Network Working Group D. Pinkas
Request for Comments: 5126 Bull SAS
Obsoletes: 3126 N. Pope
Category: Informational Thales eSecurity
J. Ross
Security and Standards
February 2008
Network Working Group D. Pinkas
Request for Comments: 5126 Bull SAS
Obsoletes: 3126 N. Pope
Category: Informational Thales eSecurity
J. Ross
Security and Standards
February 2008
CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures (CAdES)
CMS高级电子签名（CAdES）
Status of This Memo
关于下段备忘
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
本备忘录为互联网社区提供信息。它没有规定任何类型的互联网标准。本备忘录的分发不受限制。
Abstract
摘要
This document defines the format of an electronic signature that can remain valid over long periods. This includes evidence as to its validity even if the signer or verifying party later attempts to deny (i.e., repudiates) the validity of the signature.
本文件规定了可以长期有效的电子签字的格式。这包括关于签名有效性的证据，即使签名人或验证方后来试图否认（即否认）签名的有效性。
The format can be considered as an extension to RFC 3852 and RFC 2634, where, when appropriate, additional signed and unsigned attributes have been defined.
该格式可以视为RFC 3852和RFC 2634的扩展，在适当的情况下，定义了附加的有符号和无符号属性。
The contents of this Informational RFC amount to a transposition of the ETSI Technical Specification (TS) 101 733 V.1.7.4 (CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures -- CAdES) and is technically equivalent to it.
本信息RFC的内容相当于ETSI技术规范（TS）101 733 V.1.7.4（CMS高级电子签名——CAdES）的换位，在技术上与之相当。
The technical contents of this specification are maintained by ETSI.
The ETSI TS and further updates are available free of charge at:
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/StandardsDownload.aspx
The technical contents of this specification are maintained by ETSI.
The ETSI TS and further updates are available free of charge at:
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/StandardsDownload.aspx
Table of Contents
目录
1. Introduction ....................................................6
2. Scope ...........................................................6
3. Definitions and Abbreviations ...................................8
3.1. Definitions ................................................8
3.2. Abbreviations .............................................11
4. Overview .......................................................12
4.1. Major Parties .............................................13
4.2. Signature Policies ........................................14
4.3. Electronic Signature Formats ..............................15
4.3.1. CAdES Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES) .......15
4.3.2. CAdES Explicit Policy-based Electronic
Signatures (CAdES-EPES) ............................18
4.4. Electronic Signature Formats with Validation Data .........19
4.4.1. Electronic Signature with Time (CAdES-T) ...........20
4.4.2. ES with Complete Validation Data References
(CAdES-C) ..........................................21
4.4.3. Extended Electronic Signature Formats ..............23
4.4.3.1. EXtended Long Electronic Signature
(CAdES-X Long) ............................24
4.4.3.2. EXtended Electronic Signature with
Time Type 1 ...............................25
4.4.3.3. EXtended Electronic Signature with
Time Type 2 ...............................26
4.4.3.4. EXtended Long Electronic Signature
with Time (CAdES-X Long ...................27
4.4.4. Archival Electronic Signature (CAdES-A) ............27
4.5. Arbitration ...............................................28
4.6. Validation Process ........................................29
5. Electronic Signature Attributes ................................30
5.1. General Syntax ............................................30
5.2. Data Content Type .........................................30
5.3. Signed-data Content Type ..................................30
5.4. SignedData Type ...........................................31
5.5. EncapsulatedContentInfo Type ..............................31
5.6. SignerInfo Type ...........................................31
5.6.1. Message Digest Calculation Process .................32
5.6.2. Message Signature Generation Process ...............32
5.6.3. Message Signature Verification Process .............32
5.7. Basic ES Mandatory Present Attributes .....................32
5.7.1. content-type .......................................32
5.7.2. Message Digest .....................................33
5.7.3. Signing Certificate Reference Attributes ...........33
5.7.3.1. ESS signing-certificate Attribute
Definition ................................34
5.7.3.2. ESS signing-certificate-v2
Attribute Definition ......................34
1. Introduction ....................................................6
2. Scope ...........................................................6
3. Definitions and Abbreviations ...................................8
3.1. Definitions ................................................8
3.2. Abbreviations .............................................11
4. Overview .......................................................12
4.1. Major Parties .............................................13
4.2. Signature Policies ........................................14
4.3. Electronic Signature Formats ..............................15
4.3.1. CAdES Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES) .......15
4.3.2. CAdES Explicit Policy-based Electronic
Signatures (CAdES-EPES) ............................18
4.4. Electronic Signature Formats with Validation Data .........19
4.4.1. Electronic Signature with Time (CAdES-T) ...........20
4.4.2. ES with Complete Validation Data References
(CAdES-C) ..........................................21
4.4.3. Extended Electronic Signature Formats ..............23
4.4.3.1. EXtended Long Electronic Signature
(CAdES-X Long) ............................24
4.4.3.2. EXtended Electronic Signature with
Time Type 1 ...............................25
4.4.3.3. EXtended Electronic Signature with
Time Type 2 ...............................26
4.4.3.4. EXtended Long Electronic Signature
with Time (CAdES-X Long ...................27
4.4.4. Archival Electronic Signature (CAdES-A) ............27
4.5. Arbitration ...............................................28
4.6. Validation Process ........................................29
5. Electronic Signature Attributes ................................30
5.1. General Syntax ............................................30
5.2. Data Content Type .........................................30
5.3. Signed-data Content Type ..................................30
5.4. SignedData Type ...........................................31
5.5. EncapsulatedContentInfo Type ..............................31
5.6. SignerInfo Type ...........................................31
5.6.1. Message Digest Calculation Process .................32
5.6.2. Message Signature Generation Process ...............32
5.6.3. Message Signature Verification Process .............32
5.7. Basic ES Mandatory Present Attributes .....................32
5.7.1. content-type .......................................32
5.7.2. Message Digest .....................................33
5.7.3. Signing Certificate Reference Attributes ...........33
5.7.3.1. ESS signing-certificate Attribute
Definition ................................34
5.7.3.2. ESS signing-certificate-v2
Attribute Definition ......................34
5.7.3.3. Other signing-certificate
Attribute Definition ......................35
5.8. Additional Mandatory Attributes for Explicit
Policy-based Electronic Signatures ........................36
5.8.1. signature-policy-identifier ........................36
5.9. CMS Imported Optional Attributes ..........................38
5.9.1. signing-time .......................................38
5.9.2. countersignature ...................................39
5.10. ESS-Imported Optional Attributes .........................39
5.10.1. content-reference Attribute .......................39
5.10.2. content-identifier Attribute ......................39
5.10.3. content-hints Attribute ...........................40
5.11. Additional Optional Attributes Defined in the
Present Document .........................................40
5.11.1. commitment-type-indication Attribute ..............41
5.11.2. signer-location Attribute .........................43
5.11.3. signer-attributes Attribute .......................43
5.11.4. content-time-stamp Attribute ......................44
5.12. Support for Multiple Signatures ..........................44
5.12.1. Independent Signatures ............................44
5.12.2. Embedded Signatures ...............................45
6. Additional Electronic Signature Validation Attributes ..........45
6.1. signature time-stamp Attribute (CAdES-T) ..................47
6.1.1. signature-time-stamp Attribute Definition ..........47
6.2. Complete Validation Data References (CAdES-C) .............48
6.2.1. complete-certificate-references Attribute
Definition .........................................48
6.2.2. complete-revocation-references Attribute
Definition .........................................49
6.2.3. attribute-certificate-references Attribute
Definition .........................................51
6.2.4. attribute-revocation-references Attribute
Definition .........................................52
6.3. Extended Validation Data (CAdES-X) ........................52
6.3.1. Time-Stamped Validation Data (CAdES-X Type
1 or Type 2) .......................................53
6.3.2. Long Validation Data (CAdES-X Long, CAdES-X
Long Type 1 or 2) ..................................53
6.3.3. certificate-values Attribute Definition ............54
6.3.4. revocation-values Attribute Definition .............54
6.3.5. CAdES-C-time-stamp Attribute Definition ............56
6.3.6. time-stamped-certs-crls-references
Attribute Definition ...............................57
6.4. Archive Validation Data ...................................58
6.4.1. archive-time-stamp Attribute Definition ............58
7. Other Standard Data Structures .................................60
7.1. Public Key Certificate Format .............................60
7.2. Certificate Revocation List Format ........................60
5.7.3.3. Other signing-certificate
Attribute Definition ......................35
5.8. Additional Mandatory Attributes for Explicit
Policy-based Electronic Signatures ........................36
5.8.1. signature-policy-identifier ........................36
5.9. CMS Imported Optional Attributes ..........................38
5.9.1. signing-time .......................................38
5.9.2. countersignature ...................................39
5.10. ESS-Imported Optional Attributes .........................39
5.10.1. content-reference Attribute .......................39
5.10.2. content-identifier Attribute ......................39
5.10.3. content-hints Attribute ...........................40
5.11. Additional Optional Attributes Defined in the
Present Document .........................................40
5.11.1. commitment-type-indication Attribute ..............41
5.11.2. signer-location Attribute .........................43
5.11.3. signer-attributes Attribute .......................43
5.11.4. content-time-stamp Attribute ......................44
5.12. Support for Multiple Signatures ..........................44
5.12.1. Independent Signatures ............................44
5.12.2. Embedded Signatures ...............................45
6. Additional Electronic Signature Validation Attributes ..........45
6.1. signature time-stamp Attribute (CAdES-T) ..................47
6.1.1. signature-time-stamp Attribute Definition ..........47
6.2. Complete Validation Data References (CAdES-C) .............48
6.2.1. complete-certificate-references Attribute
Definition .........................................48
6.2.2. complete-revocation-references Attribute
Definition .........................................49
6.2.3. attribute-certificate-references Attribute
Definition .........................................51
6.2.4. attribute-revocation-references Attribute
Definition .........................................52
6.3. Extended Validation Data (CAdES-X) ........................52
6.3.1. Time-Stamped Validation Data (CAdES-X Type
1 or Type 2) .......................................53
6.3.2. Long Validation Data (CAdES-X Long, CAdES-X
Long Type 1 or 2) ..................................53
6.3.3. certificate-values Attribute Definition ............54
6.3.4. revocation-values Attribute Definition .............54
6.3.5. CAdES-C-time-stamp Attribute Definition ............56
6.3.6. time-stamped-certs-crls-references
Attribute Definition ...............................57
6.4. Archive Validation Data ...................................58
6.4.1. archive-time-stamp Attribute Definition ............58
7. Other Standard Data Structures .................................60
7.1. Public Key Certificate Format .............................60
7.2. Certificate Revocation List Format ........................60
7.3. OCSP Response Format ......................................60
7.4. Time-Stamp Token Format ...................................60
7.5. Name and Attribute Formats ................................60
7.6. AttributeCertificate ......................................61
8. Conformance Requirements .......................................61
8.1. CAdES-Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES) ..............62
8.2. CAdES-Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature ..........63
8.3. Verification Using Time-Stamping ..........................63
8.4. Verification Using Secure Records .........................63
9. References .....................................................64
9.1. Normative References ......................................64
9.2. Informative References ....................................65
Annex A (normative): ASN.1 Definitions ............................69
A.1. Signature Format Definitions Using
X.208 ASN.1 Syntax ...................................69
A.2. Signature Format Definitions Using
X.680 ASN.1 Syntax ...................................77
Annex B (informative): Extended Forms of Electronic Signatures ....86
B.1. Extended Forms of Validation Data ....................86
B.1.1. CAdES-X Long ..................................87
B.1.2. CAdES-X Type 1 ................................88
B.1.3. CAdES-X Type 2 ................................90
B.1.4. CAdES-X Long Type 1 and CAdES-X Long Type 2 ...91
B.2. Time-Stamp Extensions ................................93
B.3. Archive Validation Data (CAdES-A) ....................94
B.4. Example Validation Sequence ..........................97
B.5. Additional Optional Features ........................102
Annex C (informative): General Description .......................103
C.1. The Signature Policy ................................103
C.2. Signed Information ..................................104
C.3. Components of an Electronic Signature ...............104
C.3.1. Reference to the Signature Policy ............104
C.3.2. Commitment Type Indication ...................105
C.3.3. Certificate Identifier from the Signer .......106
C.3.4. Role Attributes ..............................106
C.3.4.1. Claimed Role .......................107
C.3.4.2. Certified Role .....................107
C.3.5. Signer Location ..............................108
C.3.6. Signing Time .................................108
C.3.7. Content Format ...............................108
C.3.8. content-hints ................................109
C.3.9. Content Cross-Referencing ....................109
C.4. Components of Validation Data .......................109
C.4.1. Revocation Status Information ................109
C.4.1.1. CRL Information .....................110
C.4.1.2. OCSP Information ....................110
C.4.2. Certification Path ...........................111
C.4.3. Time-stamping for Long Life of Signatures ....111
7.3. OCSP Response Format ......................................60
7.4. Time-Stamp Token Format ...................................60
7.5. Name and Attribute Formats ................................60
7.6. AttributeCertificate ......................................61
8. Conformance Requirements .......................................61
8.1. CAdES-Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES) ..............62
8.2. CAdES-Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature ..........63
8.3. Verification Using Time-Stamping ..........................63
8.4. Verification Using Secure Records .........................63
9. References .....................................................64
9.1. Normative References ......................................64
9.2. Informative References ....................................65
Annex A (normative): ASN.1 Definitions ............................69
A.1. Signature Format Definitions Using
X.208 ASN.1 Syntax ...................................69
A.2. Signature Format Definitions Using
X.680 ASN.1 Syntax ...................................77
Annex B (informative): Extended Forms of Electronic Signatures ....86
B.1. Extended Forms of Validation Data ....................86
B.1.1. CAdES-X Long ..................................87
B.1.2. CAdES-X Type 1 ................................88
B.1.3. CAdES-X Type 2 ................................90
B.1.4. CAdES-X Long Type 1 and CAdES-X Long Type 2 ...91
B.2. Time-Stamp Extensions ................................93
B.3. Archive Validation Data (CAdES-A) ....................94
B.4. Example Validation Sequence ..........................97
B.5. Additional Optional Features ........................102
Annex C (informative): General Description .......................103
C.1. The Signature Policy ................................103
C.2. Signed Information ..................................104
C.3. Components of an Electronic Signature ...............104
C.3.1. Reference to the Signature Policy ............104
C.3.2. Commitment Type Indication ...................105
C.3.3. Certificate Identifier from the Signer .......106
C.3.4. Role Attributes ..............................106
C.3.4.1. Claimed Role .......................107
C.3.4.2. Certified Role .....................107
C.3.5. Signer Location ..............................108
C.3.6. Signing Time .................................108
C.3.7. Content Format ...............................108
C.3.8. content-hints ................................109
C.3.9. Content Cross-Referencing ....................109
C.4. Components of Validation Data .......................109
C.4.1. Revocation Status Information ................109
C.4.1.1. CRL Information .....................110
C.4.1.2. OCSP Information ....................110
C.4.2. Certification Path ...........................111
C.4.3. Time-stamping for Long Life of Signatures ....111
C.4.4. Time-stamping for Long Life of Signature
before CA key Compromises ....................113
C.4.4.1. Time-stamping the ES with
Complete Validation Data ...........113
C.4.4.2. Time-Stamping Certificates and
Revocation Information References ..114
C.4.5. Time-stamping for Archive of Signature .......115
C.4.6. Reference to Additional Data .................116
C.4.7. Time-Stamping for Mutual Recognition .........116
C.4.8. TSA Key Compromise ...........................117
C.5. Multiple Signatures .................................118
Annex D (informative): Data Protocols to Interoperate with TSPs ..118
D.1. Operational Protocols ...............................118
D.1.1. Certificate Retrieval ........................118
D.1.2. CRL Retrieval ................................118
D.1.3. Online Certificate Status ....................119
D.1.4. Time-Stamping ................................119
D.2. Management Protocols ................................119
D.2.1. Request for Certificate Revocation ...........119
Annex E (informative): Security Considerations ...................119
E.1. Protection of Private Key ...........................119
E.2. Choice of Algorithms ................................119
Annex F (informative): Example Structured Contents and MIME ......120
F.1. General Description .................................120
F.1.1. Header Information ...........................120
F.1.2. Content Encoding .............................121
F.1.3. Multi-Part Content ...........................121
F.2. S/MIME ..............................................122
F.2.1. Using application/pkcs7-mime .................123
F.2.2. Using application/pkcs7-signature ............124
Annex G (informative): Relationship to the European Directive
and EESSI .................................125
G.1. Introduction ........................................125
G.2. Electronic Signatures and the Directive .............126
G.3. ETSI Electronic Signature Formats and the Directive .127
G.4. EESSI Standards and Classes of Electronic Signature .127
G.4.1. Structure of EESSI Standardization ...........127
G.4.2. Classes of Electronic Signatures .............128
G.4.3. Electronic Signature Classes and the ETSI
Electronic Signature Format ..................128
Annex H (informative): APIs for the Generation and Verification
of Electronic Signatures Tokens ...........129
H.1. Data Framing ........................................129
H.2. IDUP-GSS-APIs Defined by the IETF ...................131
H.3. CORBA Security Interfaces Defined by the OMG ........132
Annex I (informative): Cryptographic Algorithms ..................133
I.1. Digest Algorithms ...................................133
I.1.1. SHA-1 ........................................133
C.4.4. Time-stamping for Long Life of Signature
before CA key Compromises ....................113
C.4.4.1. Time-stamping the ES with
Complete Validation Data ...........113
C.4.4.2. Time-Stamping Certificates and
Revocation Information References ..114
C.4.5. Time-stamping for Archive of Signature .......115
C.4.6. Reference to Additional Data .................116
C.4.7. Time-Stamping for Mutual Recognition .........116
C.4.8. TSA Key Compromise ...........................117
C.5. Multiple Signatures .................................118
Annex D (informative): Data Protocols to Interoperate with TSPs ..118
D.1. Operational Protocols ...............................118
D.1.1. Certificate Retrieval ........................118
D.1.2. CRL Retrieval ................................118
D.1.3. Online Certificate Status ....................119
D.1.4. Time-Stamping ................................119
D.2. Management Protocols ................................119
D.2.1. Request for Certificate Revocation ...........119
Annex E (informative): Security Considerations ...................119
E.1. Protection of Private Key ...........................119
E.2. Choice of Algorithms ................................119
Annex F (informative): Example Structured Contents and MIME ......120
F.1. General Description .................................120
F.1.1. Header Information ...........................120
F.1.2. Content Encoding .............................121
F.1.3. Multi-Part Content ...........................121
F.2. S/MIME ..............................................122
F.2.1. Using application/pkcs7-mime .................123
F.2.2. Using application/pkcs7-signature ............124
Annex G (informative): Relationship to the European Directive
and EESSI .................................125
G.1. Introduction ........................................125
G.2. Electronic Signatures and the Directive .............126
G.3. ETSI Electronic Signature Formats and the Directive .127
G.4. EESSI Standards and Classes of Electronic Signature .127
G.4.1. Structure of EESSI Standardization ...........127
G.4.2. Classes of Electronic Signatures .............128
G.4.3. Electronic Signature Classes and the ETSI
Electronic Signature Format ..................128
Annex H (informative): APIs for the Generation and Verification
of Electronic Signatures Tokens ...........129
H.1. Data Framing ........................................129
H.2. IDUP-GSS-APIs Defined by the IETF ...................131
H.3. CORBA Security Interfaces Defined by the OMG ........132
Annex I (informative): Cryptographic Algorithms ..................133
I.1. Digest Algorithms ...................................133
I.1.1. SHA-1 ........................................133
I.1.2. General ......................................133
I.2. Digital Signature Algorithms ........................134
I.2.1. DSA ..........................................134
I.2.2. RSA ..........................................135
I.2.3. General ......................................135
Annex J (informative): Guidance on Naming ........................137
J.1. Allocation of Names .................................137
J.2. Providing Access to Registration Information ........138
J.3. Naming Schemes ......................................138
J.3.1. Naming Schemes for Individual Citizens .......138
J.3.2. Naming Schemes for Employees of an
Organization .................................139
I.1.2. General ......................................133
I.2. Digital Signature Algorithms ........................134
I.2.1. DSA ..........................................134
I.2.2. RSA ..........................................135
I.2.3. General ......................................135
Annex J (informative): Guidance on Naming ........................137
J.1. Allocation of Names .................................137
J.2. Providing Access to Registration Information ........138
J.3. Naming Schemes ......................................138
J.3.1. Naming Schemes for Individual Citizens .......138
J.3.2. Naming Schemes for Employees of an
Organization .................................139
This document is intended to cover electronic signatures for various types of transactions, including business transactions (e.g., purchase requisition, contract, and invoice applications) where long-term validity of such signatures is important. This includes evidence as to its validity even if the signer or verifying party later attempts to deny (i.e., repudiates; see ISO/IEC 10181-5 [ISO10181-5]) the validity of the signature.
本文件旨在涵盖各类交易的电子签名，包括商业交易（如请购单、合同和发票申请），此类签名的长期有效性非常重要。这包括关于其有效性的证据，即使签名人或验证方后来试图否认（即否认；见ISO/IEC 10181-5[ISO10181-5]）签名的有效性。
Thus, the present document can be used for any transaction between an individual and a company, between two companies, between an individual and a governmental body, etc. The present document is independent of any environment; it can be applied to any environment, e.g., smart cards, Global System for Mobile Communication Subscriber Identity Module (GSM SIM) cards, special programs for electronic signatures, etc.
因此，本文件可用于个人与公司、两家公司、个人与政府机构等之间的任何交易。本文件独立于任何环境；它可以应用于任何环境，例如智能卡、全球移动通信用户识别模块系统（GSM SIM）卡、电子签名专用程序等。
The European Directive on a community framework for Electronic Signatures defines an electronic signature as: "Data in electronic form which is attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which serves as a method of authentication".
《欧洲共同体电子签名框架指令》将电子签名定义为：“附属于其他电子数据或与其他电子数据在逻辑上有关联的电子形式数据，作为认证方法”。
An electronic signature, as used in the present document, is a form of advanced electronic signature, as defined in the Directive.
本文件中使用的电子签名是指令中定义的高级电子签名的一种形式。
The scope of the present document covers electronic signature formats only. The aspects of Electronic Signature Policies are defined in RFC 3125 [RFC3125] and ETSI TR 102 272 [TR102272].
本文件的范围仅涵盖电子签字格式。RFC 3125[RFC3125]和ETSI TR 102 272[TR102272]中定义了电子签名策略的各个方面。
The present document defines a number of electronic signature formats, including electronic signatures that can remain valid over long periods. This includes evidence as to its validity even if the
本文件界定了若干电子签字格式，包括可以长期有效的电子签字。这包括关于其有效性的证据，即使
signer or verifying party later attempts to deny (repudiates) the validity of the electronic signature.
签名人或验证方随后试图否认（否认）电子签名的有效性。
The present document specifies use of Trusted Service Providers (e.g., Time-Stamping Authorities) and the data that needs to be archived (e.g., cross-certificates and revocation lists) to meet the requirements of long-term electronic signatures.
本文件规定使用受信任的服务提供者（例如，时间戳管理机构）和需要存档的数据（例如，交叉证书和撤销清单），以满足长期电子签名的要求。
An electronic signature, as defined by the present document, can be used for arbitration in case of a dispute between the signer and verifier, which may occur at some later time, even years later.
本文件所界定的电子签名可用于在签名人和验证者之间发生争议时进行仲裁，这种争议可能发生在以后某个时间，甚至几年之后。
The present document includes the concept of signature policies that can be used to establish technical consistency when validating electronic signatures, but it does not mandate their use.
本文件载有签字政策的概念，可用于在验证电子签字时建立技术上的一致性，但并不要求使用这些政策。
The present document is based on the use of public key cryptography to produce digital signatures, supported by public key certificates. The present document also specifies the use of time-stamping and time-marking services to prove the validity of a signature long after the normal lifetime of critical elements of an electronic signature. This document also, as an option, defines ways to provide very long-term protection against key compromise or weakened algorithms.
本文件的基础是使用公钥加密技术产生数字签名，并附有公钥证书。本文件还具体规定了使用时间戳和时间标记服务，在电子签名关键要素的正常使用期限之后很久证明签名的有效性。作为一种选择，本文档还定义了针对密钥泄露或削弱的算法提供长期保护的方法。
The present document builds on existing standards that are widely adopted. These include:
本文件以广泛采用的现有标准为基础。这些措施包括：
- RFC 3852 [4]: "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)";
- RFC 3852[4]：“加密消息语法（CMS）”；
- ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Authentication framework";
- ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T建议X.509[1]：“信息技术-开放系统互连-目录：认证框架”；
- RFC 3280 [2]: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure (PKIX) Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile";
- RFC 3280[2]：“Internet X.509公钥基础设施（PKIX）证书和证书吊销列表（CRL）配置文件”；
- RFC 3161 [7]: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)".
- RFC 3161[7]：“Internet X.509公钥基础结构时间戳协议（TSP）”。
NOTE: See Section 11 for a full set of references.
注：完整的参考资料见第11节。
The present document describes formats for advanced electronic signatures using ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation 1) [14]. ASN.1 is encoded using X.690 [16].
本文件描述了使用ASN.1（抽象语法符号1）[14]的高级电子签名格式。ASN.1使用X.690[16]进行编码。
These formats are based on CMS (Cryptographic Message Syntax) defined in RFC 3852 [4]. These electronic signatures are thus called CAdES, for "CMS Advanced Electronic Signatures".
这些格式基于RFC 3852[4]中定义的CMS（加密消息语法）。这些电子签名因此被称为CADE，用于“CMS高级电子签名”。
Another document, TS 101 903 [TS101903], describes formats for XML advanced electronic signatures (XAdES) built on XMLDSIG as specified in [XMLDSIG].
另一个文档TS 101 903[TS101903]描述了在[XMLDSIG]中指定的XMLDSIG上构建的XML高级电子签名（XADE）的格式。
In addition, the present document identifies other documents that define formats for Public Key Certificates, Attribute Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists and supporting protocols, including protocols for use by trusted third parties to support the operation of electronic signature creation and validation.
此外，本文件还确定了定义公钥证书、属性证书、证书撤销列表和支持协议格式的其他文件，包括受信任的第三方用于支持电子签名创建和验证操作的协议。
Informative annexes include:
资料性附件包括：
- illustrations of extended forms of Electronic Signature formats that protect against various vulnerabilities and examples of validation processes (Annex B);
- 防止各种漏洞的电子签名格式扩展形式的说明和验证过程的示例（附件B）；
- descriptions and explanations of some of the concepts used in the present document, giving a rationale for normative parts of the present document (Annex C);
- 对本文件中使用的一些概念进行说明和解释，为本文件的规范性部分提供理由（附件C）；
- information on protocols to interoperate with Trusted Service Providers (Annex D);
- 关于与受信任的服务提供商进行互操作的协议的信息（附件D）；
- guidance on naming (Annex E);
- 命名指南（附件E）；
- an example structured content and MIME (Annex F);
- 结构化内容和MIME示例（附录F）；
- the relationship between the present document and the directive on electronic signature and associated standardization initiatives (Annex G);
- 本文件与《电子签名指令》和相关标准化举措之间的关系（附件G）；
- APIs to support the generation and verification of electronic signatures (Annex H);
- 支持生成和验证电子签名的API（附件H）；
- cryptographic algorithms that may be used (Annex I); and
- 可使用的加密算法（附件一）；和
- naming schemes (see Annex J).
- 命名方案（见附件J）。
For the purposes of the present document, the following terms and definitions apply:
就本文件而言，以下术语和定义适用：
Arbitrator: an arbitrator entity may be used to arbitrate a dispute between a signer and verifier when there is a disagreement on the validity of a digital signature.
仲裁员：当对数字签名的有效性存在分歧时，仲裁员实体可用于仲裁签名人和验证者之间的争议。
Attribute Authority (AA): an authority that assigns privileges by issuing attribute certificates.
属性权限（AA）：通过颁发属性证书来分配权限的权限。
Authority Certificate: a certificate issued to an authority (e.g., either to a certification authority or an attribute authority).
颁发机构证书：颁发给颁发机构（例如，颁发给证书颁发机构或属性颁发机构）的证书。
Attribute Authority Revocation List (AARL): a revocation list containing a list of references to certificates issued to AAs that are no longer considered valid by the issuing authority.
属性颁发机构撤销列表（AARL）：一个撤销列表，包含对颁发机构不再认为有效的颁发给AAs的证书的引用列表。
Attribute Certificate Revocation List (ACRL): a revocation list containing a list of references to attribute certificates that are no longer considered valid by the issuing authority.
属性证书吊销列表（ACRL）：一个吊销列表，包含对颁发机构不再认为有效的属性证书的引用列表。
Certification Authority Revocation List (CARL): a revocation list containing a list of public key certificates issued to certification authorities that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer.
证书颁发机构吊销列表（CARL）：一个吊销列表，包含颁发给证书颁发机构的公钥证书列表，证书颁发机构不再认为这些证书有效。
Certification Authority (CA): an authority trusted by one or more users to create and assign public key certificates; optionally, the certification authority may create the users' keys.
证书颁发机构（CA）：一个或多个用户信任的机构，用于创建和分配公钥证书；或者，证书颁发机构可以创建用户密钥。
NOTE: See ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1].
注：见ITU-T建议X.509[1]。
Certificate Revocation List (CRL): a signed list indicating a set of public key certificates that are no longer considered valid by the certificate issuer.
证书吊销列表（CRL）：一个签名列表，指示证书颁发者不再认为有效的一组公钥证书。
Digital Signature: data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a data unit that allows a recipient of the data unit to prove the source and integrity of the data unit and protect against forgery, e.g., by the recipient.
数字签名：附加到数据单元的数据或数据单元的加密转换，允许数据单元的接收者证明数据单元的来源和完整性，并防止伪造（例如由接收者伪造）。
NOTE: See ISO 7498-2 [ISO7498-2].
注：见ISO 7498-2[ISO7498-2]。
Electronic Signature: data in electronic form that is attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and that serves as a method of authentication.
电子签名：附加在其他电子数据上或在逻辑上与其他电子数据关联的电子形式的数据，用作认证方法。
NOTE: See Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures [EUDirective].
注：见欧洲议会和理事会1999年12月13日关于共同体电子签名框架的指令1999/93/EC[欧盟指令]。
Extended Electronic Signatures: electronic signatures enhanced by complementing the baseline requirements with additional data, such as time-stamp tokens and certificate revocation data, to address commonly recognized threats.
扩展电子签名：通过使用附加数据（如时间戳令牌和证书撤销数据）补充基线要求，增强电子签名，以应对常见的威胁。
Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature (EPES): an electronic signature where the signature policy that shall be used to validate it is explicitly specified.
基于明确策略的电子签名（EPES）：一种电子签名，其中明确规定了用于验证该签名的签名策略。
Grace Period: a time period that permits the certificate revocation information to propagate through the revocation process to relying parties.
宽限期：允许证书撤销信息通过撤销过程传播给依赖方的时间段。
Initial Verification: a process performed by a verifier done after an electronic signature is generated in order to capture additional information that could make it valid for long-term verification.
初始验证：在生成电子签名后，由验证者执行的一个过程，目的是获取额外信息，使其对长期验证有效。
Public Key Certificate (PKC): public keys of a user, together with some other information, rendered unforgeable by encipherment with the private key of the certification authority that issued it.
公钥证书（PKC）：用户的公钥以及其他一些信息，通过使用颁发它的证书颁发机构的私钥进行加密而变得不可伪造。
NOTE: See ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1].
注：见ITU-T建议X.509[1]。
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA): an asymmetric cryptography algorithm based on the difficulty to factor very large numbers using a key pair: a private key and a public key.
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman（RSA）：一种非对称密码算法，基于使用密钥对（私钥和公钥）很难计算出非常大的数字。
Signature Policy: a set of rules for the creation and validation of an electronic signature that defines the technical and procedural requirements for electronic signature creation and validation, in order to meet a particular business need, and under which the signature can be determined to be valid.
签名政策：一套电子签名的创建和验证规则，定义了电子签名创建和验证的技术和程序要求，以满足特定的业务需要，并根据这些规则可以确定签名是否有效。
Signature Policy Issuer: an entity that defines and issues a signature policy.
签名策略颁发者：定义和颁发签名策略的实体。
Signature Validation Policy: part of the signature policy that specifies the technical requirements on the signer in creating a signature and verifier when validating a signature.
签名验证策略：签名策略的一部分，指定签名人在验证签名时创建签名和验证人的技术要求。
Signer: an entity that creates an electronic signature.
签名人：创建电子签名的实体。
Subsequent Verification: a process performed by a verifier to assess the signature validity.
后续验证：由验证者执行的评估签名有效性的过程。
NOTE: Subsequent verification may be done even years after the electronic signature was produced by the signer and completed by the initial verification, and it might not need to capture more data than those captured at the time of initial verification.
注：即使在签名人制作电子签名并在初始验证时完成之后几年，也可以进行后续验证，并且可能不需要捕获比初始验证时捕获的数据更多的数据。
Time-Stamp Token: a data object that binds a representation of a datum to a particular time, thus establishing evidence that the datum existed before that time.
时间戳标记：一种数据对象，它将一个数据的表示绑定到一个特定的时间，从而确定该数据在该时间之前存在的证据。
Time-Mark: information in an audit trail from a Trusted Service Provider that binds a representation of a datum to a particular time, thus establishing evidence that the datum existed before that time.
时间标记：来自可信服务提供商的审计跟踪中的信息，该信息将数据的表示绑定到特定时间，从而确定数据在该时间之前存在的证据。
Time-Marking Authority: a trusted third party that creates records in an audit trail in order to indicate that a datum existed before a particular point in time.
时间标记机构：可信的第三方，在审计跟踪中创建记录，以表明数据在特定时间点之前存在。
Time-Stamping Authority (TSA): a trusted third party that creates time-stamp tokens in order to indicate that a datum existed at a particular point in time.
时间戳授权机构（TSA）：一个可信的第三方，它创建时间戳令牌，以表明数据存在于特定时间点。
Time-Stamping Unit (TSU): a set of hardware and software that is managed as a unit and has a single time-stamp token signing key active at a time.
时间戳单元（TSU）：一组硬件和软件，作为一个单元进行管理，一次只有一个时间戳令牌签名密钥处于活动状态。
Trusted Service Provider (TSP): an entity that helps to build trust relationships by making available or providing some information upon request.
可信服务提供商（TSP）：一个实体，通过在请求时提供或提供一些信息来帮助建立信任关系。
Validation Data: additional data that may be used by a verifier of electronic signatures to determine that the signature is valid.
验证数据：电子签名验证人可用于确定签名有效性的附加数据。
Valid Electronic Signature: an electronic signature that passes validation.
有效电子签名：通过验证的电子签名。
Verifier: an entity that verifies evidence.
验证人：验证证据的实体。
NOTE 1: See ISO/IEC 13888-1 [ISO13888-1].
注1：见ISO/IEC 13888-1[ISO13888-1]。
NOTE 2: Within the context of the present document, this is an entity that validates an electronic signature.
注2：在本文件范围内，这是一个验证电子签名的实体。
For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:
在本文件中，以下缩写词适用：
AA Attribute Authority AARL Attribute Authority Revocation List ACRL Attribute Certificate Revocation List API Application Program Interface ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange ASN.1 Abstract Syntax Notation 1 CA Certification Authority CAD Card Accepting Device CAdES CMS Advanced Electronic Signature CAdES-A CAdES with Archive validation data
AA属性机构AARL属性机构撤销列表ACRL属性证书撤销列表API应用程序接口ASCII信息交换美国标准代码ASN.1抽象语法符号1 CA认证机构CAD卡接受设备CAdES CMS高级电子签名CAdES-A CAdES存档验证数据
CAdES-BES CAdES Basic Electronic Signature CAdES-C CAdES with Complete validation data CAdES-EPES CAdES Explicit Policy Electronic Signature CAdES-T CAdES with Time CAdES-X CAdES with eXtended validation data CAdES-X Long CAdES with EXtended Long validation data CARL Certification Authority Revocation List CMS Cryptographic Message Syntax CRL Certificate Revocation List CWA CEN (European Committee for Standardization) Workshop Agreement DER Distinguished Encoding Rules (for ASN.1) DSA Digital Signature Algorithm EDIFACT Electronic Data Interchange For Administration, Commerce and Transport EESSI European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative EPES Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature ES Electronic Signature ESS Enhanced Security Services (enhances CMS) IDL Interface Definition Language MIME Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions OCSP Online Certificate Status Provider OID Object IDentifier PKC Public Key Certificate PKIX Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (IETF Working Group) RSA Rivest-Shamir-Adleman SHA-1 Secure Hash Algorithm 1 TSA Time-Stamping Authority TSP Trusted Service Provider TST Time-Stamp Token TSU Time-Stamping Unit URI Uniform Resource Identifier URL Uniform Resource Locator XML Extensible Markup Language XMLDSIG XML Digital Signature
CAdES BES CAdES CAdES基本电子签名CAdES-C CAdES具有完整验证数据CAdES EPES CAdES明确策略电子签名CAdES-T CAdES-T CAdES具有时间CAdES-X CAdES具有扩展验证数据CAdES-X具有扩展长验证数据CAdES-X具有扩展长验证数据CAdES认证机构撤销列表CMS加密消息语法CRL证书撤销列表CWA CEN（欧洲标准化委员会）车间协议DER区分编码规则（用于ASN.1）DSA数字签名算法EDIFACT电子数据交换管理，商业和运输EESSI欧洲电子签名标准化倡议EPES基于明确政策的电子签名ES电子签名ESS增强安全服务（增强CMS）IDL接口定义语言MIME多用途Internet邮件扩展OCSP联机证书状态提供程序OID对象标识符PKC公钥证书PKIX公钥基础设施使用X.509（IETF工作组）RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman SHA-1安全哈希算法1 TSA时间戳授权TSP可信服务提供商TST时间戳令牌TSU时间戳单元URI统一资源标识符URL统一资源定位器XML可扩展标记语言XMLDSIG XML数字签名
The present document defines a number of Electronic Signature (ES) formats that build on CMS (RFC 3852 [4]) by adding signed and unsigned attributes.
