）、EAP和EAP方法之间有明确的分工，如[RFC3748]所述。
Various environments and usage models for PANA are identified in Appendix A of [RFC4058]. Potential security threats for network-layer access authentication protocol are discussed in [RFC4016]. These have been essential in defining the requirements [RFC4058] of the PANA protocol. Note that some of these requirements are imposed by the chosen payload, EAP [RFC3748].
[RFC4058]的附录A中确定了PANA的各种环境和使用模式。[RFC4016]中讨论了网络层访问认证协议的潜在安全威胁。这些对于定义PANA协议的要求[RFC4058]至关重要。请注意，其中一些要求是由所选有效载荷EAP[RFC3748]施加的。
There are components that are part of a complete secure network access solution but are outside of the PANA protocol specification, including PANA Authentication Agent (PAA) discovery, authentication method choice, PANA Authentication Agent-Enforcement Point (PAA-EP) protocol, access control filter creation, and data traffic protection. These components are described in separate documents (see [RFC5193] and [RFC5192]).
有一些组件是完整安全网络访问解决方案的一部分，但不属于PANA协议规范，包括PANA身份验证代理（PAA）发现、身份验证方法选择、PANA身份验证代理实施点（PAA-EP）协议、访问控制筛选器创建和数据流量保护。这些组件在单独的文档中进行了描述（参见[RFC5193]和[RFC5192]）。
In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
在本文件中，使用了几个词来表示规范的要求。这些词通常大写。本文件中的关键词“必须”、“不得”、“必需”、“应”、“不应”、“应”、“不应”、“建议”、“可”和“可选”应按照[RFC2119]中所述进行解释。
PANA Client (PaC):
泛亚客户（PaC）：
The client side of the protocol that resides in the access device (e.g., laptop, PDA, etc.). It is responsible for providing the credentials in order to prove its identity (authentication) for network access authorization. The PaC and the EAP peer are colocated in the same access device.
驻留在接入设备（如笔记本电脑、PDA等）中的协议客户端。它负责提供凭证，以证明其网络访问授权的身份（身份验证）。PaC和EAP对等机位于同一接入设备中。
PANA Authentication Agent (PAA):
PANA身份验证代理（PAA）：
The protocol entity in the access network whose responsibility it is to verify the credentials provided by a PANA client (PaC) and authorize network access to the access device. The PAA and the EAP authenticator (and optionally the EAP server) are colocated in the same node. Note the authentication and authorization procedure can, according to the EAP model, also be offloaded to the back end Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure.
接入网络中的协议实体，其职责是验证PANA客户端（PaC）提供的凭据并授权对接入设备的网络访问。PAA和EAP验证器（以及可选的EAP服务器）位于同一节点中。注意：根据EAP模型，身份验证和授权过程也可以卸载到后端身份验证、授权和计费（AAA）基础设施。
PANA Session:
泛亚会议：
A PANA session is established between the PANA Client (PaC) and the PANA Authentication Agent (PAA), and it terminates as a result of an authentication and authorization or liveness test failure, a message delivery failure after retransmissions reach maximum values, session lifetime expiration, an explicit termination message or any event that causes discontinuation of the access service. A fixed session identifier is maintained throughout a session. A session cannot be shared across multiple network interfaces.
PANA会话在PANA客户端（PaC）和PANA身份验证代理（PAA）之间建立，并因身份验证和授权或活动性测试失败、重传达到最大值后的消息传递失败、会话生存期到期而终止，显式终止消息或导致访问服务中断的任何事件。固定会话标识符在整个会话中保持不变。不能跨多个网络接口共享会话。
Session Lifetime:
会话生存期：
A duration that is associated with a PANA session. For an established PANA session, the session lifetime is bound to the lifetime of the current authorization given to the PaC. The session lifetime can be extended by a new round of EAP authentication before it expires. Until a PANA session is established, the lifetime SHOULD be set to a value that allows the PaC to detect a failed session in a reasonable amount of time.
与PANA会话相关联的持续时间。对于已建立的PANA会话，会话生存期绑定到授予PaC的当前授权的生存期。会话生存期可以在到期之前通过新一轮EAP身份验证来延长。在建立PANA会话之前，应将生存期设置为允许PaC在合理时间内检测失败会话的值。
Session Identifier:
会话标识符：
This identifier is used to uniquely identify a PANA session on the PaC and the PAA. It is included in PANA messages to bind the message to a specific PANA session. This bidirectional identifier is allocated by the PAA in the initial request message and freed when the session terminates. The session identifier is assigned by the PAA and is unique within the PAA.
此标识符用于唯一标识PaC和PAA上的PANA会话。它包含在PANA消息中，用于将消息绑定到特定的PANA会话。该双向标识符由PAA在初始请求消息中分配，并在会话终止时释放。会话标识符由PAA分配，在PAA中是唯一的。
PANA Security Association (PANA SA):
泛亚安全协会（泛亚安全协会）：
A PANA security association is formed between the PaC and the PAA by sharing cryptographic keying material and associated context. The formed duplex security association is used to protect the bidirectional PANA signaling traffic between the PaC and PAA.
通过共享加密密钥材料和相关上下文，在PaC和PAA之间形成PANA安全关联。形成的双工安全关联用于保护PaC和PAA之间的双向PANA信令流量。
Enforcement Point (EP):
执行点（EP）：
A node on the access network where per-packet enforcement policies (i.e., filters) are applied on the inbound and outbound traffic of access devices. The EP and the PAA may be colocated. EPs should prevent data traffic from and to any unauthorized client, unless that data traffic is either PANA or one of the other allowed traffic types (e.g., Address Resolution Protocol (ARP), IPv6 neighbor discovery, DHCP, etc.).
接入网络上的一种节点，其中对接入设备的入站和出站流量应用每包强制策略（即过滤器）。EP和PAA可以共用。EPs应防止任何未经授权的客户端之间的数据通信，除非该数据通信是PANA或其他允许的通信类型之一（例如，地址解析协议（ARP）、IPv6邻居发现、DHCP等）。
Master Session Key (MSK):
主会话密钥（MSK）：
A key derived by the EAP peer and the EAP server and transported to the EAP authenticator [RFC3748].
由EAP对等方和EAP服务器派生并传输到EAP验证器的密钥[RFC3748]。
For additional terminology definitions, see the PANA framework document [RFC5193].
有关其他术语定义，请参阅PANA框架文件[RFC5193]。
The PANA protocol is run between a client (PaC) and a server (PAA) in order to perform authentication and authorization for the network access service.
PANA协议在客户端（PaC）和服务器（PAA）之间运行，以便对网络访问服务执行身份验证和授权。
The protocol messaging consists of a series of requests and answers, some of which may be initiated by either end. Each message can carry zero or more AVPs (Attribute-Value Pairs) within the payload. The main payload of PANA is EAP, which performs authentication. PANA helps the PaC and PAA establish an EAP session.
协议消息传递由一系列请求和应答组成，其中一些请求和应答可能由任意一端发起。每条消息可以在有效负载内携带零个或多个AVP（属性值对）。PANA的主要负载是执行身份验证的EAP。PANA帮助PaC和PAA建立EAP会议。
PANA is a UDP-based protocol. It has its own retransmission mechanism to reliably deliver messages.
PANA是一种基于UDP的协议。它有自己的重传机制来可靠地传递消息。
PANA messages are sent between the PaC and PAA as part of a PANA session. A PANA session consists of distinct phases:
PANA消息作为PANA会话的一部分在PaC和PAA之间发送。PANA会议由不同的阶段组成：
o Authentication and authorization phase: This is the phase that initiates a new PANA session and executes EAP between the PAA and PaC. The PANA session can be initiated by both the PaC and the PAA. The EAP payload (which carries an EAP method inside) is what is used for authentication. The PAA conveys the result of authentication and authorization to the PaC at the end of this phase.
o 身份验证和授权阶段：这是启动新的PANA会话并在PAA和PaC之间执行EAP的阶段。PANA会议可由PaC和PAA发起。EAP有效负载（内部携带EAP方法）用于身份验证。PAA在该阶段结束时将认证和授权的结果传达给PaC。
o Access phase: After successful authentication and authorization, the access device gains access to the network and can send and receive IP traffic through the EP(s). At any time during this phase, the PaC and PAA may optionally send PANA notification messages to test liveness of the PANA session on the peer.
o 接入阶段：成功认证和授权后，接入设备获得对网络的接入，并可通过EP发送和接收IP流量。在该阶段的任何时候，PaC和PAA都可以选择发送PANA通知消息，以测试对等机上PANA会话的活跃度。
o Re-authentication phase: During the access phase, the PAA may, and the PaC should, initiate re-authentication if they want to update the PANA session lifetime before the PANA session lifetime expires. EAP is carried by PANA to perform re-authentication. This phase may be optionally triggered by both the PaC and the PAA without any respect to the session lifetime. The re-authentication phase is a sub-phase of the access phase. The session moves to this sub-phase from the access phase when re-authentication starts, and returns back there upon successful re-authentication.
o 重新认证阶段：在访问阶段，如果PAA希望在PANA会话生存期到期之前更新PANA会话生存期，则PAA可以并且PaC应该启动重新认证。PANA携带EAP执行重新认证。此阶段可以由PaC和PAA任意触发，而不考虑会话生存期。重新认证阶段是访问阶段的子阶段。当重新身份验证开始时，会话从访问阶段移到此子阶段，并在成功重新身份验证后返回。
o Termination phase: The PaC or PAA may choose to discontinue the access service at any time. An explicit disconnect message can be sent by either end. If either the PaC or the PAA disconnects without engaging in termination messaging, it is expected that either the expiration of a finite session lifetime or failed liveness tests would clean up the session at the other end.
o 终止阶段：PaC或PAA可选择随时中断接入服务。任何一端都可以发送明确的断开连接消息。如果PaC或PAA在不参与终止消息传递的情况下断开连接，则预计有限会话生存期到期或活动性测试失败将清除另一端的会话。
Cryptographic protection of messages between the PaC and PAA is possible as soon as EAP in conjunction with the EAP method exports a shared key. That shared key is used to create a PANA SA. The PANA SA helps generate per-message authentication codes that provide integrity protection and authentication.
一旦EAP结合EAP方法导出共享密钥，PaC和PAA之间的消息就可以进行加密保护。该共享密钥用于创建PANA SA。PANA SA帮助生成每封邮件的身份验证代码，以提供完整性保护和身份验证。
The following sections explain in detail the various phases of a PANA session.
以下各节详细解释了PANA会议的各个阶段。
The main task of the authentication and authorization phase is to establish a PANA session and carry EAP messages between the PaC and the PAA. The PANA session can be initiated by either the PaC or the PAA.
认证和授权阶段的主要任务是建立PANA会话，并在PaC和PAA之间传输EAP消息。PANA会议可由PaC或PAA发起。
PaC-initiated Session:
PaC发起的会议：
When the PaC initiates a PANA session, it sends a PANA-Client-Initiation message to the PAA. When the PaC is not configured with an IP address of the PAA before initiating the PANA session, DHCP [RFC5192] is used as the default method for dynamically configuring the IP address of the PAA. Alternative methods for dynamically discovering the IP address of the PAA may be used for PaC-initiated sessions, but they are outside the scope of this specification. The PAA that receives the PANA-Client-Initiation message MUST respond to the PaC with a PANA-Auth-Request message.
当PaC启动PANA会话时，它向PAA发送PANA客户端启动消息。当PaC在启动PANA会话之前未配置PAA的IP地址时，DHCP[RFC5192]用作动态配置PAA IP地址的默认方法。动态发现PAA IP地址的替代方法可用于PaC启动的会话，但它们不在本规范的范围内。接收PANA客户端启动消息的PAA必须使用PANA Auth请求消息响应PaC。
PAA-initiated Session:
临时机场管理局发起的会议：
When the PAA knows the IP address of the PaC, it MAY send an unsolicited PANA-Auth-Request to the PaC. The details of how PAA can learn the IP address of the PaC are outside the scope of this specification.
当PAA知道PaC的IP地址时，它可以向PaC发送未经请求的PANA身份验证请求。PAA如何了解PaC的IP地址的详细信息不在本规范的范围内。
A session identifier for the session is assigned by the PAA and carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message. The same session identifier MUST be carried in the subsequent messages exchanged between the PAA and PaC throughout the session.
会话的会话标识符由PAA分配，并在初始PANA Auth请求消息中携带。在整个会话期间，PAA和PaC之间交换的后续消息中必须携带相同的会话标识符。
When the PaC receives the initial PANA-Auth-Request message from a PAA, it responds with a PANA-Auth-Answer message, if it wishes to continue the PANA session. Otherwise, it silently discards the PANA-Auth-Request message.
当PaC从PAA收到初始PANA Auth Request消息时，如果它希望继续PANA会话，它将以PANA Auth RESPONSE消息进行响应。否则，它会自动丢弃PANA Auth请求消息。
The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have the 'S' (Start) bit set, regardless of whether the session is initiated by the PaC or the PAA. Non-initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages as well as any other messages MUST NOT have the 'S' (Start) bit set.
无论会话是由PaC还是PAA发起，初始PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息都必须设置“S”（开始）位。非初始PANA身份验证请求和PANA身份验证应答消息以及任何其他消息不得设置“S”（开始）位。
It is recommended that the PAA limit the rate at which it processes incoming PANA-Client-Initiation messages to provide robustness against denial of service (DoS) attacks. The details of rate limiting are outside the scope of this specification.
建议PAA限制其处理传入PANA客户端启动消息的速率，以提供对拒绝服务（DoS）攻击的鲁棒性。速率限制的细节不在本规范的范围内。
If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP method, the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) and integrity algorithms to be used for PANA_AUTH_KEY derivation (see Section 5.3) and AUTH AVP calculation (see Section 5.4) are negotiated as follows: the PAA sends the initial PANA-Auth-Request carrying one or more PRF-Algorithm AVPs and one or more Integrity-Algorithm AVPs for the PRF and integrity algorithms supported by it, respectively. The PaC then selects one PRF algorithm and one integrity algorithm from these AVPs carried in the initial PANA-Auth-Request, and it responds with the initial PANA-Auth-Answer carrying one PRF-Algorithm AVP and one Integrity-Algorithm AVP for the selected algorithms. The negotiation is protected after the MSK is available, as described in Section 5.3.
如果需要使用密钥生成EAP方法建立PANA SA，则需使用伪随机函数（PRF）和完整性算法进行PANA_认证密钥推导（见第5.3节）和认证AVP计算（见第5.4节）协议如下：PAA发送初始PANA Auth请求，分别携带一个或多个PRF算法AVP和一个或多个完整性算法AVP，用于其支持的PRF和完整性算法。然后，PaC从初始PANA Auth请求中携带的这些AVP中选择一个PRF算法和一个完整性算法，并使用初始PANA Auth应答对所选算法进行响应，初始PANA Auth应答中携带一个PRF算法AVP和一个完整性算法AVP。如第5.3节所述，MSK可用后，协商受到保护。
If the PAA wants to stay stateless in response to a PANA-Client-Initiation message, it doesn't include an EAP-Payload AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request message, and it should not retransmit the message on a timer. For this reason, the PaC MUST retransmit the PANA-Client-Initiation message until it receives the second PANA-Auth-Request message (not a retransmission of the initial one) from the PAA.
如果PAA希望在响应PANA客户端启动消息时保持无状态，则在初始PANA Auth请求消息中不包括EAP有效负载AVP，并且不应在计时器上重新传输该消息。因此，PaC必须重新传输PANA客户端启动消息，直到它从PAA接收到第二条PANA身份验证请求消息（不是初始消息的重新传输）。
It is possible that both the PAA and the PaC initiate the PANA session at the same time, i.e., the PAA sends the initial PANA-Auth-Request message without solicitation while the PaC sends a PANA-Client-Initiation message. To resolve the race condition, the PAA MUST silently discard the PANA-Client-Initiation message received from the PaC after it has sent the initial PANA-Auth-Request message. The PAA uses the source IP address and the source port number of the PANA-Client-Initiation message to identify the PaC among multiple PANA-Client-Initiation messages sent from different PaCs.
PAA和PaC可能同时启动PANA会话，即，PAA发送初始PANA身份验证请求消息而不请求，而PaC发送PANA客户端启动消息。要解决争用条件，PAA必须在发送初始PANA Auth请求消息后，以静默方式放弃从PaC接收的PANA客户端启动消息。PAA使用PANA客户端启动消息的源IP地址和源端口号在从不同PaC发送的多个PANA客户端启动消息中识别PaC。
EAP messages are carried in PANA-Auth-Request messages. PANA-Auth-Answer messages are simply used to acknowledge receipt of the requests. As an optimization, a PANA-Auth-Answer message sent from the PaC MAY include the EAP message. This optimization SHOULD NOT be used when it takes time to generate the EAP message (due to, e.g., intervention of human input), in which case returning an PANA-Auth-Answer message without piggybacking an EAP message can avoid unnecessary retransmission of the PANA-Auth-Request message.
EAP消息包含在PANA身份验证请求消息中。PANA Auth应答消息仅用于确认收到请求。作为优化，从PaC发送的PANA Auth应答消息可以包括EAP消息。如果生成EAP消息需要时间（例如，由于人为输入的干预），则不应使用此优化，在这种情况下，返回PANA Auth应答消息而不附带EAP消息可以避免不必要的PANA Auth请求消息重传。
A Nonce AVP MUST be included in the first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages following the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages (i.e., with the 'S' (Start) bit set), and MUST NOT be included in any other message, except during re-authentication procedures (see Section 4.3).
初始PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息之后的第一个PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息中必须包含Nonce AVP（即设置了“S”（开始）位），并且不得包含在任何其他消息中，除非在重新认证过程中（见第4.3节）。
The result of PANA authentication is carried in the last PANA-Auth-Request message sent from the PAA to the PaC. This message carries the EAP authentication result and the result of PANA authentication. The last PANA-Auth-Request message MUST be acknowledged with a PANA-Auth-Answer message. The last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST have the 'C' (Complete) bit set, and any other message MUST NOT have the 'C' (Complete) bit set. Figure 1 shows an example sequence in the authentication and authorization phase for a PaC-initiated session.
PANA身份验证的结果在从PAA发送到PaC的最后一条PANA身份验证请求消息中携带。此消息包含EAP身份验证结果和PANA身份验证结果。最后一条PANA Auth请求消息必须通过PANA Auth应答消息确认。最后一条PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息必须设置“C”（完整）位，任何其他消息不得设置“C”（完整）位。图1显示了PaC启动会话的身份验证和授权阶段的示例序列。
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x)[PRF-Algorithm,Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP-Payload]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
// Piggybacking EAP
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Client-Initiation(0)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x)[PRF-Algorithm,Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x)[PRF-Algorithm, Integrity-Algorithm]
// The 'S' (Start) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+1)[Nonce, EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+1)[Nonce] // No piggybacking EAP
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(y)[EAP-Payload]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(y)
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+2)[EAP-Payload]
// Piggybacking EAP
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(x+3)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(x+3)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
Figure 1: Example sequence for the authentication and authorization phase for a PaC-initiated session ("Piggybacking EAP" is the case in which an EAP-Payload AVP is carried in PAN)
图1:PaC启动会话的身份验证和授权阶段的示例顺序（“搭载EAP”是指PAN中携带EAP有效负载AVP的情况）
If a PANA SA needs to be established with use of a key-generating EAP method and an MSK is successfully generated, the last PANA-Auth-Request message with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST contain a Key-Id AVP and an AUTH AVP for the first derivation of keys in the session, and any subsequent message MUST contain an AUTH AVP.
如果需要使用密钥生成EAP方法建立PANA SA并成功生成MSK，则最后一条带有“C”（完整）位集的PANA Auth请求消息必须包含密钥Id AVP和会话中密钥第一次派生的Auth AVP，并且任何后续消息必须包含Auth AVP。
EAP authentication can fail at a pass-through authenticator without sending an EAP Failure message [RFC4137]. When this occurs, the PAA SHOULD silently terminate the session, expecting that a session timeout on the PaC will clean up the state on the PaC.
EAP身份验证可能在直通身份验证程序处失败，而不发送EAP失败消息[RFC4137]。当这种情况发生时，PAA应该静默地终止会话，期望PaC上的会话超时将清除PaC上的状态。
There is a case where EAP authentication succeeds with producing an EAP Success message, but network access authorization fails due to, e.g., authorization rejected by a AAA server or authorization locally rejected by the PAA. When this occurs, the PAA MUST send the last PANA-Auth-Request with a result code PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED. If an MSK is available, the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP and carry a Key-Id AVP. The PANA session MUST be terminated immediately after the last PANA-Auth message exchange.
存在EAP身份验证成功生成EAP成功消息，但网络访问授权失败的情况，例如，AAA服务器拒绝授权或PAA本地拒绝授权。发生这种情况时，PAA必须发送最后一个PANA Auth请求，结果代码为PANA\U AUTHORITION\U REJECTED。如果MSK可用，最后的PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息（带有“C”（完整）位集）必须使用Auth AVP进行保护，并带有密钥Id AVP。必须在最后一次PANA验证消息交换后立即终止PANA会话。
For reasons described in Section 3 of [RFC5193], the PaC may need to reconfigure the IP address after a successful authentication and authorization phase to obtain an IP address that is usable for
出于[RFC5193]第3节所述原因，PaC可能需要在成功的身份验证和授权阶段后重新配置IP地址，以获得可用于以下目的的IP地址：
exchanging data traffic through EP. In this case, the PAA sets the 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit of PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication and authorization phase to indicate to the PaC the need for IP address reconfiguration. How IP address reconfiguration is performed is outside the scope of this document.
通过EP交换数据流量。在这种情况下，PAA在身份验证和授权阶段设置PANA身份验证请求消息的“I”（IP重新配置）位，以向PaC指示IP地址重新配置的需要。如何执行IP地址重新配置不在本文档范围内。
Once the authentication and authorization phase successfully completes, the PaC gains access to the network and can send and receive IP data traffic through the EP(s), and the PANA session enters the access phase. In this phase, PANA-Notification-Request and PANA-Notification-Answer messages with the 'P' (Ping) bit set (ping request and ping answer messages, respectively) can be used for testing the liveness of the PANA session on the PANA peer. Both the PaC and the PAA are allowed to send a ping request to the communicating peer whenever they need to ensure the availability of the session on the peer, and they expect the peer to return a ping answer message. The ping request and answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP when a PANA SA is available. A ping request MUST NOT be sent in the authentication and authorization phase, re-authentication phase, and termination phase.
一旦认证和授权阶段成功完成，PaC将获得对网络的访问权，并可以通过EP发送和接收IP数据流量，PANA会话将进入访问阶段。在此阶段，设置了“P”（Ping）位的PANA通知请求和PANA通知应答消息（分别为Ping请求和Ping应答消息）可用于测试PANA对等机上PANA会话的活跃度。PaC和PAA都可以在需要确保对等机上会话的可用性时向通信对等机发送ping请求，并且它们希望对等机返回ping应答消息。当PANA SA可用时，必须使用AUTH AVP保护ping请求和应答消息。不得在身份验证和授权阶段、重新身份验证阶段和终止阶段发送ping请求。
Implementations MUST limit the rate of performing this test. The PaC and the PAA can handle rate limitation on their own, they do not have to perform any coordination with each other. There is no negotiation of timers for this purpose. Additionally, an implementation MAY rate limit processing the incoming ping requests. It should be noted that if a PAA or PaC that considers its connectivity lost after a relatively small number of unresponsive pings is coupled with a peer that is aggressively rate limiting the ping request and answer messages, then false-positives could result. Therefore, a PAA or PaC should not rely on frequent ping operation to quickly determine loss of connectivity.
实现必须限制执行此测试的速率。PaC和PAA可以自行处理费率限制，它们之间不必进行任何协调。没有为此目的协商计时器。此外，一种实现可以限制处理传入ping请求的速率。应该注意的是，如果认为在相对较少的无响应ping之后其连接丢失的PAA或PaC与积极限制ping请求和应答消息速率的对等方耦合，则可能会导致误报。因此，PAA或PaC不应依赖频繁的ping操作来快速确定连接丢失。
The PANA session in the access phase can enter the re-authentication phase to extend the current session lifetime by re-executing EAP. Once the re-authentication phase successfully completes, the session re-enters the access phase. Otherwise, the session is terminated.
访问阶段的PANA会话可以进入重新身份验证阶段，通过重新执行EAP来延长当前会话的生存期。一旦重新身份验证阶段成功完成，会话将重新进入访问阶段。否则，会话将终止。
When the PaC initiates re-authentication, it sends a PANA-Notification-Request message with the 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set (a re-authentication request message) to the PAA. This message MUST contain the session identifier assigned to the session being re-authenticated. If the PAA already has an established PANA session for the PaC with the matching session identifier, it MUST
当PaC启动重新认证时，它向PAA发送带有“a”（重新认证）位设置的PANA通知请求消息（重新认证请求消息）。此消息必须包含分配给正在重新验证的会话的会话标识符。如果PAA已经为PaC建立了具有匹配会话标识符的PANA会话，则必须
first respond with a PANA-Notification-Answer message with the 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set (a re-authentication answer message), followed by a PANA-Auth-Request message that starts a new EAP authentication. If the PAA cannot identify the session, it MUST silently discard the message. The first PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages in the re-authentication phase MUST have the 'S' (Start) bit cleared and carry a Nonce AVP.
首先使用设置了“a”（重新认证）位的PANA通知应答消息（重新认证应答消息）进行响应，然后是启动新EAP认证的PANA认证请求消息。如果PAA无法识别会话，则必须以静默方式放弃该消息。重新身份验证阶段中的第一个PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息必须清除“S”（开始）位并携带一个Nonce AVP。
The PaC may receive a PANA-Auth-Request before receiving the answer to its outstanding re-authentication request message. This condition can arise due to packet re-ordering or a race condition between the PaC and PAA when they both attempt to engage in re-authentication. The PaC MUST keep discarding the received PANA-Auth-Requests until it receives the answer to its request.
PaC可在收到对其未完成的重新认证请求消息的答复之前接收PANA认证请求。当PaC和PAA都试图进行重新身份验证时，由于数据包重新排序或PaC和PAA之间的竞争条件，可能会出现这种情况。PaC必须不断丢弃收到的PANA Auth请求，直到收到对其请求的答复。
When the PAA initiates re-authentication, it sends a PANA-Auth-Request message containing the session identifier for the PaC. The PAA MUST initiate EAP re-authentication before the current session lifetime expires.