本文件通过添加签名和未签名属性，定义了许多基于CMS（RFC 3852[4]）的电子签名格式。
This section:
本节：
- provides an introduction to the major parties involved (Section 4.1),
- 介绍主要参与方（第4.1节），
- introduces the concept of signature policies (Section 4.2),
- 介绍签名策略的概念（第4.2节），
- provides an overview of the various ES formats (Section 4.3),
- 概述各种ES格式（第4.3节），
- introduces the concept of validation data, and provides an overview of formats that incorporate validation data (Section 4.4), and
- 介绍验证数据的概念，并概述包含验证数据的格式（第4.4节），以及
- presents relevant considerations on arbitration (Section 4.5) and for the validation process (Section 4.6).
- 介绍了仲裁（第4.5节）和验证过程（第4.6节）的相关注意事项。
The formal specifications of the attributes are specified in Sections 5 and 6; Annexes C and D provide rationale for the definitions of the different ES forms.
第5节和第6节规定了属性的正式规范；附录C和D提供了不同ES表格定义的基本原理。
The major parties involved in a business transaction supported by electronic signatures, as defined in the present document, are:
根据本文件的定义，涉及电子签名支持的商业交易的主要当事方包括：
- the signer; - the verifier; - Trusted Service Providers (TSP); and - the arbitrator.
- 签署人；-验证者；-可信服务提供商（TSP）；和-仲裁员。
The signer is the entity that creates the electronic signature. When the signer digitally signs over data using the prescribed format, this represents a commitment on behalf of the signing entity to the data being signed.
签名人是创建电子签名的实体。当签名者使用规定的格式对数据进行数字签名时，这表示代表签名实体对被签名数据的承诺。
The verifier is the entity that validates the electronic signature; it may be a single entity or multiple entities.
验证人是验证电子签名的实体；它可以是单个实体或多个实体。
The Trusted Service Providers (TSPs) are one or more entities that help to build trust relationships between the signer and verifier. They support the signer and verifier by means of supporting services including: user certificates, cross-certificates, time-stamp tokens, CRLs, ARLs, and OCSP responses. The following TSPs are used to support the functions defined in the present document:
可信服务提供者（TSP）是一个或多个实体，有助于在签名者和验证者之间建立信任关系。它们通过支持服务（包括：用户证书、交叉证书、时间戳令牌、CRL、ARL和OCSP响应）来支持签名者和验证者。以下TSP用于支持本文件中定义的功能：
- Certification Authorities; - Registration Authorities; - CRL Issuers; - OCSP Responders; - Repository Authorities (e.g., a Directory); - Time-Stamping Authorities; - Time-Marking Authorities; and - Signature Policy Issuers.
- 核证机关；及登记机关；-CRL发行人；-OCSP应答器；-存储库权限（例如目录）；-加盖时间戳当局；及时间标记机构；和-签名保单发行人。
Certification Authorities provide users with public key certificates and a revocation service.
证书颁发机构为用户提供公钥证书和吊销服务。
Registration Authorities allow the identification and registration of entities before a CA generates certificates.
注册机构允许在CA生成证书之前识别和注册实体。
Repository Authorities publish CRLs issued by CAs, signature policies issued by Signature Policy Issuers, and optionally public key certificates.
存储库管理机构发布CAs发布的CRL、签名策略发布者发布的签名策略，以及可选的公钥证书。
Time-Stamping Authorities attest that some data was formed before a given trusted time.
时间戳权威机构证明，某些数据是在给定的可信时间之前形成的。
Time-Marking Authorities record that some data was formed before a given trusted time.
时间标记机构记录某些数据是在给定的可信时间之前形成的。
Signature Policy Issuers define the signature policies to be used by signers and verifiers.
签名策略颁发者定义签名者和验证者要使用的签名策略。
In some cases, the following additional TSPs are needed:
在某些情况下，需要以下附加TSP：
- Attribute Authorities.
- 属性权限。
Attributes Authorities provide users with attributes linked to public key certificates.
属性授权为用户提供链接到公钥证书的属性。
An Arbitrator is an entity that arbitrates in disputes between a signer and a verifier.
仲裁员是在签名人和验证人之间的争议中进行仲裁的实体。
The present document includes the concept of signature policies that can be used to establish technical consistency when validating electronic signatures.
本文件包括签名政策的概念，可用于在验证电子签名时建立技术一致性。
When a comprehensive signature policy used by the verifier is either explicitly indicated by the signer or implied by the data being signed, then a consistent result can be obtained when validating an electronic signature.
当验证者使用的综合签名策略由签名者明确指示或由被签名的数据暗示时，则在验证电子签名时可以获得一致的结果。
When the signature policy being used by the verifier is neither indicated by the signer nor can be derived from other data, or the signature policy is incomplete, then verifiers, including arbitrators, may obtain different results when validating an electronic signature. Therefore, comprehensive signature policies that ensure consistency of signature validation are recommended from both the signer's and verifier's point of view.
当验证者正在使用的签名策略既不是由签名者指示的，也不能从其他数据派生，或者签名策略不完整时，验证者，包括仲裁员，在验证电子签名时可能会获得不同的结果。因此，从签名者和验证者的角度出发，建议采用全面的签名策略来确保签名验证的一致性。
Further information on signature policies is provided in:
有关签名政策的更多信息，请参见：
- TR 102 038 [TR102038]; - Sections 5.8.1, C.1, and C.3.1 of the present document; - RFC 3125 [RFC3125]; and - TR 102 272 [TR102272].
- TR 102 038[TR102038]；-本文件第5.8.1、C.1和C.3.1节；-RFC3125[RFC3125]；和-TR 102 272[TR102272]。
The current section provides an overview for two forms of CMS advanced electronic signature specified in the present document, namely, the CAdES Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES) and the CAdES Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature (CAdES-EPES). Conformance to the present document mandates that the signer create one of these formats.
本节概述了本文件中规定的两种CMS高级电子签名形式，即CAdES基本电子签名（CAdES BES）和CAdES基于明确政策的电子签名（CAdES EPES）。与本文件的一致性要求签名人创建其中一种格式。
A CAdES Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES), in accordance with the present document, contains:
根据本文件，CAdES基本电子签名（CAdES BES）包含：
- The signed user data (e.g., the signer's document), as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]);
- CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义的已签名用户数据（例如，签名人文件）；
- A collection of mandatory signed attributes, as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]) and in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]);
- CMS（RFC 3852[4]）和ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中定义的强制性签名属性集合；
- Additional mandatory signed attributes, defined in the present document; and
- 本文件中定义的其他强制性签名属性；和
- The digital signature value computed on the user data and, when present, on the signed attributes, as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
- 根据CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中的定义，对用户数据和签名属性（如果存在）计算的数字签名值。
A CAdES Basic Electronic Signature (CAdES-BES), in accordance with the present document, may contain:
根据本文件，CAdES基本电子签名（CAdES BES）可包含：
- a collection of additional signed attributes; and
- 附加签名属性的集合；和
- a collection of optional unsigned attributes.
- 可选无符号属性的集合。
The mandatory signed attributes are:
强制签名属性包括：
- Content-type. It is defined in RFC 3852 [4] and specifies the type of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed. Details are provided in Section 5.7.1 of the present document. Rationale for its inclusion is provided in Annex C.3.7;
- 内容类型。它在RFC 3852[4]中定义，并指定要签名的封装ContentInfo值的类型。本文件第5.7.1节提供了详细信息。附录C.3.7中提供了其包含的理由；
- Message-digest. It is defined in RFC 3852 [4] and specifies the message digest of the eContent OCTET STRING within encapContentInfo being signed. Details are provided in Section 5.7.2;
- 消息摘要。它在RFC 3852[4]中定义，并指定要签名的encapContentInfo中eContent八位字节字符串的消息摘要。详情见第5.7.2节；
- ESS signing-certificate OR ESS signing-certificate-v2. The ESS signing-certificate attribute is defined in Enhanced Security Services (ESS), RFC 2634 [5], and only allows for the use of SHA-1 as a digest algorithm. The ESS signing-certificate-v2 attribute is defined in "ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility", RFC 5035 [15], and allows for the use of any digest algorithm. A CAdES-BES claiming compliance with the present document must include one of them. Section 5.7.3 provides the details of these attributes. Rationale for its inclusion is provided in Annex C.3.3.
- ESS签名证书或ESS签名证书-v2。ESS签名证书属性在增强安全服务（ESS）RFC 2634[5]中定义，仅允许将SHA-1用作摘要算法。ESS signing-certificate-v2属性在“ESS更新：添加CertID算法敏捷性”RFC 5035[15]中定义，并允许使用任何摘要算法。声称符合本文件要求的CAdES BES必须包括其中之一。第5.7.3节提供了这些属性的详细信息。附录C.3.3中提供了其包含的理由。
Optional signed attributes may be added to the CAdES-BES, including optional signed attributes defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]), ESS (RFC 2634 [5]), and the present document. Listed below are optional attributes that are defined in Section 5 and have a rationale provided in Annex C:
可选签名属性可以添加到CAdES BES中，包括CMS（RFC 3852[4]）、ESS（RFC 2634[5]）和本文档中定义的可选签名属性。以下列出了第5节中定义的可选属性，其基本原理见附录C：
- Signing-time: as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]), indicates the time of the signature, as claimed by the signer. Details and short rationale are provided in Section 5.9.1. Annex C.3.6 provides the rationale.
- 签名时间：如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中的定义，表示签名人声明的签名时间。第5.9.1节提供了详细信息和简要理由。附录C.3.6提供了基本原理。
- content-hints: as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]), provides information that describes the innermost signed content of a multi-layer message where one content is encapsulated in another. Section 5.10.1 provides the specification details. Annex C.3.8 provides the rationale.
- 内容提示：根据ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中的定义，提供了描述多层消息最内层签名内容的信息，其中一个内容封装在另一个内容中。第5.10.1节提供了规范细节。附录C.3.8提供了基本原理。
- content-reference: as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]), can be incorporated as a way to link request and reply messages in an exchange between two parties. Section 5.10.1 provides the specification details. Annex C.3.9 provides the rationale.
- 内容参考：如ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中所定义，可以作为一种在双方交换中链接请求和回复消息的方式合并。第5.10.1节提供了规范细节。附录C.3.9提供了基本原理。
- content-identifier: as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]), contains an identifier that may be used later on in the previous content-reference attribute. Section 5.10.2 provides the specification details.
- 内容标识符：如ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中所定义，包含一个标识符，该标识符可稍后在先前的内容引用属性中使用。第5.10.2节提供了规范细节。
- commitment-type-indication: this attribute is defined by the present document as a way to indicate the commitment endorsed by the signer when producing the signature. Section 5.11.1 provides the specification details. Annex C.3.2 provides the rationale.
- 承诺类型指示：本文件将此属性定义为在生成签名时指示签名人背书的承诺的一种方式。第5.11.1节提供了规范细节。附录C.3.2提供了基本原理。
- signer-location: this attribute is defined by the present document. It allows the signer to indicate the place where the signer purportedly produced the signature. Section 5.11.2 provides the specification details. Annex C.3.5 provides the rationale.
- 签名者位置：此属性由当前文档定义。它允许签名人指明签名人据称制作签名的地点。第5.11.2节提供了规范细节。附录C.3.5提供了基本原理。
- signer-attributes: this attribute is defined by the present document. It allows a claimed or certified role to be incorporated into the signed information. Section 5.11.3 provides the specification details. Annex C.3.4 provides the rationale.
- 签名者属性：此属性由当前文档定义。它允许将声明或认证的角色合并到签名信息中。第5.11.3节提供了规范细节。附录C.3.4提供了基本原理。
- content-time-stamp: this attribute is defined by the present document. It allows a time-stamp token of the data to be signed to be incorporated into the signed information. It provides proof of the existence of the data before the signature was created. Section 5.11.4 provides the specification details. Annex C.3.6 provides the rationale.
- 内容时间戳：此属性由当前文档定义。它允许将要签名的数据的时间戳令牌合并到签名信息中。它提供了在创建签名之前存在数据的证据。第5.11.4节提供了规范细节。附录C.3.6提供了基本原理。
A CAdES-BES form can also incorporate instances of unsigned attributes, as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]) and ESS (RFC 2634 [5]).
CAdES BES表单还可以包含CMS（RFC 3852[4]）和ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中定义的未签名属性实例。
- CounterSignature, as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]); it can be incorporated wherever embedded signatures (i.e., a signature on a previous signature) are needed. Section 5.9.2 provides the specification details. Annex C.5 in Annex C provides the rationale.
- CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义的会签；它可以在需要嵌入签名（即先前签名上的签名）的任何地方合并。第5.9.2节提供了规范细节。附录C中的附录C.5提供了基本原理。
The structure of the CAdES-BES is illustrated in Figure 1.
CAdES BES的结构如图1所示。
+------Elect.Signature (CAdES-BES)------+
|+----------------------------------- + |
||+---------+ +----------+ | |
|||Signer's | | Signed | Digital | |
|||Document | |Attributes| Signature | |
||| | | | | |
||+---------+ +----------+ | |
|+------------------------------------+ |
+---------------------------------------+
+------Elect.Signature (CAdES-BES)------+
|+----------------------------------- + |
||+---------+ +----------+ | |
|||Signer's | | Signed | Digital | |
|||Document | |Attributes| Signature | |
||| | | | | |
||+---------+ +----------+ | |
|+------------------------------------+ |
+---------------------------------------+
Figure 1: Illustration of a CAdES-BES
图1：CAdES BES的图解
The signer's conformance requirements of a CAdES-BES are defined in Section 8.1.
第8.1节规定了CAdES BES的签署人合规性要求。
NOTE: The CAdES-BES is the minimum format for an electronic signature to be generated by the signer. On its own, it does not provide enough information for it to be verified in the longer term. For example, revocation information issued by the relevant certificate status information issuer needs to be available for long-term validation (see Section 4.4.2).
注：CAdES BES是签名人生成电子签名的最低格式。就其本身而言，它没有提供足够的信息，以便在长期内进行核实。例如，相关证书状态信息颁发者发布的撤销信息需要可用于长期验证（见第4.4.2节）。
The CAdES-BES satisfies the legal requirements for electronic signatures, as defined in the European Directive on Electronic Signatures, (see Annex C for further discussion on the relationship of the present document to the Directive). It provides basic authentication and integrity protection.
CAdES BES满足《欧洲电子签名指令》中规定的电子签名的法律要求（关于本文件与该指令关系的进一步讨论，见附录C）。它提供基本的身份验证和完整性保护。
The semantics of the signed data of a CAdES-BES or its context may implicitly indicate a signature policy to the verifier.
CAdES BES或其上下文的签名数据的语义可以向验证者隐式地指示签名策略。
Specification of the contents of signature policies is outside the scope of the present document. However, further information on signature policies is provided in TR 102 038 [TR102038], RFC 3125 [RFC3125], and Sections 5.8.1, C.1, and C.3.1 of the present document.
签名政策内容的具体说明不在本文件的范围之内。但是，本文件TR 102 038[TR102038]、RFC 3125[RFC3125]和第5.8.1、C.1和C.3.1节提供了有关签名政策的更多信息。
A CAdES Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature (CAdES-EPES), in accordance with the present document, extends the definition of an electronic signature to conform to the identified signature policy.
根据本文件，CAdES基于明确政策的电子签名（CAdES EPES）扩展了电子签名的定义，以符合已识别的签名政策。
A CAdES Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature (CAdES-EPES) incorporates a signed attribute (sigPolicyID attribute) indicating the signature policy that shall be used to validate the electronic signature. This signed attribute is protected by the signature. The signature may also have other signed attributes required to conform to the mandated signature policy.
CAdES显式基于策略的电子签名（CAdES EPES）包含一个签名属性（sigPolicyID属性），该属性指示用于验证电子签名的签名策略。此签名属性受签名保护。签名还可能具有符合强制签名策略所需的其他签名属性。
Section 5.7.3 provides the details on the specification of signature-policy-identifier attribute. Annex C.1 provides a short rationale. Specification of the contents of signature policies is outside the scope of the present document.
第5.7.3节提供了有关签名策略标识符属性规范的详细信息。附件C.1提供了一个简短的理由。签名政策内容的具体说明不在本文件的范围之内。
Further information on signature policies is provided in TR 102 038 [TR102038] and Sections 5.8.1, C.1, and C.3.1 of the present document.
TR 102 038[TR102038]和本文件第5.8.1、C.1和C.3.1节提供了有关签名政策的更多信息。
The structure of the CAdES-EPES is illustrated in Figure 2.
CAdES EPE的结构如图2所示。
+------------- Elect.Signature (CAdES-EPES) ---------------+
| |
|+-------------------------------------------------------+ |
|| +-----------+ | |
|| | | +---------------------------+ | |
|| | | | +----------+ | | |
|| | Signer's | | |Signature | Signed | Digital | |
|| | Document | | |Policy ID | Attributes |Signature| |
|| | | | +----------+ | | |
|| | | +---------------------------+ | |
|| +-----------+ | |
|+-------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
+------------- Elect.Signature (CAdES-EPES) ---------------+
| |
|+-------------------------------------------------------+ |
|| +-----------+ | |
|| | | +---------------------------+ | |
|| | | | +----------+ | | |
|| | Signer's | | |Signature | Signed | Digital | |
|| | Document | | |Policy ID | Attributes |Signature| |
|| | | | +----------+ | | |
|| | | +---------------------------+ | |
|| +-----------+ | |
|+-------------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+----------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 2: Illustration of a CAdES-EPES
图2:CAdES EPES的示意图
The signer's conformance requirements of CAdES-EPES are defined in Section 8.2.
第8.2节规定了CAdES EPES的签署人合规性要求。
Validation of an electronic signature, in accordance with the present document, requires additional data needed to validate the electronic signature. This additional data is called validation data, and includes:
根据本文件，电子签字的验证需要验证电子签字所需的额外数据。此附加数据称为验证数据，包括：
- Public Key Certificates (PKCs);
- 公钥证书；
- revocation status information for each PKC;
- 每个PKC的撤销状态信息；
- trusted time-stamps applied to the digital signature, otherwise a time-mark shall be available in an audit log.
- 应用于数字签名的可信时间戳，否则审计日志中应提供时间标记。
- when appropriate, the details of a signature policy to be used to verify the electronic signature.
- 在适当情况下，用于验证电子签名的签名策略的详细信息。
The validation data may be collected by the signer and/or the verifier. When the signature-policy-identifier signed attribute is present, it shall meet the requirements of the signature policy.
验证数据可由签名者和/或验证者收集。当签名策略标识符signed属性存在时，应满足签名策略的要求。
Validation data includes CA certificates as well as revocation status information in the form of Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) or certificate status information (OCSP) provided by an online service. Validation data also includes evidence that the signature was created before a particular point in time; this may be either a time-stamp token or time-mark.
验证数据包括CA证书以及在线服务提供的证书吊销列表（CRL）或证书状态信息（OCSP）形式的吊销状态信息。验证数据还包括签名在特定时间点之前创建的证据；这可以是时间戳令牌或时间标记。
The present document defines unsigned attributes able to contain validation data that can be added to CAdES-BES and CAdES-EPES, leading to electronic signature formats that include validation data. The sections below summarize these formats and their most relevant characteristics.
本文件定义了能够包含可添加到CAdES BES和CAdES EPES的验证数据的未签名属性，从而形成包含验证数据的电子签名格式。以下各节总结了这些格式及其最相关的特征。
An electronic signature with time (CAdES-T), in accordance with the present document, is when there exits trusted time associated with the ES.
根据本文件，有时间的电子签名（CAdES-T）是指存在与电子签名相关的可信时间。
The trusted time may be provided by:
可通过以下方式提供可信时间：
- a time-stamp attribute as an unsigned attribute added to the ES; and
- 时间戳属性，作为添加到ES的无符号属性；和
- a time-mark of the ES provided by a Trusted Service Provider.
- 由可信服务提供商提供的ES的时间标记。
The time-stamp attribute contains a time-stamp token of the electronic signature value. Section 6.1.1 provides the specification details. Annex C.4.3 provides the rationale.
时间戳属性包含电子签名值的时间戳标记。第6.1.1节提供了规范细节。附录C.4.3提供了基本原理。
A time-mark provided by a Trusted Service would have a similar effect to the signature-time-stamp attribute, but in this case, no attribute is added to the ES, as it is the responsibility of the TSP to provide evidence of a time-mark when required to do so. The management of time marks is outside the scope of the present document.
受信任服务提供的时间标记与签名时间戳属性具有类似的效果，但在这种情况下，不会向ES添加任何属性，因为TSP有责任在需要时提供时间标记的证据。时间标记的管理不在本文件的范围之内。
Trusted time provides the initial steps towards providing long-term validity. Electronic signatures with the time-stamp attribute or a time-marked BES/EPES, forming the CAdES-T are illustrated in Figure 3.
可信时间为提供长期有效性提供了初始步骤。具有时间戳属性或带有时间标记的BES/EPES的电子签名构成CAdES-T，如图3所示。
+-------------------------------------------------CAdES-T ---------+
|+------ CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES -------+ |
||+-----------------------------------+ | +----------------------+ |
|||+---------+ +----------+ | | | | |
||||Signer's | | Signed | Digital | | | Signature-time-stamp | |
||||Document | |Attributes| Signature | | | attribute required | |
|||| | | | | | | when using time | |
|||+---------+ +----------+ | | | stamps. | |
||+-----------------------------------+ | | | |
|+--------------------------------------+ | or the BES/EPES | |
| | shall be time-marked | |
| | | |
| | Management and | |
| | provision of time | |
| | mark is the | |
| | responsibility of | |
| | the TSP. | |
| +----------------------+ |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
+-------------------------------------------------CAdES-T ---------+
|+------ CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES -------+ |
||+-----------------------------------+ | +----------------------+ |
|||+---------+ +----------+ | | | | |
||||Signer's | | Signed | Digital | | | Signature-time-stamp | |
||||Document | |Attributes| Signature | | | attribute required | |
|||| | | | | | | when using time | |
|||+---------+ +----------+ | | | stamps. | |
||+-----------------------------------+ | | | |
|+--------------------------------------+ | or the BES/EPES | |
| | shall be time-marked | |
| | | |
| | Management and | |
| | provision of time | |
| | mark is the | |
| | responsibility of | |
| | the TSP. | |
| +----------------------+ |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 3: Illustration of CAdES-T formats
图3:CAdES-T格式示意图
NOTE 1: A time-stamp token is added to the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES as an unsigned attribute.
注1：时间戳标记作为未签名属性添加到CAdES BES或CAdES EPES。
NOTE 2: Time-stamp tokens that may themselves include unsigned attributes required to validate the time-stamp token, such as the complete-certificate-references and complete-revocation-references attributes, as defined by the present document.
注2：时间戳令牌本身可能包括验证时间戳令牌所需的未签名属性，如本文档定义的完整证书引用和完整撤销引用属性。
Electronic Signature with Complete validation data references (CAdES-C), in accordance with the present document, adds to the CAdES-T the complete-certificate-references and complete-revocation-references attributes, as defined by the present document. The complete-certificate-references attribute contains references to all the certificates present in the certification path used for verifying the signature. The complete-revocation-references attribute contains references to the CRLs and/or OCSPs responses used for verifying the signature. Section 6.2 provides the specification details. Storing the references allows the values of the certification path and the CRLs or OCSPs responses to be stored elsewhere, reducing the size of a stored electronic signature format.
根据本文件，带有完整验证数据参考的电子签名（CAdES-C）将本文件定义的完整证书参考和完整撤销参考属性添加到CAdES-T中。complete certificate references属性包含对用于验证签名的证书路径中存在的所有证书的引用。“完整吊销引用”属性包含对用于验证签名的CRL和/或OCSPs响应的引用。第6.2节提供了规范细节。存储引用允许将认证路径和CRLs或OCSPs响应的值存储在其他位置，从而减小存储的电子签名格式的大小。
Sections C.4.1 to C.4.2 provide rationale on the usage of validation data and when it is suitable to generate the CAdES-C form. Electronic signatures, with the additional validation data forming the CAdES-C, are illustrated in Figure 4.
第C.4.1至C.4.2节提供了验证数据使用的基本原理，以及何时适合生成CAdES-C表格。电子签名以及构成CAdES-C的其他验证数据如图4所示。
+------------------------- CAdES-C --------------------------------+
|+----------------------------- CAdES-T ---------+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+ |
|| |Timestamp | | | | |
|| |attribute | | | | |
||+- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES ------+|over | | | | |
||| ||digital | | | Complete | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||signature | | | certificate | |
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital ||is | | | and | |
||||Document ||Attributes|Signature||mandatory | | | revocation | |
|||| || | ||if is not | | | references | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||timemarked| | | | |
||+--------------------------------++----------+ | | | |
|+-----------------------------------------------+ +-------------+ |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------- CAdES-C --------------------------------+
|+----------------------------- CAdES-T ---------+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+ |
|| |Timestamp | | | | |
|| |attribute | | | | |
||+- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES ------+|over | | | | |
||| ||digital | | | Complete | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||signature | | | certificate | |
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital ||is | | | and | |
||||Document ||Attributes|Signature||mandatory | | | revocation | |
|||| || | ||if is not | | | references | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||timemarked| | | | |
||+--------------------------------++----------+ | | | |
|+-----------------------------------------------+ +-------------+ |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 4: Illustration of CAdES-C format
图4:CAdES-C格式示意图
NOTE 1: The complete certificate and revocation references are added to the CAdES-T as an unsigned attribute.
注1：完整的证书和撤销引用作为未签名属性添加到CAdES-T中。
NOTE 2: As a minimum, the signer will provide the CAdES-BES or, when indicating that the signature conforms to an explicit signing policy, the CAdES-EPES.
注2：作为最低要求，签名人将提供CAdES BES，或在表明签名符合明确的签名政策时，提供CAdES EPES。
NOTE 3: To reduce the risk of repudiating signature creation, the trusted time indication needs to be as close as possible to the time the signature was created. The signer or a TSP could provide the CAdES-T; if not, the verifier should create the CAdES-T on first receipt of an electronic signature because the CAdES-T provides independent evidence of the existence of the signature prior to the trusted time indication.
注3：为了降低拒绝签名创建的风险，可信时间指示需要尽可能接近签名创建的时间。签名者或TSP可以提供学员；如果没有，验证者应在第一次收到电子签名时创建CAdES-T，因为CAdES-T在可信时间指示之前提供了签名存在的独立证据。
NOTE 4: A CAdES-T trusted time indication must be created before a certificate has been revoked or expired.
注4：在证书被吊销或过期之前，必须创建CAdES-T可信时间指示。
NOTE 5: The signer and TSP could provide the CAdES-C to minimize this risk, and when the signer does not provide the CAdES-C, the verifier should create the CAdES-C when the required component of revocation and validation data become available; this may require a grace period.
注5：签字人和TSP可提供CAdES-C以将此风险降至最低，当签字人未提供CAdES-C时，验证人应在撤销和验证数据的所需组件可用时创建CAdES-C；这可能需要一段宽限期。
NOTE 6: A grace period permits certificate revocation information to propagate through the revocation processes. This period could extend from the time an authorized entity requests certificate revocation to when the information is available for the relying party to use. In order to make sure that the certificate was not revoked at the time the signature was time-marked or time-stamped, verifiers should wait until the end of the grace period. A signature policy may define specific values for grace periods.
注6：宽限期允许证书撤销信息通过撤销过程传播。这一期限可以从授权实体请求撤销证书的时间延长到依赖方可以使用信息的时间。为了确保在签名带有时间标记或时间戳时证书未被撤销，验证者应等到宽限期结束。签名策略可以定义宽限期的特定值。
An illustration of a grace period is provided in Figure 5.
图5提供了宽限期的说明。
+<--------------Grace Period --------->+
----+-------+-------+--------+---------------------+----------+
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
Signature | First | Second |
creation | revocation | revocation |
time | status | status |
| checking | checking |
| | |
Time-stamp Certification Build
or path CAdES-C
time-mark construction
over & verification
signature
+<--------------Grace Period --------->+
----+-------+-------+--------+---------------------+----------+
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
Signature | First | Second |
creation | revocation | revocation |
time | status | status |
| checking | checking |
| | |
Time-stamp Certification Build
or path CAdES-C
time-mark construction
over & verification
signature
Figure 5: Illustration of a grace period
图5：宽限期示意图
NOTE 7: CWA 14171 [CWA14171] specifies a signature validation process using CAdES-T, CAdES-C, and a grace period. Annex B provides example validation processes. Annex C.4 provides additional information about applying grace periods during the validation process.
注7:CWA 14171[CWA14171]规定了使用CAdES-T、CAdES-C和宽限期的签名验证过程。附录B提供了验证过程的示例。附录C.4提供了验证过程中应用宽限期的附加信息。
The verifier's conformance requirements are defined in Section 8.3 for time-stamped CAdES-C, and Section 8.4 for time-marked CAdES-C. The present document only defines conformance requirements for the verifier up to an ES with Complete validation data (CAdES-C). This means that none of the extended and archive forms of electronic signatures, as defined in Sections 4.4.3 to 4.4.4, need to be implemented to achieve conformance to the present document.
第8.3节为带时间戳的CAdES-C定义了验证者的一致性要求，第8.4节为带时间戳的CAdES-C定义了验证者的一致性要求。本文件仅为具有完整验证数据（CAdES-C）的ES定义了验证者的一致性要求。这意味着无需实施第4.4.3节至第4.4.4节中定义的电子签名扩展和归档形式，以实现与本文件的一致性。
CAdES-C can be extended by adding unsigned attributes to the electronic signature. The present document defines various unsigned attributes that are applicable for very long-term verification, and
CAdES-C可以通过向电子签名添加未签名属性来扩展。本文档定义了适用于长期验证的各种未签名属性，以及
for preventing some disaster situations that are discussed in Annex C. Annex B provides the details of the various extended formats, all the required unsigned attributes for each type, and how they can be used within the electronic signature validation process. The sections below give an overview of the various forms of extended signature formats in the present document.
为了防止附件C中讨论的某些灾难情况，附件B提供了各种扩展格式的详细信息、每种类型所需的所有未签名属性，以及如何在电子签名验证过程中使用这些属性。以下各节概述了本文件中各种形式的扩展签名格式。
Extended Long format (CAdES-X Long), in accordance with the present document, adds the certificate-values and revocation-values attributes to the CAdES-C format. The first one contains the whole certificate path required for verifying the signature; the second one contains the CRLs and/OCSP responses required for the validation of the signature. This provides a known repository of certificate and revocation information required to validate a CAdES-C and prevents such information from getting lost. Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 give specification details. Annex B.1.1 gives details on the production of the format. Annexes C4.1 to C.4.2 provide the rationale.
根据本文件，扩展长格式（CAdES-X Long）将证书值和撤销值属性添加到CAdES-C格式中。第一个包含验证签名所需的整个证书路径；第二个包含验证签名所需的CRL和/OCSP响应。这提供了验证CAdES-C所需的证书和吊销信息的已知存储库，并防止此类信息丢失。第6.3.3节和第6.3.4节给出了规范细节。附录B.1.1给出了格式制作的详细信息。附录C4.1至C.4.2提供了基本原理。
The structure of the CAdES-X Long format is illustrated in Figure 6.
CAdES-X长格式的结构如图6所示。
+----------------------- CAdES-X-Long -----------------------------+
|+------------------------------------ CadES-C --+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+ |
||+------ CAdES -------------------+|Timestamp | | | | |
||| || over | | | Complete | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||digital | | | certificate | |
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital ||signature | | | and | |
||||Document ||Attributes|Signature|| | | | revocation | |
|||| || | ||Optional | | | data | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||when | | | | |
||+--------------------------------+|timemarked| | | | |
|| +----------+ | | | |
|| +-------------+ | +-------------+ |
|| | Complete | | |
|| | certificate | | |
|| | and | | |
|| | revocation | | |
|| | references | | |
|| +-------------+ | |
|+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
+----------------------- CAdES-X-Long -----------------------------+
|+------------------------------------ CadES-C --+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+ |
||+------ CAdES -------------------+|Timestamp | | | | |
||| || over | | | Complete | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||digital | | | certificate | |
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital ||signature | | | and | |
||||Document ||Attributes|Signature|| | | | revocation | |
|||| || | ||Optional | | | data | |
|||+---------++----------+ ||when | | | | |
||+--------------------------------+|timemarked| | | | |
|| +----------+ | | | |
|| +-------------+ | +-------------+ |
|| | Complete | | |
|| | certificate | | |
|| | and | | |
|| | revocation | | |
|| | references | | |
|| +-------------+ | |
|+-----------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 6: Illustration of CAdES-X-Long
图6:CAdES-X-Long示意图
4.4.3.2. EXtended Electronic Signature with Time Type 1 (CAdES-X Type 1)
4.4.3.2. 时间类型1的扩展电子签名（CAdES-X类型1）
Extended format with time type 1 (CAdES-X Type 1), in accordance with the present document, adds the CAdES-C-time-stamp attribute, whose content is a time-stamp token on the CAdES-C itself, to the CAdES-C format.
根据本文件，时间类型为1的扩展格式（CAdES-X类型1）将CAdES-C-time-stamp属性添加到CAdES-C格式中，该属性的内容是CAdES-C本身的时间戳标记。
This provides an integrity and trusted time protection over all the elements and references. It may protect the certificates, CRLs, and OCSP responses in case of a later compromise of a CA key, CRL key, or OCSP issuer key. Section 6.3.5 provides the specification details.
这为所有元素和引用提供了完整性和受信任的时间保护。如果CA密钥、CRL密钥或OCSP颁发者密钥稍后出现泄露，它可以保护证书、CRL和OCSP响应。第6.3.5节提供了规范细节。
Annex B.1.2 gives details on the production of the time-stamping process. Annex C.4.4.1 provides the rationale.
附录B.1.2给出了时间戳过程的制作细节。附录C.4.4.1提供了基本原理。
The structure of the CAdES-X Type 1 format is illustrated in Figure 7.
CAdES-X Type 1格式的结构如图7所示。
+----------------------- CAdES-X-Type 1 ------------------------------+
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C -----+ |
|| +-------------+ | +-----------+ |
||+--------- CAdES ------------------+| Timestamp | | | | |
||| || over | | | | |
|||+---------++----------+ || digital | | | | |
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital || signature | | | Timestamp | |
||||Document ||Attributes| Signature || | | | over | |
|||| || | || Optional | | | CAdES-C | |
|||+---------++----------+ || when | | | | |
||+----------------------------------+| time-marked | | | | |
|| +-------------+ | | | |
|| +-------------+ | +-----------+ |
|| | Complete | | |
|| | certificate | | |
|| | and | | |
|| | revocation | | |
|| | references | | |
|| +-------------+ | |
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
+----------------------- CAdES-X-Type 1 ------------------------------+
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C -----+ |
|| +-------------+ | +-----------+ |
||+--------- CAdES ------------------+| Timestamp | | | | |
||| || over | | | | |
|||+---------++----------+ || digital | | | | |
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital || signature | | | Timestamp | |
||||Document ||Attributes| Signature || | | | over | |
|||| || | || Optional | | | CAdES-C | |
|||+---------++----------+ || when | | | | |
||+----------------------------------+| time-marked | | | | |
|| +-------------+ | | | |
|| +-------------+ | +-----------+ |
|| | Complete | | |
|| | certificate | | |
|| | and | | |
|| | revocation | | |
|| | references | | |
|| +-------------+ | |
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 7: Illustration of CAdES-X Type 1
图7:CAdES-X类型1的图解
4.4.3.3. EXtended Electronic Signature with Time Type 2 (CAdES-X Type 2)
4.4.3.3. 时间类型2的扩展电子签名（CAdES-X类型2）
Extended format with time type 2 (CAdES-X Type 2), in accordance with the present document, adds to the CAdES-C format the CAdES-C-time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute, whose content is a time-stamp token on the certification path and revocation information references. This provides an integrity and trusted time protection over all the references.
根据本文件，时间类型为2的扩展格式（CAdES-X类型2）在CAdES-C格式中添加了CAdES-C-time-stamped-certs-crls-references属性，其内容是认证路径和撤销信息引用上的时间戳令牌。这为所有引用提供了完整性和受信任的时间保护。
It may protect the certificates, CRLs and OCSP responses in case of a later compromise of a CA key, CRL key or OCSP issuer key.
它可以保护证书、CRL和OCSP响应，以防以后CA密钥、CRL密钥或OCSP颁发者密钥出现泄露。
Both CAdES-X Type 1 and CAdES-X Type 2 counter the same threats, and the usage of one or the other depends on the environment. Section 6.3.5 provides the specification details. Annex B.1.3 gives details on the production of the time-stamping process. Annex C.4.4.2 provides the rationale.