当PAA启动重新身份验证时，它会发送一条PANA Auth请求消息，其中包含PaC的会话标识符。PAA必须在当前会话生存期到期之前启动EAP重新身份验证。
Re-authentication of an ongoing PANA session MUST NOT reset the sequence numbers.
正在进行的PANA会话的重新身份验证不得重置序列号。
For any re-authentication, if there is an established PANA SA, re-authentication request and answer messages and subsequent PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP. The final PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages and any subsequent PANA message MUST be protected by using the key generated from the latest EAP authentication.
对于任何重新身份验证，如果存在已建立的PANA SA，则必须使用Auth AVP保护重新身份验证请求和应答消息以及后续的PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息。必须使用最新EAP身份验证生成的密钥保护最终PANA身份验证请求和PANA身份验证应答消息以及任何后续PANA消息。
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Notification-Request(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Notification-Answer(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP-Payload, Nonce, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+2)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+2)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
PaC PAA Message(sequence number)[AVPs]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
-----> PANA-Notification-Request(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Notification-Answer(q)[AUTH]
// The 'A' (re-Authentication) bit set
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p)[EAP-Payload, Nonce, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p)[AUTH, Nonce]
-----> PANA-Auth-Request(q+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Answer(q+1)[AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+1)[EAP-Payload, AUTH]
<----- PANA-Auth-Request(p+2)[Result-Code, EAP-Payload,
Key-Id, Session-Lifetime, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
-----> PANA-Auth-Answer(p+2)[Key-Id, AUTH]
// The 'C' (Complete) bit set
Figure 2: Example sequence for the re-authentication phase initiated by PaC
图2:PaC发起的重新认证阶段的示例序列
A procedure for explicitly terminating a PANA session can be initiated either from the PaC (i.e., disconnect indication) or from the PAA (i.e., session revocation). The PANA-Termination-Request and PANA-Termination-Answer message exchanges are used for disconnect-indication and session-revocation procedures.
明确终止PANA会话的过程可以从PaC（即断开指示）或PAA（即会话撤销）启动。PANA终止请求和PANA终止应答消息交换用于断开连接指示和会话撤销程序。
The reason for termination is indicated in the Termination-Cause AVP. When there is an established PANA SA between the PaC and the PAA, all messages exchanged during the termination phase MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP. When the sender of the PANA-Termination-Request message receives a valid acknowledgment, all states maintained for the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately.
终止原因在终止原因AVP中说明。当PaC和PAA之间存在已建立的PANA SA时，必须使用AUTH AVP保护在终止阶段交换的所有消息。当PANA终止请求消息的发送方收到有效确认时，必须立即终止为PANA会话维护的所有状态。
PANA does not provide fragmentation of PANA messages. Instead, it relies on fragmentation provided by EAP methods and IP layer when needed.
PANA不提供PANA消息的分段。相反，它依赖于EAP方法和IP层在需要时提供的碎片。
PANA uses sequence numbers to provide ordered and reliable delivery of messages.
PANA使用序列号提供有序可靠的消息传递。
The PaC and PAA maintain two sequence numbers: one is for setting the sequence number of the next outgoing request; the other is for matching the sequence number of the next incoming request. These sequence numbers are 32-bit unsigned numbers. They are monotonically incremented by 1 as new requests are generated and received, and wrapped to zero on the next message after 2^32-1. Answers always contain the same sequence number as the corresponding request. Retransmissions reuse the sequence number contained in the original packet.
PaC和PAA维护两个序列号：一个用于设置下一个传出请求的序列号；另一个用于匹配下一个传入请求的序列号。这些序列号是32位无符号数。当生成和接收新请求时，它们单调递增1，并在2^32-1之后的下一条消息中包装为零。答案始终包含与相应请求相同的序列号。重新传输重用原始数据包中包含的序列号。
The initial sequence numbers (ISN) are randomly picked by the PaC and PAA as they send their very first request messages. PANA-Client-Initiation message carries sequence number 0.
PaC和PAA在发送第一个请求消息时随机选择初始序列号（ISN）。PANA客户端启动消息带有序号0。
When a request message is received, it is considered valid in terms of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches the expected value. This check does not apply to the PANA-Client-Initiation message and the initial PANA-Auth-Request message.
当接收到请求消息时，如果且仅当其序列号与预期值匹配时，根据序列号将其视为有效。此检查不适用于PANA客户端启动消息和初始PANA身份验证请求消息。
When an answer message is received, it is considered valid in terms of sequence numbers if and only if its sequence number matches that of the currently outstanding request. A peer can only have one outstanding request at a time.
当接收到应答消息时，如果且仅当其序列号与当前未完成请求的序列号匹配时，就序列号而言，它被认为是有效的。对等方一次只能有一个未完成的请求。
PANA request messages are retransmitted based on a timer until an answer is received (in which case the retransmission timer is stopped) or the number of retransmission reaches the maximum value (in which case the PANA session MUST be terminated immediately).
PANA请求消息根据计时器重新传输，直到收到应答（在此情况下，重新传输计时器停止）或重新传输次数达到最大值（在此情况下，必须立即终止PANA会话）。
The retransmission timers SHOULD be calculated as described in Section 9, unless a given deployment chooses to use its own retransmission timers optimized for the underlying link-layer characteristics.
应按照第9节所述计算重传计时器，除非给定部署选择使用其自己的重传计时器，该计时器针对基础链路层特性进行了优化。
Unless dropped due to rate limiting, the PaC and PAA MUST respond to all duplicate request messages received. The last transmitted answer MAY be cached in case it is not received by the peer, which generates a retransmission of the last request. When available, the cached answer can be used instead of fully processing the retransmitted request and forming a new answer from scratch.
除非由于速率限制而丢弃，否则PaC和PAA必须响应接收到的所有重复请求消息。在对等方未接收到最后发送的应答的情况下，可以缓存最后发送的应答，从而生成最后请求的重传。如果可用，可以使用缓存的应答，而不是完全处理重新传输的请求并从头形成新的应答。
A PANA SA is created as an attribute of a PANA session when EAP authentication succeeds with a creation of an MSK. A PANA SA is not created when the PANA authentication fails or no MSK is produced by the EAP authentication method. When a new MSK is derived in the PANA re-authentication phase, any key derived from the old MSK MUST be updated to a new one that is derived from the new MSK. In order to distinguish the new MSK from old ones, one Key-Id AVP MUST be carried in the last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with the 'C' (Complete) bit set at the end of the EAP authentication, which resulted in deriving a new MSK. The Key-Id AVP is of type Unsigned32 and MUST contain a value that uniquely identifies the MSK within the PANA session. The last PANA-Auth-Answer message with the 'C' (Complete) bit set in response to the last PANA-Auth-Request message with the 'C' (Complete) bit set MUST contain a Key-Id AVP with the same MSK identifier carried in the request. The last PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages with a Key-Id AVP MUST also carry an AUTH AVP whose value is computed by using the new PANA_AUTH_KEY derived from the new MSK. Although the specification does not mandate a particular method for calculation of the Key-Id AVP value, a simple method is to use monotonically increasing numbers.
当EAP身份验证通过创建MSK成功时，将PANA SA创建为PANA会话的属性。当PANA身份验证失败或EAP身份验证方法未生成MSK时，不会创建PANA SA。在PANA重新身份验证阶段派生新MSK时，必须将从旧MSK派生的任何密钥更新为从新MSK派生的新密钥。为了区分新的MSK和旧的MSK，必须在最后一个PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息中携带一个密钥Id AVP，并在EAP身份验证结束时设置“C”（完整）位，从而产生一个新的MSK。密钥Id AVP的类型为Unsigned32，必须包含一个在PANA会话中唯一标识MSK的值。为响应最后一条带有“C”（完整）位集的PANA认证请求消息，最后一条带有“C”（完整）位集的PANA认证应答消息必须包含一个密钥Id AVP，该密钥Id AVP与请求中携带的MSK标识符相同。最后一个带有密钥Id AVP的PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答消息还必须携带一个Auth AVP，其值是通过使用从新MSK派生的新PANA_Auth_密钥来计算的。尽管本规范没有规定计算密钥Id AVP值的特定方法，但一种简单的方法是使用单调递增的数字。
The PANA session lifetime is bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication server (same as the MSK lifetime). The lifetime of the PANA SA (hence the PANA_AUTH_KEY) is the same as the lifetime of the PANA session. The created PANA SA is deleted when the corresponding PANA session is terminated.
PANA会话生存期受身份验证服务器授予的授权生存期的限制（与MSK生存期相同）。PANA SA的生存期（因此PANA_AUTH_密钥）与PANA会话的生存期相同。当相应的PANA会话终止时，将删除创建的PANA SA。
PANA SA attributes as well as PANA session attributes are listed below:
PANA SA属性以及PANA会话属性如下所示：
PANA Session attributes:
PANA会话属性：
* Session Identifier
* 会话标识
* IP address and UDP port number of the PaC
* PaC的IP地址和UDP端口号
* IP address and UDP port number of the PAA
* PAA的IP地址和UDP端口号
* Sequence number for the next outgoing request
* 下一个传出请求的序列号
* Sequence number for the next incoming request
* 下一个传入请求的序列号
* Last transmitted message payload
* 最后发送的消息有效载荷
* Retransmission interval
* 重传间隔
* Session lifetime
* 会话生存期
* PANA SA attributes
* PANA SA属性
PANA SA attributes:
PANA SA属性：
* Nonce generated by PaC (PaC_nonce)
* 由PaC生成的Nonce（PaC_Nonce）
* Nonce generated by PAA (PAA_nonce)
* PAA生成的Nonce（PAA_Nonce）
* MSK
* MSK
* MSK Identifier
* MSK标识符
* PANA_AUTH_KEY
* PANA_认证密钥
* Pseudo-random function
* 伪随机函数
* Integrity algorithm
* 完整性算法
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is derived from the available MSK, and it is used to integrity protect PANA messages. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is computed in the following way:
PANA_AUTH_密钥来自可用的MSK，用于保护PANA消息的完整性。PANA_AUTH_密钥按以下方式计算：
PANA_AUTH_KEY = prf+(MSK, "IETF PANA"|I_PAR|I_PAN| PaC_nonce|PAA_nonce|Key_ID)
PANA|U AUTH|U KEY=prf+（MSK，“IETF PANA”| I|U PAR | I|U PAN | PaC|U nonce | PAA|U nonce | KEY|U ID）
where:
哪里：
- The prf+ function is defined in IKEv2 [RFC4306]. The pseudo-random function to be used for the prf+ function is negotiated using PRF-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set.
- prf+功能在IKEv2[RFC4306]中定义。用于prf+函数的伪随机函数在初始PANA Auth请求和PANA Auth应答交换中使用prf算法AVP与“S”（开始）位集协商。
- MSK is the master session key generated by the EAP method.
- MSK是EAP方法生成的主会话密钥。
- "IETF PANA" is the ASCII code representation of the non-NULL terminated string (excluding the double quotes around it).
- “IETF PANA”是非空终止字符串（不包括其周围的双引号）的ASCII码表示形式。
- I_PAR and I_PAN are the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer messages (the PANA header and the following PANA AVPs) with 'S' (Start) bit set, respectively.
- I_PAR和I_PAN分别是设置了“S”（开始）位的初始PANA身份验证请求和PANA身份验证应答消息（PANA头和以下PANA AVP）。
- PaC_nonce and PAA_nonce are values of the Nonce AVP carried in the first non-initial PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication and authorization phase or the first PANA-Auth-Answer and PANA-Auth-Request messages in the re-authentication phase, respectively.
- PaC_nonce和PAA_nonce分别是在身份验证和授权阶段的第一个非初始PANA Auth ANCE和PANA Auth Request消息或在重新身份验证阶段的第一个PANA Auth ANCE和PANA Auth Request消息中携带的nonce AVP值。
- Key_ID is the value of the Key-Id AVP.
- Key_ID是Key ID AVP的值。
The length of PANA_AUTH_KEY depends on the integrity algorithm in use. See Section 5.4 for the detailed usage of the PANA_AUTH_KEY.
PANA_AUTH_密钥的长度取决于使用的完整性算法。有关PANA_认证密钥的详细用法，请参见第5.4节。
A PANA message can contain an AUTH AVP for cryptographically protecting the message.
PANA消息可以包含用于加密保护消息的身份验证AVP。
When an AUTH AVP is included in a PANA message, the Value field of the AUTH AVP is calculated by using the PANA_AUTH_KEY in the following way:
当PANA消息中包含AUTH AVP时，通过使用PANA_AUTH_键按以下方式计算AUTH AVP的值字段：
AUTH AVP value = PANA_AUTH_HASH(PANA_AUTH_KEY, PANA_PDU)
AUTH AVP value=PANA_AUTH_散列（PANA_AUTH_密钥，PANA_PDU）
where PANA_PDU is the PANA message including the PANA header, with the AUTH AVP Value field first initialized to 0. PANA_AUTH_HASH represents the integrity algorithm negotiated using Integrity-Algorithm AVP in the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set. The PaC and PAA MUST use the same integrity algorithm to calculate an AUTH AVP they originate and receive.