CAdES-X类型1和CAdES-X类型2都能应对相同的威胁，其中一种或另一种的使用取决于环境。第6.3.5节提供了规范细节。附录B.1.3给出了时间戳过程的制作细节。附录C.4.4.2提供了基本原理。
The structure of the CAdES-X Type 2 format is illustrated in Figure 8.
CAdES-X 2型格式的结构如图8所示。
+------------------------- CAdES-X-Type 2 ----------------------------+
|+----------------------------------------CAdES-C ---+ |
|| +------------+| |
||+----- CAdES -----------------------+| Timestamp || |
||| || over || |
|||+---------+ +----------+ || digital || +-------------+|
||||Signer's | | Signed | Digital || signature || | Time-stamp ||
||||Document | |Attributes| signature || || | only over ||
|||| | | | || optional || | complete ||
|||+---------+ +----------+ || when || | certificate ||
||+-----------------------------------+| timemarked || | and ||
|| +------------+| | revocation ||
|| +-------------+ | | references ||
|| | Complete | | +-------------+|
|| | certificate | | |
|| | and | | |
|| | revocation | | |
|| | references | | |
|| +-------------+ | |
|+---------------------------------------------------+ |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------- CAdES-X-Type 2 ----------------------------+
|+----------------------------------------CAdES-C ---+ |
|| +------------+| |
||+----- CAdES -----------------------+| Timestamp || |
||| || over || |
|||+---------+ +----------+ || digital || +-------------+|
||||Signer's | | Signed | Digital || signature || | Time-stamp ||
||||Document | |Attributes| signature || || | only over ||
|||| | | | || optional || | complete ||
|||+---------+ +----------+ || when || | certificate ||
||+-----------------------------------+| timemarked || | and ||
|| +------------+| | revocation ||
|| +-------------+ | | references ||
|| | Complete | | +-------------+|
|| | certificate | | |
|| | and | | |
|| | revocation | | |
|| | references | | |
|| +-------------+ | |
|+---------------------------------------------------+ |
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 8: Illustration of CAdES-X Type 2
图8:CAdES-X类型2的图解
4.4.3.4. EXtended Long Electronic Signature with Time (CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2)
4.4.3.4. 带时间的扩展长电子签名（CAdES-X长类型1或2）
Extended Long with Time (CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2), in accordance with the present document, is a combination of CAdES-X Long and one of the two former types (CAdES-X Type 1 and CAdES-X Type 2). Annex B.1.4 gives details on the production of the time-stamping process. Annex C.4.8 in Annex C provides the rationale.
根据本文件，随时间延长（CAdES-X Long类型1或2）是CAdES-X Long和前两种类型（CAdES-X类型1和CAdES-X类型2）之一的组合。附录B.1.4给出了时间戳过程的制作细节。附录C中的附录C.4.8提供了基本原理。
The structure of the CAdES-X Long Type 1 and CAdES-X Long Type 2 format is illustrated in Figure 9.
CAdES-X Long Type 1和CAdES-X Long Type 2格式的结构如图9所示。
+------------------ CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2 -----------------------+
| +--------------+|
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C --+|+------------+||
|| ||| Timestamp |||
||+------- CAdES --------------------++----------+ ||| over |||
||| ||Timestamp | ||| CAdES-C |||
||| ||over | ||+------------+||
|||+---------++----------+ ||digital | || OR ||
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital ||signature | ||+------------+||
||||Document ||Attributes| signature || | ||| Timestamp |||
|||| || | ||Optional | ||| only over |||
|||+---------++----------+ ||when | ||| complete |||
||+----------------------------------+|timemarked| ||| certificate|||
|| +----------+ ||| and |||
|| ||| Revocation |||
|| +-------------+ ||| References |||
|| | Complete | ||+------------+||
|| | certificate | |+--------------+|
|| | and | | +------------+ |
|| | revocation | | | Complete | |
|| | references | | |certificate | |
|| +-------------+ | | and | |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ |revocation | |
| | value | |
| +------------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------ CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2 -----------------------+
| +--------------+|
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C --+|+------------+||
|| ||| Timestamp |||
||+------- CAdES --------------------++----------+ ||| over |||
||| ||Timestamp | ||| CAdES-C |||
||| ||over | ||+------------+||
|||+---------++----------+ ||digital | || OR ||
||||Signer's || Signed | Digital ||signature | ||+------------+||
||||Document ||Attributes| signature || | ||| Timestamp |||
|||| || | ||Optional | ||| only over |||
|||+---------++----------+ ||when | ||| complete |||
||+----------------------------------+|timemarked| ||| certificate|||
|| +----------+ ||| and |||
|| ||| Revocation |||
|| +-------------+ ||| References |||
|| | Complete | ||+------------+||
|| | certificate | |+--------------+|
|| | and | | +------------+ |
|| | revocation | | | Complete | |
|| | references | | |certificate | |
|| +-------------+ | | and | |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ |revocation | |
| | value | |
| +------------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 9: Illustration of CAdES-X Long Type 1 and CAdES Long Type 2
图9:CAdES-X长型1和CAdES长型2的图示
Archival Form (CAdES-A), in accordance with the present document, builds on a CAdES-X Long or a CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2 by adding one or more archive-time-stamp attributes. This form is used for archival of long-term signatures. Successive time-stamps protect the whole material against vulnerable hashing algorithms or the breaking
根据本文件，档案表格（CAdES-A）以CAdES-X Long或CAdES-X Long类型1或2为基础，添加一个或多个档案时间戳属性。此表格用于存档长期签名。连续的时间戳保护整个材质不受易受攻击的哈希算法或破坏
of the cryptographic material or algorithms. Section 6.4 contains the specification details. Sections C.4.5 and C.4.8 provide the rationale.
指加密材料或算法。第6.4节包含规范细节。第C.4.5节和第C.4.8节提供了基本原理。
The structure of the CAdES-A form is illustrated in Figure 10.
CAdES-A表格的结构如图10所示。
+---------------------------CAdES-A ---------------------------------+
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
|| +--------------+| +----------+ |
||+----------------------CAdES-C ----+|+------------+|| | | |
||| +----------+ ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||+---- CAdES-BES ----+|Timestamp | ||| over ||| | | |
|||| or CAdeS-EPES || over | ||| CAdES-C ||| | Archive | |
|||| ||digital | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||signature | || or || |Timestamp | |
|||| || | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||Optional | ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||| ||when | ||| only over ||| | | |
|||| ||Timemarked| ||| complete ||| | | |
|||+-------------------+| | ||| certificate||| +----------+ |
||| +----------+ ||| and ||| |
||| +-------------+ ||| revocation ||| |
||| | Complete | ||| references ||| |
||| | certificate | ||+------------+|| |
||| | and | |+--------------+| |
||| | revocation | | +------------+ | |
||| | references | | | Complete | | |
||| +-------------+ | |certificate | | |
||| | | and | | |
||+----------------------------------+ |revocation | | |
|| | values | | |
|| +------------+ | |
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------------------------CAdES-A ---------------------------------+
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
|| +--------------+| +----------+ |
||+----------------------CAdES-C ----+|+------------+|| | | |
||| +----------+ ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||+---- CAdES-BES ----+|Timestamp | ||| over ||| | | |
|||| or CAdeS-EPES || over | ||| CAdES-C ||| | Archive | |
|||| ||digital | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||signature | || or || |Timestamp | |
|||| || | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||Optional | ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||| ||when | ||| only over ||| | | |
|||| ||Timemarked| ||| complete ||| | | |
|||+-------------------+| | ||| certificate||| +----------+ |
||| +----------+ ||| and ||| |
||| +-------------+ ||| revocation ||| |
||| | Complete | ||| references ||| |
||| | certificate | ||+------------+|| |
||| | and | |+--------------+| |
||| | revocation | | +------------+ | |
||| | references | | | Complete | | |
||| +-------------+ | |certificate | | |
||| | | and | | |
||+----------------------------------+ |revocation | | |
|| | values | | |
|| +------------+ | |
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure 10: Illustration of CAdES-A
图10:CAdES-A的图解
The CAdES-C may be used for arbitration should there be a dispute between the signer and verifier, provided that:
如果签名人和验证人之间存在争议，则CAdES-C可用于仲裁，前提是：
- the arbitrator knows where to retrieve the signer's certificate (if not already present), all the cross-certificates and the required CRLs, ACRLs, or OCSP responses referenced in the CAdES-C;
- 仲裁员知道从何处检索签名人的证书（如果尚未存在）、所有交叉证书以及CAdES-C中引用的所需CRL、ACRL或OCSP响应；
- when time-stamping in the CAdES-T is being used, the certificate from the TSU that has issued the time-stamp token in the CAdES-T format is still within its validity period;
- 使用CAdES-T时间戳时，TSU以CAdES-T格式颁发时间戳令牌的证书仍在其有效期内；
- when time-stamping in the CAdES-T is being used, the certificate from the TSU that has issued the time-stamp token in the CAdES-T format is not revoked at the time of arbitration;
- 当在CAdES-T中使用时间戳时，在仲裁时不会撤销TSU签发的CAdES-T格式时间戳令牌的证书；
- when time-marking in the CAdES-T is being used, a reliable audit trail from the Time-Marking Authority is available for examination regarding the time;
- 当使用CAdES-T中的时间标记时，时间标记机构提供的可靠审计线索可用于检查时间；
- none of the private keys corresponding to the certificates used to verify the signature chain have ever been compromised;
- 与用于验证签名链的证书相对应的私钥从未被泄露；
- the cryptography used at the time the CAdES-C was built has not been broken at the time the arbitration is performed; and
- 在建立CAdES-C时使用的加密技术在执行仲裁时未被破坏；和
- if the signature policy can be explicitly or implicitly identified, then an arbitrator is able to determine the rules required to validate the electronic signature.
- 如果可以显式或隐式地识别签名策略，则仲裁员能够确定验证电子签名所需的规则。
The validation process validates an electronic signature; the output status of the validation process can be:
验证过程验证电子签名；验证过程的输出状态可以是：
- invalid;
- 无效的
- incomplete validation; or
- 验证不完全；或
- valid.
- 有效的
An invalid response indicates that either the signature format is incorrect or that the digital signature value fails verification (e.g., the integrity check on the digital signature value fails, or any of the certificates on which the digital signature verification depends is known to be invalid or revoked).
无效响应表示签名格式不正确或数字签名值未通过验证（例如，数字签名值的完整性检查失败，或数字签名验证所依赖的任何证书已知无效或已撤销）。
An incomplete validation response indicates that the signature validation status is currently unknown. In the case of incomplete validation, additional information may be made available to the application or user, thus allowing them to decide what to do with the electronic signature. In the case of incomplete validation, the electronic signature may be checked again at some later time when additional information becomes available.
验证响应不完整表示签名验证状态当前未知。在验证不完整的情况下，可向应用程序或用户提供补充信息，从而使他们能够决定如何处理电子签名。在验证不完整的情况下，可在以后获得其他信息时再次检查电子签名。
NOTE: For example, an incomplete validation may be because all the required certificates are not available or the grace period is not completed.
注意：例如，验证不完整可能是因为所有必需的证书不可用或宽限期未完成。
A valid response indicates that the signature has passed verification, and it complies with the signature validation policy.
有效响应表示签名已通过验证，并且符合签名验证策略。
Example validation sequences are illustrated in Annex B.
附录B中说明了验证顺序示例。
This section builds upon the existing Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS), as defined in RFC 3852 [4], and Enhanced Security Services (ESS), as defined in RFC 2634 [5]. The overall structure of an Electronic Signature is as defined in CMS. The Electronic Signature (ES) uses attributes defined in CMS, ESS, and the present document. The present document defines ES attributes that it uses and that are not defined elsewhere.
本节以RFC 3852[4]中定义的现有加密消息语法（CMS）和RFC 2634[5]中定义的增强安全服务（ESS）为基础。电子签名的总体结构如CMS中所定义。电子签名使用CMS、ESS和本文件中定义的属性。本文档定义了它使用的、其他地方未定义的ES属性。
The mandated set of attributes and the digital signature value is defined as the minimum Electronic Signature (ES) required by the present document. A signature policy may mandate that other signed attributes be present.
法定属性集和数字签名值被定义为本文件要求的最低电子签名。签名策略可以要求存在其他签名属性。
The general syntax of the ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
ES的一般语法如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
NOTE: CMS defines content types for id-data, id-signedData, id-envelopedData, id-digestedData, id-encryptedData, and id-authenticatedData. Although CMS permits other documents to define other content types, the ASN.1 type defined should not be a CHOICE type. The present document does not define other content types.
注意：CMS定义了id数据、id签名数据、id信封数据、id摘要数据、id加密数据和id身份验证数据的内容类型。尽管CMS允许其他文档定义其他内容类型，但定义的ASN.1类型不应是选择类型。本文档未定义其他内容类型。
The data content type of the ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
ES的数据内容类型如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
NOTE: If the content type is id-data, it is recommended that the content be encoded using MIME, and that the MIME type is used to identify the presentation format of the data. See Annex F.1 for an example of using MIME to identify the encoding type.
注意：如果内容类型是id数据，建议使用MIME对内容进行编码，并使用MIME类型标识数据的表示格式。有关使用MIME识别编码类型的示例，请参见附录F.1。
The Signed-data content type of the ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
ES的签名数据内容类型如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
The syntax of the SignedData of the ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
ES签名数据的语法如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
The fields of type SignedData are as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
SignedData类型的字段如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
The identification of a signer's certificate used to create the signature is always signed (see Section 5.7.3). The validation policy may specify requirements for the presence of certain certificates. The degenerate case, where there are no signers, is not valid in the present document.
用于创建签名的签名人证书的标识始终经过签名（见第5.7.3节）。验证策略可能会指定某些证书的存在要求。没有签字人的退化情况在本文件中无效。
The syntax of the EncapsulatedContentInfo type ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
封装的ContentInfo类型ES的语法如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
For the purpose of long-term validation, as defined by the present document, it is advisable that either the eContent is present, or the data that is signed is archived in such as way as to preserve any data encoding. It is important that the OCTET STRING used to generate the signature remains the same every time either the verifier or an arbitrator validates the signature.
为了长期验证的目的，如本文件所定义，建议存在eContent，或者以保存任何数据编码的方式存档已签名的数据。每次验证器或仲裁器验证签名时，用于生成签名的八位字节字符串保持不变，这一点很重要。
NOTE: The eContent is optional in CMS :
注：eContent在CMS中是可选的：
- When it is present, this allows the signed data to be encapsulated in the SignedData structure, which then contains both the signed data and the signature. However, the signed data may only be accessed by a verifier able to decode the ASN.1 encoded SignedData structure.
- 当它存在时，这允许将签名数据封装在SignedData结构中，然后该结构包含签名数据和签名。然而，签名数据只能由能够解码ASN.1编码的签名数据结构的验证器访问。
- When it is missing, this allows the signed data to be sent or stored separately from the signature, and the SignedData structure only contains the signature. It is, in the case of the signature, only the data that is signed that needs to be stored and distributed in such as way as to preserve any data encoding.
- 如果缺少签名，则允许将签名数据与签名分开发送或存储，并且SignedData结构仅包含签名。在签名的情况下，只有已签名的数据才需要以保存任何数据编码的方式存储和分发。
The degenerate case where there are no signers is not valid in the present document.
没有签名人的退化情况在本文件中无效。
The syntax of the SignerInfo type ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
签名信息类型ES的语法如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
Per-signer information is represented in the type SignerInfo. In the case of multiple independent signatures (see Annex B.5), there is an instance of this field for each signer.
每个签名者的信息在SignerInfo类型中表示。对于多个独立签名（见附件B.5），每个签名人都有一个该字段的实例。
The fields of type SignerInfo have the meanings defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]), but the signedAttrs field shall contain the following attributes:
SignerinInfo类型的字段具有CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义的含义，但signedAttrs字段应包含以下属性：
- content-type, as defined in Section 5.7.1; and
- 第5.7.1节中定义的内容类型；和
- message-digest, as defined in Section 5.7.2;
- 第5.7.2节中定义的消息摘要；
- signing-certificate, as defined in Section 5.7.3.
- 第5.7.3节中定义的签署证书。
The message digest calculation process is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
消息摘要计算过程如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
The input to the message signature generation process is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
消息签名生成过程的输入如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
The procedures for message signature verification are defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]) and enhanced in the present document: the input to the signature verification process must be the signer's public key, which shall be verified as correct using the signing certificate reference attribute containing a reference to the signing certificate, i.e., when SigningCertificateV2 from RFC 5035 [16] or SigningCertificate from ESS [5] is used, the public key from the first certificate identified in the sequence of certificate identifiers from SigningCertificate must be the key used to verify the digital signature.
消息签名验证程序在CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义并在本文件中得到增强：签名验证过程的输入必须是签名者的公钥，应使用包含签名证书引用的签名证书引用属性验证其正确性，即。，当使用来自RFC 5035[16]的SigningCertificateV2或来自ESS[5]的SigningCertificate时，来自SigningCertificate的证书标识符序列中标识的第一个证书的公钥必须是用于验证数字签名的密钥。
The following attributes shall be present with the signed-data defined by the present document. The attributes are defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
以下属性应与本文件定义的签名数据一起呈现。这些属性在CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义。
The content-type attribute indicates the type of the signed content. The syntax of the content-type attribute type is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]) Section 11.1.
content type属性指示已签名内容的类型。内容类型属性类型的语法如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）第11.1节所定义。
NOTE 1: As stated in RFC 3852 [4] , the content-type attribute must have its value (i.e., ContentType) equal to the eContentType of the EncapsulatedContentInfo value being signed.
注1：如RFC 3852[4]中所述，内容类型属性的值（即ContentType）必须等于要签名的封装ContentInfo值的eContentType。
NOTE 2: For implementations supporting signature generation, if the content-type attribute is id-data, then it is recommended that the eContent be encoded using MIME. For implementations supporting signature verification, if the signed data (i.e., eContent) is MIME-encoded, then the OID of the content-type attribute must be id-data. In both cases, the MIME content-type(s) must be used to identify the presentation format of the data. See Annex F for further details about the use of MIME.
注意2：对于支持签名生成的实现，如果content-type属性是id-data，则建议使用MIME对eContent进行编码。对于支持签名验证的实现，如果签名数据（即eContent）是MIME编码的，则content type属性的OID必须是id数据。在这两种情况下，必须使用MIME内容类型来标识数据的表示格式。有关MIME使用的更多详细信息，请参见附录F。
The syntax of the message-digest attribute type of the ES is as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
ES的消息摘要属性类型的语法如CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中所定义。
The Signing certificate reference attributes are supported by using either the ESS signing-certificate attribute or the ESS-signing-certificate-v2 attribute.
通过使用ESS Signing certificate属性或ESS-Signing-certificate-v2属性支持签名证书引用属性。
These attributes shall contain a reference to the signer's certificate; they are designed to prevent simple substitution and reissue attacks and to allow for a restricted set of certificates to be used in verifying a signature. They have a compact form (much shorter than the full certificate) that allows for a certificate to be unambiguously identified.
这些属性应包含对签名人证书的引用；它们旨在防止简单的替换和重新发布攻击，并允许在验证签名时使用一组受限的证书。它们有一个紧凑的表单（比完整的证书短得多），允许明确地标识证书。
One, and only one, of the following alternative attributes shall be present with the signedData, defined by the present document:
以下可选属性中的一个（且仅一个）应与本文件定义的签名数据一起提供：
- The ESS signing-certificate attribute, defined in ESS [5], must be used if the SHA-1 hashing algorithm is used.
- 如果使用SHA-1哈希算法，则必须使用ESS[5]中定义的ESS签名证书属性。
- The ESS signing-certificate-v2 attribute, defined in "ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility", RFC 5035 [15], which shall be used when other hashing algorithms are to be used.
- ESS signing-certificate-v2属性，在“ESS更新：添加CertID算法敏捷性”RFC 5035[15]中定义，在使用其他哈希算法时应使用该属性。
The certificate to be used to verify the signature shall be identified in the sequence (i.e., the certificate from the signer), and the sequence shall not be empty. The signature validation policy may mandate other certificates be present that may include all the certificates up to the trust anchor.
用于验证签名的证书应按顺序标识（即签名人的证书），且顺序不得为空。签名验证策略可能要求存在其他证书，这些证书可能包括信任锚之前的所有证书。
The syntax of the signing-certificate attribute type of the ES is as defined in Enhanced Security Services (ESS), RFC 2634 [5], and further qualified in the present document.
ES的签名证书属性类型的语法如增强安全服务（ESS）、RFC 2634[5]中所定义，并在本文档中进一步限定。
The sequence of the policy information field is not used in the present document.
本文档中未使用“策略信息”字段的顺序。
The ESS signing-certificate attribute shall be a signed attribute. The encoding of the ESSCertID for this certificate shall include the issuerSerial field.
ESS签名证书属性应为已签名属性。本证书的ESSCertID编码应包括发行人序列字段。
If present, the issuerAndSerialNumber in SignerIdentifier field of the SignerInfo shall match the issuerSerial field present in ESSCertID. In addition, the certHash from ESSCertID shall match the SHA-1 hash of the certificate. The certificate identified shall be used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the signature, the signature shall be considered invalid.
如果存在，则签名信息的SignerIdentifier字段中的issuerAndSerialNumber应与ESSCertID中的issuerSerial字段匹配。此外，来自ESSCertID的certHash应与证书的SHA-1哈希匹配。应在签名验证过程中使用识别的证书。如果证书的哈希与用于验证签名的证书不匹配，则签名应视为无效。
NOTE: Where an attribute certificate is used by the signer to associate a role, or other attributes of the signer, with the electronic signature; this is placed in the signer-attributes attribute as defined in Section 5.8.3.
注：签名人使用属性证书将角色或签名人的其他属性与电子签名关联；该属性位于第5.8.3节定义的“签名者属性”属性中。
The ESS signing-certificate-v2 attribute is similar to the ESS signing-certificate defined above, except that this attribute can be used with hashing algorithms other than SHA-1.
ESS signing-certificate-v2属性与上面定义的ESS signing-certificate类似，不同之处在于此属性可用于SHA-1以外的哈希算法。
The syntax of the signing-certificate-v2 attribute type of the ES is as defined in "ESS Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility", RFC 5035 [15], and further qualified in the present document.
ES的signing-certificate-v2属性类型的语法如“ESS更新：添加CertID算法敏捷性”RFC 5035[15]中所定义，并在本文档中进一步限定。
The sequence of the policy information field is not used in the present document.
本文档中未使用“策略信息”字段的顺序。
This attribute shall be used in the same manner as defined above for the ESS signing-certificate attribute.
该属性的使用方式应与上述ESS签名证书属性相同。
The object identifier for this attribute is:
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
The object identifier for this attribute is:
id-aa-signingCertificateV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 47 }
If present, the issuerAndSerialNumber in SignerIdentifier field of the SignerInfo shall match the issuerSerial field present in ESSCertIDv2. In addition, the certHash from ESSCertIDv2 shall match the hash of the certificate computed using the hash function specified in the hashAlgorithm field. The certificate identified shall be used during the signature verification process. If the hash of the certificate does not match the certificate used to verify the signature, the signature shall be considered invalid.
如果存在，则签名信息的SignerIdentifier字段中的issuerAndSerialNumber应与ESSCertiverD2中的issuerSerial字段匹配。此外，ESSCertIDv2中的certHash应与使用hashAlgorithm字段中指定的哈希函数计算的证书哈希相匹配。应在签名验证过程中使用识别的证书。如果证书的哈希与用于验证签名的证书不匹配，则签名应视为无效。
NOTE 1: Where an attribute certificate is used by the signer to associate a role, or other attributes of the signer, with the electronic signature; this is placed in the signer-attributes attribute as defined in Section 5.8.3.
注1：签名人使用属性证书将角色或签名人的其他属性与电子签名相关联；该属性位于第5.8.3节定义的“签名者属性”属性中。
NOTE 2: RFC 3126 was using the other signing-certificate attribute (see Section 5.7.3.3) for the same purpose. Its use is now deprecated, since this structure is simpler.
注2:RFC 3126出于相同目的使用了其他签名证书属性（见第5.7.3.3节）。由于这种结构更简单，现在不推荐使用它。
RFC 3126 was using the other signing-certificate attribute as an alternative to the ESS signing-certificate when hashing algorithms other than SHA-1 were being used. Its use is now deprecated, since the structure of the signing-certificate-v2 attribute is simpler. Its description is however still present in this version for backwards compatibility.
当使用SHA-1以外的散列算法时，RFC 3126使用other signing certificate属性作为ESS签名证书的替代方案。现在不推荐使用它，因为signing-certificate-v2属性的结构更简单。但是，为了向后兼容，它的描述仍然存在于该版本中。
id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }
id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }
The other-signing-certificate attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax OtherSigningCertificate:
“其他签名证书”属性值具有ASN.1语法OtherSigningCertificate:
OtherSigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
-- NOT USED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT }
OtherSigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
-- NOT USED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT }
OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertHash OtherHash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertHash OtherHash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
sha1Hash OtherHashValue, -- This contains a SHA-1 hash
otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue}
OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
sha1Hash OtherHashValue, -- This contains a SHA-1 hash
otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue}
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue }
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue }
5.8. Additional Mandatory Attributes for Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signatures
5.8. 显式基于策略的电子签名的附加强制属性
The present document mandates that for CAdES-EPES, a reference to the signature policy is included in the signedData. This reference is explicitly identified. A signature policy defines the rules for creation and validation of an electronic signature, and is included as a signed attribute with every Explicit Policy-based Electronic Signature. The signature-policy-identifier shall be a signed attribute.
本文件规定，对于CAdES EPES，签名数据中应包含对签名政策的参考。此引用已明确标识。签名策略定义了创建和验证电子签名的规则，并作为签名属性包含在每个显式基于策略的电子签名中。签名策略标识符应为签名属性。
The following object identifier identifies the signature-policy-identifier attribute:
以下对象标识符标识签名策略标识符属性：
id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }
id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }
signature-policy-identifier attribute values have ASN.1 type SignaturePolicyIdentifier:
签名策略标识符属性值具有ASN.1类型的SignaturePolicyIdentifier:
SignaturePolicyIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
signaturePolicyId SignaturePolicyId,
signaturePolicyImplied SignaturePolicyImplied
-- not used in this version
}
SignaturePolicyIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
signaturePolicyId SignaturePolicyId,
signaturePolicyImplied SignaturePolicyImplied
-- not used in this version
}
SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyId SigPolicyId,
sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,
sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL}
SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyId SigPolicyId,
sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,
sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL}
SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL
SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL
The sigPolicyId field contains an object-identifier that uniquely identifies a specific version of the signature policy. The syntax of this field is as follows:
sigPolicyId字段包含唯一标识签名策略特定版本的对象标识符。此字段的语法如下所示：
SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
The sigPolicyHash field optionally contains the identifier of the hash algorithm and the hash of the value of the signature policy. The hashValue within the sigPolicyHash may be set to zero to indicate that the policy hash value is not known.
sigPolicyHash字段可选地包含哈希算法的标识符和签名策略值的哈希。sigPolicyHash中的hashValue可以设置为零，以指示策略哈希值未知。
NOTE: The use of a zero sigPolicyHash value is to ensure backwards compatibility with earlier versions of the current document. If sigPolicyHash is zero, then the hash value should not be checked against the calculated hash value of the signature policy.
注意：使用零sigPolicyHash值是为了确保与当前文档的早期版本向后兼容。如果sigPolicyHash为零，则不应根据签名策略的计算哈希值检查哈希值。
If the signature policy is defined using ASN.1, then the hash is calculated on the value without the outer type and length fields, and the hashing algorithm shall be as specified in the field sigPolicyHash.
如果签名策略是使用ASN.1定义的，则散列是在没有外部类型和长度字段的值上计算的，散列算法应符合字段sigPolicyHash中的规定。
If the signature policy is defined using another structure, the type of structure and the hashing algorithm shall be either specified as part of the signature policy, or indicated using a signature policy qualifier.
如果使用其他结构定义了签名策略，则应将结构类型和哈希算法指定为签名策略的一部分，或使用签名策略限定符指示。
SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue
SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue }
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue }
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
A Signature Policy Identifier may be qualified with other information about the qualifier. The semantics and syntax of the qualifier is as associated with the object-identifier in the sigPolicyQualifierId field. The general syntax of this qualifier is as follows:
签名策略标识符可以与有关限定符的其他信息一起限定。限定符的语义和语法与sigPolicyQualifierId字段中的对象标识符相关联。此限定符的一般语法如下所示：
SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyQualifierId SigPolicyQualifierId,
sigQualifier ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId }
SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyQualifierId SigPolicyQualifierId,
sigQualifier ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId }
The present document specifies the following qualifiers:
本文件规定了以下限定符：
- spuri: this contains the web URI or URL reference to the signature policy, and
- spuri：它包含对签名策略的web URI或URL引用，以及
- sp-user-notice: this contains a user notice that should be displayed whenever the signature is validated.
- sp user NOTIONE（sp用户通知）：它包含一个用户通知，在验证签名时应显示该用户通知。
sigpolicyQualifierIds defined in the present document:
SigPolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
sigpolicyQualifierIds defined in the present document:
SigPolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }
id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }
SPuri ::= IA5String
SPuri ::= IA5String
id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }
id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }
SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL}
SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL}
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText, noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
组织显示文本，通知整数的枚举序列}
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
The following attributes may be present with the signed-data; the attributes are defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]) and are imported into the present document. Where appropriate, the attributes are qualified and profiled by the present document.
签名数据可能具有以下属性：；这些属性在CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义，并导入到本文档中。在适当情况下，本文件对这些属性进行了限定和分析。
The signing-time attribute specifies the time at which the signer claims to have performed the signing process.
签名时间属性指定签名者声称已执行签名过程的时间。
Signing-time attribute values for ES have the ASN.1 type SigningTime as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]).
ES的签名时间属性值具有CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义的ASN.1类型的签名时间。
NOTE: RFC 3852 [4] states that dates between January 1, 1950 and December 31, 2049 (inclusive) must be encoded as UTCTime. Any dates with year values before 1950 or after 2049 must be encoded as GeneralizedTime.
注：RFC 3852[4]规定1950年1月1日至2049年12月31日（含）之间的日期必须编码为UTCTime。年份值在1950年之前或2049年之后的任何日期都必须编码为GeneratedTime。
The countersignature attribute values for ES have ASN.1 type CounterSignature, as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]). A countersignature attribute shall be an unsigned attribute.
ES的会签属性值具有CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义的ASN.1类型会签。会签属性应为未签名属性。
The following attributes may be present with the signed-data defined by the present document. The attributes are defined in ESS and are imported into the present document and are appropriately qualified and profiled by the present document.
以下属性可能与本文档定义的签名数据一起出现。这些属性在ESS中定义，并导入到本文档中，并由本文档进行适当的限定和分析。
The content-reference attribute is a link from one SignedData to another. It may be used to link a reply to the original message to which it refers, or to incorporate by reference one SignedData into another. The content-reference attribute shall be a signed attribute.
内容引用属性是从一个SignedData到另一个SignedData的链接。它可以用于将回复链接到它所引用的原始消息，或者通过引用将一个签名数据合并到另一个签名数据中。内容引用属性应为签名属性。
content-reference attribute values for ES have ASN.1 type ContentReference, as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]).
ES的内容引用属性值具有ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中定义的ASN.1类型的ContentReference。
The content-reference attribute shall be used as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]).
内容参考属性应按照ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中的定义使用。
The content-identifier attribute provides an identifier for the signed content, for use when a reference may be later required to that content; for example, in the content-reference attribute in other signed data sent later. The content-identifier shall be a signed attribute.
内容标识符属性为签名内容提供标识符，以便在稍后可能需要对该内容进行引用时使用；例如，在以后发送的其他签名数据的“内容引用”属性中。内容标识符应为签名属性。
content-identifier attribute type values for the ES have an ASN.1 type ContentIdentifier, as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]).
ES的内容标识符属性类型值具有ASN.1类型的内容标识符，如ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中所定义。
The minimal content-identifier attribute should contain a concatenation of user-specific identification information (such as a
最小内容标识符属性应包含特定于用户的标识信息（例如
user name or public keying material identification information), a GeneralizedTime string, and a random number.
用户名或公钥材料标识信息）、泛化时间字符串和随机数。
The content-hints attribute provides information on the innermost signed content of a multi-layer message where one content is encapsulated in another.
“内容提示”属性提供有关多层消息的最内层签名内容的信息，其中一个内容封装在另一个内容中。
The syntax of the content-hints attribute type of the ES is as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]).
ES的内容提示属性类型的语法如ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中所定义。
When used to indicate the precise format of the data to be presented to the user, the following rules apply:
当用于指示要呈现给用户的数据的精确格式时，以下规则适用：
- the contentType indicates the type of the associated content. It is an object identifier (i.e., a unique string of integers) assigned by an authority that defines the content type; and
- contentType指示关联内容的类型。它是由定义内容类型的机构分配的对象标识符（即，唯一的整数字符串）；和
- when the contentType is id-data, the contentDescription shall define the presentation format; the format may be defined by MIME types.
- 当contentType为id数据时，contentDescription应定义表示格式；格式可以由MIME类型定义。
When the format of the content is defined by MIME types, the following rules apply:
当内容的格式由MIME类型定义时，以下规则适用：
- the contentType shall be id-data, as defined in CMS (RFC 3852 [4]);
- 内容类型应为CMS（RFC 3852[4]）中定义的id数据；
- the contentDescription shall be used to indicate the encoding of the data, in accordance with the rules defined RFC 2045 [6]; see Annex F for an example of structured contents and MIME.
- 根据RFC 2045[6]定义的规则，contentDescription应用于指示数据编码；结构化内容和MIME示例见附录F。
NOTE 1: id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 }
NOTE 1: id-data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) 1 }
NOTE 2: contentDescription is optional in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]). It may be used to complement contentTypes defined elsewhere; such definitions are outside the scope of the present document.
注2:ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中的contentDescription是可选的。它可以用来补充其他地方定义的内容类型；这些定义不在本文件的范围之内。
This section defines a number of attributes that may be used to indicate additional information to a verifier:
本节定义了一些属性，这些属性可用于向验证器指示附加信息：
a) the type of commitment from the signer, and/or
a) 签署人承诺的类型，和/或
b) the claimed location where the signature is performed, and/or
b) 执行签名的声称位置，和/或
c) claimed attributes or certified attributes of the signer, and/or
c) 签名人的声明属性或认证属性，和/或
d) a content time-stamp applied before the content was signed.
d) 签名内容之前应用的内容时间戳。
There may be situations where a signer wants to explicitly indicate to a verifier that by signing the data, it illustrates a type of commitment on behalf of the signer. The commitment-type-indication attribute conveys such information.
在某些情况下，签名者可能希望明确地向验证者表明，通过对数据进行签名，它代表签名者说明了一种承诺类型。承诺类型指示属性传递此类信息。
The commitment-type-indication attribute shall be a signed attribute. The commitment type may be:
承诺类型指示属性应为有符号属性。承诺类型可以是：
- defined as part of the signature policy, in which case, the commitment type has precise semantics that are defined as part of the signature policy; and
- 定义为签名策略的一部分，在这种情况下，承诺类型具有定义为签名策略一部分的精确语义；和
- be a registered type, in which case, the commitment type has precise semantics defined by registration, under the rules of the registration authority. Such a registration authority may be a trading association or a legislative authority.
- 是注册类型，在这种情况下，承诺类型具有注册机构根据注册规则定义的精确语义。这种登记机关可以是贸易协会或立法机关。
The signature policy specifies a set of attributes that it "recognizes". This "recognized" set includes all those commitment types defined as part of the signature policy, as well as any externally defined commitment types that the policy may choose to recognize. Only recognized commitment types are allowed in this field.
签名策略指定它“识别”的一组属性。此“已识别”集合包括作为签名策略一部分定义的所有承诺类型，以及策略可能选择识别的任何外部定义的承诺类型。此字段中只允许识别的承诺类型。
The following object identifier identifies the commitment-type-indication attribute:
以下对象标识符标识承诺类型指示属性：
id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}
id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}
commitment-type-indication attribute values have ASN.1 type CommitmentTypeIndication.
承诺类型指示属性值具有ASN.1类型承诺类型指示。
CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
commitmentTypeQualifier SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CommitmentTypeQualifier OPTIONAL}
CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
commitmentTypeQualifier SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CommitmentTypeQualifier OPTIONAL}
CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeIdentifier CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY commitmentTypeIdentifier }
CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeIdentifier CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY commitmentTypeIdentifier }
The use of any qualifiers to the commitment type is outside the scope of the present document.
对承诺类型使用任何限定符不在本文件的范围之内。
The following generic commitment types are defined in the present document:
本文件定义了以下通用承诺类型：
id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1}
id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1}
id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}
id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}
id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 3}
id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 3}
id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}
id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}
id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 5}
id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 5}
id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 6}
id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 6}
These generic commitment types have the following meanings:
这些通用承诺类型具有以下含义：
Proof of origin indicates that the signer recognizes to have created, approved, and sent the message.
原产地证明表示签名人确认已创建、批准和发送该邮件。
Proof of receipt indicates that signer recognizes to have received the content of the message.
收到证明表示签名人确认已收到邮件内容。
Proof of delivery indicates that the TSP providing that indication has delivered a message in a local store accessible to the recipient of the message.
传递证明表明提供该指示的TSP已在本地存储中传递消息，该本地存储可供消息接收方访问。
Proof of sender indicates that the entity providing that indication has sent the message (but not necessarily created it).
发送方证明表明提供该指示的实体已发送消息（但不一定创建了该消息）。
Proof of approval indicates that the signer has approved the content of the message.
批准证明表明签名人已批准邮件内容。
Proof of creation indicates that the signer has created the message (but not necessarily approved, nor sent it).
创建证明表明签名者已创建消息（但不一定已批准或已发送）。
The signer-location attribute specifies a mnemonic for an address associated with the signer at a particular geographical (e.g., city) location. The mnemonic is registered in the country in which the signer is located and is used in the provision of the Public Telegram Service (according to ITU-T Recommendation F.1 [11]).
“签名者位置”属性指定在特定地理位置（如城市）与签名者关联的地址的助记符。助记符在签名人所在国注册，并用于提供公共电报服务（根据ITU-T建议F.1[11]）。
The signer-location attribute shall be a signed attribute. The following object identifier identifies the signer-location attribute:
签名者位置属性应为签名属性。以下对象标识符标识签名者位置属性：
id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}
id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}
Signer-location attribute values have ASN.1 type SignerLocation:
签名者位置属性值具有ASN.1类型的签名者位置：
SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
-- at least one of the following shall be present:
countryName [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a Country in X.500
localityName [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a locality in X.500
postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
-- at least one of the following shall be present:
countryName [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a Country in X.500
localityName [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a locality in X.500
postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString
The signer-attributes attribute specifies additional attributes of the signer (e.g., role). It may be either:
签名者属性指定签名者的其他属性（例如，角色）。它可以是：
- claimed attributes of the signer; or
- 签名人声称的属性；或
- certified attributes of the signer.
- 签名者的认证属性。
The signer-attributes attribute shall be a signed attribute. The following object identifier identifies the signer-attribute attribute:
签名者属性应为签名属性。以下对象标识符标识签名者属性：
id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}
id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}
signer-attributes values have ASN.1 type SignerAttribute:
签名者属性值具有ASN.1类型的SignerAttribute：
SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
claimedAttributes [0] ClaimedAttributes,
certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
claimedAttributes [0] ClaimedAttributes,
certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- as defined in RFC 3281: see Section 4.1.
CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- as defined in RFC 3281: see Section 4.1.
NOTE 1: Only a single signer-attributes can be used.
注1：只能使用单个签名者属性。
NOTE 2: Attribute and AttributeCertificate are as defined respectively in ITU-T Recommendations X.501 [9] and X.509 [1].
注2：属性和属性证书分别在ITU-T建议X.501[9]和X.509[1]中定义。
The content-time-stamp attribute is an attribute that is the time-stamp token of the signed data content before it is signed. The content-time-stamp attribute shall be a signed attribute.
内容时间戳属性是一个属性，它是已签名数据内容在签名之前的时间戳标记。内容时间戳属性应为签名属性。
The following object identifier identifies the content-time-stamp attribute:
以下对象标识符标识内容时间戳属性：
id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member- body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}
id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member- body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}
content-time-stamp attribute values have ASN.1 type ContentTimestamp:
ContentTimestamp ::= TimeStampToken
content-time-stamp attribute values have ASN.1 type ContentTimestamp:
ContentTimestamp ::= TimeStampToken
The value of messageImprint of TimeStampToken (as described in RFC 3161 [7]) shall be a hash of the value of the eContent field within encapContentInfo in the signedData.
TimeStampToken的messageImprint值（如RFC 3161[7]中所述）应为signedData中encapContentInfo内eContent字段值的散列。
For further information and definition of TimeStampToken, see Section 7.4.
有关时间标记的更多信息和定义，请参见第7.4节。
NOTE: content-time-stamp indicates that the signed information was formed before the date included in the content-time-stamp.
注意：内容时间戳表示签名信息是在内容时间戳中包含的日期之前形成的。
Multiple independent signatures (see Annex B.5) are supported by independent SignerInfo from each signer.
多个独立签名（见附录B.5）由每个签名人的独立签名信息支持。
Each SignerInfo shall include all the attributes required under the present document and shall be processed independently by the verifier.
每个签名信息应包括本文件要求的所有属性，并应由验证者独立处理。
NOTE: Independent signatures may be used to provide independent signatures from different parties with different signed attributes, or to provide multiple signatures from the same party using alternative signature algorithms, in which case the other attributes, excluding time values and signature policy information, will generally be the same.
注：独立签名可用于提供具有不同签名属性的不同方的独立签名，或使用替代签名算法提供来自同一方的多个签名，在这种情况下，其他属性（不包括时间值和签名策略信息）通常相同。
Multiple embedded signatures (see Annex C.5) are supported using the countersignature unsigned attribute (see Section 5.9.2). Each counter signature is carried in countersignature held as an unsigned attribute to the SignerInfo to which the counter-signature is applied.
多个嵌入式签名（见附录C.5）支持使用会签无签名属性（见第5.9.2节）。每个反签名都在反签名中进行，作为应用反签名的SignerinInfo的未签名属性。
NOTE: Counter signatures may be used to provide signatures from different parties with different signed attributes, or to provide multiple signatures from the same party using alternative signature algorithms, in which case the other attributes, excluding time values and signature policy information, will generally be the same.
注：反签名可用于提供具有不同签名属性的不同方的签名，或使用替代签名算法提供来自同一方的多个签名，在这种情况下，其他属性（不包括时间值和签名策略信息）通常相同。
This section specifies attributes that contain different types of validation data. These attributes build on the electronic signature specified in Section 5. This includes:
本节指定包含不同类型验证数据的属性。这些属性以第5节规定的电子签名为基础。这包括：
- Signature-time-stamp applied to the electronic signature value or a Time-Mark in an audit trail. This is defined as the Electronic Signature with Time (CAdES-T); and
- 应用于审核跟踪中的电子签名值或时间标记的签名时间戳。这被定义为带时间的电子签名（CAdES-T）；和
- Complete validation data references that comprise the time-stamp of the signature value, plus references to all the certificates (complete-certificate-references) and revocation (complete-revocation-references) information used for full validation of the electronic signature. This is defined as the Electronic Signature with Complete data references (CAdES-C).
- 完整的验证数据引用，包括签名值的时间戳，加上用于完全验证电子签名的所有证书（完整的证书引用）和撤销（完整的撤销引用）信息的引用。这被定义为具有完整数据参考的电子签名（CAdES-C）。
NOTE 1: Formats for CAdES-T are illustrated in Section 4.4, and the attributes are defined in Section 6.1.1.
注1：第4.4节说明了CAdES-T的格式，第6.1.1节定义了属性。
NOTE 2: Formats for CAdES-C are illustrated in Section 4.4. The required attributes for the CAdES-C signature format are defined in Sections 6.2.1 to 6.2.2; optional attributes are defined in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.
注2:CAdES-C的格式如第4.4节所示。第6.2.1至6.2.2节定义了CAdES-C签名格式所需的属性；可选属性在第6.2.3节和第6.2.4节中定义。
In addition, the following optional extended forms of validation data are also defined; see Annex B for an overview of the extended forms of validation data:
此外，还定义了以下可选的验证数据扩展形式；有关验证数据扩展形式的概述，请参见附录B：
- CAdES-X with time-stamp: there are two types of time-stamps used in extended validation data defined by the present document;
- 带时间戳的CAdES-X：本文件定义的扩展验证数据中使用了两种类型的时间戳；
- Type 1(CAdES-X Type 1): comprises a time-stamp over the ES with Complete validation data (CAdES-C); and
- 类型1（CAdES-X类型1）：包括ES上的时间戳和完整的验证数据（CAdES-C）；和
- Type 2 (CAdES-X Type2): comprises a time-stamp over the certification path references and the revocation information references used to support the CAdES-C.
- 类型2（CAdES-X类型2）：包括用于支持CAdES-C的认证路径引用和撤销信息引用上的时间戳。
NOTE 3: Formats for CAdES-X Type 1 and CAdES-X Type 2 are illustrated in Sections B.1.2 and B.1.3, respectively.
注3：第B.1.2和B.1.3节分别说明了CAdES-X类型1和CAdES-X类型2的格式。
- CAdES-X Long: comprises the Complete validation data references (CAdES-C), plus the actual values of all the certificates and revocation information used in the CAdES-C.
- CAdES-X Long：包括完整的验证数据参考（CAdES-C），加上CAdES-C中使用的所有证书和撤销信息的实际值。
NOTE 4: Formats for CAdES-X Long are illustrated in Annex B.1.1.
注4:CAdES-X长的格式如附录B.1.1所示。
- CAdES-X Long Type 1 or CAdES-X Long Type 2: comprises an X-Time-Stamp (Type 1 or Type 2), plus the actual values of all the certificates and revocation information used in the CAdES-C as per CAdES-X Long.
- CAdES-X Long类型1或CAdES-X Long类型2：包括一个X时间戳（类型1或类型2），加上CAdES-C中使用的所有证书和撤销信息的实际值（根据CAdES-X Long）。
This section also specifies the data structures used in Archive validation data format (CAdES-A)of extended forms:
本节还规定了扩展表单归档验证数据格式（CAdES-A）中使用的数据结构：
- Archive form of electronic signature (CAdES-A) comprises:
- 电子签名存档表格（CAdES-A）包括：
- the Complete validation data references (CAdES-C),
- 完整的验证数据参考（CAdES-C），
- the certificate and revocation values (as in a CAdES-X Long ),
- 证书和撤销值（如在CAdES-X长文件中），
- any existing extended electronic signature time-stamps (CAdES-X Type 1 or CAdES-X Type 2), if present, and
- 任何现有的扩展电子签名时间戳（CAdES-X类型1或CAdES-X类型2）（如有），以及
- the signed user data and an additional archive time-stamp applied over all that data.
- 已签名的用户数据和附加的存档时间戳应用于所有这些数据。
An archive time-stamp may be repeatedly applied after long periods to maintain validity when electronic signature and time-stamping algorithms weaken.
当电子签名和时间戳算法减弱时，档案时间戳可在长时间后重复使用，以保持有效性。
The additional data required to create the forms of electronic signature identified above is carried as unsigned attributes associated with an individual signature by being placed in the unsignedAttrs field of SignerInfo. Thus, all the attributes defined in Section 6 are unsigned attributes.
创建上述电子签名形式所需的附加数据作为与单个签名相关联的未签名属性携带在SignerInfo的unsignedAttrs字段中。因此，第6节中定义的所有属性都是无符号属性。
NOTE 5: Where multiple signatures are to be supported, as described in Section 5.12, each signature has a separate SignerInfo. Thus, each signature requires its own unsigned attribute values to create CAdES-T, CAdES-C, etc.
注5：如第5.12节所述，如果支持多个签名，则每个签名都有一个单独的签名信息。因此，每个签名都需要自己的未签名属性值来创建CAdES-T、CAdES-C等。
NOTE 6: The optional attributes of the extended validation data are defined in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
注6：第6.3节和第6.4节定义了扩展验证数据的可选属性。
An electronic signature with time-stamp is an electronic signature for which part, but not all, of the additional data required for validation is available (i.e., some certificates and revocation information are available, but not all).
带有时间戳的电子签名是一种电子签名，其验证所需的部分（但不是全部）附加数据可用（即，某些证书和撤销信息可用，但不是全部）。
The minimum structure time-stamp validation data is:
最小结构时间戳验证数据为：
- the signature time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1, over the ES signature value.
- 第6.1.1节中定义的ES签名值上的签名时间戳属性。
The signature-time-stamp attribute is a TimeStampToken computed on the signature value for a specific signer; it is an unsigned attribute. Several instances of this attribute may occur with an electronic signature, from different TSAs.
签名时间戳属性是根据特定签名者的签名值计算的时间戳令牌；它是一个无符号属性。此属性的几个实例可能与来自不同TSA的电子签名一起出现。
The following object identifier identifies the signature-time-stamp attribute:
以下对象标识符标识签名时间戳属性：
id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}
id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}
The signature-time-stamp attribute value has ASN.1 type SignatureTimeStampToken:
签名时间戳属性值具有ASN.1类型SignatureTimeStampToken:
SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
The value of the messageImprint field within TimeStampToken shall be a hash of the value of the signature field within SignerInfo for the signedData being time-stamped.
TimeStampToken中messageImprint字段的值应是SignerInfo中签名字段的值的散列，用于标记时间的signedData。
For further information and definition of TimeStampToken, see Section 7.4.
有关时间标记的更多信息和定义，请参见第7.4节。
NOTE 1: In the case of multiple signatures, it is possible to have a:
注1：在多个签名的情况下，可以有：
- TimeStampToken computed for each and all signers; or
- 为每个和所有签名者计算的时间戳令牌；或
- TimeStampToken computed on one signer's signature; and no
- 根据一个签名人的签名计算的时间戳令牌；没有
- TimeStampToken on another signer's signature.
- 另一个签名者签名上的时间戳标记。
NOTE 2: In the case of multiple signatures, several TSTs, issued by different TSAs, may be present within the same signerInfo (see RFC 3852 [4]).
注2：在多个签名的情况下，不同TSA发布的多个TST可能存在于同一个签名信息中（参见RFC 3852[4]）。
An electronic signature with Complete validation data references (CAdES-C) is an electronic signature for which all the additional data required for validation (i.e., all certificates and revocation information) is available. This form is built on the CAdES-T form defined above.
具有完整验证数据参考的电子签名（CAdES-C）是指验证所需的所有附加数据（即所有证书和撤销信息）均可用的电子签名。此表格建立在上述CAdES-T表格的基础上。
As a minimum, the Complete validation data shall include the following:
完整的验证数据至少应包括以下内容：
- a time, which shall either be a signature-timestamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1, or a time-mark operated by a Time-Marking Authority;
- 时间，其应为第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性，或由时间标记机构操作的时间标记；
- complete-certificate-references, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书参考；
- complete-revocation-references, as defined in Section 6.2.2.
- 按照第6.2.2节的规定，完成撤销参考。
The complete-certificate-references attribute is an unsigned attribute. It references the full set of CA certificates that have been used to validate an ES with Complete validation data up to (but not including) the signer's certificate. Only a single instance of this attribute shall occur with an electronic signature.
“完整证书引用”属性是一个未签名的属性。它引用了用于验证ES的完整CA证书集，该证书集包含签名者证书之前（但不包括）的完整验证数据。电子签名只能出现此属性的一个实例。
NOTE 1: The signer's certificate is referenced in the signing certificate attribute (see Section 5.7.3).
注1：签名者的证书在签名证书属性中引用（参见第5.7.3节）。
id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}
id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}
The complete-certificate-references attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax CompleteCertificateRefs.
complete certificate references属性值具有ASN.1语法CompleteCertificateRefs。
CompleteCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
CompleteCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
OtherCertID is defined in Section 5.7.3.3.
第5.7.3.3节定义了其他认证。
The IssuerSerial that shall be present in OtherCertID. The certHash shall match the hash of the certificate referenced.
应在其他认证文件中出现的发行人序列。certHash应与引用证书的哈希匹配。
NOTE 2: Copies of the certificate values may be held using the certificate-values attribute, defined in Section 6.3.3.
注2：可使用第6.3.3节中定义的证书值属性保存证书值的副本。
This attribute may include references to the certification chain for any TSUs that provides time-stamp tokens. In this case, the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the relevant time-stamp token as an unsignedAttrs in the signerInfos field.
此属性可能包括对提供时间戳令牌的任何TSU的证书链的引用。在这种情况下，unsigned属性应作为signerInfos字段中的unsignedAttr添加到相关时间戳令牌的signedData中。
The complete-revocation-references attribute is an unsigned attribute. Only a single instance of this attribute shall occur with an electronic signature. It references the full set of the CRL, ACRL, or OCSP responses that have been used in the validation of the signer, and CA certificates used in ES with Complete validation data.
“完全吊销引用”属性是一个未签名的属性。电子签名只能出现此属性的一个实例。它引用了签名人验证中使用的全套CRL、ACRL或OCSP响应，以及ES中使用的CA证书和完整的验证数据。
This attribute indicates that the verifier has taken due diligence to gather the available revocation information. The references stored in this attribute can be used to retrieve the referenced information, if not stored in the CMS structure, but somewhere else.
此属性表示验证者已尽职调查以收集可用的吊销信息。如果不是存储在CMS结构中，而是存储在其他地方，则此属性中存储的引用可用于检索引用的信息。
The following object identifier identifies the complete-revocation-references attribute:
以下对象标识符标识“完全吊销引用”属性：
id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}
id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}
The complete-revocation-references attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax CompleteRevocationRefs:
“完全吊销引用”属性值具有ASN.1语法CompleteResociationRefs：
CompleteRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
CompleteRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
crlids [0] CRLListID OPTIONAL,
ocspids [1] OcspListID OPTIONAL,
otherRev [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
}
CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
crlids [0] CRLListID OPTIONAL,
ocspids [1] OcspListID OPTIONAL,
otherRev [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
}
CompleteRevocationRefs shall contain one CrlOcspRef for the signing-certificate, followed by one for each OtherCertID in the CompleteCertificateRefs attribute. The second and subsequent CrlOcspRef fields shall be in the same order as the OtherCertID to which they relate. At least one of CRLListID or OcspListID or OtherRevRefs should be present for all but the "trusted" CA of the certificate path.
CompleteCertificateRefs应包含一个用于签名证书的CrlOcspRef，然后在CompleteCertificateRefs属性中为每个其他CertId包含一个CrlOcspRef。第二个和后续CrlOcspRef字段的顺序应与其相关的其他CertId相同。除了证书路径的“受信任”CA之外，其他所有CA都应至少存在一个CRLListID或OcspListID或其他REVREF。
CRLListID ::= SEQUENCE {
crls SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID }
CRLListID ::= SEQUENCE {
crls SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID }
CrlValidatedID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlHash OtherHash,
crlIdentifier CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL }
CrlValidatedID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlHash OtherHash,
crlIdentifier CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL }
CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
crlissuer Name,
crlIssuedTime UTCTime,
crlNumber INTEGER OPTIONAL }
CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
crlissuer Name,
crlIssuedTime UTCTime,
crlNumber INTEGER OPTIONAL }
OcspListID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponses SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID }
OcspListID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponses SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID }
OcspResponsesID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspIdentifier OcspIdentifier,
ocspRepHash OtherHash OPTIONAL
}
OcspResponsesID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspIdentifier OcspIdentifier,
ocspRepHash OtherHash OPTIONAL
}
OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponderID ResponderID,
-- As in OCSP response data
producedAt GeneralizedTime
-- As in OCSP response data
}
OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponderID ResponderID,
-- As in OCSP response data
producedAt GeneralizedTime
-- As in OCSP response data
}
When creating a crlValidatedID, the crlHash is computed over the entire DER encoded CRL including the signature. The crlIdentifier would normally be present unless the CRL can be inferred from other information.
在创建crlValidatedID时，将对整个DER编码的CRL（包括签名）计算CRLHAH。除非可以从其他信息推断CRL，否则CRL标识符通常存在。
The crlIdentifier is to identify the CRL using the issuer name and the CRL issued time, which shall correspond to the time thisUpdate contained in the issued CRL, and if present, the crlNumber. The crlListID attribute is an unsigned attribute. In the case that the identified CRL is a Delta CRL, then references to the set of CRLs to provide a complete revocation list shall be included.
CRL标识符用于使用发卡机构名称和CRL发布时间来识别CRL，该时间应与发布CRL中包含的更新时间以及CRL编号（如果存在）相对应。crlListID属性是一个无符号属性。如果已识别的CRL是增量CRL，则应包括对CRL集的引用，以提供完整的撤销列表。
The OcspIdentifier is to identify the OCSP response using the issuer name and the time of issue of the OCSP response, which shall correspond to the time produced as contained in the issued OCSP response. Since it may be needed to make the difference between two OCSP responses received within the same second, the hash of the response contained in the OcspResponsesID may be needed to solve the ambiguity.
OCSP识别器应使用发卡机构名称和OCSP响应发布时间来识别OCSP响应，该时间应与已发布OCSP响应中包含的时间相对应。由于可能需要在同一秒内接收到的两个OCSP响应之间产生差异，因此可能需要OCSPResponseId中包含的响应的散列来解决歧义。
NOTE 1: Copies of the CRL and OCSP responses values may be held using the revocation-values attribute defined in Section 6.3.4.
注1：可使用第6.3.4节中定义的撤销值属性保存CRL和OCSP响应值的副本。
NOTE 2: It is recommended that this attribute be used in preference to the OtherRevocationInfoFormat specified in RFC 3852 to maintain backwards compatibility with the earlier version of this specification.
注2：建议优先使用此属性，而不是RFC 3852中指定的OtherRevocationInfo格式，以保持与本规范早期版本的向后兼容性。
The syntax and semantics of other revocation references are outside the scope of the present document. The definition of the syntax of the other form of revocation information is as identified by OtherRevRefType.
其他撤销引用的语法和语义不在本文档的范围内。其他形式的撤销信息的语法定义由OtherRevRefType标识。
This attribute may include the references to the full set of the CRL, ACRL, or OCSP responses that have been used to verify the certification chain for any TSUs that provide time-stamp tokens. In this case, the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the relevant time-stamp token as an unsignedAttrs in the signerInfos field.
此属性可能包括对全套CRL、ACRL或OCSP响应的引用，这些响应用于验证提供时间戳令牌的任何TSU的证书链。在这种情况下，unsigned属性应作为signerInfos字段中的unsignedAttr添加到相关时间戳令牌的signedData中。
This attribute is only used when a user attribute certificate is present in the electronic signature.
此属性仅在电子签名中存在用户属性证书时使用。
The attribute-certificate-references attribute is an unsigned attribute. It references the full set of AA certificates that have
属性证书引用属性是未签名的属性。它引用了具有以下特性的全套AA证书：
been used to validate the attribute certificate. Only a single instance of this attribute shall occur with an electronic signature.
已用于验证属性证书。电子签名只能出现此属性的一个实例。
id-aa-ets-attrCertificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 44}
id-aa-ets-attrCertificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 44}
The attribute-certificate-references attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax AttributeCertificateRefs:
属性证书引用属性值具有ASN.1语法AttributeCertificateRefs:
AttributeCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
AttributeCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
OtherCertID is defined in Section 5.7.3.3.
第5.7.3.3节定义了其他认证。
NOTE: Copies of the certificate values may be held using the certificate-values attribute defined in Section 6.3.3.
注：可使用第6.3.3节中定义的证书值属性保存证书值的副本。
This attribute is only used when a user attribute certificate is present in the electronic signature and when that attribute certificate can be revoked.
仅当电子签名中存在用户属性证书且该属性证书可以撤销时，才使用此属性。
The attribute-revocation-references attribute is an unsigned attribute. Only a single instance of this attribute shall occur with an electronic signature. It references the full set of the ACRL or OCSP responses that have been used in the validation of the attribute certificate. This attribute can be used to illustrate that the verifier has taken due diligence of the available revocation information.
属性吊销引用属性是一个未签名的属性。电子签名只能出现此属性的一个实例。它引用了在属性证书验证中使用的一整套ACRL或OCSP响应。此属性可用于说明验证者已对可用撤销信息进行了尽职调查。
The following object identifier identifies the attribute-revocation-references attribute:
以下对象标识符标识属性吊销引用属性：
id-aa-ets-attrRevocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
id-aa(2) 45}
id-aa-ets-attrRevocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
id-aa(2) 45}
The attribute-revocation-references attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax AttributeRevocationRefs:
属性吊销引用属性值具有ASN.1语法AttributeResociationRefs:
AttributeRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
AttributeRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
This section specifies a number of optional attributes that are used by extended forms of electronic signatures (see Annex B for an overview of these forms of validation data).
本节规定了扩展形式的电子签名使用的若干可选属性（这些形式的验证数据概述见附件B）。
The extended validation data may include one of the following additional attributes, forming a CAdES-X Time-Stamp validation data (CAdES-X Type 1 or CAdES-X Type 2), to provide additional protection against later CA compromise and provide integrity of the validation data used:
扩展验证数据可包括以下附加属性之一，形成CAdES-X时间戳验证数据（CAdES-X类型1或CAdES-X类型2），以提供额外保护，防止以后CA泄露，并提供所用验证数据的完整性：
- CAdES-C Time-stamp, as defined in Section 6.3.5 (CAdES-X Type 1); or
- 第6.3.5节（CAdES-X类型1）中定义的CAdES-C时间戳；或
- Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs references, as defined in Section 6.3.6 (CAdES-X Type 2).
- 第6.3.6节（CAdES-X类型2）中定义的时间戳证书和CRLs参考。
The extended validation data may also include the following additional information, forming a CAdES-X Long, for use if later validation processes may not have access to this information:
扩展验证数据还可能包括以下附加信息，形成CAdES-X长，以便在以后的验证过程可能无法访问此信息时使用：
- certificate-values, as defined in Section 6.3.3; and
- 第6.3.3节中定义的证书值；和
- revocation-values, as defined in Section 6.3.4.
- 撤销值，如第6.3.4节所定义。
The extended validation data may, in addition to certificate-values and revocation-values as defined in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4, include one of the following additional attributes, forming a CAdES-X Long Type 1 or CAdES-X Long Type 2.
除了第6.3.3节和第6.3.4节中定义的证书值和撤销值外，扩展验证数据还可以包括以下附加属性之一，形成CAdES-X长类型1或CAdES-X长类型2。
- CAdES-C Time-stamp, as defined in Section 6.3.3 (CAdES-X long Type 1); or
- 第6.3.3节定义的CAdES-C时间戳（CAdES-X长型1）；或
- Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs references, as defined in Section 6.3.4 (CAdES-X Long Type 2).
- 第6.3.4节（CAdES-X长型2）中定义的时间戳证书和CRLs参考。
The CAdES-X Long Type 1 or CAdES-X Long Type 2 provides additional protection against later CA compromise and provides integrity of the validation data used.
CAdES-X Long类型1或CAdES-X Long类型2提供了额外的保护，以防止以后CA泄露，并提供所用验证数据的完整性。
NOTE 1: The CAdES-X-Long signature provides long-term proof of the validity of the signature for as long as the CA keys, CRL Issuers keys, and OCSP responder keys are not compromised and are resistant to cryptographic attacks.
注1:CAdES-X-Long签名提供签名有效性的长期证明，只要CA密钥、CRL颁发者密钥和OCSP响应者密钥不受损害，并且能够抵抗加密攻击。
NOTE 2: As long as the time-stamp data remains valid, the CAdES-X Long Type 1 and the CAdES-X Long Type 2 provide the following important property for long-standing signatures; that having been found once to be valid, it shall continue to be so months or years
注2：只要时间戳数据保持有效，CAdES-X long Type 1和CAdES-X long Type 2为长期签名提供以下重要属性：；一旦被认定为有效，则应继续有效数月或数年
later, long after the validity period of the certificates has expired, or after the user key has been compromised.
稍后，在证书的有效期过期很久之后，或者在用户密钥被泄露之后。
This attribute may be used to contain the certificate information required for the following forms of extended electronic signature: CAdES-X Long, ES X-Long Type 1, and CAdES-X Long Type 2; see Annex B.1.1 for an illustration of this form of electronic signature.
此属性可用于包含以下形式的扩展电子签名所需的证书信息：CAdES-X Long、ES-X Long Type 1和CAdES-X Long Type 2；关于这种形式的电子签名的说明，见附件B.1.1。
The certificate-values attribute is an unsigned attribute. Only a single instance of this attribute shall occur with an electronic signature. It holds the values of certificates referenced in the complete-certificate-references attribute.
证书值属性是一个无符号属性。电子签名只能出现此属性的一个实例。它保存完整证书引用属性中引用的证书的值。
NOTE: If an attribute certificate is used, it is not provided in this structure but shall be provided by the signer as a signer-attributes attribute (see Section 5.11.3).
注：如果使用属性证书，则此结构中不提供属性证书，但签名人应将其作为签名人属性提供（见第5.11.3节）。
The following object identifier identifies the certificate-values attribute:
以下对象标识符标识证书值属性：
id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}
id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}
The certificate-values attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax CertificateValues.
CertificateValues属性值具有ASN.1语法CertificateValues。
CertificateValues ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
CertificateValues ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
Certificate is defined in Section 7.1. (which is as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]).
证书定义见第7.1节。（定义见ITU-T建议X.509[1]）。
This attribute may include the certification information for any TSUs that have provided the time-stamp tokens, if these certificates are not already included in the TSTs as part of the TSUs signatures. In this case, the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the relevant time-stamp token.
如果这些证书尚未作为TSU签名的一部分包含在TST中，则该属性可能包括已提供时间戳令牌的任何TSU的证书信息。在这种情况下，unsigned属性应添加到相关时间戳令牌的signedData中。
This attribute is used to contain the revocation information required for the following forms of extended electronic signature: CAdES-X Long, ES X-Long Type 1, and CAdES-X Long Type 2; see Annex B.1.1 for an illustration of this form of electronic signature.
此属性用于包含以下形式的扩展电子签名所需的撤销信息：CAdES-X Long、ES X Long Type 1和CAdES-X Long Type 2；关于这种形式的电子签名的说明，见附件B.1.1。
The revocation-values attribute is an unsigned attribute. Only a single instance of this attribute shall occur with an electronic
吊销值属性是一个无符号属性。电子表格中只能出现该属性的一个实例
signature. It holds the values of CRLs and OCSP referenced in the complete-revocation-references attribute.
签名它保存在complete revocation references属性中引用的CRLs和OCSP的值。
NOTE: It is recommended that this attribute be used in preference to the OtherRevocationInfoFormat specified in RFC 3852 to maintain backwards compatibility with the earlier version of this specification.
注意：建议优先使用此属性，而不是RFC 3852中指定的OtherRevocationInfo格式，以保持与本规范早期版本的向后兼容性。
The following object identifier identifies the revocation-values attribute:
以下对象标识符标识吊销值属性：
id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}
id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}
The revocation-values attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax RevocationValues
吊销值属性值具有ASN.1语法RevocationValues
RevocationValues ::= SEQUENCE {
crlVals [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL,
ocspVals [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse OPTIONAL,
otherRevVals [2] OtherRevVals OPTIONAL }
RevocationValues ::= SEQUENCE {
crlVals [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL,
ocspVals [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse OPTIONAL,
otherRevVals [2] OtherRevVals OPTIONAL }
OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
OtherRevValType OtherRevValType,
OtherRevVals ANY DEFINED BY OtherRevValType }
OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
OtherRevValType OtherRevValType,
OtherRevVals ANY DEFINED BY OtherRevValType }
OtherRevValType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
OtherRevValType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
The syntax and semantics of the other revocation values (OtherRevVals) are outside the scope of the present document.
其他撤销值（OtherRevVals）的语法和语义不在本文档的范围内。
The definition of the syntax of the other form of revocation information is as identified by OtherRevRefType.
其他形式的撤销信息的语法定义由OtherRevRefType标识。
CertificateList is defined in Section 7.2. (which is as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]).
第7.2节定义了证书列表。（定义见ITU-T建议X.509[1]）。
BasicOCSPResponse is defined in Section 7.3. (which is as defined in RFC 2560 [3]).
第7.3节定义了基本责任。（定义见RFC 2560[3]）。
This attribute may include the values of revocation data including CRLs and OCSPs for any TSUs that have provided the time-stamp tokens, if these certificates are not already included in the TSTs as part of the TSUs signatures. In this case, the unsigned attribute shall be added to the signedData of the relevant time-stamp token.
如果这些证书尚未作为TSU签名的一部分包含在TST中，则该属性可能包括已提供时间戳令牌的任何TSU的撤销数据（包括CRL和OCSP）的值。在这种情况下，unsigned属性应添加到相关时间戳令牌的signedData中。
This attribute is used to protect against CA key compromise.
此属性用于防止CA密钥泄露。
This attribute is used for the time-stamping of the complete electronic signature (CAdES-C). It is used in the following forms of extended electronic signature; CAdES-X Type 1 and CAdES-X Long Type 1; see Annex B.1.2 for an illustration of this form of electronic signature.
此属性用于完整电子签名（CAdES-C）的时间戳。它用于下列形式的扩展电子签名：；CAdES-X型1和CAdES-X长型1；关于这种形式的电子签名的说明，见附件B.1.2。
The CAdES-C-time-stamp attribute is an unsigned attribute. It is a time-stamp token of the hash of the electronic signature and the complete validation data (CAdES-C). It is a special-purpose TimeStampToken Attribute that time-stamps the CAdES-C. Several instances of this attribute may occur with an electronic signature from different TSAs.
CAdES-C-time-stamp属性是一个无符号属性。它是电子签名哈希和完整验证数据（CAdES-C）的时间戳标记。CAdES-C的时间戳是一个特殊用途的TimeStampToken属性。该属性的多个实例可能与来自不同TSA的电子签名一起出现。
NOTE 1: It is recommended that the attributes being time-stamped be encoded in DER. If DER is not employed, then the binary encoding of the ASN.1 structures being time-stamped should be preserved to ensure that the recalculation of the data hash is consistent.
注1：建议使用DER对带有时间戳的属性进行编码。如果未使用DER，则应保留带有时间戳的ASN.1结构的二进制编码，以确保数据哈希的重新计算是一致的。
NOTE 2: Each attribute is included in the hash with the attrType and attrValues (including type and length) but without the type and length of the outer SEQUENCE.
注2：散列中的每个属性都包含attrType和attrValue（包括type和length），但不包含外部序列的类型和长度。
The following object identifier identifies the CAdES-C-Timestamp attribute:
以下对象标识符标识CAdES-C-Timestamp属性：
id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}
id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}
The CAdES-C-timestamp attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax ESCTimeStampToken :
CAdES-C-timestamp属性值具有ASN.1语法ESCSTIMESTANKE：
ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
The value of the messageImprint field within TimeStampToken shall be a hash of the concatenated values (without the type or length encoding for that value) of the following data objects:
TimeStampToken内messageImprint字段的值应为下列数据对象的串联值（不含该值的类型或长度编码）的散列：
- OCTETSTRING of the SignatureValue field within SignerInfo;
- SignerInfo中SignatureValue字段的八进制字符串；
- signature-time-stamp, or a time-mark operated by a Time-Marking Authority;
- 签名时间戳，或时间标记机构操作的时间标记；
- complete-certificate-references attribute; and
- 完整的证书引用属性；和
- complete-revocation-references attribute.
- 完全吊销引用属性。
For further information and definition of the TimeStampToken, see Section 7.4.
有关时间标记的更多信息和定义，请参见第7.4节。
This attribute is used to protect against CA key compromise. This attribute is used for the time-stamping certificate and revocation references. It is used in the following forms of extended electronic signature: CAdES-X Type 2 and CAdES-X Long Type 2; see Annex B.1.3 for an illustration of this form of electronic signature.
此属性用于防止CA密钥泄露。此属性用于时间戳证书和吊销引用。它用于以下形式的扩展电子签名：CAdES-X第2类和CAdES-X长第2类；关于这种形式的电子签名的说明，见附件B.1.3。
A time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute is an unsigned attribute. It is a time-stamp token issued for a list of referenced certificates and OCSP responses and/or CRLs to protect against certain CA compromises. Its syntax is as follows:
带有时间戳的certs crls references属性是未签名的属性。它是为参考证书和OCSP响应和/或CRL列表颁发的时间戳令牌，用于防止某些CA泄露。其语法如下：
NOTE 1: It is recommended that the attributes being time-stamped be encoded in DER. If DER is not employed, then the binary encoding of the ASN.1 structures being time-stamped should be preserved to ensure that the recalculation of the data hash is consistent.
注1：建议使用DER对带有时间戳的属性进行编码。如果未使用DER，则应保留带有时间戳的ASN.1结构的二进制编码，以确保数据哈希的重新计算是一致的。
NOTE 2: Each attribute is included in the hash with the attrType and attrValues (including type and length) but without the type and length of the outer SEQUENCE.
注2：散列中的每个属性都包含attrType和attrValue（包括type和length），但不包含外部序列的类型和长度。
The following object identifier identifies the time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute:
以下对象标识符标识带时间戳的证书crls引用属性：
id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}
id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}
The attribute value has the ASN.1 syntax TimestampedCertsCRLs:
属性值具有ASN.1语法TimestampedCertsCRLs:
TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken
TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken
The value of the messageImprint field within the TimeStampToken shall be a hash of the concatenated values (without the type or length encoding for that value) of the following data objects, as present in the ES with Complete validation data (CAdES-C):
TimeStampToken内messageImprint字段的值应为以下数据对象的串联值（无该值的类型或长度编码）的散列，如ES中完整验证数据（CAdES-C）所示：
- complete-certificate-references attribute; and
- 完整的证书引用属性；和
- complete-revocation-references attribute.
- 完全吊销引用属性。
Where an electronic signature is required to last for a very long time, and the time-stamp token on an electronic signature is in danger of being invalidated due to algorithm weakness or limits in the validity period of the TSA certificate, it may be required to time-stamp the electronic signature several times. When this is required, an archive time-stamp attribute may be required for the archive form of the electronic signature (CAdES-A). This archive time-stamp attribute may be repeatedly applied over a period of time.
如果电子签名需要持续很长时间，并且电子签名上的时间戳令牌由于算法缺陷或TSA证书有效期的限制而有失效的危险，则可能需要对电子签名进行多次时间戳。需要时，电子签名（CAdES-A）的存档表格可能需要存档时间戳属性。此存档时间戳属性可以在一段时间内重复应用。
The archive-time-stamp attribute is a time-stamp token of many of the elements of the signedData in the electronic signature. If the certificate-values and revocation-values attributes are not present in the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES, then they shall be added to the electronic signature prior to computing the archive time-stamp token.