其中，PANA_PDU是包含PANA头的PANA消息，AUTH AVP Value字段首先初始化为0。PANA_AUTH_HASH表示在初始PANA AUTH请求和PANA AUTH应答交换中使用完整性算法AVP与“S”（开始）位集协商的完整性算法。PaC和PAA必须使用相同的完整性算法来计算它们发起和接收的AUTH AVP。
When a PANA message is received, the message is considered to be invalid, at least when one of the following conditions are not met:
当收到PANA消息时，至少当下列条件之一未满足时，该消息被视为无效：
o Each field in the message header contains a valid value including sequence number, message length, message type, flags, session identifier, etc.
o 消息头中的每个字段都包含一个有效值，包括序列号、消息长度、消息类型、标志、会话标识符等。
o The message type is one of the expected types in the current state. Specifically, the following messages are unexpected and invalid:
o 消息类型是当前状态下的预期类型之一。具体而言，以下消息是意外且无效的：
* In the authentication and authorization phase:
* 在身份验证和授权阶段：
+ PANA-Client-Initiation after completion of the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set.
+ PANA客户端在完成初始PANA身份验证请求和PANA身份验证应答交换（设置了“S”（开始）位）后启动。
+ Re-authentication request.
+ 重新验证请求。
+ Ping request.
+ Ping请求。
+ The last PANA-Auth-Request with 'C' (Complete) bit set before completion of the initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange with 'S' (Start) bit set.
+ 在完成初始PANA身份验证请求和PANA身份验证应答交换（设置为“S”（开始）位之前，设置为“C”（完成）位的最后一个PANA身份验证请求。
+ The initial PANA-Auth-Request with 'S' (Start) bit set after a PaC receives a valid non-initial PANA-Auth-Request with 'S' (Start) bit cleared.
+ PaC收到清除了“S”（开始）位的有效非初始PANA身份验证请求后，设置了“S”（开始）位的初始PANA身份验证请求。
+ PANA-Termination-Request.
+ PANA终止请求。
* In the re-authentication phase:
* 在重新身份验证阶段：
+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ PANA客户端启动。
+ The initial PANA-Auth-Request.
+ 初始PANA身份验证请求。
* In the access phase:
* 在访问阶段：
+ PANA-Auth-Request.
+ PANA身份验证请求。
+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ PANA客户端启动。
* In the termination phase:
* 在终止阶段：
+ PANA-Client-Initiation.
+ PANA客户端启动。
+ All requests but PANA-Termination-Request and ping request.
+ 除PANA终止请求和ping请求外的所有请求。
o The message payload contains a valid set of AVPs allowed for the message type. There is no missing AVP that needs to be included in the payload, and no AVP, which needs to be at a fixed position, is included in a position different from this fixed position.
o 消息有效负载包含消息类型允许的一组有效AVP。不存在需要包含在有效载荷中的缺失AVP，也不存在需要位于固定位置的AVP，其位于与该固定位置不同的位置。
o Each AVP is recognized and decoded correctly.
o 每个AVP都被正确识别和解码。
o Once the PANA authentication succeeds in using a key-generating EAP method, the PANA-Auth-Request message that carries the EAP Success and any subsequent message in that session contains an AUTH AVP. The AVP value matches the hash value computed against the received message.
o 一旦PANA身份验证成功使用密钥生成EAP方法，则在该会话中携带EAP成功和任何后续消息的PANA Auth Request消息将包含Auth AVP。AVP值与根据接收到的消息计算的哈希值相匹配。
Invalid messages MUST be discarded in order to provide robustness against DoS attacks.
必须丢弃无效消息，以提供对DoS攻击的鲁棒性。
A PaC's IP address used for PANA can change in certain situations, e.g., when IP address reconfiguration is needed for the PaC to obtain an IP address after successful PANA authentication (see Section 3 of [RFC5193]) or when the PaC moves from one IP link to another within the same PAA's realm. In order to maintain the PANA session, the PAA needs to be notified about the change of PaC address.
在某些情况下，用于PANA的PaC的IP地址可能会发生变化，例如，当PaC需要重新配置IP地址以在成功的PANA身份验证后获得IP地址时（参见[RFC5193]第3节），或者当PaC在同一PAA领域内从一个IP链路移动到另一个IP链路时。为了维持PANA会话，需要将PaC地址的更改通知PAA。
After the PaC has changed its IP address used for PANA, it MUST send any valid PANA message. If the message that carries the new PaC IP address in the Source Address field of the IP header is valid, the PAA MUST update the PANA session with the new PaC address. If there is an established PANA SA, the message MUST be protected with an AUTH AVP.
PaC更改其用于PANA的IP地址后，必须发送任何有效的PANA消息。如果在IP报头的Source address（源地址）字段中携带新PaC IP地址的消息有效，则PAA必须使用新PaC地址更新PANA会话。如果存在已建立的PANA SA，则必须使用AUTH AVP保护消息。
The authentication and authorization phase determines the PANA session lifetime, and the lifetime is indicated to the PaC when the network access authorization succeeds. For this purpose, when the last PANA-Auth-Request message (i.e., with the 'C' (Complete) bit set) in authentication and authorization phase or re-authentication phase carries a Result-Code AVP with a value of PANA_SUCCESS, a Session-Lifetime AVP MUST also be carried in the message. A Session-Lifetime AVP MUST be ignored when included in other PANA messages.
身份验证和授权阶段确定PANA会话生存期，当网络访问授权成功时，生存期将向PaC指示。为此，当身份验证和授权阶段或重新身份验证阶段的最后一条PANA Auth请求消息（即，设置了“C”（完整）位）携带值为PANA_SUCCESS的结果代码AVP时，消息中还必须携带会话生存期AVP。会话生存期AVP包含在其他PANA消息中时必须忽略。
The lifetime is a non-negotiable parameter that can be used by the PaC to manage PANA-related state. The PaC MUST initiate the re-authentication phase before the current session lifetime expires, if it wants to extend the session.
生命周期是一个不可协商的参数，PaC可以使用它来管理与PANA相关的状态。如果要延长会话，PaC必须在当前会话生存期到期之前启动重新身份验证阶段。
The PaC and the PAA MAY use information obtained outside PANA (e.g., lower-layer indications) to expedite the detection of a disconnected peer. Availability and reliability of such indications MAY depend on a specific link-layer or network topology and are therefore only hints. A PANA peer SHOULD use the ping request and answer exchange to verify that a peer is, in fact, no longer alive, unless information obtained outside PANA is being used to expedite the detection of a disconnected peer.
PaC和PAA可以使用从PANA外部获得的信息（例如，较低层指示）来加快对断开连接的对等方的检测。此类指示的可用性和可靠性可能取决于特定链路层或网络拓扑，因此仅为提示。PANA对等方应使用ping请求和应答交换来验证对等方实际上已不存在，除非在PANA外部获得的信息用于加快检测断开连接的对等方。
The session lifetime parameter is not related to the transmission of ping request messages. These messages can be used for asynchronously verifying the liveness of the peer. The decision to send a ping request message is made locally and does not require coordination between the peers.
会话生存期参数与ping请求消息的传输无关。这些消息可用于异步验证对等方的活动性。发送ping请求消息的决定是在本地做出的，不需要对等方之间的协调。
This section defines message formats for PANA protocol.
本节定义了PANA协议的消息格式。
Any PANA message is unicast between the PaC and the PAA.
任何PANA消息都是PaC和PAA之间的单播消息。
For any PANA message sent from the peer that has initiated the PANA session, the UDP source port is set to any number on which the peer can receive incoming PANA messages, and the destination port is set to the assigned PANA port number (716). For any PANA message sent from the other peer, the source port is set to the assigned PANA port number (716), and the destination port is copied from the source port of the last received message. In case both the PaC and PAA initiate the session (i.e., PANA-Client-Initiation and unsolicited PANA-Auth-Request messages cross each other), then the PaC is identified as the initiator. All PANA peers MUST listen on the assigned PANA port number (716).
对于从发起PANA会话的对等方发送的任何PANA消息，UDP源端口设置为对等方可以接收传入PANA消息的任何号码，目标端口设置为分配的PANA端口号（716）。对于从另一对等方发送的任何PANA消息，源端口被设置为分配的PANA端口号（716），并且目标端口从最后接收到的消息的源端口复制。如果PaC和PAA都启动会话（即，PANA客户端启动和未经请求的PANA身份验证请求消息相互交叉），则PaC被标识为发起方。所有PANA对等方必须侦听分配的PANA端口号（716）。
A summary of the PANA message header format is shown below. The fields are transmitted in network byte order.
PANA消息头格式的摘要如下所示。字段以网络字节顺序传输。
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVPs ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Reserved | Message Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Flags | Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Session Identifier |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Sequence Number |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVPs ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-
Reserved
含蓄的
This 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set to zero and ignored by the receiver.
此16位字段保留供将来使用。接收器必须将其设置为零并忽略。
Message Length
消息长度
The Message Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the PANA message including the header fields.
消息长度字段为两个八位字节，表示PANA消息的长度，包括标头字段。
Flags
旗帜
The Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
标志字段是两个八位字节。分配了以下位：
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S C A P I r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|R S C A P I r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
R (Request)
R（请求）
If set, the message is a request. If cleared, the message is an answer.
如果已设置，则消息为请求。如果清除，则该消息为应答。
S (Start)
S（开始）
If set, the message is the first PANA-Auth-Request or PANA-Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
如果设置，则该消息是身份验证和授权阶段的第一个PANA Auth请求或PANA Auth应答。对于其他消息，必须清除此位。
C (Complete)
C（完整）
If set, the message is the last PANA-Auth-Request or PANA-Auth-Answer in authentication and authorization phase. For other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
如果设置，则消息是身份验证和授权阶段的最后一个PANA身份验证请求或PANA身份验证应答。对于其他消息，必须清除此位。
A (re-Authentication)
A（重新认证）
If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or PANA-Notification-Answer to initiate re-authentication. For other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
如果已设置，则消息为PANA通知请求或PANA通知应答，以启动重新身份验证。对于其他消息，必须清除此位。
P (Ping)
P（平）
If set, the message is a PANA-Notification-Request or PANA-Notification-Answer for liveness test. For other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
如果设置，则消息是活动性测试的PANA通知请求或PANA通知应答。对于其他消息，必须清除此位。
I (IP Reconfiguration)
I（IP重新配置）
If set, it indicates that the PaC is required to perform IP address reconfiguration after successful authentication and authorization phase to configure an IP address that is usable for exchanging data traffic across EP. This bit is set by the PAA only for PANA-Auth-Request messages in the authentication and authorization phase. For other messages, this bit MUST be cleared.
如果设置，则表示PaC需要在成功的身份验证和授权阶段后执行IP地址重新配置，以配置可用于在EP之间交换数据流量的IP地址。PAA仅在身份验证和授权阶段为PANA身份验证请求消息设置此位。对于其他消息，必须清除此位。
r (reserved)
r（保留）
These flag bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to zero and ignored by the receiver.
这些标志位保留供将来使用。接收器必须将它们设置为零并忽略。
Message Type
消息类型
The Message Type field is two octets, and it is used in order to communicate the message type with the message. Message Type allocation is managed by IANA [IANAWEB].
消息类型字段是两个八位字节，用于将消息类型与消息进行通信。消息类型分配由IANA[IANAWEB]管理。
Session Identifier
会话标识
This field contains a 32-bit session identifier.
此字段包含32位会话标识符。
Sequence Number
序列号
This field contains a 32-bit sequence number.
此字段包含一个32位序列号。
AVPs
AVPs
AVPs are a method of encapsulating information relevant to the PANA message. See Section 6.3 for more information on AVPs.
AVP是封装与PANA消息相关的信息的方法。有关AVP的更多信息，请参见第6.3节。
Each AVP of type OctetString MUST be padded to align on a 32-bit boundary, while other AVP types align naturally. A number of zero-valued bytes are added to the end of the AVP Value field until a word boundary is reached. The length of the padding is not reflected in the AVP Length field [RFC3588].
OctetString类型的每个AVP必须填充以在32位边界上对齐，而其他AVP类型则自然对齐。许多零值字节被添加到AVP值字段的末尾，直到达到字边界。填充的长度不反映在AVP长度字段[RFC3588]中。
The fields in the AVP are sent in network byte order. The AVP format is:
AVP中的字段按网络字节顺序发送。AVP格式为：
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Code | AVP Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id (opt) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Code | AVP Flags |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| AVP Length | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Vendor-Id (opt) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Value ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
AVP Code
AVP码
The AVP Code, together with the optional Vendor-Id field, identifies an attribute that follows. If the V-bit is not set, then the Vendor-Id is not present and the AVP Code refers to an IETF attribute.
AVP代码与可选的供应商Id字段一起标识后面的属性。如果未设置V位，则供应商Id不存在，AVP代码引用IETF属性。
AVP Flags
AVP标志
The AVP Flags field is two octets. The following bits are assigned:
AVP标志字段是两个八位字节。分配了以下位：
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
0 1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|V r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
V (Vendor)
V（供应商）
The 'V' (Vendor) bit indicates whether the optional Vendor-Id field is present in the AVP header. When set, the AVP Code belongs to the specific vendor code address space. All AVPs defined in this document MUST have the 'V' (Vendor) bit cleared.
“V”（供应商）位指示AVP标头中是否存在可选供应商Id字段。设置后，AVP代码属于特定的供应商代码地址空间。本文档中定义的所有AVP必须清除“V”（供应商）位。
r (reserved)
r（保留）
These flag bits are reserved for future use. They MUST be set to zero and ignored by the receiver.
这些标志位保留供将来使用。接收器必须将它们设置为零并忽略。
AVP Length
AVP长度
The AVP Length field is two octets, and indicates the number of octets in the Value field. The length of the AVP Code, AVP Length, AVP Flags, Reserved and Vendor-Id fields are not counted in the AVP Length value.