存档时间戳属性是电子签名中签名数据的许多元素的时间戳标记。如果CAdES BES或CAdES EPE中不存在证书值和撤销值属性，则应在计算存档时间戳令牌之前将其添加到电子签名中。
The archive-time-stamp attribute is an unsigned attribute. Several instances of this attribute may occur with an electronic signature both over time and from different TSUs.
存档时间戳属性是一个未签名的属性。随着时间的推移和来自不同TSU的电子签名可能会出现此属性的多个实例。
The following object identifier identifies the nested archive-time-stamp attribute:
以下对象标识符标识嵌套的存档时间戳属性：
id-aa-ets-archiveTimestampV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 48}
id-aa-ets-archiveTimestampV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 48}
Archive-time-stamp attribute values have the ASN.1 syntax ArchiveTimeStampToken
存档时间戳属性值具有ASN.1语法ArchiveTimeStampToken
ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
The value of the messageImprint field within TimeStampToken shall be a hash of the concatenation of:
TimeStampToken内messageImprint字段的值应为以下各项串联的哈希值：
- the encapContentInfo element of the SignedData sequence;
- SignedData序列的encapContentInfo元素；
- any external content being protected by the signature, if the eContent element of the encapContentInfo is omitted;
- 如果省略了encapContentInfo的eContent元素，则受签名保护的任何外部内容；
- the Certificates and crls elements of the SignedData sequence, when present, and;
- 签名数据序列的证书和crls元素（如果存在），以及；
- all data elements in the SignerInfo sequence including all signed and unsigned attributes.
- SignerInfo序列中的所有数据元素，包括所有有符号和无符号属性。
NOTE 1: An alternative archiveTimestamp attribute, identified by an object identifier { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 27, is defined in prior versions of TS 101 733 [TS101733] and in RFC 3126.
注1：由对象标识符{iso（1）成员体（2）us（840）rsadsi（113549）pkcs（1）pkcs-9（9）smime（16）id aa（2）27标识的替代archiveTimestamp属性在先前版本的TS 101 733[TS101733]和RFC 3126中定义。
The archiveTimestamp attribute, defined in versions of TS 101 733 prior to 1.5.1 and in RFC 3126, is not compatible with the attribute defined in the current document. The archiveTimestamp attribute, defined in versions 1.5.1 to 1.6.3 of TS 101 733, is compatible with the current document if the content is internal to encapContentInfo. Unless the version of TS 101 733 employed by the signing party is known by all recipients, use of the archiveTimestamp attribute defined in prior versions of TS 101 733 is deprecated.
TS 101 733 1.5.1之前的版本和RFC 3126中定义的archiveTimestamp属性与当前文档中定义的属性不兼容。TS 101 733版本1.5.1至1.6.3中定义的archiveTimestamp属性，如果内容是encapContentInfo内部的，则与当前文档兼容。除非所有收件人都知道签名方使用的TS 101 733版本，否则不推荐使用TS 101 733以前版本中定义的archiveTimestamp属性。
NOTE 2: Counter signatures held as countersignature attributes do not require independent archive time-stamps, as they are protected by the archive time-stamp against the containing SignedData structure.
注2：作为会签属性保留的会签不需要独立的存档时间戳，因为它们受存档时间戳保护，不受包含SignedData结构的影响。
NOTE 3: Unless DER is used throughout, it is recommended that the binary encoding of the ASN.1 structures being time-stamped be preserved when being archived to ensure that the recalculation of the data hash is consistent.
注3：除非始终使用DER，否则建议在存档时保留带有时间戳的ASN.1结构的二进制编码，以确保数据哈希的重新计算是一致的。
NOTE 4: The hash is calculated over the concatenated data elements as received/stored, including the Type and Length encoding.
注4：哈希是在接收/存储的级联数据元素上计算的，包括类型和长度编码。
NOTE 5: Whilst it is recommended that unsigned attributes be DER encoded, it cannot generally be so guaranteed except by prior arrangement. For further information and definition of TimeStampToken, see Section 7.4. The timestamp should be created using stronger algorithms (or longer key lengths) than in the original electronic signatures and weak algorithm (key length) timestamps.
注5：虽然建议对无符号属性进行DER编码，但除非事先安排，否则通常不能保证这样做。有关时间标记的更多信息和定义，请参见第7.4节。应使用比原始电子签名更强的算法（或更长的密钥长度）和弱算法（密钥长度）时间戳来创建时间戳。
NOTE 6: This form of ES also provides protection against a TSP key compromise.
注6：这种形式的ES还提供了针对TSP密钥泄露的保护。
The ArchiveTimeStamp will be added as an unsigned attribute in the SignerInfo sequence. For the validation of one ArchiveTimeStamp, the data elements of the SignerInfo must be concatenated, excluding all later ArchivTimeStampToken attributes.
ArchiveTimeStamp将作为无符号属性添加到SignerInfo序列中。为了验证一个ArchiveTimeStamp，必须连接SignerInfo的数据元素，不包括所有以后的ArchiveTimeStampToken属性。
Certificates and revocation information required to validate the ArchiveTimeStamp shall be provided by one of the following methods:
验证ArchiveTimeStamp所需的证书和撤销信息应通过以下方法之一提供：
- The TSU provides the information in the SignedData of the timestamp token;
- TSU在时间戳令牌的SignedData中提供信息；
- Adding the complete-certificate-references attribute and the complete-revocation-references attribute of the TSP as an unsigned attribute within TimeStampToken, when the required information is stored elsewhere; or
- 当所需信息存储在别处时，将TSP的完整证书引用属性和完整撤销引用属性添加为TimeStampToken内的未签名属性；或
- Adding the certificate-values attribute and the revocation-values attribute of the TSP as an unsigned attribute within TimeStampToken, when the required information is stored elsewhere.
- 当所需信息存储在其他位置时，将TSP的证书值属性和吊销值属性添加为TimeStampToken内的未签名属性。
The X.509 v3 certificate basis syntax is defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]. A profile of the X.509 v3 certificate is defined in RFC 3280 [2].
ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义了X.509 v3证书基础语法。RFC 3280[2]中定义了X.509 v3证书的配置文件。
The X.509 v2 CRL syntax is defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]. A profile of the X.509 v2 CRL is defined in RFC 3280 [2].
X.509 v2 CRL语法在ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义。RFC 3280[2]中定义了X.509 v2 CRL的配置文件。
The format of an OCSP token is defined in RFC 2560 [3].
OCSP令牌的格式在RFC 2560[3]中定义。
The format of a TimeStampToken type is defined in RFC 3161 [7] and profiled in ETSI TS 101 861 [TS101861].
TimeStampToken类型的格式在RFC 3161[7]中定义，并在ETSI TS 101 861[TS101861]中分析。
The syntax of the naming and other attributes is defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1].
命名和其他属性的语法在ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义。
NOTE: The name used by the signer, held as the subject in the signer's certificate, is allocated and verified on registration with the Certification Authority, either directly or indirectly through a Registration Authority, before being issued with a Certificate.
注：签名人使用的名称作为签名人证书中的主体，在证书颁发之前，在证书颁发机构直接或间接向证书颁发机构注册时进行分配和验证。
The present document places no restrictions on the form of the name. The subject's name may be a distinguished name, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.500 [12], held in the subject field of the certificate, or any other name form held in the subjectAltName certificate extension field, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1]. In the case that the subject has no distinguished name, the subject name can be an empty sequence and the subjectAltName extension shall be critical.
本文件对名称的形式没有任何限制。主体名称可以是ITU-T建议X.500[12]中定义的可分辨名称，保存在证书的主体字段中，或ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义的主体名称证书扩展字段中保存的任何其他名称形式。如果主题没有可分辨名称，则主题名称可以是空序列，并且主题名称扩展名应该是关键的。
All Certification Authorities, Attribute Authorities, and Time-Stamping Authorities shall use distinguished names in the subject field of their certificate.
所有认证机构、属性机构和时间戳机构应在其证书的主题字段中使用可分辨名称。
The distinguished name shall include identifiers for the organization providing the service and the legal jurisdiction (e.g., country) under which it operates.
可分辨名称应包括提供服务的组织的标识符及其运营所在的法律管辖区（如国家）。
Where a signer signs as an individual, but wishes to also identify him/herself as acting on behalf of an organization, it may be necessary to provide two independent forms of identification. The first identity, which is directly associated with the signing key, identifies him/her as an individual. The second, which is managed independently, identifies that person acting as part of the organization, possibly with a given role. In this case, one of the two identities is carried in the subject/subjectAltName field of the signer's certificate as described above.
如果签名人以个人身份签名，但同时希望表明其代表组织行事，则可能需要提供两种独立的身份证明形式。第一个身份与签名密钥直接关联，将他/她标识为个人。第二个是独立管理的，标识作为组织一部分的人员，可能具有给定的角色。在这种情况下，如上所述，两个身份中的一个携带在签名者证书的subject/subjectAltName字段中。
The present document does not specify the format of the signer's attribute that may be included in public key certificates.
本文档未指定公钥证书中可能包含的签名者属性的格式。
NOTE: The signer's attribute may be supported by using a claimed role in the CMS signed attributes field or by placing an attribute certificate containing a certified role in the CMS signed attributes field; see Section 7.6.
注意：签名者的属性可以通过在CMS签名属性字段中使用声明的角色或在CMS签名属性字段中放置包含认证角色的属性证书来支持；见第7.6节。
The syntax of the AttributeCertificate type is defined in RFC 3281 [13].
AttributeCertificate类型的语法在RFC 3281[13]中定义。
For implementations supporting signature generation, the present document defines conformance requirements for the generation of two forms of basic electronic signature, one of the two forms must be implemented.
对于支持签名生成的实现，本文件定义了生成两种形式的基本电子签名的一致性要求，必须实现两种形式中的一种。
For implementations supporting signature verification, the present document defines conformance requirements for the verification of two forms of basic electronic signature, one of the two forms must be implemented.
对于支持签名验证的实现，本文件定义了两种基本电子签名形式验证的一致性要求，必须实现其中一种形式。
The present document only defines conformance requirements up to an ES with Complete validation data (CAdES-C). This means that none of the extended and archive forms of the electronic signature (CAdES-X, CAdES-A) need to be implemented to get conformance to the present document.
本文件仅定义了符合性要求，直至具有完整验证数据的ES（CAdES-C）。这意味着无需实施电子签名的扩展形式和存档形式（CAdES-X、CAdES-A）来与本文件保持一致。
On verification the inclusion of optional signed and unsigned attributes must be supported only to the extent that the signature is verifiable. The semantics of optional attributes may be unsupported, unless specified otherwise by a signature policy.
在验证时，必须仅在签名可验证的范围内支持包含可选的有符号和无符号属性。除非签名策略另有规定，否则可能不支持可选属性的语义。
A system supporting CAdES-BES signers, according to the present document, shall, at a minimum, support generation of an electronic signature consisting of the following components:
根据本文件，支持CAdES BES签名人的系统应至少支持生成由以下组件组成的电子签名：
- The general CMS syntax and content type, as defined in RFC 3852 [4] (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2);
- RFC 3852[4]中定义的通用CMS语法和内容类型（见第5.1节和第5.2节）；
- CMS SignedData, as defined in RFC 3852 [4], with the version set to 3 and at least one SignerInfo present (see Sections 5.3 to 5.6);
- CMS SignedData，如RFC 3852[4]中所定义，版本设置为3，且至少存在一个SignerinInfo（见第5.3至5.6节）；
- The following CMS attributes, as defined in RFC 3852 [4]:
- RFC 3852[4]中定义的以下CMS属性：
- content-type; this shall always be present (see Section 5.7.1); and
- 内容类型；这应始终存在（见第5.7.1节）；和
- message-digest; this shall always be present (see Section 5.7.2).
- 信息摘要；这应始终存在（见第5.7.2节）。
- One of the following attributes, as defined in the present document:
- 本文件中定义的下列属性之一：
- signing-certificate: as defined in Section 5.7.3.1; or - signing-certificate v2 : as defined in Section 5.7.3.2.
- 签署证书：如第5.7.3.1节所定义；或-签署证书v2：如第5.7.3.2节所定义。
NOTE: RFC 3126 was using the other signing-certificate attribute (see Section 5.7.3.3). Its use is now deprecated, since the structure of the signing-certificate v2 attribute is simpler than the other signing-certificate attribute.
注意：RFC 3126使用了其他签名证书属性（参见第5.7.3.3节）。现在不推荐使用它，因为签名证书v2属性的结构比其他签名证书属性更简单。
A system supporting Policy-based signers, according to the present document, shall, at a minimum, support the generation of an electronic signature consisting of the previous components defined for the basic signer, plus:
根据本文件，支持基于策略的签名人的系统至少应支持生成电子签名，该电子签名由为基本签名人定义的先前组件组成，加上：
- The following attributes, as defined in Section 5.9:
- 第5.9节中定义的以下属性：
- signature-policy-identifier; this shall always be present (see Section 5.8.1).
- 签名策略标识符；这应始终存在（见第5.8.1节）。
A system supporting verifiers, according to the present document, with time-stamping facilities shall, at a minimum, support:
根据本文件，具有时间戳设施的支持核查人员的系统应至少支持：
- verification of the mandated components of an electronic signature, as defined in Section 8.1;
- 按照第8.1节的定义，验证电子签名的法定组成部分；
- signature-time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1;
- 第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 第6.2.2节中定义的完整撤销引用属性；
- Public Key Certificates, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1] (see Section 8.1); and
- ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义的公钥证书（见第8.1节）；和
- either of:
- 以下任一项：
- Certificate Revocation Lists, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1] (see Section 8.2); or
- ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义的证书撤销列表（见第8.2节）；或
- Online Certificate Status Protocol, as defined in RFC 2560 [3] (see Section 8.3).
- RFC 2560[3]中定义的在线证书状态协议（见第8.3节）。
A system supporting verifiers, according to the present document, shall, at a minimum, support:
根据本文件，支持验证者的系统至少应支持：
- verification of the mandated components of an electronic signature, as defined in Section 8.1;
- 按照第8.1节的定义，验证电子签名的法定组成部分；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 第6.2.2节中定义的完整撤销引用属性；
- a record of the electronic signature and the time when the signature was first validated, using the referenced certificates and revocation information, must be maintained, such that records cannot be undetectably modified;
- 必须使用参考证书和撤销信息保留电子签名和签名首次生效时间的记录，以便记录不会被不可察觉地修改；
- Public Key Certificates, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1] (see Section 8.1); and
- ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义的公钥证书（见第8.1节）；和
- either of:
- 以下任一项：
- Certificate Revocation Lists, as defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.509 [1] (see Section 8.2); or
- ITU-T建议X.509[1]中定义的证书撤销列表（见第8.2节）；或
- online Certificate Status Protocol, as defined in RFC 2560 [3] (see Section 8.3).
- RFC 2560[3]中定义的在线证书状态协议（见第8.3节）。
[1] ITU-T Recommendation X.509 (2000)/ISO/IEC 9594-8 (2001): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public key and Attribute Certificate framework".
[1] ITU-T建议X.509（2000）/ISO/IEC 9594-8（2001）：“信息技术-开放系统互连-目录：公钥和属性证书框架”。
[2] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W., and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280, April 2002.
[2] Housley，R.，Polk，W.，Ford，W.，和D.Solo，“Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书和证书撤销列表（CRL）配置文件”，RFC 32802002年4月。
[3] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560, June 1999.
[3] 迈尔斯，M.，安克尼，R.，马尔帕尼，A.，加尔佩林，S.，和C.亚当斯，“X.509互联网公钥基础设施在线证书状态协议-OCSP”，RFC2560，1999年6月。
[4] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 3852, July 2004.
[4] Housley，R.，“加密消息语法（CMS）”，RFC3852，2004年7月。
[5] Hoffman, P., Ed., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC 2634, June 1999.
[5] Hoffman，P.，Ed.“S/MIME的增强安全服务”，RFC 2634，1999年6月。
[6] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part One: Format of Internet Message Bodies", RFC 2045, November 1996.
[6] Freed，N.和N.Borenstein，“多用途互联网邮件扩展（MIME）第一部分：互联网邮件正文格式”，RFC 20451996年11月。
[7] Adams, C., Cain, P., Pinkas, D., and R. Zuccherato, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Time-Stamp Protocol (TSP)", RFC 3161, August 2001.
[7] Adams，C.，Cain，P.，Pinkas，D.，和R.Zuccherato，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施时间戳协议（TSP）”，RFC3161，2001年8月。
[8] ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (1997): "Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation".
[8] ITU-T建议X.680（1997）：“信息技术——抽象语法符号一（ASN.1）：基本符号规范”。
[9] ITU-T Recommendation X.501 (2000)/ISO/IEC 9594-1 (2001): "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - Directory models".
[9] ITU-T建议X.501（2000）/ISO/IEC 9594-1（2001）：“信息技术-开放系统互连-目录模型”。
[10] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Algorithms", RFC 3370, August 2002.
[10] Housley，R.，“加密消息语法（CMS）算法”，RFC3370，2002年8月。
[11] ITU-T Recommendation F.1: "Operational provisions for the international public telegram service".
[11] ITU-T建议F.1：“国际公共电报业务的业务规定”。
[12] ITU-T Recommendation X.500: "Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Overview of concepts, models and services".
[12] ITU-T建议X.500：“信息技术-开放系统互连-目录：概念、模型和服务概述”。
[13] Farrell, S. and R. Housley, "An Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization", RFC 3281, April 2002.
[13] Farrell，S.和R.Housley，“用于授权的互联网属性证书配置文件”，RFC 3281，2002年4月。
[14] ITU-T Recommendation X.208 (1988): "Specification of Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1)".
[14] ITU-T建议X.208（1988）：“抽象语法符号1规范（ASN.1）”。
[15] Schaad, J., "Enhanced Security Services (ESS) Update: Adding CertID Algorithm Agility", RFC 5035, August 2007.
[15] Schaad，J.，“增强的安全服务（ESS）更新：添加CertID算法敏捷性”，RFC 50352007年8月。
[16] ITU-T Recommendation X.690 (2002): "Information technology ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)".
[16] ITU-T建议X.690（2002）：“信息技术ASN.1编码规则：基本编码规则（BER）、规范编码规则（CER）和区分编码规则（DER）规范”。
[EUDirective] Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a community framework for Electronic Signatures.
[欧盟指令]欧洲议会和理事会1999年12月13日关于共同体电子签名框架的第1999/93/EC号指令。
[TS101733] ETSI Standard TS 101 733 V.1.7.3 (2005-06) Electronic Signature Formats.
[TS101733]ETSI标准TS 101 733 V.1.7.3（2005-06）电子签名格式。
[TS101861] ETSI TS 101 861: "Time stamping profile".
[TS101861]ETSI TS 101 861：“时间戳配置文件”。
[TS101903] ETSI TS 101 903: "XML Advanced Electronic Signatures (XAdES)".
[TS101903]ETSI TS 101 903：“XML高级电子签名（XAdES）”。
[TR102038] ETSI TR 102 038: "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); XML format for signature policies".
[TR102038]ETSI TR 102 038：“电子签名和基础设施（ESI）；签名策略的XML格式”。
[TR102272] ETSI TR 102 272 V1.1.1 (2003-12). "Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); ASN.1 format for signature policies".
[TR102272]ETSI TR 102 272 V1.1.1（2003-12）。“电子签名和基础设施（ESI）；ASN.1签名政策格式”。
[RFC2479] Adams, C., "Independent Data Unit Protection Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (IDUP-GSS-API)", RFC 2479, December 1998.
[RFC2479]Adams，C.“独立数据单元保护通用安全服务应用程序接口（IDUP-GSS-API）”，RFC 2479，1998年12月。
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743, January 2000.
[RFC2743]Linn，J.，“通用安全服务应用程序接口版本2，更新1”，RFC 2743，2000年1月。
[RFC3125] Ross, J., Pinkas, D., and N. Pope, "Electronic Signature Policies", RFC 3125, September 2001.
[RFC3125]Ross，J.，Pinkas，D.，和N.Pope，“电子签名政策”，RFC31252001年9月。
[RFC3447] Jonsson, J. and B. Kaliski, "Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.1", RFC 3447, February 2003.
[RFC3447]Jonsson，J.和B.Kaliski，“公钥密码标准（PKCS）#1:RSA密码规范版本2.1”，RFC 3447，2003年2月。
[RFC3494] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol version 2 (LDAPv2) to Historic Status", RFC 3494, March 2003.
[RFC3494]Zeilenga，K.，“轻型目录访问协议版本2（LDAPv2）到历史状态”，RFC 34942003年3月。
[RFC3851] Ramsdell, B., Ed., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", RFC 3851, July 2004.
[RFC3851]Ramsdell，B.，编辑，“安全/多用途Internet邮件扩展（S/MIME）版本3.1消息规范”，RFC 38512004年7月。
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, September 2005.
[RFC4210]Adams，C.，Farrell，S.，Kause，T.，和T.Mononen，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施证书管理协议（CMP）”，RFC 42102005年9月。
[RFC4346] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", RFC 4346, April 2006.
[RFC4346]Dierks，T.和E.Rescorla，“传输层安全（TLS）协议版本1.1”，RFC 4346，2006年4月。
[RFC4523] Zeilenga, K., "Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) Schema Definitions for X.509 Certificates", RFC 4523, June 2006.
[RFC4523]Zeilenga，K.，“X.509证书的轻型目录访问协议（LDAP）模式定义”，RFC4523，2006年6月。
[ISO7498-2] ISO 7498-2 (1989): "Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic Reference Model - Part 2: Security Architecture".
[ISO7498-2]ISO 7498-2（1989）：“信息处理系统-开放系统互连-基本参考模型-第2部分：安全体系结构”。
[ISO9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2 (2002): "Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms".
[ISO9796-2]ISO/IEC 9796-2（2002）：“信息技术-安全技术-提供消息恢复的数字签名方案-第2部分：基于整数分解的机制”。
[ISO9796-4] ISO/IEC 9796-4 (1998): "Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 4: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms".
[ISO9796-4]ISO/IEC 9796-4（1998）：“提供消息恢复的数字签名方案-第4部分：基于离散对数的机制”。
[ISO10118-1] ISO/IEC 10118-1 (2000): "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 1: General".
[ISO10118-1]ISO/IEC 10118-1（2000）：“信息技术-安全技术-哈希函数-第1部分：总则”。
[ISO10118-2] ISO/IEC 10118-2 (2000): "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 2: Hash-functions using an n-bit block cipher algorithm".
[ISO10118-2]ISO/IEC 10118-2（2000）：“信息技术-安全技术-哈希函数-第2部分：使用n位分组密码算法的哈希函数”。
[ISO10118-3] ISO/IEC 10118-3 (2004): "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions".
[ISO10118-3]ISO/IEC 10118-3（2004）：“信息技术-安全技术-哈希函数-第3部分：专用哈希函数”。
[ISO10118-4] ISO/IEC 10118-4 (1998): "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 4: Hash-functions using modular arithmetic".
[ISO10118-4]ISO/IEC 10118-4（1998）：“信息技术-安全技术-散列函数-第4部分：使用模运算的散列函数”。
[ISO10181-5] ISO/IEC 10181-5: Security Frameworks in Open Systems. Non-Repudiation Framework. April 1997.
[ISO10181-5]ISO/IEC 10181-5：开放系统中的安全框架。不可否认框架。1997年4月。
[ISO13888-1] ISO/IEC 13888-1 (2004): "IT security techniques - Non-repudiation - Part 1: General".
[ISO13888-1]ISO/IEC 13888-1（2004）：“IT安全技术-不可否认性-第1部分：总则”。
[ISO14888-1] ISO/IEC 14888-1 (1998): "Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signatures with appendix - Part 1: General".
[ISO14888-1]ISO/IEC 14888-1（1998）：“信息技术-安全技术-带附录的数字签名-第1部分：总则”。
[ISO14888-2] ISO/IEC 14888-2 (1999): "Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signatures with appendix - Part 2: Identity-based mechanisms".
[ISO14888-2]ISO/IEC 14888-2（1999）：“信息技术-安全技术-带附录的数字签名-第2部分：基于身份的机制”。
[ISO14888-3] ISO/IEC 14888-3 (1998): "Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signatures with appendix - Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms".
[ISO14888-3]ISO/IEC 14888-3（1998）：“信息技术-安全技术-带附录的数字签名-第3部分：基于证书的机制”。
[ISO15946-2] ISO/IEC 15946-2 (2002): "Information technology - Security techniques - Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - Part 2: Digital signatures".
[ISO15946-2]ISO/IEC 15946-2（2002）：“信息技术-安全技术-基于椭圆曲线的加密技术-第2部分：数字签名”。
[CWA14171] CWA 14171 CEN Workshop Agreement: "General Guidelines for Electronic Signature Verification".
[CWA14171]CWA 14171 CEN研讨会协议：“电子签名验证的一般指南”。
[XMLDSIG] XMLDSIG: W3C/IETF Recommendation (February 2002): "XML-Signature Syntax and Processing".
[XMLDSIG]XMLDSIG:W3C/IETF建议（2002年2月）：“XML签名语法和处理”。
[X9.30-1] ANSI X9.30-1 (1997): "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Part 1: The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)".
[X9.30-1]ANSI X9.30-1（1997）：“金融服务业的公钥加密-第1部分：数字签名算法（DSA）”。
[X9.30-2] ANSI X9.30-2 (1997): "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Part 2: The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)".
[X9.30-2]ANSI X9.30-2（1997）：“金融服务业的公钥加密-第2部分：安全哈希算法（SHA-1）”。
[X9.31-1] ANSI X9.31-1 (1997): "Public Key Cryptography Using Reversible Algorithms for the Financial Services Industry - Part 1: The RSA Signature Algorithm".
[X9.31-1]ANSI X9.31-1（1997）：“金融服务业使用可逆算法的公钥密码术-第1部分：RSA签名算法”。
[X9.31-2] ANSI X9.31-2 (1996): "Public Key Cryptography Using Reversible Algorithms for the Financial Services Industry - Part 2: Hash Algorithms".
[X9.31-2]ANSI X9.31-2（1996）：“金融服务业使用可逆算法的公钥密码术-第2部分：散列算法”。
[X9.62] ANSI X9.62 (1998): "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)".
[X9.62]ANSI X9.62（1998）：“金融服务业的公钥加密-椭圆曲线数字签名算法（ECDSA）”。
[P1363] IEEE P1363 (2000): "Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography".
[P1363]IEEE P1363（2000）：“公钥加密的标准规范”。
ETSI technical specifications can be downloaded free of charge via
the Services and Products Download Area at:
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/StandardsDownload.aspx
ETSI technical specifications can be downloaded free of charge via
the Services and Products Download Area at:
http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/Standards/StandardsDownload.aspx
Annex A (Normative): ASN.1 Definitions
附录A（规范性附录）：ASN.1定义
This annex provides a summary of all the ASN.1 syntax definitions for new syntax defined in the present document.
本附件概述了本文件中定义的新语法的所有ASN.1语法定义。
NOTE: The ASN.1 module defined in Annex A.1 using syntax defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.208 [14] has precedence over that defined in Annex A.2 in the case of any conflict.
注：附录A.1中定义的ASN.1模块使用ITU-T建议X.208[14]中定义的语法，在发生任何冲突的情况下优先于附录A.2中定义的模块。
ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-ExplicitSyntax88 { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0)
eSignature-explicit88(28)}
ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-ExplicitSyntax88 { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0)
eSignature-explicit88(28)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
开始
-- EXPORTS All
--全部出口
IMPORTS
进口
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS): RFC 3852
--加密消息语法（CMS）：RFC 3852
ContentInfo, ContentType, id-data, id-signedData, SignedData,
EncapsulatedContentInfo, SignerInfo, id-contentType,
id-messageDigest, MessageDigest, id-signingTime, SigningTime,
id-countersignature, Countersignature
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
ContentInfo, ContentType, id-data, id-signedData, SignedData,
EncapsulatedContentInfo, SignerInfo, id-contentType,
id-messageDigest, MessageDigest, id-signingTime, SigningTime,
id-countersignature, Countersignature
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- ESS Defined attributes: ESS Update
-- RFC 5035 (Adding CertID Algorithm Agility)
-- ESS Defined attributes: ESS Update
-- RFC 5035 (Adding CertID Algorithm Agility)
id-aa-signingCertificate, SigningCertificate, IssuerSerial,
id-aa-contentReference, ContentReference, id-aa-contentIdentifier,
ContentIdentifier, id-aa-signingCertificateV2
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }
id-aa-signingCertificate, SigningCertificate, IssuerSerial,
id-aa-contentReference, ContentReference, id-aa-contentIdentifier,
ContentIdentifier, id-aa-signingCertificateV2
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }
-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and CRL
-- Profile: RFC 3280
-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Certificate and CRL
-- Profile: RFC 3280
Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateList, Name, DirectoryString, Attribute, BMPString, UTF8String
证书，算法标识符，证书列表，名称，目录字符串，属性，BMPString，UTF8String
FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
GeneralNames, GeneralName, PolicyInformation
FROM PKIX1Implicit88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit (19)}
GeneralNames, GeneralName, PolicyInformation
FROM PKIX1Implicit88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit (19)}
-- Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization - RFC 3281
--授权的Internet属性证书配置文件-RFC 3281
AttributeCertificate
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert(12)}
AttributeCertificate
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-attribute-cert(12)}
-- OCSP - RFC 2560
--OCSP-RFC2560
BasicOCSPResponse, ResponderID
FROM OCSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp(14)}
BasicOCSPResponse, ResponderID
FROM OCSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp(14)}
-- Time Stamp Protocol RFC 3161
--时间戳协议RFC361
TimeStampToken
FROM PKIXTSP
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}
TimeStampToken
FROM PKIXTSP
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}
;
;
-- Definitions of Object Identifier arcs used in the present document
-- ==================================================================
-- Definitions of Object Identifier arcs used in the present document
-- ==================================================================
-- OID used referencing electronic signature mechanisms based on
-- the present document for use with the Independent Data Unit
-- Protection (IDUP) API (see Annex D)
-- OID used referencing electronic signature mechanisms based on
-- the present document for use with the Independent Data Unit
-- Protection (IDUP) API (see Annex D)
id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1) idupMechanism (4)
etsiESv1(1) }
id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1) idupMechanism (4)
etsiESv1(1) }
-- Basic ES CMS Attributes Defined in the present document
-- =======================================================
-- Basic ES CMS Attributes Defined in the present document
-- =======================================================
-- OtherSigningCertificate - deprecated
--OtherSigningCertificate-已弃用
id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }
id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }
OtherSigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
-- NOT USED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT
}
OtherSigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
-- NOT USED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT
}
OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertHash OtherHash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertHash OtherHash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
sha1Hash OtherHashValue,
-- This contains a SHA-1 hash
otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue}
OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
sha1Hash OtherHashValue,
-- This contains a SHA-1 hash
otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue}
-- Policy ES Attributes Defined in the present document
-- ====================================================
-- Policy ES Attributes Defined in the present document
-- ====================================================
-- Mandatory Basic Electronic Signature Attributes as above,
-- plus in addition.
-- Mandatory Basic Electronic Signature Attributes as above,
-- plus in addition.
-- Signature-policy-identifier attribute
--签名策略标识符属性
id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }
id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }
SignaturePolicy ::= CHOICE {
signaturePolicyId SignaturePolicyId,
signaturePolicyImplied SignaturePolicyImplied
-- not used in this version
}
SignaturePolicy ::= CHOICE {
signaturePolicyId SignaturePolicyId,
signaturePolicyImplied SignaturePolicyImplied
-- not used in this version
}
SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyId SigPolicyId,
sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,
sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
}
SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyId SigPolicyId,
sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,
sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
}
SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL
SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL
SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue
SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue }
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue }
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyQualifierId SigPolicyQualifierId,
sigQualifier ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId }
SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyQualifierId SigPolicyQualifierId,
sigQualifier ANY DEFINED BY sigPolicyQualifierId }
SigPolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SigPolicyQualifierId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }
id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }
SPuri ::= IA5String
SPuri ::= IA5String
id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }
id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }
SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL}
SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL}
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
utf8String utf8String（大小（1..200））}
-- Optional Electronic Signature Attributes
--可选电子签名属性
-- Commitment-type attribute
--承诺类型属性
id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}
id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}
CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier, commitmentTypeQualifier SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CommitmentTypeQualifier OPTIONAL}
commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier，commitmentTypeQualifier序列大小（1..MAX）commitmentTypeQualifier可选}
CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeIdentifier CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY commitmentTypeIdentifier }
CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeIdentifier CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
qualifier ANY DEFINED BY commitmentTypeIdentifier }
id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1}
id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1}
id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}
id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}
id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 3}
id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 3}
id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}
id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}
id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 5}
id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 5}
id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 6}
id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 6}
-- Signer-location attribute
--签名者位置属性
id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}
id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}
SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
-- at least one of the following shall be present
countryName [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a Country in X.500
localityName [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a locality in X.500
postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
-- at least one of the following shall be present
countryName [0] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a Country in X.500
localityName [1] DirectoryString OPTIONAL,
-- As used to name a locality in X.500
postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString
-- Signer-attributes attribute
--签名者属性
id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}
id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}
SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
claimedAttributes [0] ClaimedAttributes,
certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
claimedAttributes [0] ClaimedAttributes,
certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- as defined in RFC 3281: see Section 4.1
CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- as defined in RFC 3281: see Section 4.1
-- Content-time-stamp attribute
--内容时间戳属性
id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}
id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}
ContentTimestamp ::= TimeStampToken
ContentTimestamp ::= TimeStampToken
-- Signature-time-stamp attribute
--签名时间戳属性
id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}
id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}
SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
-- Complete-certificate-references attribute
--完整证书引用属性
id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}
id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}
CompleteCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
CompleteCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
-- Complete-revocation-references attribute
--完全吊销引用属性
id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}
id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}
CompleteRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
CompleteRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
crlids [0] CRLListID OPTIONAL,
ocspids [1] OcspListID OPTIONAL,
otherRev [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
}
CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
crlids [0] CRLListID OPTIONAL,
ocspids [1] OcspListID OPTIONAL,
otherRev [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
}
CRLListID ::= SEQUENCE {
crls SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID}
CRLListID ::= SEQUENCE {
crls SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID}
CrlValidatedID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlHash OtherHash,
crlIdentifier CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL}
CrlValidatedID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlHash OtherHash,
crlIdentifier CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL}
CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
crlissuer Name,
crlIssuedTime UTCTime,
crlNumber INTEGER OPTIONAL }
CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
crlissuer Name,
crlIssuedTime UTCTime,
crlNumber INTEGER OPTIONAL }
OcspListID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponses SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID}
OcspListID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponses SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID}
OcspResponsesID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspIdentifier OcspIdentifier,
ocspRepHash OtherHash OPTIONAL
}
OcspResponsesID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspIdentifier OcspIdentifier,
ocspRepHash OtherHash OPTIONAL
}
OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponderID ResponderID,
-- As in OCSP response data
producedAt GeneralizedTime
-- As in OCSP response data
}
OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponderID ResponderID,
-- As in OCSP response data
producedAt GeneralizedTime
-- As in OCSP response data
}
OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevRefType OtherRevRefType,
otherRevRefs ANY DEFINED BY otherRevRefType
}
OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevRefType OtherRevRefType,
otherRevRefs ANY DEFINED BY otherRevRefType
}
OtherRevRefType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
OtherRevRefType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- Certificate-values attribute
--证书值属性
id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}
id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}
CertificateValues ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
CertificateValues ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
-- Certificate-revocation-values attribute
--证书吊销值属性
id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}
id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}
RevocationValues ::= SEQUENCE {
RevocationValues ::= SEQUENCE {
crlVals [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL, ocspVals [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse OPTIONAL, otherRevVals [2] OtherRevVals OPTIONAL}
crlVals[0]证书序列列表可选，OCSPVAL[1]基本响应序列可选，OtherRevVAL[2]OtherRevVAL可选}
OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevValType OtherRevValType,
otherRevVals ANY DEFINED BY otherRevValType
}
OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevValType OtherRevValType,
otherRevVals ANY DEFINED BY otherRevValType
}
OtherRevValType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
OtherRevValType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
-- CAdES-C time-stamp attribute
--CAdES-C时间戳属性
id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}
id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}
ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
-- Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs
--带时间戳的证书和CRL
id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}
id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}
TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken
TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken
-- Archive time-stamp attribute
id-aa-ets-archiveTimestampV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 48}
-- Archive time-stamp attribute
id-aa-ets-archiveTimestampV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 48}
ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
-- Attribute-certificate-references attribute
--属性证书引用属性
id-aa-ets-attrCertificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 44}
id-aa-ets-attrCertificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 44}
AttributeCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
AttributeCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
-- Attribute-revocation-references attribute
--属性撤销引用属性
id-aa-ets-attrRevocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 45}
id-aa-ets-attrRevocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 45}
AttributeRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
AttributeRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
END
终止
NOTE: The ASN.1 module defined in Annex A.1 has precedence over that defined in Annex A.2 using syntax defined in ITU-T Recommendation X.680 (1997) [8] in the case of any conflict.
注：在任何冲突情况下，使用ITU-T建议X.680（1997）[8]中定义的语法，附录A.1中定义的ASN.1模块优先于附录A.2中定义的模块。
ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-ExplicitSyntax97 { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0)
eSignature-explicit97(29)}
ETS-ElectronicSignatureFormats-ExplicitSyntax97 { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-mod(0)
eSignature-explicit97(29)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
开始
-- EXPORTS All -
--全部出口-
IMPORTS
进口
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS): RFC 3852
--加密消息语法（CMS）：RFC 3852
ContentInfo, ContentType, id-data, id-signedData, SignedData,
EncapsulatedContentInfo, SignerInfo,
id-contentType, id-messageDigest, MessageDigest, id-signingTime,
SigningTime, id-countersignature, Countersignature
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
ContentInfo, ContentType, id-data, id-signedData, SignedData,
EncapsulatedContentInfo, SignerInfo,
id-contentType, id-messageDigest, MessageDigest, id-signingTime,
SigningTime, id-countersignature, Countersignature
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax2004
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) cms-2004(24) }
-- ESS Defined attributes: ESS Update
-- RFC 5035 (Adding CertID Algorithm Agility)
-- ESS Defined attributes: ESS Update
-- RFC 5035 (Adding CertID Algorithm Agility)
id-aa-signingCertificate, SigningCertificate, IssuerSerial,
id-aa-contentReference, ContentReference, id-aa-contentIdentifier,
ContentIdentifier, id-aa-signingCertificateV2
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }
id-aa-signingCertificate, SigningCertificate, IssuerSerial,
id-aa-contentReference, ContentReference, id-aa-contentIdentifier,
ContentIdentifier, id-aa-signingCertificateV2
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices-2006
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006(30) }
-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
-- Certificate and CRL Profile: RFC 3280
-- Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
-- Certificate and CRL Profile: RFC 3280
Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier, CertificateList, Name, Attribute
证书，算法标识符，证书列表，名称，属性
FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
FROM PKIX1Explicit88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-explicit(18)}
GeneralNames, GeneralName, PolicyInformation
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
GeneralNames, GeneralName, PolicyInformation
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-pkix1-implicit(19)}
-- Internet Attribute Certificate Profile for Authorization - RFC 3281
--授权的Internet属性证书配置文件-RFC 3281
AttributeCertificate
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-attribute-cert(12)}
AttributeCertificate
FROM PKIXAttributeCertificate {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-attribute-cert(12)}
-- OCSP RFC 2560
--OCSP RFC 2560
BasicOCSPResponse, ResponderID
FROM OCSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp(14)}
BasicOCSPResponse, ResponderID
FROM OCSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-ocsp(14)}
-- RFC 3161 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
-- Time-Stamp Protocol
-- RFC 3161 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
-- Time-Stamp Protocol
TimeStampToken
FROM PKIXTSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}
TimeStampToken
FROM PKIXTSP {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tsp(13)}
-- X.520
--X.520
DirectoryString {}
FROM SelectedAttributeTypes
{joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) selectedAttributeTypes(5) 4}
DirectoryString {}
FROM SelectedAttributeTypes
{joint-iso-itu-t ds(5) module(1) selectedAttributeTypes(5) 4}
;
;
-- Definitions of Object Identifier arcs used in the present document
-- ==================================================================
-- Definitions of Object Identifier arcs used in the present document
-- ==================================================================
-- OID used referencing electronic signature mechanisms based
-- on the present document for use with the IDUP API (see Annex D)
-- OID used referencing electronic signature mechanisms based
-- on the present document for use with the IDUP API (see Annex D)
id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1) idupMechanism (4)
etsiESv1(1) }
id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1) idupMechanism (4)
etsiESv1(1) }
-- Basic ES Attributes Defined in the present document
-- ===================================================
-- Basic ES Attributes Defined in the present document
-- ===================================================
-- CMS Attributes defined in the present document
--本文件中定义的CMS属性
-- OtherSigningCertificate - deprecated
--OtherSigningCertificate-已弃用
id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }
id-aa-ets-otherSigCert OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 19 }
OtherSigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
-- NOT USED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT
}
OtherSigningCertificate ::= SEQUENCE {
certs SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID,
policies SEQUENCE OF PolicyInformation OPTIONAL
-- NOT USED IN THE PRESENT DOCUMENT
}
OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertHash OtherHash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
OtherCertID ::= SEQUENCE {
otherCertHash OtherHash,
issuerSerial IssuerSerial OPTIONAL }
OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
sha1Hash OtherHashValue,
-- This contains a SHA-1 hash
otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue}
OtherHash ::= CHOICE {
sha1Hash OtherHashValue,
-- This contains a SHA-1 hash
otherHash OtherHashAlgAndValue}
-- Policy ES Attributes Defined in the present document
-- ====================================================
-- Policy ES Attributes Defined in the present document
-- ====================================================
-- Mandatory Basic Electronic Signature Attributes, plus in addition.
-- Signature Policy Identifier
-- Mandatory Basic Electronic Signature Attributes, plus in addition.
-- Signature Policy Identifier
id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }
id-aa-ets-sigPolicyId OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 15 }
SignaturePolicy ::= CHOICE {
signaturePolicyId SignaturePolicyId,
signaturePolicyImplied SignaturePolicyImplied
-- not used in this version
}
SignaturePolicy ::= CHOICE {
signaturePolicyId SignaturePolicyId,
signaturePolicyImplied SignaturePolicyImplied
-- not used in this version
}
SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyId SigPolicyId,
sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,
sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
SignaturePolicyId ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyId SigPolicyId,
sigPolicyHash SigPolicyHash,
sigPolicyQualifiers SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SigPolicyQualifierInfo OPTIONAL
}
}
SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL
SignaturePolicyImplied ::= NULL
SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SigPolicyId ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue
SigPolicyHash ::= OtherHashAlgAndValue
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue
}
OtherHashAlgAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OtherHashValue
}
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
OtherHashValue ::= OCTET STRING
SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyQualifierId SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&id
({SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers}),
qualifier SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier
({SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers}
{@sigPolicyQualifierId})OPTIONAL }
SigPolicyQualifierInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
sigPolicyQualifierId SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&id
({SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers}),
qualifier SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier
({SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers}
{@sigPolicyQualifierId})OPTIONAL }
SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::=
{ noticeToUser | pointerToSigPolSpec }
SupportedSigPolicyQualifiers SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::=
{ noticeToUser | pointerToSigPolSpec }
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Qualifier OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID &id
[SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE &Qualifier] }
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Qualifier OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID &id
[SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE &Qualifier] }
noticeToUser SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= {
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-spq-ets-unotice SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE
SPUserNotice }
noticeToUser SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= {
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-spq-ets-unotice SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE
SPUserNotice }
pointerToSigPolSpec SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= {
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-spq-ets-uri SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE SPuri }
pointerToSigPolSpec SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER ::= {
SIG-POLICY-QUALIFIER-ID id-spq-ets-uri SIG-QUALIFIER-TYPE SPuri }
id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }
id-spq-ets-uri OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 1 }
SPuri ::= IA5String
SPuri ::= IA5String
id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }
id-spq-ets-unotice OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9)
smime(16) id-spq(5) 2 }
SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL}
SPUserNotice ::= SEQUENCE {
noticeRef NoticeReference OPTIONAL,
explicitText DisplayText OPTIONAL}
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
NoticeReference ::= SEQUENCE {
organization DisplayText,
noticeNumbers SEQUENCE OF INTEGER }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
DisplayText ::= CHOICE {
visibleString VisibleString (SIZE (1..200)),
bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..200)),
utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..200)) }
-- Optional Electronic Signature Attributes
--可选电子签名属性
-- Commitment Type
--承诺类型
id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}
id-aa-ets-commitmentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 16}
CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
commitmentTypeQualifier SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CommitmentTypeQualifier OPTIONAL}
CommitmentTypeIndication ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentTypeId CommitmentTypeIdentifier,
commitmentTypeQualifier SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
CommitmentTypeQualifier OPTIONAL}
CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
CommitmentTypeIdentifier ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentQualifierId COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER.&id,
qualifier COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier OPTIONAL }
CommitmentTypeQualifier ::= SEQUENCE {
commitmentQualifierId COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER.&id,
qualifier COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER.&Qualifier OPTIONAL }
COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Qualifier OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER-ID &id
[COMMITMENT-TYPE &Qualifier] }
COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER ::= CLASS {
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
&Qualifier OPTIONAL }
WITH SYNTAX {
COMMITMENT-QUALIFIER-ID &id
[COMMITMENT-TYPE &Qualifier] }
id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1}
id-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 1}
id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}
id-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 2}
id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 3}
id-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
cti(6) 3}
id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}
id-cti-ets-proofOfSender OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) cti(6) 4}
id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 5}
id-cti-ets-proofOfApproval OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 5}
id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 6}
id-cti-ets-proofOfCreation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) cti(6) 6}
-- Signer Location
--签名者位置
id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}
id-aa-ets-signerLocation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 17}
SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
-- at least one of the following shall be present
countryName [0] DirectoryString{maxSize} OPTIONAL,
-- as used to name a Country in X.520
localityName [1] DirectoryString{maxSize} OPTIONAL,
-- as used to name a locality in X.520
postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
SignerLocation ::= SEQUENCE {
-- at least one of the following shall be present
countryName [0] DirectoryString{maxSize} OPTIONAL,
-- as used to name a Country in X.520
localityName [1] DirectoryString{maxSize} OPTIONAL,
-- as used to name a locality in X.520
postalAdddress [2] PostalAddress OPTIONAL }
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString{maxSize}
-- maxSize parametrization as specified in X.683
PostalAddress ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..6) OF DirectoryString{maxSize}
-- maxSize parametrization as specified in X.683
-- Signer Attributes
--签名者属性
id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}
id-aa-ets-signerAttr OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 18}
SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
claimedAttributes [0] ClaimedAttributes,
certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
SignerAttribute ::= SEQUENCE OF CHOICE {
claimedAttributes [0] ClaimedAttributes,
certifiedAttributes [1] CertifiedAttributes }
ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
ClaimedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- as defined in RFC 3281: see Section 4.1
CertifiedAttributes ::= AttributeCertificate
-- as defined in RFC 3281: see Section 4.1
-- Content Timestamp
--内容时间戳
id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}
ContentTimestamp ::= TimeStampToken
id-aa-ets-contentTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 20}
ContentTimestamp ::= TimeStampToken
-- Signature Timestamp
--签名时间戳
id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}
id-aa-signatureTimeStampToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 14}
SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
SignatureTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
-- Complete Certificate Refs.
--完整的证书参考。
id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}
id-aa-ets-certificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 21}
CompleteCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
CompleteCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
-- Complete Revocation Refs
--完全撤销引用
id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}
id-aa-ets-revocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 22}
CompleteRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
CompleteRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
crlids [0] CRLListID OPTIONAL,
ocspids [1] OcspListID OPTIONAL,
otherRev [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
}
CrlOcspRef ::= SEQUENCE {
crlids [0] CRLListID OPTIONAL,
ocspids [1] OcspListID OPTIONAL,
otherRev [2] OtherRevRefs OPTIONAL
}
CRLListID ::= SEQUENCE {
crls SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID
}
CRLListID ::= SEQUENCE {
crls SEQUENCE OF CrlValidatedID
}
CrlValidatedID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlHash OtherHash,
crlIdentifier CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL }
CrlValidatedID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlHash OtherHash,
crlIdentifier CrlIdentifier OPTIONAL }
CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
crlissuer Name,
crlIssuedTime UTCTime,
crlNumber INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
CrlIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
crlissuer Name,
crlIssuedTime UTCTime,
crlNumber INTEGER OPTIONAL
}
OcspListID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponses SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID
}
OcspListID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponses SEQUENCE OF OcspResponsesID
}
OcspResponsesID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspIdentifier OcspIdentifier,
OcspResponsesID ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspIdentifier OcspIdentifier,
ocspRepHash OtherHash OPTIONAL }
ocspRepHash OTHERSHASH可选}
OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponderID ResponderID,
-- As in OCSP response data
producedAt GeneralizedTime
-- As in OCSP response data
}
OcspIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
ocspResponderID ResponderID,
-- As in OCSP response data
producedAt GeneralizedTime
-- As in OCSP response data
}
OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevRefType OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&id,
otherRevRefs SEQUENCE OF OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&Type
}
OtherRevRefs ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevRefType OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&id,
otherRevRefs SEQUENCE OF OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&Type
}
OTHER-REVOCATION-REF ::= CLASS {
&Type,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
WITH SYNTAX {
WITH SYNTAX &Type ID &id }
OTHER-REVOCATION-REF ::= CLASS {
&Type,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
WITH SYNTAX {
WITH SYNTAX &Type ID &id }
-- Certificate Values
--证书值
id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}
id-aa-ets-certValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 23}
CertificateValues ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
CertificateValues ::= SEQUENCE OF Certificate
-- Certificate Revocation Values
--证书吊销值
id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}
id-aa-ets-revocationValues OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 24}
RevocationValues ::= SEQUENCE {
crlVals [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL,
ocspVals [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse OPTIONAL,
RevocationValues ::= SEQUENCE {
crlVals [0] SEQUENCE OF CertificateList OPTIONAL,
ocspVals [1] SEQUENCE OF BasicOCSPResponse OPTIONAL,
otherRevVals [2] OtherRevVals OPTIONAL }
OtherRevals[2]OtherRevals可选}
OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevValType OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL.&id,
otherRevVals SEQUENCE OF OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&Type
}
OtherRevVals ::= SEQUENCE {
otherRevValType OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL.&id,
otherRevVals SEQUENCE OF OTHER-REVOCATION-REF.&Type
}
OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL ::= CLASS {
&Type,
OTHER-REVOCATION-VAL ::= CLASS {
&Type,
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
WITH SYNTAX {
WITH SYNTAX &Type ID &id }
&id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE }
WITH SYNTAX {
WITH SYNTAX &Type ID &id }
-- CAdES-C Timestamp
id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}
-- CAdES-C Timestamp
id-aa-ets-escTimeStamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) id-aa(2) 25}
ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
ESCTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
-- Time-Stamped Certificates and CRLs
--带时间戳的证书和CRL
id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}
id-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 26}
TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken
TimestampedCertsCRLs ::= TimeStampToken
-- Archive Timestamp
--存档时间戳
id-aa-ets-archiveTimestampV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 48}
id-aa-ets-archiveTimestampV2 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 48}
ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
ArchiveTimeStampToken ::= TimeStampToken
-- Attribute certificate references
--属性证书引用
id-aa-ets-attrCertificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 44}
id-aa-ets-attrCertificateRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 44}
AttributeCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
AttributeCertificateRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF OtherCertID
-- Attribute revocation references
--属性撤销引用
id-aa-ets-attrRevocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 45}
id-aa-ets-attrRevocationRefs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) id-aa(2) 45}
AttributeRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
AttributeRevocationRefs ::= SEQUENCE OF CrlOcspRef
END
终止
Annex B (Informative): Extended Forms of Electronic Signatures
附件B（资料性）：电子签字的扩展形式
Section 4 provides an overview of the various formats of electronic signatures included in the present document. This annex lists the attributes that need to be present in the various extended electronic signature formats and provides example validation sequences using the extended formats.
第4节概述了本文件所载的各种电子签字格式。本附录列出了各种扩展电子签名格式中需要呈现的属性，并提供了使用扩展格式的验证序列示例。
The Complete validation data (CAdES-C) described in Section 4.3 and illustrated in Figure 3 may be extended to create electronic signatures with extended validation data. Some electronic signature forms that include extended validation are explained below.
第4.3节所述和图3所示的完整验证数据（CAdES-C）可以扩展，以创建具有扩展验证数据的电子签名。下文解释了一些包含扩展验证的电子签名表格。
An X-Long electronic signature (CAdES-X Long) is the CAdES-C with the values of the certificates and revocation information.
X长电子签名（CAdES-X长）是具有证书值和撤销信息的CAdES-C。
This form of electronic signature can be useful when the verifier does not have direct access to the following information:
当验证者无法直接访问以下信息时，这种形式的电子签名可能很有用：
- the signer's certificate;
- 签署人的证书；
- all the CA certificates that make up the full certification path;
- 构成完整认证路径的所有CA证书；
- all the associated revocation status information, as referenced in the CAdES-C.
- CAdES-C中引用的所有相关撤销状态信息。
In some situations, additional time-stamps may be created and added to the Electronic Signatures as additional attributes. For example:
在某些情况下，可以创建附加时间戳并将其作为附加属性添加到电子签名中。例如：
- time-stamping all the validation data as held with the ES (CAdES-C), this eXtended validation data is called a CAdES-X Type 1; or
- 对ES（CAdES-C）保存的所有验证数据进行时间戳，该扩展验证数据称为CAdES-X类型1；或
- time-stamping individual reference data as used for complete validation. This form of eXtended validation data is called an CAdES-X Type 2.
- 用于完整验证的时间戳个人参考数据。这种形式的扩展验证数据称为CAdES-X类型2。
NOTE 1: The advantages/drawbacks for CAdES-X Type 1 and CAdES-X Type 2 are discussed in Annex C.4.4.
注1：附录C.4.4讨论了CAdES-X类型1和CAdES-X类型2的优点/缺点。
The above time-stamp forms can be useful when it is required to counter the risk that any CA keys used in the certificate chain may be compromised.
当需要对抗证书链中使用的任何CA密钥可能被泄露的风险时，上述时间戳表格可能会很有用。
A combination of the two formats above may be used. This form of eXtended validation data is called an ES X-Long Type 1 or CAdES-X Long Type 2. This form of electronic signature can be useful when the verifier needs both the values and proof of when the validation data existed.
可以使用上述两种格式的组合。这种形式的扩展验证数据称为ES-X-Long类型1或CAdES-X-Long类型2。当验证者需要验证数据存在时的值和证据时，这种形式的电子签名可能很有用。
NOTE 2: The advantages/drawbacks for CAdES-X long Type 1 and CAdES-X long Type 2 are discussed in Annex C.4.6.
注2：附录C.4.6中讨论了CAdES-X长型1和CAdES-X长型2的优点/缺点。
An electronic signature with the additional validation data forming the CAdES-X Long form (CAdES-X-Long) is illustrated in Figure B.1 and comprises the following:
带有额外验证数据的电子签名构成CAdES-X长格式（CAdES-X长格式），如图B.1所示，包括以下内容：
- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES, as defined in Sections 4.3 , 5.7, or 5.8;
- 第4.3节、第5.7节或第5.8节中定义的CAdES BES或CAdES EPES；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2.
- 按照第6.2.2节的定义，完成撤销引用属性。
The following attributes are required if a TSP is not providing a time-mark of the ES:
如果TSP未提供ES的时间标记，则需要以下属性：
- signature-time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1.
- 第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性。
The following attributes are required if the full certificate values and revocation values are not already included in the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES:
如果CAdES BES或CAdES EPES中尚未包含完整证书值和吊销值，则需要以下属性：
- certificate-values attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.3;
- 第6.3.3节中定义的证书值属性；
- revocation-values attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.4.
- 撤销值属性，如第6.3.4节所定义。
If attributes certificates are used, then the following attributes may be present:
如果使用属性证书，则可能存在以下属性：
- attribute-certificate-references attribute, defined in Section 6.2.3;
- 属性证书引用第6.2.3节中定义的属性；
- attribute-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.4.
- 属性撤销引用第6.2.4节中定义的属性。
Other unsigned attributes may be present, but are not required.
可能存在其他未签名属性，但不是必需的。
NOTE: Attribute certificate and revocation references are only present if a user attribute certificate is present in the electronic signature; see Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3.
注：仅当电子签名中存在用户属性证书时，属性证书和撤销引用才存在；见第6.2.2节和第6.2.3节。
+---------------------- CAdES-X-Long --------------------------------+
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C ---+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+|
||+----- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES ----+ |Timestamp | | | ||
||| | |over | | | Complete ||
|||+---------++----------++---------+| |digital | | | certificate ||
|||| || || || |signature | | | and ||
||||Signer's || Signed ||Digital || | | | | revocation ||
||||Document ||Attributes||signature|| |Optional | | | data ||
|||| || || || |when | | | ||
|||+---------++----------++---------+| |timemarked| | | ||
||+----------------------------------+ +----------+ | | ||
|| +-----------+| +-------------+|
|| |Complete || |
|| |certificate|| |
|| |and || |
|| |revocation || |
|| |references || |
|| +-----------+| |
|+--------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------------------- CAdES-X-Long --------------------------------+
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C ---+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+|
||+----- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES ----+ |Timestamp | | | ||
||| | |over | | | Complete ||
|||+---------++----------++---------+| |digital | | | certificate ||
|||| || || || |signature | | | and ||
||||Signer's || Signed ||Digital || | | | | revocation ||
||||Document ||Attributes||signature|| |Optional | | | data ||
|||| || || || |when | | | ||
|||+---------++----------++---------+| |timemarked| | | ||
||+----------------------------------+ +----------+ | | ||
|| +-----------+| +-------------+|
|| |Complete || |
|| |certificate|| |
|| |and || |
|| |revocation || |
|| |references || |
|| +-----------+| |
|+--------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure B.1: Illustration of CAdES-X-Long
图B.1:CAdES-X-Long示意图
An electronic signature with the additional validation data forming the eXtended validation data - Type 1 X is illustrated in Figure B.2 and comprises the following:
带有附加验证数据的电子签名构成扩展验证数据类型1 X，如图B.2所示，包括以下内容：
- the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES, as defined in Sections 4.2, 5.7, or 5.8;
- 第4.2节、第5.7节或第5.8节中定义的CADE BES或CADE EPES；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 第6.2.2节中定义的完整撤销引用属性；
- CAdES-C-Timestamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.5.
- CAdES-C-时间戳属性，如第6.3.5节所定义。
The following attributes are required if a TSP is not providing a time-mark of the ES:
如果TSP未提供ES的时间标记，则需要以下属性：
- signature-time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1.
- 第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性。
If attributes certificates are used, then the following attributes may be present:
如果使用属性证书，则可能存在以下属性：
- attribute-certificate-references attribute, defined in Section 6.2.3;
- 属性证书引用第6.2.3节中定义的属性；
- attribute-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.4.
- 属性撤销引用第6.2.4节中定义的属性。
Other unsigned attributes may be present, but are not required.
可能存在其他未签名属性，但不是必需的。
+------------------------ CAdES-X-Type 1 ----------------------------+
|+---------------------------------- CAdES-C ------+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+ |
||+--- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES ------+|Timestamp | | | | |
||| ||over | | | | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||digital | | | | |
||||Signer's || Signed || Digital |||signature | | | Timestamp | |
||||Document ||Attributes||signature||| | | | over | |
|||| || || |||Optional | | | CAdES-C | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||when | | | | |
||+----------------------------------+|timemarked| | | | |
|| +----------+ | | | |
|| +-----------+| +-------------+ |
|| |Complete || |
|| |certificate|| |
|| | and || |
|| |revocation || |
|| |references || |
|| +-----------+| |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
+------------------------ CAdES-X-Type 1 ----------------------------+
|+---------------------------------- CAdES-C ------+ |
|| +----------+ | +-------------+ |
||+--- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES ------+|Timestamp | | | | |
||| ||over | | | | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||digital | | | | |
||||Signer's || Signed || Digital |||signature | | | Timestamp | |
||||Document ||Attributes||signature||| | | | over | |
|||| || || |||Optional | | | CAdES-C | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||when | | | | |
||+----------------------------------+|timemarked| | | | |
|| +----------+ | | | |
|| +-----------+| +-------------+ |
|| |Complete || |
|| |certificate|| |
|| | and || |
|| |revocation || |
|| |references || |
|| +-----------+| |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure B.2: Illustration of CAdES-X Type 1
图B.2:CAdES-X类型1的图解
An electronic signature with the additional validation data forming the eXtended Validation Data - Type 2 X is illustrated in Figure B.3 and comprises the following:
带有附加验证数据的电子签名构成扩展验证数据类型2 X，如图B.3所示，包括以下内容：
- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES, as defined in Sections 4.2, 5.7, or 5.8;
- 第4.2节、第5.7节或第5.8节中定义的CAdES BES或CAdES EPES；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 第6.2.2节中定义的完整撤销引用属性；
- time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.6.
- 时间戳证书crls引用属性，如第6.3.6节所定义。
The following attributes are required if a TSP is not providing a time-mark of the ES:
如果TSP未提供ES的时间标记，则需要以下属性：
- signature-time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1.
- 第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性。
If attributes certificates are used, then the following attributes may be present:
如果使用属性证书，则可能存在以下属性：
- attribute-certificate-references attribute, defined in Section 6.2.3;
- 属性证书引用第6.2.3节中定义的属性；
- attribute-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.4.
- 属性撤销引用第6.2.4节中定义的属性。
Other unsigned attributes may be present, but are not required.
可能存在其他未签名属性，但不是必需的。
+----------------------- CAdES-X-Type 2 -----------------------------+
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C --+ |
|| +----------+ | |
||+-- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES -------+|Timestamp | | |
||| ||over | | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||digital | | +-------------+ |
|||| || || |||Signature | | | Timestamp | |
||||Signer's || Signed || Digital ||| | | | only over | |
||||Document ||Attributes||signature|||Optional | | | Complete | |
|||| || || |||when | | | certificate | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||Timemarked| | | and | |
||+----------------------------------++----------+ | | revocation | |
|| +-----------+| | references | |
|| |Complete || +-------------+ |
|| |certificate|| |
|| |and || |
|| |revocation || |
|| |references || |
|| +-----------+| |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
+----------------------- CAdES-X-Type 2 -----------------------------+
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C --+ |
|| +----------+ | |
||+-- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES -------+|Timestamp | | |
||| ||over | | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||digital | | +-------------+ |
|||| || || |||Signature | | | Timestamp | |
||||Signer's || Signed || Digital ||| | | | only over | |
||||Document ||Attributes||signature|||Optional | | | Complete | |
|||| || || |||when | | | certificate | |
|||+---------++----------++---------+||Timemarked| | | and | |
||+----------------------------------++----------+ | | revocation | |
|| +-----------+| | references | |
|| |Complete || +-------------+ |
|| |certificate|| |
|| |and || |
|| |revocation || |
|| |references || |
|| +-----------+| |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ |
| |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure B.3: Illustration of CAdES-X Type 2
图B.3:CAdES-X类型2的图解
An electronic signature with the additional validation data forming the CAdES-X Long Type 1 and CAdES-X Long Type 2 is illustrated in Figure B.4 and comprises the following:
图B.4中说明了电子签名以及构成CAdES-X长型1和CAdES-X长型2的附加验证数据，包括以下内容：
- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES, as defined in Sections 4.3, 5.7, or 5.8;
- 第4.3节、第5.7节或第5.8节中定义的CAdES BES或CAdES EPES；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 第6.2.2节中定义的完整撤销引用属性；
The following attributes are required if a TSP is not providing a time-mark of the ES:
如果TSP未提供ES的时间标记，则需要以下属性：
- signature-time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1.
- 第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性。
The following attributes are required if the full certificate values and revocation values are not already included in the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES:
如果CAdES BES或CAdES EPES中尚未包含完整证书值和吊销值，则需要以下属性：
- certificate-values attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.3;
- 第6.3.3节中定义的证书值属性；
- revocation-values attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.4.
- 撤销值属性，如第6.3.4节所定义。
If attributes certificates are used, then the following attributes may be present:
如果使用属性证书，则可能存在以下属性：
- attribute-certificate-references attribute, defined in Section 6.2.3;
- 属性证书引用第6.2.3节中定义的属性；
- attribute-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.4.
- 属性撤销引用第6.2.4节中定义的属性。
Plus one of the following attributes is required:
此外，还需要以下属性之一：
- CAdES-C-Timestamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.5;
- 第6.3.5节中定义的CAdES-C-时间戳属性；
- time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.6.
- 时间戳证书crls引用属性，如第6.3.6节所定义。
Other unsigned attributes may be present, but are not required.
可能存在其他未签名属性，但不是必需的。
+---------------------- CAdES-X-Type 1 or 2 ------------------------+
| +--------------+|
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C --+|+------------+||
|| +----------+ ||| Timestamp |||
||+-- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES -------+|Timestamp | ||| over |||
||| ||over | ||| CAdES-C |||
|||+---------++----------++---------+||digital | | +------------+ |
|||| || || |||signature | || or ||
||||Signer's || Signed || Digital ||| | ||+------------+||
||||Document ||Attributes||Signature|||Optional | ||| Timestamp |||
|||| || || |||when | ||| only over |||
|||+---------++----------++---------+||timemarked| ||| complete |||
||+----------------------------------++----------+ ||| certificate|||
|| ||| and |||
|| +-----------+||| revocation |||
|| |Complete |||| references |||
|| |certificate|||+------------+||
|| |and ||+--------------+|
|| |revocation || +------------+ |
|| |references || |Complete | |
|| +-----------+| |certificate | |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ | and | |
| |revocation | |
| | values | |
| +------------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------------------- CAdES-X-Type 1 or 2 ------------------------+
| +--------------+|
|+-------------------------------------- CAdES-C --+|+------------+||
|| +----------+ ||| Timestamp |||
||+-- CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES -------+|Timestamp | ||| over |||
||| ||over | ||| CAdES-C |||
|||+---------++----------++---------+||digital | | +------------+ |
|||| || || |||signature | || or ||
||||Signer's || Signed || Digital ||| | ||+------------+||
||||Document ||Attributes||Signature|||Optional | ||| Timestamp |||
|||| || || |||when | ||| only over |||
|||+---------++----------++---------+||timemarked| ||| complete |||
||+----------------------------------++----------+ ||| certificate|||
|| ||| and |||
|| +-----------+||| revocation |||
|| |Complete |||| references |||
|| |certificate|||+------------+||
|| |and ||+--------------+|
|| |revocation || +------------+ |
|| |references || |Complete | |
|| +-----------+| |certificate | |
|+-------------------------------------------------+ | and | |
| |revocation | |
| | values | |
| +------------+ |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure B.4: Illustration of CAdES-X Long Type 1 and CAdES-X Long Type 2
图B.4:CAdES-X长型1和CAdES-X长型2的图示
Each instance of the time-stamp attribute may include, as unsigned attributes in the signedData of the time-stamp, the following attributes related to the TSU:
时间戳属性的每个实例可以包括与TSU相关的以下属性，作为时间戳的signedData中的未签名属性：
- complete-certificate-references attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 根据第6.2.1节的定义，完整的TSU证书参考属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 根据第6.2.2节的定义，完整撤销TSU的引用属性；
- certificate-values attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.3.3;
- 第6.3.3节定义的TSU的证书值属性；
- revocation-values attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.3.4.
- 第6.3.4节中定义的TSU撤销值属性。
Other unsigned attributes may be present, but are not required.
可能存在其他未签名属性，但不是必需的。
Before the algorithms, keys, and other cryptographic data used at the time the CAdES-C was built become weak and the cryptographic functions become vulnerable, or the certificates supporting previous time-stamps expire, the signed data, the CAdES-C, and any additional information (i.e., any CAdES-X) should be time-stamped. If possible, this should use stronger algorithms (or longer key lengths) than in the original time-stamp. This additional data and time-stamp is called Archive validation data required for the ES Archive format (CAdES-A). The Time-stamping process may be repeated every time the protection used to time-stamp a previous CAdES-A becomes weak. A CAdES-A may thus bear multiple embedded time-stamps.
在构建CAdES-C时使用的算法、密钥和其他加密数据变弱，加密功能变得脆弱，或者支持以前时间戳的证书过期之前，签名数据、CAdES-C和任何附加信息（即任何CAdES-X）都应该有时间戳。如果可能，这应该使用比原始时间戳更强的算法（或更长的密钥长度）。此附加数据和时间戳称为ES归档格式（CAdES-A）所需的归档验证数据。每次用于对以前的CADE-a进行时间戳的保护变弱时，可重复时间戳过程。因此，CAdES-A可能具有多个嵌入的时间戳。
An example of an electronic signature (ES), with the additional validation data for the CAdES-C and CAdES-X forming the CAdES-A is illustrated in Figure B.5.
图B.5中说明了电子签名的示例，以及构成CAdES-A的CAdES-C和CAdES-X的附加验证数据。
+--------------------------- CAdES-A---------------------------------+
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
|| +--------------+| +----------+ |
||+--------------------- CAdES-C ----+|+------------+|| | | |
||| +----------+ ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||+-- CAdES-BES ------+|Timestamp | ||| over ||| | | |
|||| or CAdES-EPES ||over | ||| CAdES-C ||| | Archive | |
|||| ||digital | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||signature | || or || |Timestamp | |
|||| || | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||optional | ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||| ||when | ||| only over ||| | | |
|||| ||timemarked| ||| complete ||| | | |
|||+-------------------++----------+ ||| certificate||| +----------+ |
||| ||| and ||| |
||| +-------------+||| revocation ||| |
||| | Complete |||| references ||| |
||| | certificate |||+------------+|| |
||| | and ||+--------------+| |
||| | revocation || +------------+ | |
||| | references || |Complete | | |
||| +-------------+| |certificate | | |
||+----------------------------------+ | and | | |
|| |revocation | | |
|| | values | | |
|| +------------+ | |
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
+--------------------------- CAdES-A---------------------------------+
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
|| +--------------+| +----------+ |
||+--------------------- CAdES-C ----+|+------------+|| | | |
||| +----------+ ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||+-- CAdES-BES ------+|Timestamp | ||| over ||| | | |
|||| or CAdES-EPES ||over | ||| CAdES-C ||| | Archive | |
|||| ||digital | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||signature | || or || |Timestamp | |
|||| || | ||+------------+|| | | |
|||| ||optional | ||| Timestamp ||| | | |
|||| ||when | ||| only over ||| | | |
|||| ||timemarked| ||| complete ||| | | |
|||+-------------------++----------+ ||| certificate||| +----------+ |
||| ||| and ||| |
||| +-------------+||| revocation ||| |
||| | Complete |||| references ||| |
||| | certificate |||+------------+|| |
||| | and ||+--------------+| |
||| | revocation || +------------+ | |
||| | references || |Complete | | |
||| +-------------+| |certificate | | |
||+----------------------------------+ | and | | |
|| |revocation | | |
|| | values | | |
|| +------------+ | |
|+----------------------------------------------------+ |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Figure B.5: Illustration of CAdES-A
图B.5:CAdES-A图解
The CAdES-A comprises the following elements:
CAdES-A由以下要素组成：
- the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES, including their signed and unsigned attributes;
- CADE BES或CADE EPE，包括其有符号和无符号属性；
- complete-certificate-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 第6.2.1节中定义的完整证书引用属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.2.
- 按照第6.2.2节的定义，完成撤销引用属性。
The following attributes are required if a TSP is not providing a time-mark of the ES:
如果TSP未提供ES的时间标记，则需要以下属性：
- signature-time-stamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.1.1.
- 第6.1.1节中定义的签名时间戳属性。
If attributes certificates are used, then the following attributes may be present:
如果使用属性证书，则可能存在以下属性：
- attribute-certificate-references attribute, defined in Section 6.2.3;
- 属性证书引用第6.2.3节中定义的属性；
- attribute-revocation-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.2.4.
- 属性撤销引用第6.2.4节中定义的属性。
The following attributes are required if the full certificate values and revocation values are not already included in the CAdES-BES or CAdES-EPES:
如果CAdES BES或CAdES EPES中尚未包含完整证书值和吊销值，则需要以下属性：
- certificate-values attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.3;
- 第6.3.3节中定义的证书值属性；
- revocation-values attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.4.
- 撤销值属性，如第6.3.4节所定义。
At least one of the following two attributes is required:
至少需要以下两个属性中的一个：
- CAdES-C-Timestamp attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.5;
- 第6.3.5节中定义的CAdES-C-时间戳属性；
- time-stamped-certs-crls-references attribute, as defined in Section 6.3.6.
- 时间戳证书crls引用属性，如第6.3.6节所定义。
The following attribute is required:
以下属性是必需的：
- archive-time-stamp attributes, defined in Section 6.4.1.
- 第6.4.1节中定义的存档时间戳属性。
Several instances of the archive-time-stamp attribute may occur with an electronic signature, both over time and from different TSUs. The time-stamp should be created using stronger algorithms (or longer key lengths) than in the original electronic signatures or time-stamps.
存档时间戳属性的多个实例可能与电子签名一起出现，包括随时间的推移和来自不同TSU的电子签名。应使用比原始电子签名或时间戳更强的算法（或更长的密钥长度）创建时间戳。
Other unsigned attributes of the ES may be present, but are not required.
ES的其他无符号属性可能存在，但不是必需的。
The archive-time-stamp will itself contain the certificate and revocation information required to validate the archive-time-stamp; this may include the following unsigned attributes:
存档时间戳本身将包含验证存档时间戳所需的证书和撤销信息；这可能包括以下未签名属性：
- complete-certificate-references attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.2.1;
- 根据第6.2.1节的定义，完整的TSU证书参考属性；
- complete-revocation-references attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.2.2;
- 根据第6.2.2节的定义，完整撤销TSU的引用属性；
- certificate-values attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.3.3;
- 第6.3.3节定义的TSU的证书值属性；
- revocation-values attribute of the TSU, as defined in Section 6.3.4.
- 第6.3.4节中定义的TSU撤销值属性。
Other unsigned attributes may be present, but are not required.
可能存在其他未签名属性，但不是必需的。
As described earlier, the signer or initial verifier may collect all the additional data that forms the electronic signature. Figure B.6 and the subsequent description describe how the validation process may build up a complete electronic signature over time.