AVP长度字段是两个八位字节，表示值字段中的八位字节数。AVP代码长度、AVP长度、AVP标志、保留和供应商Id字段不计入AVP长度值。
Reserved
含蓄的
This two-octet field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set to zero and ignored by the receiver.
此两个八位字节字段保留供将来使用。接收器必须将其设置为零并忽略。
Vendor-Id
供应商Id
The Vendor-Id field is present if the 'V' (Vendor) bit is set in the AVP Flags field. The optional four-octet Vendor-Id field contains the IANA assigned "SMI Network Management Private Enterprise Codes" [IANAWEB] value, encoded in network byte order. Any vendor wishing to implement a vendor-specific PANA AVP MUST use their own Vendor-Id along with their privately managed AVP address space, guaranteeing that they will not collide with any other vendor's vendor-specific AVP(s) nor with future IETF applications.
如果在AVP标志字段中设置了“V”（供应商）位，则供应商Id字段存在。可选的四个八位字节的供应商Id字段包含IANA分配的“SMI网络管理私有企业代码”[IANAWEB]值，按网络字节顺序编码。任何希望实现特定于供应商的PANA AVP的供应商必须使用其自己的供应商Id及其私人管理的AVP地址空间，以确保不会与任何其他供应商的特定于供应商的AVP或未来的IETF应用程序发生冲突。
Value
价值
The Value field is zero or more octets and contains information specific to the Attribute. The format of the Value field is determined by the AVP Code and Vendor-Id fields. The length of the Value field is determined by the AVP Length field.
值字段为零个或多个八位字节，包含特定于属性的信息。值字段的格式由AVP代码和供应商Id字段确定。值字段的长度由AVP长度字段确定。
Each Request/Answer message pair is assigned a sequence number, and the sub-type (i.e., request or answer) is identified via the 'R' (Request) bit in the Message Flags field of the PANA message header.
每个请求/应答消息对分配一个序列号，子类型（即请求或应答）通过PANA消息头的消息标志字段中的“R”（请求）位进行标识。
Every PANA message MUST contain a message type in its header's Message Type field, which is used to determine the action that is to be taken for a particular message. Figure 3 lists all PANA messages defined in this document:
每个PANA消息都必须在其标头的消息类型字段中包含消息类型，该字段用于确定要对特定消息采取的操作。图3列出了本文档中定义的所有PANA消息：
Message Name Abbrev. Message PaC<->PAA Ref.
Type
---------------------------------------------------------------------
PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 2 <-------> 7.2
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 2 <-------> 7.3
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Notification-Request PNR 4 <-------> 7.6
PANA-Notification-Answer PNA 4 <-------> 7.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Message Name Abbrev. Message PaC<->PAA Ref.
Type
---------------------------------------------------------------------
PANA-Client-Initiation PCI 1 --------> 7.1
PANA-Auth-Request PAR 2 <-------> 7.2
PANA-Auth-Answer PAN 2 <-------> 7.3
PANA-Termination-Request PTR 3 <-------> 7.4
PANA-Termination-Answer PTA 3 <-------> 7.5
PANA-Notification-Request PNR 4 <-------> 7.6
PANA-Notification-Answer PNA 4 <-------> 7.7
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3: Table of PANA Messages
图3:PANA消息表
The language used for PANA message definitions (i.e., AVPs valid for that PANA message type), in Section 7.1 through Section 7.7, is defined using ABNF [RFC5234] as follows:
第7.1节至第7.7节中用于PANA消息定义的语言（即对该PANA消息类型有效的AVP）使用ABNF[RFC5234]定义如下：
message-def = Message-Name LWSP "::=" LWSP PANA-message
message-def = Message-Name LWSP "::=" LWSP PANA-message
Message-Name = PANA-name
Message-Name = PANA-name
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-name = ALPHA *(ALPHA / DIGIT / "-")
PANA-message = header LWSP *fixed LWSP *required
LWSP *optional LWSP *fixed
PANA-message = header LWSP *fixed LWSP *required
LWSP *optional LWSP *fixed
header = "<" LWSP "PANA-Header:" LWSP Message-Type [r-bit] [s-bit] [c-bit] [a-bit] [p-bit] [i-bit] LWSP ">"
header=“<”LWSP“PANA header:“LWSP消息类型[r-bit][s-bit][c-bit][a-bit][p-bit][i-bit]LWSP”>”
Message-Type = 1*DIGIT
; The Message Type assigned to the message
Message-Type = 1*DIGIT
; The Message Type assigned to the message
r-bit = ",REQ"
; If present, the 'R' (Request) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
r-bit = ",REQ"
; If present, the 'R' (Request) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a request, as opposed to an answer.
s-bit = ",STA"
; If present, the 'S' (Start) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is the initial PAR or PAN in authentication
; and authorization phase.
s-bit = ",STA"
; If present, the 'S' (Start) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is the initial PAR or PAN in authentication
; and authorization phase.
c-bit = ",COM"
; If present, the 'C' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is the final PAR and PAN in authentication
; and authorization phase or re-authentication
; phase.
c-bit = ",COM"
; If present, the 'C' bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is the final PAR and PAN in authentication
; and authorization phase or re-authentication
; phase.
a-bit = ",REA"
; If present, the 'A' (re-Authentication) bit
; in the Message Flags is set, indicating that
; the message is a re-authentication request or
; answer.
a-bit = ",REA"
; If present, the 'A' (re-Authentication) bit
; in the Message Flags is set, indicating that
; the message is a re-authentication request or
; answer.
p-bit = ",PIN"
; If present, the 'P' (Ping) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a ping request or answer.
p-bit = ",PIN"
; If present, the 'P' (Ping) bit in the Message
; Flags is set, indicating that the message
; is a ping request or answer.
i-bit = ",IPR"
; If present, the 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit
; in the Message Flags is set, indicating that
; the PaC requires IP address reconfiguration
; after successful authentication and
; authorization phase.
i-bit = ",IPR"
; If present, the 'I' (IP Reconfiguration) bit
; in the Message Flags is set, indicating that
; the PaC requires IP address reconfiguration
; after successful authentication and
; authorization phase.
fixed = [qual] "<" LWSP avp-spec LWSP ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
fixed = [qual] "<" LWSP avp-spec LWSP ">"
; Defines the fixed position of an AVP.
required = [qual] "{" LWSP avp-spec LWSP "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message.
required = [qual] "{" LWSP avp-spec LWSP "}"
; The AVP MUST be present and can appear
; anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" LWSP avp-name LWSP "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate any AVP Name that is included
; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can
; appear anywhere in the message.
optional = [qual] "[" LWSP avp-name LWSP "]"
; The avp-name in the 'optional' rule cannot
; evaluate any AVP Name that is included
; in a fixed or required rule. The AVP can
; appear anywhere in the message.
qual = [min] "*" [max]
; See ABNF conventions, RFC 5234 Section 3.6.
; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether
; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional
; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no
; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST
; be present. If an optional rule has no
; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be
; present.
;
; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning
; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above).
; These braces cannot be used to express
; optional fixed rules (such as an optional
; AUTH at the end). To do this, the convention
; is '0*1fixed'.
qual = [min] "*" [max]
; See ABNF conventions, RFC 5234 Section 3.6.
; The absence of any qualifiers depends on whether
; it precedes a fixed, required, or optional
; rule. If a fixed or required rule has no
; qualifier, then exactly one such AVP MUST
; be present. If an optional rule has no
; qualifier, then 0 or 1 such AVP may be
; present.
;
; NOTE: "[" and "]" have a different meaning
; than in ABNF (see the optional rule, above).
; These braces cannot be used to express
; optional fixed rules (such as an optional
; AUTH at the end). To do this, the convention
; is '0*1fixed'.
min = 1*DIGIT
; The minimum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is zero.
min = 1*DIGIT
; The minimum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is zero.
max = 1*DIGIT
; The maximum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is infinity. A
; value of zero implies the AVP MUST NOT be
; present.
max = 1*DIGIT
; The maximum number of times the element may
; be present. The default value is infinity. A
; value of zero implies the AVP MUST NOT be
; present.
avp-spec = PANA-name
; The avp-spec has to be an AVP Name, defined
; in the base or extended PANA protocol
; specifications.
avp-spec = PANA-name
; The avp-spec has to be an AVP Name, defined
; in the base or extended PANA protocol
; specifications.
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition.
avp-name = avp-spec / "AVP"
; The string "AVP" stands for *any* arbitrary
; AVP Name, which does not conflict with the
; required or fixed position AVPs defined in
; the message definition.
The PANA-Client-Initiation (PCI) message is used for PaC-initiated session. The Sequence Number and Session Identifier fields in this message MUST be set to zero (0).
PANA客户端启动（PCI）消息用于PaC启动的会话。此消息中的序列号和会话标识符字段必须设置为零（0）。
PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
*[ AVP ]
PANA-Client-Initiation ::= < PANA-Header: 1 >
*[ AVP ]
The PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is either sent by the PAA or the PaC.
PANA认证请求（PAR）消息由PAA或PaC发送。
The message MUST NOT have both the 'S' (Start) and 'C' (Complete) bits set.
消息不能同时设置“S”（开始）和“C”（完成）位。
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2,REQ[,STA][,COM][,IPR] >
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Nonce ]
*[ PRF-Algorithm ]
*[ Integrity-Algorithm ]
[ Result-Code ]
[ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Key-Id ]
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
PANA-Auth-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 2,REQ[,STA][,COM][,IPR] >
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Nonce ]
*[ PRF-Algorithm ]
*[ Integrity-Algorithm ]
[ Result-Code ]
[ Session-Lifetime ]
[ Key-Id ]
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
The PANA-Auth-Answer (PAN) message is sent by either the PaC or the PAA in response to a PANA-Auth-Request message.
PANA认证应答（PAN）消息由PaC或PAA发送，以响应PANA认证请求消息。
The message MUST NOT have both the 'S' (Start) and 'C' (Complete) bits set.
消息不能同时设置“S”（开始）和“C”（完成）位。
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2[,STA][,COM] >
[ Nonce ]
[ PRF-Algorithm ]
[ Integrity-Algorithm ]
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ]
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
PANA-Auth-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 2[,STA][,COM] >
[ Nonce ]
[ PRF-Algorithm ]
[ Integrity-Algorithm ]
[ EAP-Payload ]
[ Key-Id ]
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
The PANA-Termination-Request (PTR) message is sent either by the PaC or the PAA to terminate a PANA session.
PANA终止请求（PTR）消息由PaC或PAA发送，以终止PANA会话。
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3,REQ >
< Termination-Cause >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
PANA-Termination-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 3,REQ >
< Termination-Cause >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
The PANA-Termination-Answer (PTA) message is sent either by the PaC or the PAA in response to PANA-Termination-Request.
PANA终止应答（PTA）消息由PaC或PAA发送，以响应PANA终止请求。
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
PANA-Termination-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 3 >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
The PANA-Notification-Request (PNR) message is used for signaling re-authentication and performing liveness test. See Section 4.3 and Section 4.2 for details on re-authentication and liveness test, respectively.
PANA通知请求（PNR）消息用于发出重新身份验证信号并执行活动性测试。有关重新认证和活性测试的详细信息，请分别参见第4.3节和第4.2节。
The message MUST have one of the 'A' (re-Authentication) and 'P' (Ping) bits exclusively set.
消息必须专门设置“A”（重新身份验证）和“P”（Ping）位之一。
PANA-Notification-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4,REQ[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
PANA-Notification-Request ::= < PANA-Header: 4,REQ[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
The PANA-Notification-Answer (PNA) message is sent by the PAA (PaC) to the PaC (PAA) in response to a PANA-Notification-Request from the PaC (PAA).
PAA通知应答（PNA）消息由PAA（PaC）发送给PaC（PAA），以响应来自PaC（PAA）的PAA通知请求。
The message MUST have one of the 'A' (re-Authentication) and 'P' (Ping) bits exclusively set.
消息必须专门设置“A”（重新身份验证）和“P”（Ping）位之一。
PANA-Notification-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
PANA-Notification-Answer ::= < PANA-Header: 4[,REA][,PIN] >
*[ AVP ]
0*1< AUTH >
This document uses AVP Value Format such as 'OctetString' and 'Unsigned32' as defined in Section 4.2 of [RFC3588]. The definitions of these data formats are not repeated in this document.
本文件使用[RFC3588]第4.2节中定义的AVP值格式，如“OctetString”和“Unsigned32”。本文件不重复这些数据格式的定义。
The following table lists the AVPs used in this document, and specifies in which PANA messages they MAY or MAY NOT be present.
下表列出了本文档中使用的AVP，并指定了它们可能存在或不存在于哪些PANA消息中。
The table uses the following symbols:
该表使用以下符号：
0 The AVP MUST NOT be present in the message.
0消息中不得出现AVP。
0-1 Zero or one instance of the AVP MAY be present in the message. It is considered an error if there is more than one instance of the AVP.
0-1消息中可能存在零个或一个AVP实例。如果AVP有多个实例，则视为错误。
1 One instance of the AVP MUST be present in the message.
1消息中必须有一个AVP实例。
0+ Zero or more instances of the AVP MAY be present in the message.
消息中可能存在0+零个或多个AVP实例。
+---------------------------+
| Message Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PCI|PAR|PAN|PTR|PTA|PNR|PNA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
AUTH | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Integrity-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PRF-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
+---------------------------+
| Message Type |
+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Attribute Name |PCI|PAR|PAN|PTR|PTA|PNR|PNA|
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
AUTH | 0 |0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|0-1|
EAP-Payload | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Integrity-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Key-Id | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Nonce | 0 |0-1|0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
PRF-Algorithm | 0 |0+ |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Result-Code | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Session-Lifetime | 0 |0-1| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Termination-Cause | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
----------------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
Figure 4: AVP Occurrence Table
图4:AVP发生表
The AUTH AVP (AVP Code 1) is used to integrity protect PANA messages. The AVP data payload contains the Message Authentication Code encoded in network byte order. The AVP length varies depending on the integrity algorithm used. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
AUTH AVP（AVP代码1）用于保护PANA消息的完整性。AVP数据有效载荷包含以网络字节顺序编码的消息认证码。AVP长度根据使用的完整性算法而变化。AVP数据的类型为OctetString。
The EAP-Payload AVP (AVP Code 2) is used for encapsulating the actual EAP message that is being exchanged between the EAP peer and the EAP authenticator. The AVP data is of type OctetString.
EAP有效负载AVP（AVP代码2）用于封装EAP对等方和EAP验证器之间正在交换的实际EAP消息。AVP数据的类型为OctetString。
The Integrity-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 3) is used for conveying the integrity algorithm to compute an AUTH AVP. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an Internet Key Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2) Transform ID of Transform Type 3 [RFC4306] for the integrity algorithm. All PANA implementations MUST support AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160 (7) [RFC4595].
完整性算法AVP（AVP代码3）用于传输完整性算法以计算认证AVP。AVP数据的类型为Unsigned32。AVP数据包含完整性算法转换类型为3[RFC4306]的互联网密钥交换协议版本2（IKEv2）转换ID。所有PANA实现必须支持AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_160（7）[RFC4595]。
The Key-Id AVP (AVP Code 4) is of type Integer32 and contains an MSK identifier. The MSK identifier is assigned by PAA and MUST be unique within the PANA session.
密钥Id AVP（AVP代码4）为Integer32类型，包含MSK标识符。MSK标识符由PAA分配，在PANA会话中必须是唯一的。
The Nonce AVP (AVP Code 5) carries a randomly chosen value that is used in cryptographic key computations. The recommendations in [RFC4086] apply with regard to generation of random values. The AVP data is of type OctetString, and it contains a randomly generated value in opaque format. The data length MUST be between 8 and 256 octets, inclusive.
Nonce AVP（AVP代码5）携带用于加密密钥计算的随机选择的值。[RFC4086]中的建议适用于随机值的生成。AVP数据的类型为OctetString，它包含一个不透明格式的随机生成的值。数据长度必须介于8到256个八位字节之间（含8到256个八位字节）。
The length of the nonces are determined based on the available pseudo-random functions (PRFs) and the degree of trust placed into the PaC and the PAA to compute random values. The length of the random value for the nonce is determined in one of two ways, depending on whether:
根据可用的伪随机函数（PRF）和PaC和PAA中用于计算随机值的信任度来确定nonce的长度。nonce的随机值的长度通过以下两种方式之一确定：
1. The PaC and the PAA each are likely to be able to compute a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length of the nonce has to be 1/2 the length of the PRF key (e.g., 10 octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
1. PaC和PAA都可能能够计算随机的nonce（根据[RFC4086]）。nonce的长度必须是PRF密钥长度的1/2（例如，在HMAC-SHA1的情况下为10个八位字节）。
2. The PaC and the PAA each are not trusted with regard to the computation of a random nonce (according to [RFC4086]). The length of the nonce has to have the full length of the PRF key (e.g., 20 octets in the case of HMAC-SHA1).
2. PaC和PAA在计算随机时值方面都不可信（根据[RFC4086]）。nonce的长度必须具有PRF密钥的全长（例如，在HMAC-SHA1的情况下为20个八位字节）。
Furthermore, the strongest available PRF for PANA has to be considered in this computation. Currently, only a single PRF (namely HMAC-SHA1) is available and therefore the maximum output length is 20 octets. Therefore, the maximum length of the nonce value SHOULD be 20 octets.
此外，在该计算中必须考虑PANA的最强可用PRF。目前，只有一个PRF（即HMAC-SHA1）可用，因此最大输出长度为20个八位字节。因此，nonce值的最大长度应为20个八位字节。
The PRF-Algorithm AVP (AVP Code 6) is used for conveying the pseudo-random function to derive PANA_AUTH_KEY. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32. The AVP data contains an IKEv2 Transform ID of Transform Type 2 [RFC4306]. All PANA implementations MUST support PRF_HMAC_SHA1 (2) [RFC2104].
PRF算法AVP（AVP代码6）用于传输伪随机函数以导出PANA_AUTH_密钥。AVP数据的类型为Unsigned32。AVP数据包含变换类型2[RFC4306]的IKEv2变换ID。所有PANA实施必须支持PRF_HMAC_SHA1（2）[RFC2104]。
The Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) is of type Unsigned32 and indicates whether an EAP authentication was completed successfully. Result-Code AVP values are described below.
结果代码AVP（AVP代码7）的类型为Unsigned32，指示EAP身份验证是否成功完成。结果代码AVP值如下所述。
PANA_SUCCESS 0
帕纳乌成功0
Both authentication and authorization processes are successful.
身份验证和授权过程都是成功的。
PANA_AUTHENTICATION_REJECTED 1
PANA_认证被拒绝1
Authentication has failed. When authentication fails, authorization is also considered to have failed.
身份验证失败。当身份验证失败时，授权也被视为失败。
PANA_AUTHORIZATION_REJECTED 2
PANA_授权被拒绝2
The authorization process has failed. This error could occur when authorization is rejected by a AAA server or rejected locally by a PAA, even if the authentication procedure has succeeded.
授权过程失败。当AAA服务器拒绝授权或PAA本地拒绝授权时，即使身份验证过程已成功，也可能发生此错误。
The Session-Lifetime AVP (AVP Code 8) contains the number of seconds remaining before the current session is considered expired. The AVP data is of type Unsigned32.
会话生存期AVP（AVP代码8）包含当前会话被视为过期之前剩余的秒数。AVP数据的类型为Unsigned32。
The Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) is used for indicating the reason why a session is terminated by the requester. The AVP data is of type Enumerated. The following Termination-Cause data values are used with PANA.
终止原因AVP（AVP代码9）用于指示请求者终止会话的原因。AVP数据属于枚举类型。以下终止原因数据值与PANA一起使用。
LOGOUT 1 (PaC -> PAA)
注销1（PaC->PAA）
The client initiated a disconnect.
客户端启动了断开连接。
ADMINISTRATIVE 4 (PAA -> PaC)
行政4（PAA->PaC）
The client was not granted access or was disconnected due to administrative reasons.
由于管理原因，客户端未被授予访问权限或已断开连接。
SESSION_TIMEOUT 8 (PAA -> PaC)
会话超时8（PAA->PaC）
The session has timed out, and service has been terminated.
会话已超时，服务已终止。
The PANA protocol provides retransmissions for the PANA-Client-Initiation message and all request messages.
PANA协议为PANA客户端启动消息和所有请求消息提供重传。
PANA retransmission timers are based on the model used in DHCPv6 [RFC3315]. Variables used here are also borrowed from this specification. PANA is a request/response-based protocol. The message exchange terminates when the requester successfully receives the answer, or the message exchange is considered to have failed according to the retransmission mechanism described below.
PANA重传定时器基于DHCPv6[RFC3315]中使用的型号。此处使用的变量也借用了本规范。PANA是一种基于请求/响应的协议。当请求者成功接收到应答时，消息交换终止，或者根据下面描述的重传机制，消息交换被认为失败。
The retransmission behavior is controlled and described by the following variables:
重传行为由以下变量控制和描述：
RT Retransmission timeout from the previous (re)transmission
上次（重新）传输的RT重新传输超时
IRT Base value for RT for the initial retransmission
初始重传的RT的IRT基值
MRC Maximum retransmission count
最大重传计数
MRT Maximum retransmission time
最大重传时间
MRD Maximum retransmission duration
最大重传持续时间
RAND Randomization factor
兰德随机化因子
With each message transmission or retransmission, the sender sets RT according to the rules given below. If RT expires before the message exchange terminates, the sender recomputes RT and retransmits the message.
在每次消息传输或重传时，发送方根据下面给出的规则设置RT。如果RT在消息交换终止之前过期，发送方将重新计算RT并重新传输消息。
Each of the computations of a new RT include a randomization factor (RAND), which is a random number chosen with a uniform distribution between -0.1 and +0.1. The randomization factor is included to minimize the synchronization of messages.
新RT的每次计算都包括一个随机化因子（RAND），它是一个均匀分布在-0.1和+0.1之间的随机数。包括随机化因子以最小化消息的同步。
The algorithm for choosing a random number does not need to be cryptographically sound. The algorithm SHOULD produce a different sequence of random numbers from each invocation.
选择一个随机数的算法不需要在密码上可靠。算法应该从每次调用中产生不同的随机数序列。
RT for the first message retransmission is based on IRT:
第一次消息重传的RT基于IRT：
RT = IRT + RAND*IRT
RT = IRT + RAND*IRT
RT for each subsequent message retransmission is based on the previous value of RT:
每次后续消息重传的RT基于先前的RT值：
RT = 2*RTprev + RAND*RTprev
RT = 2*RTprev + RAND*RTprev
MRT specifies an upper bound on the value of RT (disregarding the randomization added by the use of RAND). If MRT has a value of 0, there is no upper limit on the value of RT. Otherwise:
MRT指定RT值的上限（忽略使用RAND增加的随机化）。如果MRT的值为0，则RT的值没有上限。否则：
if (RT > MRT)
RT = MRT + RAND*MRT
if (RT > MRT)
RT = MRT + RAND*MRT
MRC specifies an upper bound on the number of times a sender may retransmit a message. Unless MRC is zero, the message exchange fails once the sender has transmitted the message MRC times.
MRC指定发送方可以重新传输消息的次数上限。除非MRC为零，否则一旦发送方发送消息MRC次，消息交换将失败。
MRD specifies an upper bound on the length of time a sender may retransmit a message. Unless MRD is zero, the message exchange fails once MRD seconds have elapsed since the client first transmitted the message.
MRD指定发送方可以重新传输消息的时间长度上限。除非MRD为零，否则自客户端首次传输消息以来，一旦MRD秒过去，消息交换就会失败。
If both MRC and MRD are non-zero, the message exchange fails whenever either of the conditions specified in the previous two paragraphs are met.
如果MRC和MRD均为非零，则只要满足前两段中指定的任一条件，消息交换就会失败。
If both MRC and MRD are zero, the client continues to transmit the message until it receives a response.
如果MRC和MRD都为零，则客户端将继续传输消息，直到收到响应为止。
This section presents a table of values used to describe the message retransmission behavior of PANA requests (REQ_*) and PANA-Client-Initiation message (PCI_*). The table shows default values.
本节提供了一个值表，用于描述PANA请求（REQ_*）和PANA客户端启动消息（PCI_*）的消息重传行为。该表显示了默认值。
Parameter Default Description
---------------------------------------------------------------------
PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PCI_MRC 0 Max PCI retransmission attempts.
PCI_MRD 0 Max PCI retransmission duration.
Parameter Default Description
---------------------------------------------------------------------
PCI_IRT 1 sec Initial PCI timeout.
PCI_MRT 120 secs Max PCI timeout value.
PCI_MRC 0 Max PCI retransmission attempts.
PCI_MRD 0 Max PCI retransmission duration.
REQ_IRT 1 sec Initial Request timeout. REQ_MRT 30 secs Max Request timeout value. REQ_MRC 10 Max Request retransmission attempts. REQ_MRD 0 Max Request retransmission duration.
请求IRT 1秒初始请求超时。请求MRT 30秒最大请求超时值。REQ_MRC 10最大请求重传尝试次数。REQ_MRD 0最大请求重传持续时间。
So, for example, the first RT for the PANA-Auth-Request (PAR) message is calculated using REQ_IRT as the IRT:
因此，例如，PANA Auth Request（PAR）消息的第一个RT是使用REQ_IRT作为IRT计算的：
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
RT = REQ_IRT + RAND*REQ_IRT
This section provides guidance to the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) regarding the registration of values related to the PANA protocol, in accordance with BCP 26 [IANA]. The following policies are used here with the meanings defined in BCP 26: "Private Use", "First Come First Served", "Expert Review", "Specification Required", "IETF Consensus", and "Standards Action".
本节根据BCP 26[IANA]，为互联网分配号码管理局（IANA）提供有关PANA协议相关值注册的指南。以下政策的含义见BCP 26：“私人使用”、“先到先得”、“专家评审”、“所需规范”、“IETF共识”和“标准行动”。
This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document.
本节解释IANA在本文档中定义的名称空间内分配数字时使用的标准。
For registration requests where a Designated Expert should be consulted, the responsible IESG Area Director should appoint the Designated Expert. For Designated Expert with Specification Required, the request is posted to the PANA WG mailing list (or, if it has been disbanded, a successor designated by the Area Director) for comment and review, and MUST include a pointer to a public specification. Before a period of 30 days has passed, the Designated Expert will either approve or deny the registration request and
对于需要咨询指定专家的注册请求，IESG区域负责人应任命指定专家。对于需要规范的指定专家，请求将被发布到PANA工作组邮件列表（或者，如果已解散，则由区域总监指定的继任者）以供评论和审查，并且必须包含指向公共规范的指针。在30天内，指定专家将批准或拒绝注册请求，并
publish a notice of the decision to the PANA WG mailing list or its successor. A denial notice must be justified by an explanation and, in the cases where it is possible, concrete suggestions on how the request can be modified so as to become acceptable.