如前所述，签名者或初始验证者可收集形成电子签名的所有附加数据。图B.6和随后的描述描述了验证过程如何随着时间的推移建立完整的电子签名。
+------------------------------------------ CAdES-C -------------+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-T ------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+| +-----------+ |
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp|| |Complete | |
|||||Sign.Pol| ||Digital |||over || |certificate| |
||||| Id. | Signed ||signature|||digital || | and | |
||||| option.|attributes|| |||signature|| |revocation | |
|||||________| |+---------+|+---------+| |references | |
|||+--------------------+ | ^ | +-----------+ |
||+---------------------------------+ | | ^ |
|| 1 | / | | |
|+---------------------- | ------------/--------+ | |
+----------------------- | ---------- / --------------- / -------+
| /2 ----3--------
+----------+ | / /
| | v / |
| Signer's | +---------------------+ +-------------+
| document |----->| Validation Process |---->|- Valid |
| | +---------------------+ 4 |- Invalid |
+----------+ | ^ | ^ |- Validation |
v | v | | Incomplete |
+---------+ +--------+ +-------------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
+------------------------------------------ CAdES-C -------------+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-T ------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+| +-----------+ |
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp|| |Complete | |
|||||Sign.Pol| ||Digital |||over || |certificate| |
||||| Id. | Signed ||signature|||digital || | and | |
||||| option.|attributes|| |||signature|| |revocation | |
|||||________| |+---------+|+---------+| |references | |
|||+--------------------+ | ^ | +-----------+ |
||+---------------------------------+ | | ^ |
|| 1 | / | | |
|+---------------------- | ------------/--------+ | |
+----------------------- | ---------- / --------------- / -------+
| /2 ----3--------
+----------+ | / /
| | v / |
| Signer's | +---------------------+ +-------------+
| document |----->| Validation Process |---->|- Valid |
| | +---------------------+ 4 |- Invalid |
+----------+ | ^ | ^ |- Validation |
v | v | | Incomplete |
+---------+ +--------+ +-------------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
Figure B.6: Illustration of a CAdES validation sequence
图B.6:CAdES验证序列图
Soon after receiving the electronic signature (CAdES) from the signer (1), the digital signature value may be checked; the validation process shall at least add a time-stamp (2), unless the signer has provided one which is trusted by the verifier. The validation process may also validate the electronic signature using additional data (e.g., certificates, CRL, etc.) provided by Trusted Service
在接收到来自签名者（1）的电子签名（CAdES）后不久，可以检查数字签名值；验证过程应至少添加一个时间戳（2），除非签字人提供了一个受验证人信任的时间戳。验证过程还可以使用可信服务提供的附加数据（例如证书、CRL等）验证电子签名
Providers. When applicable, the validation process will also need to conform to the requirements specified in a signature policy. If the validation process is validation incomplete, then the output from this stage is the CAdES-T.
提供者。适用时，验证过程还需要符合签名政策中规定的要求。如果验证过程未完成，则此阶段的输出为CAdES-T。
To ascertain the validity status as Valid or Invalid and communicate that to the user (4), all the additional data required to validate the CAdES-C must be available (e.g., the complete certificate and revocation information).
为了确定有效性状态是否有效并将其告知用户（4），必须提供验证CAdES-C所需的所有附加数据（例如，完整的证书和撤销信息）。
Once the data needed to complete validation data references (CAdES-C) is available, then the validation process should:
一旦完成验证数据参考（CAdES-C）所需的数据可用，则验证过程应：
- obtain all the necessary additional certificates and revocation status information;
- 获取所有必要的附加证书和撤销状态信息；
- complete all the validation checks on the ES using the complete certificate and revocation information (if a time-stamp is not already present, this may be added at the same stage, combining the CAdES-T and CAdES-C processes);
- 使用完整的证书和撤销信息完成ES上的所有验证检查（如果时间戳不存在，可在同一阶段添加，结合CAdES-T和CAdES-C流程）；
- record the complete certificate and revocation references (3);
- 记录完整的证书和撤销参考（3）；
- indicate the validity status to the user (4).
- 向用户指示有效性状态（4）。
At the same time as the validation process creates the CAdES-C, the validation process may provide and/or record the values of certificates and revocation status information used in CAdES-C (5). The end result is called CAdES-X Long.
在验证过程创建CAdES-C的同时，验证过程可提供和/或记录CAdES-C（5）中使用的证书值和撤销状态信息。最终结果称为CAdES-X Long。
This is illustrated in Figure B.7.
如图B.7所示。
+----------------------------------------------------- CAdES-X Long -+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-C -------------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+ |+-----------+|
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp| ||Complete ||
|||||Sign.Pol| ||Digital |||over | ||certificate||
||||| Id. | Signed ||signature|||digital | || and ||
||||| option.|attributes|| |||signature| ||revocation ||
|||||________| || ||+---------+ || values ||
|||+--------------------++---------+| ^ +-----------+|+-----------+|
||+---------------------------------+ | |Complete || ^ |
|| | | |certificate|| | |
|| | 2 | | and || | |
|| | | |revocation || | |
|| | | |references || | |
|| 1 | / +-----------+| | |
|+------------------------ | ------- / --------- ^-----+ / |
+------------------------- | ------ / ---------- |--------- / -------+
| / ----- / ------- /
+----------+ | / / 3 / 5
| | v | | |
| Signer's | +--------------------+ +-----------+
| document |----->| Validation Process |----->| - Valid |
| | +--------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
+----------+ | ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
+----------------------------------------------------- CAdES-X Long -+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-C -------------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+ |+-----------+|
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp| ||Complete ||
|||||Sign.Pol| ||Digital |||over | ||certificate||
||||| Id. | Signed ||signature|||digital | || and ||
||||| option.|attributes|| |||signature| ||revocation ||
|||||________| || ||+---------+ || values ||
|||+--------------------++---------+| ^ +-----------+|+-----------+|
||+---------------------------------+ | |Complete || ^ |
|| | | |certificate|| | |
|| | 2 | | and || | |
|| | | |revocation || | |
|| | | |references || | |
|| 1 | / +-----------+| | |
|+------------------------ | ------- / --------- ^-----+ / |
+------------------------- | ------ / ---------- |--------- / -------+
| / ----- / ------- /
+----------+ | / / 3 / 5
| | v | | |
| Signer's | +--------------------+ +-----------+
| document |----->| Validation Process |----->| - Valid |
| | +--------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
+----------+ | ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
Figure B.7: Illustration of a CAdES validation sequence with CAdES-X Long
图B.7:CAdES-X长的CAdES验证序列示意图
When the validation process creates the CAdES-C, it may also create extended forms of validation data.
验证过程创建CAdES-C时，还可能创建扩展形式的验证数据。
A first alternative is to time-stamp all data forming the CAdES-X Type 1.
第一种选择是对构成CAdES-X类型1的所有数据进行时间戳。
This is illustrated in Figure B.8.
如图B.8所示。
+------------------------------------------------ CAdES-X Type 1 -----+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-C ------------------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------++----------+|+-------+|
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp|| Complete ||| ||
|||||Sign.Pol| ||Digital |||over || cert. |||Time- ||
||||| Id. | Signed ||signature|||digital || and |||stamp ||
||||| option.|attributes|| |||signature|| revoc. ||| over ||
|||||________| |+---------+|+---------+|references|||CAdES-C||
|||+--------------------+ | ^ | ||| ||
||+---------------------------------+ | +----------+|+-------+|
|| | | ^ | ^ |
|| 1 | / | | | |
|+------------------------ | --------- / ----------- / -----+ | |
+------------------------- | -------- / ----------- / --------- / ----+
| 2 / ---3---- /
+----------+ | / / -----------5------
| | v | | /
| Signer's | +--------------------+ +-----------+
| document |----->| Validation Process |-----> | - Valid |
| | +--------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
+----------+ | ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
+------------------------------------------------ CAdES-X Type 1 -----+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-C ------------------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------++----------+|+-------+|
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp|| Complete ||| ||
|||||Sign.Pol| ||Digital |||over || cert. |||Time- ||
||||| Id. | Signed ||signature|||digital || and |||stamp ||
||||| option.|attributes|| |||signature|| revoc. ||| over ||
|||||________| |+---------+|+---------+|references|||CAdES-C||
|||+--------------------+ | ^ | ||| ||
||+---------------------------------+ | +----------+|+-------+|
|| | | ^ | ^ |
|| 1 | / | | | |
|+------------------------ | --------- / ----------- / -----+ | |
+------------------------- | -------- / ----------- / --------- / ----+
| 2 / ---3---- /
+----------+ | / / -----------5------
| | v | | /
| Signer's | +--------------------+ +-----------+
| document |----->| Validation Process |-----> | - Valid |
| | +--------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
+----------+ | ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
Figure B.8: Illustration of CAdES with eXtended validation data CAdES-X Type 1
图B.8：具有扩展验证数据CAdES-X类型1的CAdES图解
Another alternative is to time-stamp the certificate and revocation information references used to validate the electronic signature (but not the signature) (6). The end result is called CAdES-X Type 2.
另一种选择是对用于验证电子签名（但不是签名）的证书和撤销信息引用加盖时间戳（6）。最终结果称为CAdES-X类型2。
This is illustrated in Figure B.9.
如图B.9所示。
+-------------------------------------------- CAdES-X Type 2 --------+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-C -------------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+ |+-----------+|
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp| ||Timestamp ||
|||||Sign.Pol| || |||over | || over ||
||||| Id. | Signed ||Digital |||digital | ||complete ||
||||| option.|attributes||signature|||signature| ||certificate||
|||||________| || ||| | || ||
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+ || and ||
||+---------------------------------+ ^ +-----------+||revocation ||
|| | | |Complete |||references ||
|| | | |certificate||+-----------+|
|| | | | and || ^ |
|| 1 | 2 | |revocation || | |
|| | | |references || | |
|| | | +-----------+| | |
|+------------------------ | --------- | --- ^ --------+ | |
| | | 3 | / |
| | | / ---------- |
| | / / / 6 |
| | / / / |
| | / / / |
+------------------------- | ----- | -- | -- / ----------------------+
| | | |
v | | |
+--------------------+ +-----------+
| Validation Process |----->| - Valid |
+--------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
| ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
+-------------------------------------------- CAdES-X Type 2 --------+
|+------------------------------- CAdES-C -------------+ |
||+-------------- CAdES ------------+ | |
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+ |+-----------+|
|||| ________ || |||Timestamp| ||Timestamp ||
|||||Sign.Pol| || |||over | || over ||
||||| Id. | Signed ||Digital |||digital | ||complete ||
||||| option.|attributes||signature|||signature| ||certificate||
|||||________| || ||| | || ||
|||+--------------------++---------+|+---------+ || and ||
||+---------------------------------+ ^ +-----------+||revocation ||
|| | | |Complete |||references ||
|| | | |certificate||+-----------+|
|| | | | and || ^ |
|| 1 | 2 | |revocation || | |
|| | | |references || | |
|| | | +-----------+| | |
|+------------------------ | --------- | --- ^ --------+ | |
| | | 3 | / |
| | | / ---------- |
| | / / / 6 |
| | / / / |
| | / / / |
+------------------------- | ----- | -- | -- / ----------------------+
| | | |
v | | |
+--------------------+ +-----------+
| Validation Process |----->| - Valid |
+--------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
| ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
Figure B.9: Illustration of CAdES with eXtended validation data CAdES-X Type 2
图B.9：具有扩展验证数据CAdES-X类型2的CAdES图解
Before the algorithms used in any of the electronic signatures become or are likely to be compromised or rendered vulnerable in the future, it may be necessary to time-stamp the entire electronic signature, including all the values of the validation and user data as an ES with Archive validation data (CAdES-A) (7).
在任何电子签名中使用的算法在将来变得或可能受到损害或变得易受攻击之前，可能有必要对整个电子签名（包括验证和用户数据的所有值）加上时间戳，作为存档验证数据的ES（CAdES-A）（7）。
A CAdES-A is illustrated in Figure B.10.
CAdES-A如图B.10所示。
+----------------------------- CAdES-A ---------------------------+
| |
| +-- CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2 ----------+ |
| | | +------------+ |
| | | | | |
| | | | Archive | |
| | | | Time-stamp | |
| | | | | |
| | | +------------+ |
| +---------------------------------------+ ^ |
| +----------+ ^ ^ ^ ^ | |
| | | | | | | / |
| | Signers' | | | | | / |
| | Document |\ | | | | / |
| | | \ 1 2 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 7 / |
| +----------+ \ | | | | / |
| \ | | | | / |
+----------------- \ --- | - | - | - | ------ / ------------------+
\ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
v v | | | |
+-----------------------------+ +-----------+
| Validation Process |----->| - Valid |
+-----------------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
| ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
+----------------------------- CAdES-A ---------------------------+
| |
| +-- CAdES-X Long Type 1 or 2 ----------+ |
| | | +------------+ |
| | | | | |
| | | | Archive | |
| | | | Time-stamp | |
| | | | | |
| | | +------------+ |
| +---------------------------------------+ ^ |
| +----------+ ^ ^ ^ ^ | |
| | | | | | | / |
| | Signers' | | | | | / |
| | Document |\ | | | | / |
| | | \ 1 2 | 3 | 5 | 6 | 7 / |
| +----------+ \ | | | | / |
| \ | | | | / |
+----------------- \ --- | - | - | - | ------ / ------------------+
\ | | | | |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |
v v | | | |
+-----------------------------+ +-----------+
| Validation Process |----->| - Valid |
+-----------------------------+ 4 | - Invalid |
| ^ | ^ +-----------+
v | v |
+---------+ +--------+
|Signature| |Trusted |
| Policy | |Service |
| Issuer | |Provider|
+---------+ +--------+
Figure B.10: Illustration of CAdES-A
图B.10:CAdES-A的图解
The present document also defines additional optional features to:
本文件还定义了以下附加可选功能：
- indicate a commitment type being made by the signer;
- 说明签字人正在作出的承诺类型；
- indicate the claimed time when the signature was done;
- 说明签名完成的时间；
- indicate the claimed location of the signer;
- 指明签名人声称的位置；
- indicate the claimed or certified role under which a signature was created;
- 指明创建签名所依据的声明或认证角色；
- support counter signatures;
- 支持反签名；
- support multiple signatures.
- 支持多个签名。
Annex C (Informative): General Description
附件C（资料性）：一般说明
This annex explains some of the concepts and provides the rationale for normative parts of the present document.
本附件解释了一些概念，并提供了本文件规范部分的基本原理。
The specification below includes a description of why and when each component of an electronic signature is useful, with a brief description of the vulnerabilities and threats and the manner by which they are countered.
以下规范说明了电子签名的每个组成部分为什么和何时有用，并简要说明了漏洞和威胁以及应对这些漏洞和威胁的方式。
The signature policy is a set of rules for the creation and validation of an electronic signature, under which the signature can be determined to be valid. A given legal/contractual context may recognize a particular signature policy as meeting its requirements. A signature policy may be issued, for example, by a party relying on the electronic signatures and selected by the signer for use with that relying party. Alternatively, a signature policy may be established through an electronic trading association for use amongst its members. Both the signer and verifier use the same signature policy.
签名政策是一套用于创建和验证电子签名的规则，根据这些规则可以确定签名是否有效。给定的法律/合同上下文可能会认为特定的签名策略满足其要求。例如，签名策略可以由依赖电子签名的一方发布，并由签名人选择用于该依赖方。或者，可通过电子贸易协会制定签名政策，供其成员使用。签名者和验证者都使用相同的签名策略。
The signature policy may be explicitly identified or may be implied by the semantics of the data being signed and other external data, like a contract being referenced, which itself refers to a signature policy. An explicit signature policy has a globally unique reference, which is bound to an electronic signature by the signer as part of the signature calculation.
签名策略可以通过被签名的数据和其他外部数据（如被引用的合同，其本身指签名策略）的语义来明确标识或暗示。显式签名策略具有全局唯一引用，作为签名计算的一部分，该引用由签名者绑定到电子签名。
The signature policy needs to be available in human readable form so that it can be assessed to meet the requirements of the legal and contractual context in which it is being applied. To facilitate the automatic processing of an electronic signature, the parts of the signature policy, which specify the electronic rules for the creation and validation of the electronic signature, also need to be comprehensively defined and in a computer-processable form.
签名政策需要以可读的形式提供，以便能够对其进行评估，以满足适用该政策的法律和合同环境的要求。为便于电子签名的自动处理，签名政策中规定了电子签名创建和验证的电子规则的部分也需要以计算机可处理的形式进行全面定义。
The signature policy thus includes the following:
因此，签名政策包括以下内容：
- rules that apply to technical validation of a particular signature;
- 适用于特定签名的技术验证的规则；
- rules that may be implied through adoption of Certificate Policies that apply to the electronic signature (e.g., rules for ensuring the secrecy of the private signing key);
- 通过采用适用于电子签名的证书政策可能隐含的规则（例如，确保私人签名密钥保密的规则）；
- rules that relate to the environment used by the signer, e.g., the use of an agreed CAD (Card Accepting Device) used in conjunction with a smart card.
- 与签名人使用的环境相关的规则，例如，与智能卡一起使用的商定CAD（卡接受设备）的使用。
For example, the major rules required for technical validation can include:
例如，技术验证所需的主要规则包括：
- recognized root keys or "top-level certification authorities";
- 公认的根密钥或“顶级认证机构”；
- acceptable certificate policies (if any);
- 可接受的证书政策（如有）；
- necessary certificate extensions and values (if any);
- 必要的证书扩展和值（如有）；
- the need for the revocation status for each component of the certification tree;
- 需要证书树的每个组件的吊销状态；
- acceptable TSAs (if time-stamp tokens are being used);
- 可接受的TSA（如果正在使用时间戳令牌）；
- acceptable organizations for keeping the audit trails with time-marks (if time-marking is being used);
- 保留带有时间标记的审核跟踪的可接受组织（如果使用时间标记）；
- acceptable AAs (if any are being used),and;
- 可接受的原子吸收光谱（如有），以及；
- rules defining the components of the electronic signature that shall be provided by the signer with data required by the verifier when required to provide long-term proof.
- 定义电子签名组成部分的规则，在需要提供长期证据时，签名人应提供验证者所需的数据。
The information being signed may be defined as a MIME-encapsulated message that can be used to signal the format of the content in order to select the right display or application. It can be composed of formatted data, free text, or fields from an electronic form (e-form). For example, the Adobe(tm) format "pdf" or the eXtensible Mark up Language (XML) may be used. Annex D defines how the content may be structured to indicate the type of signed data using MIME.
被签名的信息可以被定义为MIME封装的消息，该消息可用于向内容的格式发送信号，以便选择正确的显示或应用程序。它可以由格式化数据、自由文本或电子表单（e-form）中的字段组成。例如，可以使用Adobe（tm）格式的“pdf”或可扩展标记语言（XML）。附录D定义了内容的结构，以使用MIME指示签名数据的类型。
When two independent parties want to evaluate an electronic signature, it is fundamental that they get the same result. This requirement can be met using comprehensive signature policies that
当两个独立的当事方想要评估一个电子签名时，最基本的是他们得到相同的结果。使用全面的签名策略可以满足这一要求
ensure consistency of signature validation. Signature policies can be identified implicitly by the data being signed, or they can be explicitly identified using the CAdES-EPES form of electronic signature; the CAdES-EPES mandates a consistent signature policy must be used by both the signer and verifier.
确保签名验证的一致性。签名策略可以通过被签名的数据隐式标识，也可以使用CAdES EPES电子签名形式显式标识；CAdES EPES要求签名者和验证者必须使用一致的签名策略。
By signing over the Signature Policy Identifier in the CAdES-EPES, the signer explicitly indicates that he or she has applied the signature policy in creating the signature.
通过在CAdES EPES中的签名策略标识符上签名，签名者明确表示他或她已在创建签名时应用了签名策略。
In order to unambiguously identify the details of an explicit signature policy that is to be used to verify a CAdES-EPES, the signature, an identifier, and hash of the "Signature policy" shall be part of the signed data. Additional information about the explicit policy (e.g., web reference to the document) may be carried as "qualifiers" to the Signature Policy Identifier.
为了明确标识用于验证CAdES EPES的明确签名策略的详细信息，“签名策略”的签名、标识符和散列应为签名数据的一部分。关于显式策略的附加信息（例如，文档的web引用）可以作为签名策略标识符的“限定符”携带。
In order to unambiguously identify the authority responsible for defining an explicit signature policy, the "Signature policy" can be signed.
为了明确地确定负责定义显式签名策略的机构，可以对“签名策略”进行签名。
The commitment type can be indicated in the electronic signature either:
承诺类型可在电子签名中指明：
- explicitly using a "commitment type indication" in the electronic signature;
- 在电子签名中明确使用“承诺类型指示”；
- implicitly or explicitly from the semantics of the signed data.
- 隐式或显式地从签名数据的语义中提取。
If the indicated commitment type is explicit using a "commitment type indication" in the electronic signature, acceptance of a verified signature implies acceptance of the semantics of that commitment type. The semantics of explicit commitment type indications may be subject to signer and verifier agreement, specified as part of the signature policy or registered for generic use across multiple policies.
如果使用电子签名中的“承诺类型指示”明确表示所指示的承诺类型，则接受经验证的签名意味着接受该承诺类型的语义。显式承诺类型指示的语义可能受签名者和验证者协议的约束，指定为签名策略的一部分，或注册用于多个策略的通用。
If a CAdES-EPES electronic signature format is used and the electronic signature includes a commitment type indication other than one of those recognized under the signature policy, the signature shall be treated as invalid.
如果使用CAdES EPES电子签名格式，且电子签名包含除签名政策中认可的承诺类型之外的承诺类型指示，则该签名应视为无效。
How commitment is indicated using the semantics of the data being signed is outside the scope of the present document.
如何使用被签名数据的语义表示承诺超出了本文档的范围。
NOTE: Examples of commitment indicated through the semantics of the data being signed are:
注：通过签名数据的语义表示的承诺示例如下：
- an explicit commitment made by the signer indicated by the type of data being signed over. Thus, the data structure being signed can have an explicit commitment within the context of the application (e.g., EDIFACT purchase order);
- 由签名者做出的明确承诺，由被签名的数据类型表示。因此，正在签署的数据结构可以在应用程序的上下文中具有明确的承诺（例如，EDIFACT采购订单）；
- an implicit commitment that is a commitment made by the signer because the data being signed over has specific semantics (meaning), which is only interpretable by humans, (i.e., free text).
- 一种隐式承诺，是签名者作出的承诺，因为被签名的数据具有特定的语义（含义），只有人类才能解释（即自由文本）。
In many real-life environments, users will be able to get from different CAs or even from the same CA, different certificates containing the same public key for different names. The prime advantage is that a user can use the same private key for different purposes. Multiple use of the private key is an advantage when a smart card is used to protect the private key, since the storage of a smart card is always limited. When several CAs are involved, each different certificate may contain a different identity, e.g., as a citizen of a nation or as an employee from a company. Thus, when a private key is used for various purposes, the certificate is needed to clarify the context in which the private key was used when generating the signature. Where there is the possibility that multiple private keys are used, it is necessary for the signer to indicate to the verifier the precise certificate to be used.
在许多实际环境中，用户将能够从不同的CA，甚至从同一CA，获取包含不同名称的相同公钥的不同证书。其主要优点是用户可以将同一私钥用于不同的目的。当智能卡用于保护私钥时，私钥的多次使用是一种优势，因为智能卡的存储总是有限的。当涉及多个CA时，每个不同的证书可能包含不同的身份，例如，作为一个国家的公民或公司的雇员。因此，当私钥用于各种目的时，需要证书来澄清生成签名时使用私钥的上下文。在可能使用多个私钥的情况下，签名者必须向验证者指示要使用的确切证书。
Many current schemes simply add the certificate after the signed data and thus are vulnerable to substitution attacks. If the certificate from the signer was simply appended to the signature and thus not protected by the signature, anyone could substitute one certificate for another, and the message would appear to be signed by someone else. In order to counter this kind of attack, the identifier of the signer has to be protected by the digital signature from the signer.
当前的许多方案只是在签名数据之后添加证书，因此容易受到替换攻击。如果来自签名者的证书只是附加到签名中，因此不受签名的保护，则任何人都可以用一个证书替换另一个证书，并且消息似乎是由其他人签名的。为了对抗这种攻击，签名者的标识符必须受到签名者数字签名的保护。
In order to unambiguously identify the certificate to be used for the verification of the signature, an identifier of the certificate from the signer shall be part of the signed data.
为了明确标识用于验证签名的证书，签名人提供的证书标识符应为签名数据的一部分。
While the name of the signer is important, the position of the signer within a company or an organization is of paramount importance as well. Some information (i.e., a contract) may only be valid if signed by a user in a particular role, e.g., a Sales Director. In
虽然签名人的姓名很重要，但签名人在公司或组织中的地位也至关重要。某些信息（如合同）只有在由特定角色的用户（如销售总监）签署时才有效。在里面
many cases, who the sales Director really is, is not that important, but being sure that the signer is empowered by his company to be the Sales Director is fundamental.
在许多情况下，谁是销售总监并不重要，但确保签名人被其公司授权担任销售总监是至关重要的。
The present document defines two different ways for providing this feature:
本文件定义了提供此功能的两种不同方式：
- by placing a claimed role name in the CMS signed attributes field;
- 通过在CMS签名属性字段中放置声明的角色名称；
- by placing an attribute certificate containing a certified role name in the CMS signed attributes field.
- 通过在CMS签名属性字段中放置包含认证角色名称的属性证书。
NOTE: Another possible approach would have been to use additional attributes containing the roles name(s) in the signer's identity certificate. However, it was decided not to follow this approach as it significantly complicates the management of certificates. For example, by using separate certificates for the signer's identity and roles means new identity keys need not be issued if a user's role changes.
注意：另一种可能的方法是在签名者的身份证书中使用包含角色名称的附加属性。但是，决定不采用这种方法，因为它使证书的管理大大复杂化。例如，通过对签名者的身份和角色使用单独的证书，意味着如果用户的角色发生更改，则无需颁发新的身份密钥。
The signer may be trusted to state his own role without any certificate to corroborate this claim; in which case, the claimed role can be added to the signature as a signed attribute.
可以信任签名人声明其自己的角色，而无需任何证书来证实该声明；在这种情况下，可以将声明的角色作为已签名属性添加到签名中。
Unlike public key certificates that bind an identifier to a public key, Attribute Certificates bind the identifier of a certificate to some attributes, like a role. An Attribute Certificate is NOT issued by a CA but by an Attribute Authority (AA). The Attribute Authority, in most cases, might be under the control of an organization or a company that is best placed to know which attributes are relevant for which individual. The Attribute Authority may use or point to public key certificates issued by any CA, provided that the appropriate trust may be placed in that CA. Attribute Certificates may have various periods of validity. That period may be quite short, e.g., one day. While this requires that a new Attribute Certificate be obtained every day, valid for that day, this can be advantageous since revocation of such certificates may not be needed. When signing, the signer will have to specify which Attribute Certificate it selects. In order to do so, the Attribute Certificate will have to be included in the signed data in order to be protected by the digital signature from the signer.
与将标识符绑定到公钥的公钥证书不同，属性证书将证书的标识符绑定到某些属性，如角色。属性证书不是由CA颁发的，而是由属性颁发机构（AA）颁发的。在大多数情况下，属性权限可能由一个组织或公司控制，该组织或公司最有可能知道哪些属性与哪个个人相关。属性颁发机构可以使用或指向任何CA颁发的公钥证书，前提是可以在该CA中放置适当的信任。属性证书可以具有不同的有效期。这段时间可能很短，例如一天。虽然这需要每天获得一个新的属性证书，该证书在当天有效，但这可能是有利的，因为可能不需要撤销此类证书。签名时，签名者必须指定其选择的属性证书。为此，属性证书必须包含在已签名数据中，以便受到签名者数字签名的保护。
In order to unambiguously identify the attribute certificate(s) to be used for the verification of the signature, an identifier of the attribute certificate(s) from the signer shall be part of the signed data.
为了明确标识用于验证签名的属性证书，签名人提供的属性证书标识符应为签名数据的一部分。
In some transactions, the purported location of the signer at the time he or she applies his signature may need to be indicated. For this reason, an optional location indicator shall be able to be included.
在某些交易中，可能需要指明签名人在应用其签名时的据称所在地。因此，应能够包括可选位置指示器。
In order to provide indication of the location of the signer at the time he or she applied his signature, a location attribute may be included in the signature.
为了在签名人应用其签名时提供签名人位置的指示，签名中可以包括位置属性。
The present document provides the capability to include a claimed signing time as an attribute of an electronic signature.
本文件提供了将声称的签名时间作为电子签名属性的能力。
Using this attribute, a signer may sign over a time that is the claimed signing time. When an ES with Time is created (CAdES-T), then either a trusted time-stamp is obtained and added to the ES or a trusted time-mark exists in an audit trail. When a verifier accepts a signature, the two times shall be within acceptable limits.
使用此属性，签名者可以在声明的签名时间内签名。创建带时间的ES（CAdES-T）时，将获得可信时间戳并将其添加到ES中，或者审计跟踪中存在可信时间标记。当验证者接受签名时，两次签名应在可接受的范围内。
A further optional attribute is defined in the present document to time-stamp the content and to provide proof of the existence of the content, at the time indicated by the time-stamp token.
本文档中定义了另一个可选属性，用于在时间戳令牌指示的时间对内容进行时间戳，并提供内容存在的证据。
Using this optional attribute, a trusted secure time may be obtained before the document is signed and included under the digital signature. This solution requires an online connection to a trusted time-stamping service before generating the signature and may not represent the precise signing time, since it can be obtained in advance. However, this optional attribute may be used by the signer to prove that the signed object existed before the date included in the time-stamp (see Section 5.11.4).
使用此可选属性，可以在签名文档并将其包含在数字签名下之前获得受信任的安全时间。此解决方案要求在生成签名之前在线连接到受信任的时间戳服务，并且可能不表示精确的签名时间，因为它可以提前获得。但是，签名者可以使用此可选属性来证明签名对象在时间戳中包含的日期之前存在（参见第5.11.4节）。
When presenting signed data to a human user, it may be important that there is no ambiguity as to the presentation of the signed information to the relying party. In order for the appropriate representation (text, sound, or video) to be selected by the relying party when data (as opposed to data that has been further signed or encrypted) is encapsulated in the SignedData (indicated by the
当向人类用户呈现签名数据时，向依赖方呈现签名信息时，不存在歧义可能很重要。当数据（与已进一步签名或加密的数据相反）封装在签名数据（由
eContentType within EncapsulatedContentInfo being set to id-data), further typing information should be used to identify the type of document being signed. This is generally achieved using the MIME content typing and encoding mechanism defined in RFC 2045 [6]). Further information on the use of MIME is given in Annex F.
封装的ContentInfo中的eContentType设置为id数据），应使用进一步的键入信息来标识要签名的文档的类型。这通常是通过使用RFC 2045[6]中定义的MIME内容类型和编码机制来实现的。关于MIME使用的更多信息见附件F。
The contents-hints attribute provides information on the innermost signed content of a multi-layer message where one content is encapsulated in another. This may be useful if the signed data is itself encrypted.
“内容提示”属性提供有关多层消息的最内层签名内容的信息，其中一个内容封装在另一个内容中。如果签名数据本身是加密的，这可能很有用。
When presenting a signed data is in relation to another signed data, it may be important to identify the signed data to which it relates. The content-reference and content-identifier attributes, as defined in ESS (RFC 2634 [5]), provide the ability to link a request and reply messages in an exchange between two parties.
当呈现与另一签名数据相关的签名数据时，识别与之相关的签名数据可能很重要。ESS（RFC 2634[5]）中定义的内容引用和内容标识符属性提供了在双方之间的交换中链接请求和回复消息的能力。
A verifier will have to ascertain that the certificate of the signer was valid at the time of the signature. This can be done by either:
验证者必须确定签名者的证书在签名时是有效的。这可以通过以下方式实现：
- using Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs);
- 使用证书撤销列表（CRL）；
- using responses from an online certificate status server (for example, obtained through the OCSP protocol).
- 使用来自在线证书状态服务器的响应（例如，通过OCSP协议获得）。
NOTE 1: The time of the signature may not be known, so time-stamping or time-marking may be used to provide the time indication of when it was known that the signature existed.
注1：签名的时间可能未知，因此可以使用时间戳或时间标记来提供已知签名存在的时间指示。
NOTE 2: When validating an electronic signature and checking revocation status information, if a "grace period" is required, it needs to be suitably long enough to allow the involved authority to process a "last-minute" revocation request and for the request to propagate through the revocation system. This grace period is to be added to the time included with the time-stamp token or the time-mark, and thus the revocation status information should be captured after the end of the grace period.
注2：在验证电子签名和检查撤销状态信息时，如果需要“宽限期”，则需要足够长的宽限期，以允许相关机构处理“最后一分钟”撤销请求，并使请求通过撤销系统传播。此宽限期将添加到时间戳令牌或时间标记包含的时间中，因此应在宽限期结束后捕获撤销状态信息。
When using CRLs to get revocation information, a verifier will have to make sure that he or she gets, at the time of the first verification, the appropriate certificate revocation information from the signer's CA. This should be done as soon as possible to minimize the time delay between the generation and verification of the signature. However, a "grace period" is required to allow CAs time to process revocation requests.
当使用CRL获取撤销信息时，验证者必须确保他或她在第一次验证时从签名者的CA获得适当的证书撤销信息。这应该尽快完成，以最大限度地减少签名生成和验证之间的时间延迟。然而，需要一个“宽限期”来允许CAs有时间处理撤销请求。
For example, a revocation request may arrive at a CA just before issuing the next CRL, and there may not enough time to include the revised revocation status information. This involves checking that the signer certificate serial number is not included in the CRL. Either the signer, the initial verifier, or a subsequent verifier may obtain this CRL. If obtained by the signer, then it shall be conveyed to the verifier. It may be convenient to archive the CRL for ease of subsequent verification or arbitration. Alternatively, provided the CRL is archived elsewhere, which is accessible for the purpose of arbitration, then the serial number of the CRL used may be archived together with the verified electronic signature as a CAdES-C form.
例如，吊销请求可能在发出下一个CRL之前到达CA，并且可能没有足够的时间包含修改后的吊销状态信息。这涉及检查签名者证书序列号是否不包括在CRL中。签名者、初始验证者或后续验证者均可获得该CRL。如果由签字人获得，则应将其传达给验证者。归档CRL可能很方便，以便于后续验证或仲裁。或者，如果CRL在其他地方存档（可用于仲裁），则所用CRL的序列号可与经验证的电子签名一起作为CAdES-C表格存档。
Even if the certificate serial number appears in the CRL with the status "suspended" (i.e., on hold), the signature is not to be deemed as valid since a suspended certificate is not supposed to be used even by its rightful owner.
即使证书序列号出现在CRL中，状态为“暂停”（即，保留），签名也不被视为有效，因为暂停的证书即使是其合法所有者也不应使用。
When using OCSP to get revocation information, a verifier will have to make sure that he or she gets, at the time of the first verification, an OCSP response that contains the status "valid". This should be done as soon as possible after the generation of the signature, still providing a "grace period" suitable enough to allow the involved authority to process a "last-minute" revocation request. The signer, the verifier, or any other third party may fetch this OCSP response. Since OCSP responses are transient and thus are not archived by any TSP, including CA, it is the responsibility of every verifier to make sure that it is stored in a safe place. The simplest way is to store them associated with the electronic signature. An alternative would be to store them so that they can then be easily retrieved and incorporate references to them in the electronic signature itself as a CAdES-C form.
当使用OCSP获取撤销信息时，验证者必须确保在第一次验证时，他或她获得包含状态“有效”的OCSP响应。这应在签名生成后尽快完成，但仍应提供足够合适的“宽限期”，以允许相关机构处理“最后一分钟”撤销请求。签名者、验证者或任何其他第三方可以获取此OCSP响应。由于OCSP响应是瞬态的，因此不会由任何TSP（包括CA）存档，因此每个验证者都有责任确保将其存储在安全的地方。最简单的方法是存储与电子签名相关的信息。另一种方法是将其存储起来，以便能够轻松检索，并将对其的引用作为CAdES-C表格纳入电子签名本身。
In the same way as for the case of the CRL, it may happen that the certificate is declared as invalid but with the secondary status "suspended". In such a case, the same comment as for the CRL applies.
与CRL的情况相同，可能会发生证书被声明为无效，但次要状态为“暂停”的情况。在这种情况下，适用与CRL相同的注释。
A verifier may have to ascertain that the certification path was valid, at the time of the signature, up to a trust point, according to the:
验证者可能必须根据以下条件确定认证路径在签名时有效，直至信任点：
- naming constraints; - certificate policy constraints; - signature policy, when applicable.
- 命名限制；-证书策略约束；-签名策略（如适用）。
Since the time of the signature cannot be known with certainty, an upper limit of it should be used as indicated by either the time-stamp or time-mark.
由于无法确切知道签名的时间，因此应使用时间戳或时间标记所示的签名时间上限。
In this case, it will be necessary to capture all the certificates from the certification path, starting with those from the signer and ending up with those of the self-signed certificate from one trusted root; when applicable, this may be specified as part of the Signature Policy. In addition, it will be necessary to capture the Certificate Authority Revocation Lists (CARLs) to prove that none of the CAs from the chain were revoked at the time of the signature. Again, all this material may be incorporated in the electronic signature (ES X forms). An alternative would be to store this information so that it can be easily retrieved and incorporate references to it in the electronic signature itself as a CAdES-C form.