向PANA WG邮件列表或其继任者发布决定通知。拒绝通知必须有理由作出解释，并在可能的情况下，就如何修改请求以使其成为可接受的请求提出具体建议。
IANA has created a registry for PANA.
IANA已经为PANA创建了一个注册表。
PANA uses one well-known UDP port number (see Section 6.1), which has been assigned by the IANA (716).
PANA使用IANA（716）分配的一个众所周知的UDP端口号（见第6.1节）。
As defined in Section 6.2, the PANA message header contains two fields that require IANA namespace management; the Message Type and Flags fields.
如第6.2节所定义，PANA消息头包含两个需要IANA命名空间管理的字段；消息类型和标志字段。
The Message Type namespace is used to identify PANA messages. Message Type 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. The range of values 1 - 65,519 are for permanent, standard message types, allocated by IETF Consensus [IANA]. This document defines the range of values 1 - 4. The same Message Type is used for both the request and the answer messages, except for type 1. The Request bit distinguishes requests from answers. See Section 7 for the assignment of the namespace in this specification.
消息类型命名空间用于标识PANA消息。消息类型0未使用，且未由IANA分配。值1-65519的范围适用于IETF Consensus[IANA]分配的永久性标准消息类型。本文件定义了值1-4的范围。除了类型1之外，请求和应答消息都使用相同的消息类型。请求位区分请求和应答。有关本规范中名称空间的分配，请参见第7节。
The range of values 65,520 - 65,535 (hexadecimal values 0xfff0 - 0xffff) are reserved for experimental messages. As these codes are only for experimental and testing purposes, no guarantee is made for interoperability between the communicating PaC and PAA using experimental commands, as outlined in [IANA-EXP].
值65520-65535（十六进制值0xfff0-0xffff）的范围保留给实验消息。由于这些代码仅用于实验和测试目的，因此无法保证使用实验命令进行通信的PaC和PAA之间的互操作性，如[IANA-EXP]中所述。
There are 16 bits in the Flags field of the PANA message header. This document assigns bit 0 ('R'), 1 ('S'), 2 ('C'), 3 ('A'), 4 ('P'), and 5 ('I') in Section 6.2. The remaining bits MUST only be assigned via a Standards Action [IANA].
PANA消息头的标志字段中有16位。本文件在第6.2节中指定了第0位（“R”）、第1位（“S”）、第2位（“C”）、第3位（“A”）、第4位（“P”）和第5位（“I”）。剩余位只能通过标准操作[IANA]分配。
As defined in Section 6.3, the AVP header contains three fields that require IANA namespace management; the AVP Code, AVP Flags, and Vendor-Id fields, where only the AVP Code and AVP Flags created new namespaces.
如第6.3节所定义，AVP头包含三个需要IANA名称空间管理的字段；AVP代码、AVP标志和供应商Id字段，其中只有AVP代码和AVP标志创建了新名称空间。
The 16-bit AVP code namespace is used to identify attributes. There are multiple namespaces. Vendors can have their own AVP codes namespace, which will be identified by their Vendor-Id (also known as Enterprise-Number), and they control the assignments of their vendor-specific AVP codes within their own namespace. The absence of a Vendor-Id identifies the IETF IANA controlled AVP codes namespace. The AVP codes, and sometimes also possible values in an AVP, are controlled and maintained by IANA.
16位AVP代码命名空间用于标识属性。有多个名称空间。供应商可以拥有自己的AVP代码名称空间，该名称空间将由其供应商Id（也称为企业编号）标识，并且他们可以在自己的名称空间内控制其供应商特定AVP代码的分配。缺少供应商Id标识IETF IANA控制的AVP代码命名空间。AVP代码，有时也包括AVP中的可能值，由IANA控制和维护。
AVP Code 0 is not used and is not assigned by IANA. This document defines the AVP Codes 1-9. See Section 8.1 through Section 8.9 for the assignment of the namespace in this specification.
AVP代码0未使用，且未由IANA分配。本文件定义了AVP代码1-9。有关本规范中名称空间的分配，请参见第8.1节至第8.9节。
AVPs may be allocated following Designated Expert Review with Specification Required [IANA] or Standards Action.
AVP可在指定专家审查后分配，并附有所需规范[IANA]或标准行动。
Note that PANA defines a mechanism for Vendor-Specific AVPs, where the Vendor-Id field in the AVP header is set to a non-zero value. Vendor-Specific AVP codes are for Private Use and should be encouraged instead of allocation of global attribute types, for functions specific only to one vendor's implementation of PANA, where no interoperability is deemed useful. Where a Vendor-Specific AVP is implemented by more than one vendor, allocation of global AVPs should be encouraged instead.
请注意，PANA为特定于供应商的AVP定义了一种机制，其中AVP头中的供应商Id字段设置为非零值。特定于供应商的AVP代码仅供私人使用，应鼓励使用，而不是分配全局属性类型，用于仅针对一家供应商的PANA实施的功能，在这种情况下，互操作性被认为是无用的。如果供应商特定的AVP由多个供应商实施，则应鼓励分配全球AVP。
There are 16 bits in the AVP Flags field of the AVP header, defined in Section 6.3. This document assigns bit 0 ('V'). The remaining bits should only be assigned via a Standards Action .
第6.3节定义的AVP报头的AVP标志字段中有16位。本文件分配第0位（“V”）。剩余的位只能通过标准操作分配。
Certain AVPs in PANA define a list of values with various meanings. For attributes other than those specified in this section, adding additional values to the list can be done on a First Come, First Served basis by IANA [IANA].
PANA中的某些AVP定义了具有各种含义的值列表。对于本节规定以外的属性，IANA[IANA]可以在先到先得的基础上向列表中添加其他值。
As defined in Section 8.7, the Result-Code AVP (AVP Code 7) defines the values 0-2.
如第8.7节所述，结果代码AVP（AVP代码7）定义了值0-2。
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus [IANA].
所有剩余值可通过IETF共识[IANA]分配。
As defined in Section 8.9, the Termination-Cause AVP (AVP Code 9) defines the values 1, 4, and 8.
如第8.9节所述，终止原因AVP（AVP代码9）定义了值1、4和8。
All remaining values are available for assignment via IETF Consensus [IANA].
所有剩余值可通过IETF共识[IANA]分配。
The PANA protocol defines a UDP-based EAP encapsulation that runs between two IP-enabled nodes. Various security threats that are relevant to a protocol of this nature are outlined in [RFC4016]. Security considerations stemming from the use of EAP and EAP methods are discussed in [RFC3748] [EAP-KEYING]. This section provides a discussion on the security-related issues that are related to PANA framework and protocol design.
PANA协议定义了在两个启用IP的节点之间运行的基于UDP的EAP封装。[RFC4016]中概述了与此类协议相关的各种安全威胁。[RFC3748][EAP-KEYING]中讨论了使用EAP和EAP方法时产生的安全注意事项。本节讨论与PANA框架和协议设计相关的安全相关问题。
An important element in assessing the security of PANA design and deployment in a network is the presence of lower-layer security. In the context of this document, lower layers are said to be secure if the environment provides adequate protection against spoofing and confidentiality based on its operational needs. For example, DSL and cdma2000 networks' lower-layer security is enabled even before running the first PANA-based authentication. In the absence of such a preestablished secure channel prior to running PANA, one can be created after the successful PANA authentication using a link-layer or network-layer cryptographic mechanism (e.g., IPsec).
评估网络中PANA设计和部署的安全性的一个重要因素是存在较低层的安全性。在本文档中，如果环境根据其操作需要提供足够的防欺骗和保密保护，则较低层称为安全层。例如，DSL和cdma2000网络的低层安全性甚至在运行第一个基于PANA的身份验证之前就已启用。在运行PANA之前没有预先建立的安全通道的情况下，可以使用链路层或网络层加密机制（例如，IPsec）在成功的PANA认证之后创建一个安全通道。
PANA provides multiple mechanisms to secure a PANA session.
PANA提供多种机制来保护PANA会话。
PANA messages carry sequence numbers, which are monotonically incremented by 1 with every new request message. These numbers are randomly initialized at the beginning of the session, and they are verified against expected numbers upon receipt. A message whose sequence number is different than the expected one is silently discarded. In addition to accomplishing orderly delivery of EAP
PANA消息携带序列号，随着每个新请求消息的增加，序列号单调递增1。这些数字在会话开始时随机初始化，并在收到时根据预期数字进行验证。序列号与预期序列号不同的消息将被静默丢弃。除了完成EAP的有序交付
messages and duplicate elimination, this scheme also helps prevent an adversary from spoofing messages to disturb ongoing PANA and EAP sessions unless it can also eavesdrop to synchronize with the expected sequence number. Furthermore, impact of replay attacks is reduced as any stale message (i.e., a request or answer with an unexpected sequence number and/or a session identifier for a non-existing session) and any duplicate answer are immediately discarded, and a duplicate request can trigger transmission of the cached answer (i.e., no need to process the request and generate a new answer).
消息和重复消除，此方案还有助于防止对手欺骗消息以干扰正在进行的PANA和EAP会话，除非它还可以窃听以与预期序列号同步。此外，重播攻击的影响随着任何陈旧消息（即，具有非现有会话的意外序列号和/或会话标识符的请求或应答）和任何重复应答被立即丢弃而降低，并且重复请求可以触发缓存应答的传输（即，无需处理请求并生成新答案）。
The PANA framework defines EP, which is ideally located on a network device that can filter traffic from the PaCs before the traffic enters the Internet/intranet. A set of filters can be used to discard unauthorized packets, such as the initial PANA-Auth-Request message that is received from the segment of the access network, where only the PaCs are supposed to be connected (i.e., preventing PAA impersonation).
PANA框架定义了EP，EP理想地位于网络设备上，可以在流量进入Internet/intranet之前过滤来自PaCs的流量。一组过滤器可用于丢弃未经授权的数据包，例如从接入网络的网段接收的初始PANA Auth请求消息，其中仅应连接PAC（即，防止PAA模拟）。
The protocol also provides authentication and integrity protection to PANA messages when the used EAP method can generate cryptographic session keys. A PANA SA is generated based on the MSK exported by the EAP method. This SA is used for generating an AUTH AVP to protect the PANA message header and payload (including the complete EAP message).
当使用的EAP方法可以生成加密会话密钥时，该协议还为PANA消息提供身份验证和完整性保护。PANA SA基于EAP方法导出的MSK生成。此SA用于生成验证AVP，以保护PANA消息头和有效负载（包括完整的EAP消息）。
The cryptographic protection prevents an adversary from acting as a man-in-the-middle, injecting messages, replaying messages and modifying the content of the exchanged messages. Any packet that fails to pass the AUTH verification is silently discarded. The earliest this protection can be enabled is when the PANA-Auth-Request message that signals a successful authentication (EAP Success) is generated. Starting with these messages, any subsequent PANA message can be cryptographically protected until the session gets torn down.
加密保护可防止对手充当中间人、注入消息、重放消息和修改交换消息的内容。任何未能通过身份验证的数据包都会被自动丢弃。最早可以启用此保护的时间是在生成表示成功身份验证（EAP Success）的PANA Auth请求消息时。从这些消息开始，任何后续的PANA消息都可以受到加密保护，直到会话中断。
The lifetime of the PANA SA is set to the PANA session lifetime, which is bounded by the authorization lifetime granted by the authentication server. An implementation MAY add a grace period to that value. Unless the PANA session is extended by executing another EAP authentication, the PANA SA is removed when the current session expires.
PANA SA的生存期设置为PANA会话生存期，该生存期受身份验证服务器授予的授权生存期的限制。实现可以为该值添加一个宽限期。除非通过执行另一个EAP身份验证来扩展PANA会话，否则当前会话过期时将删除PANA SA。
The ability to use cryptographic protection within PANA is determined by the used EAP method, which is generally dictated by the deployment environment. Insecure lower layers necessitate the use of key-generating EAP methods. In networks where lower layers are already secured, cryptographic protection of PANA messages is not necessary.
在PANA中使用加密保护的能力由使用的EAP方法决定，这通常由部署环境决定。不安全的下层需要使用密钥生成EAP方法。在较低层已经安全的网络中，不需要对PANA消息进行加密保护。
The initial PANA-Auth-Request and PANA-Auth-Answer exchange is vulnerable to spoofing attacks as these messages are not authenticated and integrity protected. In order to prevent very basic DoS attacks, an adversary should not be able to cause state creation by sending PANA-Client-Initiation messages to the PAA. This protection is achieved by allowing the responder (PAA) to create as little state as possible in the initial message exchange. However, it is difficult to prevent all spoofing attacks in the initial message exchange entirely.
初始PANA身份验证请求和PANA身份验证应答交换容易受到欺骗攻击，因为这些消息未经身份验证且完整性未受到保护。为了防止非常基本的DoS攻击，对手不能通过向PAA发送PANA客户端启动消息来创建状态。这种保护是通过允许响应者（PAA）在初始消息交换中创建尽可能少的状态来实现的。然而，很难完全防止初始消息交换中的所有欺骗攻击。
Eavesdropping EAP messages might cause problems when the EAP method is weak and enables dictionary or replay attacks or even allows an adversary to learn the long-term password directly. Furthermore, if the optional EAP Response/Identity payload is used, then it allows the adversary to learn the identity of the PaC. In such a case, a privacy problem is prevalent.
窃听EAP消息可能会在EAP方法很弱并且启用字典或重播攻击，甚至允许对手直接学习长期密码时引发问题。此外，如果使用可选的EAP响应/标识有效载荷，则它允许对手了解PaC的标识。在这种情况下，隐私问题很普遍。
To prevent these threats, [RFC5193] suggests using proper EAP methods for particular environments. Depending on the deployment environment, an EAP authentication method that supports user-identity confidentiality, protection against dictionary attacks, and session-key establishment must be used. It is therefore the responsibility of the network operators and users to choose a proper EAP method.
为了防止这些威胁，[RFC5193]建议针对特定环境使用适当的EAP方法。根据部署环境，必须使用EAP身份验证方法，该方法支持用户身份保密性、防止字典攻击和会话密钥建立。因此，网络运营商和用户有责任选择合适的EAP方法。
When the EAP method exports an MSK, this key is used to produce a PANA SA with PANA_AUTH_KEY with a distinct key ID. The PANA_AUTH_KEY is unique to the PANA session, and it takes PANA-based nonce values into computation to cryptographically separate itself from the MSK.
当EAP方法导出MSK时，此密钥用于生成具有PANA_AUTH_密钥且密钥ID不同的PANA SA。PANA_AUTH_密钥对于PANA会话是唯一的，它将基于PANA的nonce值带入计算中，以加密方式将自身与MSK分离。
The PANA_AUTH_KEY is solely used for the authentication and integrity protection of the PANA messages within the designated session.
PANA_AUTH_密钥仅用于指定会话中PANA消息的身份验证和完整性保护。
The PANA SA lifetime is bounded by the MSK lifetime. Another execution of the EAP method yields a new MSK, and it updates the PANA SA, PANA_AUTH_KEY, and key ID.
PANA SA寿命受MSK寿命的限制。EAP方法的另一次执行将生成一个新的MSK，并更新PANA SA、PANA_AUTH_密钥和密钥ID。
Networks that are not secured at the lower layers prior to running PANA can rely on enabling per-packet data-traffic ciphering upon successful PANA SA establishment. The PANA framework allows generation of cryptographic keys from the PANA SA and uses the keys with a secure association protocol to enable per-packet cryptographic protection, such as link-layer or IPsec-based ciphering [PANA-IPSEC]. These mechanisms ultimately establish a cryptographic binding between the data traffic generated by and for a client and the authenticated identity of the client. Data traffic can be data origin authenticated, replay and integrity protected, and optionally encrypted using the cryptographic keys. How these keys are generated from the PANA SA and used with a secure association protocol is outside the scope of this document.
在运行PANA之前在较低层不安全的网络可以依赖于在成功建立PANA SA后启用每包数据流量加密。PANA框架允许从PANA SA生成加密密钥，并使用具有安全关联协议的密钥来启用每包加密保护，例如链路层或基于IPsec的加密[PANA-IPsec]。这些机制最终在客户机生成的数据通信量和客户机的身份验证之间建立加密绑定。可以对数据通信进行数据源身份验证、重播和完整性保护，并可以选择使用加密密钥进行加密。这些密钥如何从PANA SA生成并与安全关联协议一起使用不在本文档范围内。
The PANA framework allows separation of PAA from EP. The protocol exchange between the PAA and EP for provisioning authorized PaC information on the EP must be protected for authentication, integrity, and replay protection.
PANA框架允许将PAA与EP分离。PAA和EP之间用于在EP上提供授权PaC信息的协议交换必须受到身份验证、完整性和重播保护的保护。
A PANA session is associated with a session lifetime. The session is terminated unless it is refreshed by a new round of EAP authentication before it expires. Therefore, the latest a disconnected client can be detected is when its session expires. A disconnect may also be detected earlier by using PANA ping messages.
PANA会话与会话生存期相关联。除非在会话过期之前通过新一轮EAP身份验证刷新会话，否则会话将终止。因此，可以检测到的最新断开连接的客户端是在其会话过期时。也可以使用PANA ping消息更早地检测到断开连接。
A request message can be generated by either PaC or PAA at any time in access phase with the expectation that the peer responds with an answer message. A successful round-trip of this exchange is a simple verification that the peer is alive.
PaC或PAA可以在访问阶段的任何时候生成请求消息，并期望对等方以应答消息进行响应。此交换的成功往返只是简单地验证对等方是否活动。
This test can be engaged when there is a possibility that the peer might have disconnected (e.g., after the discontinuation of data traffic for an extended period of time). Periodic use of this exchange as a keep-alive requires additional care, as it might result in congestion and hence false alarms.
当对等方可能已断开连接时（例如，在数据通信中断较长时间后），可以进行此测试。定期将此交换用作保持活动需要额外小心，因为它可能会导致拥塞，从而导致错误警报。
This exchange is cryptographically protected when a PANA SA is available in order to prevent threats associated with the abuse of this functionality.
当PANA SA可用时，此交换受到加密保护，以防止与滥用此功能相关的威胁。
Any valid PANA answer message received in response to a recently sent request message can be taken as an indication of a peer's liveness. The PaC or PAA MAY forgo sending an explicit ping request message if a recent exchange has already confirmed that the peer is alive.
为响应最近发送的请求消息而接收的任何有效PANA应答消息都可以被视为对等方活跃性的指示。如果最近的交换已经确认对等方处于活动状态，PaC或PAA可能会放弃发送显式ping请求消息。
The PANA protocol supports the ability for both the PaC and the PAA to transmit a tear-down message before the session lifetime expires. This message causes state removal, a stop of the accounting procedure and removes the installed per-PaC state on the EP(s). This message is cryptographically protected when PANA SA is present.
PANA协议支持PaC和PAA在会话生存期到期之前传输中断消息的能力。此消息导致状态删除，停止记帐过程，并删除EP上已安装的每PaC状态。当PANA SA存在时，此消息受加密保护。
We would like to thank Mark Townsley, Jari Arkko, Mohan Parthasarathy, Julien Bournelle, Rafael Marin Lopez, Pasi Eronen, Randy Turner, Erik Nordmark, Lionel Morand, Avi Lior, Susan Thomson, Giaretta Gerardo, Joseph Salowey, Sasikanth Bharadwaj, Spencer Dawkins, Tom Yu, Bernard Aboba, Subir Das, John Vollbrecht, Prakash Jayaraman, and all members of the PANA working group for their valuable comments on this document.
我们要感谢马克·汤斯利、贾里·阿尔科、莫汉·帕塔萨拉西、朱利安·博内尔、拉斐尔·马林·洛佩兹、帕西·埃隆、兰迪·特纳、埃里克·诺德马克、莱昂内尔·莫兰德、阿维·利奥、苏珊·汤姆森、贾雷塔·杰拉尔多、约瑟夫·萨洛维、萨西坎·巴拉德瓦、斯宾塞·道金斯、汤姆·余、伯纳德·阿博巴、萨比尔·达斯、约翰·沃尔布雷希特、普拉卡什·贾亚拉姆、，感谢PANA工作组全体成员对本文件的宝贵意见。
[RFC2104] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104, February 1997.
[RFC2104]Krawczyk，H.，Bellare，M.，和R.Canetti，“HMAC：用于消息认证的键控哈希”，RFC 2104，1997年2月。
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC2119]Bradner，S.，“RFC中用于表示需求水平的关键词”，BCP 14，RFC 2119，1997年3月。
[RFC3588] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", RFC 3588, September 2003.
[RFC3588]Calhoun，P.，Loughney，J.，Guttman，E.，Zorn，G.，和J.Arkko，“直径基础协议”，RFC 3588，2003年9月。
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H. Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3748, June 2004.
[RFC3748]Aboba，B.，Blunk，L.，Vollbrecht，J.，Carlson，J.，和H.Levkowetz，Ed.，“可扩展认证协议（EAP）”，RFC 3748，2004年6月。
[RFC4086] Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
[RFC4086]伊斯特莱克，D.，3，席勒，J.和S.克罗克，“安全的随机性要求”，BCP 106，RFC 4086，2005年6月。
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.
[RFC5234] Crocker, D., Ed., and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, RFC 5234, January 2008.translate error, please retry
[RFC5192] Morand, L., Yegin A., Kumar S., and S. Madanapalli, "DHCP Options for Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Authentication Agents", RFC 5192, May 2008.
[RFC5192]Morand，L.，Yegin A.，Kumar S.，和S.Madanapalli，“承载网络访问身份验证（PANA）身份验证代理的协议的DHCP选项”，RFC 5192，2008年5月。
[IANA] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.
[IANA]Narten，T.和H.Alvestrand，“在RFCs中编写IANA注意事项部分的指南”，BCP 26，RFC 2434，1998年10月。
[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003.
[RFC3315]Droms，R.，Ed.，Bound，J.，Volz，B.，Lemon，T.，Perkins，C.，和M.Carney，“IPv6的动态主机配置协议（DHCPv6）”，RFC3315，2003年7月。
[RFC4016] Parthasarathy, M., "Protocol for Carrying Authentication and Network Access (PANA) Threat Analysis and Security Requirements", RFC 4016, March 2005.
[RFC4016]Parthasarathy，M.“承载身份验证和网络访问协议（PANA）威胁分析和安全要求”，RFC4016，2005年3月。
[RFC4058] Yegin, A., Ed., Ohba, Y., Penno, R., Tsirtsis, G., and C. Wang, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Requirements", RFC 4058, May 2005.
[RFC4058]Yegin，A.，Ed.，Ohba，Y.，Penno，R.，Tsirtsis，G.，和C.Wang，“承载网络接入认证（PANA）要求的协议”，RFC 4058，2005年5月。
[RFC4137] Vollbrecht, J., Eronen, P., Petroni, N., and Y. Ohba, "State Machines for Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Peer and Authenticator", RFC 4137, August 2005.
[RFC4137]Vollbrecht，J.，Eronen，P.，Petroni，N.，和Y.Ohba，“可扩展认证协议（EAP）对等方和认证方的状态机”，RFC 4137，2005年8月。
[RFC4306] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", RFC 4306, December 2005.
[RFC4306]考夫曼，C.，编辑，“互联网密钥交换（IKEv2）协议”，RFC4306，2005年12月。
[RFC4595] Maino, F. and D. Black, "Use of IKEv2 in the Fibre Channel Security Association Management Protocol", RFC 4595, July 2006.
[RFC4595]Maino，F.和D.Black，“在光纤通道安全关联管理协议中使用IKEv2”，RFC 45952006年7月。
[RFC5193] Jayaraman, P., Lopez R., Ohba Y., Ed., Parthasarathy, M., and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA) Framework", RFC 5193, May 2008.
[RFC5193]Jayaraman，P.，Lopez R.，Ohba Y.，Ed.，Parthasarathy，M.，和A.Yegin，“承载网络访问认证（PANA）框架的协议”，RFC 51932008年5月。
[EAP-KEYING] Aboba, B., Simon D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", Work in Progress, November 2007.
[EAP-KEYING]Aboba，B.，Simon D.，和P.Eronen，“可扩展认证协议（EAP）密钥管理框架”，正在进行的工作，2007年11月。
[PANA-IPSEC] Parthasarathy, M., "PANA Enabling IPsec based Access Control", Work in progress, July 2005.
[PANA-IPSEC]Parthasarathy，M.，“PANA启用基于IPSEC的访问控制”，正在进行的工作，2005年7月。
[IANAWEB] IANA, "Number assignment", http://www.iana.org.
[IANAWEB]IANA，“编号分配”，http://www.iana.org.
[IANA-EXP] Narten, T., "Assigning Experimental and Testing Numbers Considered Useful", BCP 82, RFC 3692, January 2004.
[IANA-EXP]Narten，T.，“分配被认为有用的实验和测试数字”，BCP 82，RFC 3692，2004年1月。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Dan Forsberg Nokia Research Center P.O. Box 407 FIN-00045 NOKIA GROUP Finland
Dan Forsberg诺基亚研究中心邮政信箱407 FIN-00045诺基亚集团芬兰
Phone: +358 50 4839470
EMail: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Phone: +358 50 4839470
EMail: dan.forsberg@nokia.com
Yoshihiro Ohba Toshiba America Research, Inc. 1 Telcordia Drive Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA
美国新泽西州皮斯卡塔韦Telcordia Drive 1号东芝美国研究有限公司，邮编：08854
Phone: +1 732 699 5305
EMail: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Phone: +1 732 699 5305
EMail: yohba@tari.toshiba.com
Basavaraj Patil Nokia Siemens Networks 6000 Connection Drive Irving, TX 75039 USA
美国德克萨斯州欧文市Basavaraj Patil诺基亚西门子网络6000连接驱动器75039
EMail: basavaraj.patil@nsn.com
EMail: basavaraj.patil@nsn.com
Hannes Tschofenig Nokia Siemens Networks Linnoitustie 6 Espoo 02600 Finland
Hannes Tschofenig诺基亚西门子网络公司芬兰Linnoitustie 6 Espoo 02600
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
EMail: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.priv.at
Alper E. Yegin Samsung Istanbul, Turkey
土耳其伊斯坦布尔阿尔珀·E·耶金三星酒店
EMail: a.yegin@partner.samsung.com
EMail: a.yegin@partner.samsung.com
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