在这种情况下，需要从证书路径捕获所有证书，从签名者的证书开始，到一个受信任根的自签名证书结束；适用时，可将其指定为签名策略的一部分。此外，还需要捕获证书颁发机构撤销列表（CARL），以证明在签名时链中没有任何CA被撤销。同样，所有这些材料可纳入电子签名（ES X表格）。另一种方法是存储这些信息，以便能够轻松检索，并将对这些信息的引用作为CAdES-C表格纳入电子签名本身。
An important property for long-standing signatures is that a signature, having been found once to be valid, shall continue to be so months or years later.
长期签名的一个重要特性是，一个签名一旦被认定为有效，应在数月或数年后继续有效。
A signer, verifier, or both may be required to provide, on request, proof that a digital signature was created or verified during the validity period of all the certificates that make up the certificate path. In this case, the signer, verifier, or both will also be required to provide proof that the signer's certificate and all the CA certificates used to form a valid certification path were not revoked when the signature was created or verified.
签名者、验证者或两者可能需要根据请求提供证据，证明在构成证书路径的所有证书的有效期内创建或验证了数字签名。在这种情况下，签名者、验证者或两者都需要提供证据，证明签名者的证书以及用于形成有效证书路径的所有CA证书在创建或验证签名时未被撤销。
It would be quite unacceptable to consider a signature as invalid even if the keys or certificates were later compromised. Thus, there is a need to be able to demonstrate that the signature keys were valid at the time that the signature was created to provide long-term evidence of the validity of a signature.
即使密钥或证书后来受到损害，认为签名无效也是不可接受的。因此，需要能够证明签名密钥在创建签名时是有效的，以提供签名有效性的长期证据。
It could be the case that a certificate was valid at the time of the signature but revoked some time later. In this event, evidence shall be provided that the document was signed before the signing key was revoked. Time-stamping by a Time-Stamping Authority (TSA) can provide such evidence. A time-stamp is obtained by sending the hash value of the given data to the TSA. The returned "time-stamp" is a signed document that contains the hash value, the identity of the TSA, and the time of stamping. This proves that the given data existed before the time of stamping. Time-stamping a digital signature (by sending a hash of the signature to the TSA) before the revocation of the signer's private key provides evidence that the signature had been created before the certificate was revoked.
可能是证书在签名时有效，但在一段时间后被吊销。在这种情况下，应提供证据，证明文件是在撤销签名密钥之前签署的。时间戳管理局（TSA）的时间戳可以提供此类证据。通过向TSA发送给定数据的散列值来获得时间戳。返回的“时间戳”是一个已签名的文档，其中包含哈希值、TSA的标识和盖章时间。这证明了给定数据在冲压时间之前存在。在撤销签名人的私钥之前，在数字签名上加盖时间戳（通过向TSA发送签名散列）可以提供证据，证明签名是在证书被撤销之前创建的。
If a recipient wants to hold a valid electronic signature, he will have to ensure that he has obtained a valid time-stamp for it before that key (and any key involved in the validation) is revoked. The sooner the time-stamp is obtained after the signing time, the better. Any time-stamp or time-mark that is taken after the expiration date of any certificate in the certification path has no value in proving the validity of a signature.
如果收件人希望持有有效的电子签名，他必须确保在撤销该密钥（以及验证中涉及的任何密钥）之前，他已经获得了有效的时间戳。在签名时间之后越早获得时间戳越好。在证书路径中的任何证书的过期日期之后使用的任何时间戳或时间标记在证明签名的有效性方面没有任何价值。
It is important to note that signatures may be generated "off-line" and time-stamped at a later time by anyone, for example, by the signer or any recipient interested in the value of the signature. The time-stamp can thus be provided by the signer, together with the signed document, or obtained by the recipient following receipt of the signed document.
重要的是要注意，签名可能由任何人“离线”生成，并在稍后时间加盖时间戳，例如，签名人或对签名价值感兴趣的任何接收人。因此，时间戳可由签字人与签字文件一起提供，或由接收人在收到签字文件后获得。
The time-stamp is NOT a component of the Basic Electronic Signature, but it is the essential component of the ES with Time.
时间戳不是基本电子签名的一个组成部分，但它是随时间变化的电子签名的基本组成部分。
It is required, in the present document, that if a signer's digital signature value is to be time-stamped, the time-stamp token is issued by a trusted source, known as a Time-Stamping Authority.
在本文件中，要求如果签名人的数字签名值要加盖时间戳，则时间戳令牌由被称为时间戳机构的可信来源颁发。
The present document requires that the signer's digital signature value be time-stamped by a trusted source before the electronic signature can become an ES with Complete validation data. Acceptable TSAs may be specified in a Signature Validation Policy.
本文件要求签名人的数字签名值由可信来源加盖时间戳，然后电子签名才能成为具有完整验证数据的电子签名。可以在签名验证策略中指定可接受的TSA。
This technique is referred to as CAdES-C in the present document.
在本文件中，该技术称为CAdES-C。
Should both the signer and verifier be required to time-stamp the signature value to meet the requirements of the signature policy, the signature policy may specify a permitted time delay between the two time-stamps.
如果签名者和验证者都需要对签名值加上时间戳以满足签名策略的要求，签名策略可以指定两个时间戳之间允许的时间延迟。
C.4.4. Time-Stamping for Long Life of Signature before CA Key Compromises
C.4.4. CA密钥泄露前签名的长寿命时间戳
Time-stamped, extended electronic signatures are needed when there is a requirement to safeguard against the possibility of a CA key in the certificate chain ever being compromised. A verifier may be required to provide, on request, proof that the certification path and the revocation information used at the time of the signature were valid, even in the case where one of the issuing keys or OCSP responder keys is later compromised.
当需要保护证书链中的CA密钥不被泄露时，需要具有时间戳的扩展电子签名。验证者可能需要根据请求提供证明，证明在签名时使用的认证路径和撤销信息是有效的，即使在颁发密钥或OCSP响应者密钥之一后来被泄露的情况下也是如此。
The present document defines two ways of using time-stamps to protect against this compromise:
本文件规定了两种使用时间戳来防止这种妥协的方法：
- time-stamp the ES with Complete validation data, when an OCSP response is used to get the status of the certificate from the signer (CAdES-X Type 1). This format is suitable to be used with an OCSP response, and it offers the additional advantage of providing an integrity protection over the whole data;
- 当OCSP响应用于从签名者（CAdES-X类型1）获取证书状态时，使用完整的验证数据对ES进行时间戳。此格式适合与OCSP响应一起使用，它提供了对整个数据提供完整性保护的额外优势；
- time-stamp only the certification path and revocation information references when a CRL is used to get the status of the certificate from the signer (CAdES-X Type2). This format is suitable to be used with CRLs, since the time-stamped information may be used for more than one signature (when signers have their certificates issued by the same CA and when signatures can be checked using the same CRLs).
- 使用CRL从签名者（CAdES-X Type2）获取证书状态时，仅对证书路径和吊销信息引用设置时间戳。此格式适用于CRL，因为时间戳信息可用于多个签名（当签名人的证书由同一CA颁发时，以及当签名可以使用相同的CRL进行检查时）。
NOTE: The signer, verifier, or both may obtain the time-stamp.
注：签名者、验证者或两者均可获得时间戳。
C.4.4.1. Time-Stamping the ES with Complete Validation Data (CAdES-X Type 1)
C.4.4.1. 使用完整验证数据在ES上加盖时间戳（CAdES-X类型1）
When an OCSP response is used, it is necessary to time-stamp in particular that response in the case the key from the responder would be compromised. Since the information contained in the OCSP response is user specific and time specific, an individual time-stamp is needed for every signature received. Instead of placing the time-stamp only over the certification path references and revocation information references, which include the OCSP response, the time-stamp is placed on the CAdES-C. Since the certification path and revocation information references are included in the ES with Complete validation data, they are also protected. For the same
当使用OCSP响应时，特别是在响应者的密钥被泄露的情况下，有必要对响应加上时间戳。由于OCSP响应中包含的信息是特定于用户和时间的，因此接收到的每个签名都需要一个单独的时间戳。与仅将时间戳放置在认证路径引用和撤销信息引用（包括OCSP响应）上不同，时间戳放置在CAdES-C上。由于认证路径和撤销信息引用包含在ES中，且具有完整的验证数据，因此它们也受到保护。同样
cryptographic price, this provides an integrity mechanism over the ES with Complete validation data. Any modification can be immediately detected. It should be noticed that other means of protecting/detecting the integrity of the ES with Complete validation data exist and could be used. Although the technique requires a time-stamp for every signature, it is well suited for individual users wishing to have an integrity-protected copy of all the validated signatures they have received.
加密价格，这为ES提供了完整性机制，并提供完整的验证数据。任何修改都可以立即检测到。应注意的是，存在并可使用其他方法保护/检测具有完整验证数据的ES的完整性。尽管该技术要求每个签名都有一个时间戳，但它非常适合希望获得其收到的所有已验证签名的完整性保护副本的个人用户。
By time-stamping the complete electronic signature, including the digital signature as well as the references to the certificates and revocation status information used to support validation of that signature, the time-stamp ensures that there is no ambiguity in the means of validating that signature.
通过对完整的电子签名（包括数字签名以及对证书的引用和用于支持签名验证的撤销状态信息）加盖时间戳，时间戳可确保在验证该签名的方法上没有歧义。
This technique is referred to as CAdES-X Type 1 in the present document.
在本文件中，该技术称为CAdES-X 1型。
NOTE: Trust is achieved in the references by including a hash of the data being referenced.
注意：引用中的信任是通过包含被引用数据的散列来实现的。
If it is desired for any reason to keep a copy of the additional data being referenced, the additional data may be attached to the electronic signature, in which case the electronic signature becomes a CAdES-X Long Type 1, as defined by the present document.
如果出于任何原因需要保留所引用的附加数据的副本，可将附加数据附在电子签名上，在这种情况下，电子签名成为本文件定义的CAdES-X长型1。
A CAdES-X Long Type 1 is simply the concatenation of a CAdES-X Type 1, with a copy of the additional data being referenced.
CAdES-X长类型1只是CAdES-X类型1的串联，并引用附加数据的副本。
C.4.4.2. Time-Stamping Certificates and Revocation Information References (CAdES-X Type 2)
C.4.4.2. 时间戳证书和撤销信息参考（CAdES-X类型2）
Time-stamping each ES with Complete validation data, as defined above, may not be efficient, particularly when the same set of CA certificates and CRL information is used to validate many signatures.
如上所述，使用完整的验证数据为每个ES打上时间戳可能是无效的，特别是当使用同一组CA证书和CRL信息验证多个签名时。
Time-stamping CA certificates will stop any attacker from issuing bogus CA certificates that could be claimed to exist before the CA key was compromised. Any bogus time-stamped CA certificates will show that the certificate was created after the legitimate CA key was compromised. In the same way, time-stamping CA CRLs will stop any attacker from issuing bogus CA CRLs that could be claimed to exist before the CA key was compromised.
时间戳CA证书将阻止任何攻击者颁发伪造的CA证书，这些证书可能在CA密钥泄露之前就已存在。任何伪造的带有时间戳的CA证书都将显示该证书是在合法CA密钥被泄露后创建的。以同样的方式，时间戳CA CRL将阻止任何攻击者发出伪造的CA CRL，这些CA CRL可能在CA密钥泄露之前就已存在。
Time-stamping of commonly used certificates and CRLs can be done centrally, e.g., inside a company or by a service provider. This method reduces the amount of data the verifier has to time-stamp; for example, it could be reduced to just one time-stamp per day (i.e., in
常用证书和CRL的时间戳可以集中完成，例如在公司内部或由服务提供商完成。这种方法减少了验证器需要时间戳的数据量；例如，它可以减少到每天只有一个时间戳（即
the case where all the signers use the same CA, and the CRL applies for the whole day). The information that needs to be time-stamped is not the actual certificates and CRLs, but the unambiguous references to those certificates and CRLs.
所有签名者使用相同CA，且CRL适用于全天的情况）。需要加盖时间戳的信息不是实际的证书和CRL，而是对这些证书和CRL的明确引用。
This technique is referred to as CAdES-X Type 2 in the present document and requires the following:
在本文件中，该技术被称为CAdES-X 2型，要求：
- all the CA certificates references and revocation information references (i.e., CRLs) used in validating the CAdES-C are covered by one or more time-stamps.
- 用于验证CAdES-C的所有CA证书引用和撤销信息引用（即CRL）都包含在一个或多个时间戳中。
Thus, a CAdES-C with a time-stamp signature value at time T1 can be proved valid if all the CA and CRL references are time-stamped at time T1+.
因此，如果所有CA和CRL参考都在时间T1+上有时间戳，则在时间T1上具有时间戳签名值的CAdES-C可以被证明是有效的。
Advances in computing increase the probability of being able to break algorithms and compromise keys. There is therefore a requirement to be able to protect electronic signatures against this possibility.
计算技术的进步增加了破解算法和破解密钥的可能性。因此，要求能够保护电子签名不受这种可能性的影响。
Over a period of time, weaknesses may occur in the cryptographic algorithms used to create an electronic signature (e.g., due to the time available for cryptoanalysis, or improvements in cryptoanalytical techniques). Before such weaknesses become likely, a verifier should take extra measures to maintain the validity of the electronic signature. Several techniques could be used to achieve this goal, depending on the nature of the weakened cryptography. In order to simplify matters, a single technique called Archive validation data, covering all the cases, is being used in the present document.
在一段时间内，用于创建电子签名的加密算法可能会出现弱点（例如，由于可用于密码分析的时间或密码分析技术的改进）。在可能出现这种弱点之前，验证者应当采取额外措施来维持电子签名的有效性。根据加密技术的性质，可以使用几种技术来实现这一目标。为了简化问题，本文件使用了一种称为归档验证数据的单一技术，涵盖所有案例。
Archive validation data consists of the validation data and the complete certificate and revocation data, time-stamped together with the electronic signature. The Archive validation data is necessary if the hash function and the crypto algorithms that were used to create the signature are no longer secure. Also, if it cannot be assumed that the hash function used by the Time-Stamping Authority is secure, then nested time-stamps of the Archived Electronic Signature are required.
存档验证数据包括验证数据、完整的证书和撤销数据，并随电子签名一起加盖时间戳。如果用于创建签名的哈希函数和加密算法不再安全，则需要归档验证数据。此外，如果不能假定时间戳管理机构使用的哈希函数是安全的，则需要存档电子签名的嵌套时间戳。
The potential for a Trusted Service Provider (TSP) key compromise should be significantly lower than user keys because TSP(s) are expected to use stronger cryptography and better key protection. It can be expected that new algorithms (or old ones with greater key lengths) will be used. In such a case, a sequence of time-stamps will protect against forgery. Each time-stamp needs to be affixed
可信服务提供商（TSP）密钥泄露的可能性应大大低于用户密钥，因为TSP预计将使用更强的加密和更好的密钥保护。可以预期将使用新算法（或密钥长度更大的旧算法）。在这种情况下，一系列时间戳可以防止伪造。每个时间戳都需要贴上
before either the compromise of the signing key or the cracking of the algorithms used by the TSA. TSAs (Time-Stamping Authorities) should have long keys (e.g., which at the time of drafting the present document was at least 2048 bits for the signing RSA algorithm) and/or a "good" or different algorithm.
在签名密钥泄露或TSA使用的算法被破解之前。TSA（时间戳授权）应具有长密钥（例如，在起草本文件时，签名RSA算法的密钥至少为2048位）和/或“良好”或不同的算法。
Nested time-stamps will also protect the verifier against key compromise or cracking the algorithm on the old electronic signatures.
嵌套的时间戳还将保护验证器，防止密钥泄露或破解旧电子签名上的算法。
The process will need to be performed and iterated before the cryptographic algorithms used for generating the previous time-stamp are no longer secure. Archive validation data may thus bear multiple embedded time-stamps.
在用于生成前一时间戳的加密算法不再安全之前，需要执行并迭代该过程。因此，归档验证数据可能带有多个嵌入的时间戳。
This technique is referred to as CAdES-A in the present document.
在本文件中，这种技术称为CAdES-A。
Using CAdES-X Type 1 or CAdES-X Type 2 extended validation data, verifiers still need to keep track of all the components that were used to validate the signature, in order to be able to retrieve them again later on. These components may be archived by an external source, like a Trusted Service Provider; in which case, referenced information that is provided as part of the ES with Complete validation data (CAdES-C) is adequate. The actual certificates and CRL information reference in the CAdES-C can be gathered when needed for arbitration.
使用CAdES-X类型1或CAdES-X类型2扩展验证数据，验证者仍然需要跟踪用于验证签名的所有组件，以便以后能够再次检索它们。这些组件可以由外部源（如可信服务提供商）存档；在这种情况下，作为ES的一部分提供的参考信息以及完整的验证数据（CAdES-C）就足够了。当需要仲裁时，可以收集CAdES-C中的实际证书和CRL信息参考。
If references to additional data are not adequate, then the actual values of all the certificates and revocation information required may be part of the electronic signature. This technique is referred to as CAdES-X Long Type 1 or CAdES-X Long Type 2 in the present document.
如果对附加数据的引用不充分，则所需的所有证书和撤销信息的实际值可能是电子签名的一部分。该技术在本文件中称为CAdES-X长型1或CAdES-X长型2。
In some business scenarios, both the signer and the verifier need to time-stamp their own copy of the signature value. Ideally, the two time-stamps should be as close as possible to each other.
在某些业务场景中，签名者和验证者都需要在自己的签名值副本上加盖时间戳。理想情况下，这两个时间戳应该尽可能彼此靠近。
EXAMPLE: A contract is signed by two parties, A and B, representing their respective organizations; to time-stamp the signer and verifier data, two approaches are possible:
示例：合同由代表各自组织的双方A和B签署；为了给签名者和验证者数据加上时间戳，可以采用两种方法：
- under the terms of the contract, a predefined common "trusted" TSA may be used;
- 根据合同条款，可使用预定义的通用“受信任”TSA；
- if both organizations run their own time-stamping services, A and B can have the transaction time-stamped by these two time-stamping services.
- 如果两个组织都运行自己的时间戳服务，则A和B可以使用这两个时间戳服务来标记事务时间。
In the latter case, the electronic signature will only be considered valid if both time-stamps were obtained in due time (i.e., there should not be a long delay between obtaining the two time-stamps). Thus, neither A nor B can repudiate the signing time indicated by their own time-stamping service. Therefore, A and B do not need to agree on a common "trusted" TSA to get a valid transaction.
在后一种情况下，只有在适当的时间内获得了两个时间戳，电子签名才会被视为有效（即，在获得两个时间戳之间不应有长时间的延迟）。因此，A和B都不能拒绝他们自己的时间戳服务指示的签名时间。因此，A和B无需就共同的“受信任”TSA达成一致，即可获得有效的交易。
It is important to note that signatures may be generated "off-line" and time-stamped at a later time by anyone, e.g., by the signer or any recipient interested in validating the signature. The time-stamp over the signature from the signer can thus be provided by the signer, together with the signed document, and/or be obtained by the verifier following receipt of the signed document.
需要注意的是，签名可能由任何人“离线”生成，并在稍后时间加盖时间戳，例如签名人或任何有兴趣验证签名的接收人。因此，签名人签名上的时间戳可与签名文件一起由签名人提供，和/或由验证者在收到签名文件后获得。
The business scenarios may thus dictate that one or more of the long-term signature time-stamping methods described above be used. This may be part of a mutually agreed Signature Validation Policy that is part of an agreed signature policy under which digital signatures may be used to support the business relationship between the two parties.
因此，业务场景可以规定使用上述一个或多个长期签名时间戳方法。这可能是双方同意的签名验证政策的一部分，该政策是双方同意的签名政策的一部分，根据该政策，数字签名可用于支持双方之间的业务关系。
TSA servers should be built in such a way that once the private signature key is installed, there is minimal likelihood of compromise over as long as a possible period. Thus, the validity period for the TSA's keys should be as long as possible.
TSA服务器的构建方式应确保，一旦安装了私有签名密钥，在尽可能长的时间内，泄露的可能性最小。因此，TSA钥匙的有效期应尽可能长。
Both the CAdES-T and the CAdES-C contain at least one time-stamp over the signer's signature. In order to protect against the compromise of the private signature key used to produce that time-stamp, the Archive validation data can be used when a different Time-Stamping Authority key is involved to produce the additional time-stamp. If it is believed that the TSA key used in providing an earlier time-stamp may ever be compromised (e.g., outside its validity period), then the CAdES-A should be used. For extremely long periods, this may be applied repeatedly using new TSA keys.
CAdES-T和CAdES-C在签名人的签名上至少有一个时间戳。为了防止用于生成该时间戳的私有签名密钥受损，当涉及不同的时间戳授权密钥以生成附加时间戳时，可以使用归档验证数据。如果认为用于提供早期时间戳的TSA密钥可能会被泄露（例如，超出其有效期），则应使用CAdES-A。在极长的时间内，可以使用新的TSA密钥重复应用此功能。
This technique is referred to as a nested CAdES-A in the present document.
该技术在本文件中称为嵌套CAdES-a。
Some electronic signatures may only be valid if they bear more than one signature. This is generally the case when a contract is signed between two parties. The ordering of the signatures may or may not be important, i.e., one may or may not need to be applied before the other.
有些电子签名只有在带有多个签名时才有效。当双方签订合同时，通常情况就是这样。签名的顺序可能重要，也可能不重要，即，一个签名可能需要或不需要在另一个签名之前应用。
Several forms of multiple and counter signatures need to be supported, which fall into two basic categories:
需要支持多种形式的多重签名和反签名，它们分为两个基本类别：
- independent signatures; - embedded signatures.
- 独立签名；-嵌入的签名。
Independent signatures are parallel signatures where the ordering of the signatures is not important. The capability to have more than one independent signature over the same data shall be provided.
独立签名是并行签名，其中签名的顺序并不重要。应提供在相同数据上具有多个独立签名的能力。
Embedded signatures are applied one after the other and are used where the order in which the signatures are applied is important. The capability to sign over signed data shall be provided.
嵌入的签名一个接一个地应用，并在签名应用顺序很重要的情况下使用。应提供签署数据的能力。
These forms are described in Section 5.13. All other multiple signature schemes, e.g., a signed document with a countersignature, double countersignatures, or multiple signatures can be reduced to one or more occurrences of the above two cases.
第5.13节描述了这些表格。所有其他多重签名方案，例如带有会签、双重会签或多重签名的已签名文档，可以减少为上述两种情况的一次或多次出现。
Annex D (Informative): Data Protocols to Interoperate with TSPs
附录D（资料性附录）：与TSP互操作的数据协议
The following protocols can be used by signers and verifiers to interoperate with Trusted Service Providers during the electronic signature creation and validation.
签名者和验证者可以使用以下协议在电子签名创建和验证期间与可信服务提供商进行互操作。
User certificates, CA certificates, and cross-certificates can be retrieved from a repository using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol as defined in RFC 3494 [RFC3494], with the schema defined in RFC 4523 [RFC4523].
用户证书、CA证书和交叉证书可以使用RFC 3494[RFC3494]中定义的轻型目录访问协议，以及RFC 4523[RFC4523]中定义的模式，从存储库中检索。
Certificate revocation lists, including authority revocation lists and partial CRL variants, can be retrieved from a repository using the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, as defined in RFC 3494 [RFC3494], with the schema defined in RFC 4523 [RFC4523].
证书撤销列表，包括授权撤销列表和部分CRL变体，可以使用轻量目录访问协议（如RFC 3494[RFC3494]中所定义）从存储库中检索，模式在RFC 4523[RFC4523]中定义。
As an alternative to the use of certificate revocation lists, the status of a certificate can be checked using the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP), as defined in RFC 2560 [3].
作为使用证书撤销列表的替代方法，可以使用RFC 2560[3]中定义的在线证书状态协议（OCSP）检查证书的状态。
The time-stamping service can be accessed using the Time-Stamping Protocol defined in RFC 3161 [7].
可以使用RFC 3161[7]中定义的时间戳协议访问时间戳服务。
Signers and verifiers can use the following management protocols to manage the use of certificates.
签名者和验证者可以使用以下管理协议来管理证书的使用。
Request for a certificate to be revoked can be made using the revocation request and response messages defined in RFC 4210 [RFC4210].
可以使用RFC 4210[RFC4210]中定义的撤销请求和响应消息来请求撤销证书。
Annex E (Informative): Security Considerations
附件E（资料性）：安全考虑
The security of the electronic signature mechanism defined in the present document depends on the privacy of the signer's private key.
本文件中定义的电子签名机制的安全性取决于签名人私钥的隐私。
Implementations should take steps to ensure that private keys cannot be compromised.
实现应该采取措施确保私钥不会被泄露。
Implementers should be aware that cryptographic algorithms become weaker with time. As new cryptoanalysis techniques are developed and computing performance improves, the work factor to break a particular cryptographic algorithm will reduce. Therefore, cryptographic algorithm implementations should be modular, allowing new algorithms to be readily inserted. That is, implementers should be prepared for the set of mandatory-to-implement algorithms to change over time.
实现者应该意识到加密算法会随着时间的推移变得越来越弱。随着新密码分析技术的发展和计算性能的提高，破坏特定密码算法的工作因素将减少。因此，加密算法的实现应该是模块化的，允许随时插入新算法。也就是说，实现者应该准备好一组强制算法，以实现随时间变化的算法。
Annex F (Informative): Example Structured Contents and MIME
附录F（资料性）：结构化内容和MIME示例
The signed content may be structured using MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions -- RFC 2045 [6]). Whilst the MIME structure was initially developed for Internet email, it has a number of features that make it useful to provide a common structure for encoding a range of electronic documents and other multi-media data (e.g., photographs, video). These features include:
签名内容可以使用MIME（多用途互联网邮件扩展——RFC 2045[6]）进行结构化。虽然MIME结构最初是为Internet电子邮件开发的，但它具有许多功能，可以为一系列电子文档和其他多媒体数据（如照片、视频）提供通用的编码结构。这些特点包括：
- providing a means of signalling the type of "object" being carried (e.g., text, image, ZIP file, application data);
- 提供发送所携带“对象”类型信号的方式（例如，文本、图像、ZIP文件、应用程序数据）；
- providing a means of associating a file name with an object;
- 提供将文件名与对象关联的方法；
- associating several independent objects (e.g., a document and image) to form a multi-part object;
- 将多个独立对象（例如，文档和图像）关联以形成多部分对象；
- handling data encoded in text or binary and, if necessary, re-encoding the binary as text.
- 处理以文本或二进制编码的数据，如有必要，将二进制重新编码为文本。
When encoding a single object, MIME consists of:
对单个对象进行编码时，MIME包括：
- header information, followed by;
- 标题信息，后跟；
- encoded content.
- 编码内容。
This structure can be extended to support multi-part content.
此结构可以扩展以支持多部分内容。
A MIME header includes:
MIME标头包括：
MIME Version information: e.g., MIME-Version: 1.0
MIME版本信息：例如，MIME版本：1.0
Content type information, which includes information describing the content sufficient for it to be presented to a user or application process, as required. This includes information on the "media type" (e.g., text, image, audio) or whether the data is for passing to a particular type of application. In the case of text, the content type includes information on the character set used, e.g., Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii".
内容类型信息，包括描述内容的信息，这些内容足以根据需要呈现给用户或应用程序进程。这包括关于“媒体类型”（例如，文本、图像、音频）或数据是否用于传递到特定类型的应用程序的信息。在文本的情况下，内容类型包括关于所使用的字符集的信息，例如，内容类型：text/plain；charset=“us ascii”。
Content-encoding information, which defines how the content is encoded (see below about encoding supported by MIME).
内容编码信息，它定义了内容的编码方式（请参见下文关于MIME支持的编码）。
Other information about the content, such as a description or an associated file name.
有关内容的其他信息，例如描述或关联的文件名。
An example MIME header for text object is:
文本对象的MIME头示例如下：
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
An example MIME header for a binary file containing a pdf document is:
包含pdf文档的二进制文件的MIME头示例如下：
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Description: JCFV201.pdf
Content-Disposition: filename="JCFV201.pdf"
Content-Type: application/pdf
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Description: JCFV201.pdf
Content-Disposition: filename="JCFV201.pdf"
MIME supports a range of mechanisms for encoding both text and binary data.
MIME支持一系列对文本和二进制数据进行编码的机制。
Text data can be carried transparently as lines of text data encoded in 7- or 8-bit ASCII characters. MIME also includes a "quoted-printable" encoding that converts characters other than the basic ASCII into an ASCII sequence.
文本数据可以作为以7位或8位ASCII字符编码的文本数据行透明地传输。MIME还包括一种“带引号的可打印”编码，它将基本ASCII以外的字符转换为ASCII序列。
Binary can either be carried:
二进制文件可以是：
- transparently as 8-bit octets; or
- 透明的8位八位组；或
- converted to a basic set of characters using a system called Base64.
- 使用名为Base64的系统转换为基本字符集。
NOTE: As there are some mail relays that can only handle 7-bit ASCII, Base64 encoding is usually used on the Internet.
注意：由于有些邮件中继只能处理7位ASCII，因此在Internet上通常使用Base64编码。
Several objects (e.g., text and a file attachment) can be associated together using a special "multi-part" content type. This is indicated by the content type "multipart" with an indication of the string to be used indicating a separation between each part.
可以使用特殊的“多部分”内容类型将多个对象（例如文本和文件附件）关联在一起。这由内容类型“multipart”表示，并指示要使用的字符串，以指示每个部分之间的分隔。
In addition to a header for the overall multipart content, each part includes its own header information indicating the inner content type and encoding.
除了整个多部分内容的标题外，每个部分还包括其自己的标题信息，指示内部内容类型和编码。
An example of a multipart content is:
多部分内容的一个示例是：
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----
=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="----
=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
------=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
------=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Per your request, I've attached our proposal for the Java Card Version 2.0 API and the Java Card FAQ.
根据您的要求，我附上了我们关于Java卡2.0版API和Java卡常见问题解答的建议。
------=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80
Content-Type: application/pdf; name="JCFV201.pdf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Description: JCFV201.pdf
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="JCFV201.pdf"
------=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80
Content-Type: application/pdf; name="JCFV201.pdf"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Description: JCFV201.pdf
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="JCFV201.pdf"
0M8R4KGxGuEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPgADAP7/CQAGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACAAAAAgAAAAA
AAAAAEAAAtAAAAAEAAAD+////AAAAAAMAAAAGAAAA//////////////////////////////
//////////AANhAAQAYg==
0M8R4KGxGuEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPgADAP7/CQAGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACAAAAAgAAAAA
AAAAAEAAAtAAAAAEAAAD+////AAAAAAMAAAAGAAAA//////////////////////////////
//////////AANhAAQAYg==
------=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80--
------=_NextPart_000_01BC4599.98004A80--
Multipart content can be nested. So a set of associated objects (e.g., HTML text and images) can be handled as a single attachment to another object (e.g., text).
多部分内容可以嵌套。因此，一组相关对象（例如HTML文本和图像）可以作为另一个对象（例如文本）的单个附件处理。
The Content-Type from each part of the S/MIME message indicates the type of content.
S/MIME消息每个部分的内容类型指示内容的类型。
The specific use of MIME to carry CMS (extended as defined in the present document) secured data is called S/MIME (see [RFC3851]).
MIME用于承载CMS（本文档中定义的扩展）安全数据的具体用途称为S/MIME（参见[RFC3851]）。
S/MIME carries electronic signatures as either:
S/MIME带有以下电子签名：
- an "application/pkcs7-mime" object with the CMS carried as a binary attachment (PKCS7 is the name of the early version of CMS).
- 带有CMS的“application/pkcs7 mime”对象，作为二进制附件（pkcs7是CMS早期版本的名称）。
The signed data may be included in the SignedData, which itself may be included in a single S/MIME object. See [RFC3851], Section 3.4.2: "Signing Using application/pkcs7-mime with SignedData" and Figure F.1 hereafter.
签名数据可以包含在SignedData中，SignedData本身可以包含在单个S/MIME对象中。参见[RFC3851]，第3.4.2节：“使用应用程序/pkcs7 mime和SignedData进行签名”和下文图F.1。
or
或
- a "multipart/signed" object with the signed data and the signature encoded as separate MIME objects.
- “多部分/签名”对象，其签名数据和签名编码为单独的MIME对象。
The signed data is not included in the SignedData, and the CMS structure only includes the signature. See [RFC3851], Section 3.4.3: "Signing Using the multipart/signed Format" and Figure F.2 hereafter.
签名数据中不包含签名数据，CMS结构仅包含签名。见[RFC3851]，第3.4.3节：“使用多部分/签名格式签名”和下文图F.2。
+-------------++----------++-------------++------------+
| || || || |
| S/MIME || CAdES || MIME || pdf file |
| || || || |
|Content-Type=||SignedData||Content-Type=||Dear MrSmith|
|application/ || eContent ||application/ ||Received |
|pkcs7-mime || ||pdf || 100 tins |
| || || || |
|smime-type= || /| || /| || Mr.Jones |
|signed-data || / -----+ / ------+ |
| || \ -----+ \ ------+ |
| || \| || \| |+------------+
| || |+-------------+
| |+----------+
+-------------+
+-------------++----------++-------------++------------+
| || || || |
| S/MIME || CAdES || MIME || pdf file |
| || || || |
|Content-Type=||SignedData||Content-Type=||Dear MrSmith|
|application/ || eContent ||application/ ||Received |
|pkcs7-mime || ||pdf || 100 tins |
| || || || |
|smime-type= || /| || /| || Mr.Jones |
|signed-data || / -----+ / ------+ |
| || \ -----+ \ ------+ |
| || \| || \| |+------------+
| || |+-------------+
| |+----------+
+-------------+
Figure F.1: Signing Using application/pkcs7-mime
图F.1：使用应用程序/pkcs7 mime进行签名
This approach is similar to handling signed data as any other binary file attachment.
这种方法类似于将签名数据作为任何其他二进制文件附件处理。
An example of signed data encoded using this approach is:
使用此方法编码的签名数据示例如下：
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data;
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=signed-data;
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7m
567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4f8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7 77n8HHGT9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6rfvbnj756tbBghyHhHUujhJhjH HUujhJh4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYGTrfvbnjT6jH7756tbB9H7n8HHGghyHh 6YT64V0GhIGfHfQbnj75
567GHIGHFYT6GHYHHHHHUJPFYFF4F8HGFFYT6GHYHHHHHJHFFFFFFJH776BB9Hg4VQBNJ7 77N8HgT9Hg4VQPFFYF467GHIGHFYT6RFVBNJ756BBGHHHHHHHHHHHHHJHFFFFFFJJH6JH7756TBB9H7N8HGHGHGHGHGHGHGHGHGHGHFYH6YH6YH64V0GHIGHFQBNJ75
CMS also supports an alternative structure where the signature and data being protected are separate MIME objects carried within a single message. In this case, the signed data is not included in the SignedData, and the CMS structure only includes the signature. See [RFC3851], Section 3.4.3: "Signing Using the multipart/signed Format" and Figure F.2 hereafter.
CMS还支持另一种结构，其中受保护的签名和数据是单个消息中携带的单独MIME对象。在这种情况下，签名数据不包括在SignedData中，CMS结构仅包括签名。见[RFC3851]，第3.4.3节：“使用多部分/签名格式签名”和下文图F.2。
An example of signed data encoded using this approach is:
使用此方法编码的签名数据示例如下：
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42
Content-Type: multipart/signed;
protocol="application/pkcs7-signature";
micalg=sha1; boundary=boundary42
--boundary42
Content-Type: text/plain
--boundary42
Content-Type: text/plain
This is a clear-signed message.
这是一条清晰的签名信息。
--boundary42
--边界42
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s
Content-Type: application/pkcs7-signature; name=smime.p7s
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=smime.p7s
ghyHhHUujhJhjH77n8HHGTrfvbnj756tbB9HG4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6 4VQpfyF467GhIGfHfYT6jH77n8HHGghyHhHUujhJh756tbB9HGTrfvbnj n8HHGTrfvhJhjH776tbB9HG4VQbnj7567GhIGfHfYT6ghyHhHUujpfyF4 7GhIGfHfYT64VQbnj756
Ghyhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhjhjh77n8hghtrfvbnj756tb9hg4vqpfyf467ghighfyt6 4vqpfyf467ghighfyt6jhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhjhjh756tb9hgtrffbnj n8hghtrfvhhhhhhhhhhhhhj776bb9hg4vqbnj7567ghigfyfyfyfyfyf4 7ghigff
--boundary42--
--边界42--
With this second approach, the signed data passes through the CMS process and is carried as part of a multiple-parts signed MIME structure, as illustrated in Figure F.2. The CMS structure just holds the electronic signature.
使用第二种方法，签名数据通过CMS进程，并作为多部分签名MIME结构的一部分进行传输，如图F.2所示。CMS结构只保存电子签名。
+---------------++----------++-------------++------------+
| || || || |
| MIME || CAdES || MIME || pdf file |
| || || || |
|Content-Type= ||SignedData||Content-Type=||Dear MrSmith|
|multipart/ || ||application/ ||Received |
|signed || ||pdf || 100 tins |
| /| || || || |
| / -------------------+ /| || Mr.Jones |
| \ -------------------+ / -----+ |
| \| || || \ -----+ |
|Content-Type= || || \| |+------------+
|application/ || |+-------------+
|pdf || |
| || |
|Content-Type= || |
|application/ || |
|pkcs7-signature|| |
| || |
| /| || |
| / -------+ |
| \ -------+ |
| \| ||----------+
| |
+---------------+
+---------------++----------++-------------++------------+
| || || || |
| MIME || CAdES || MIME || pdf file |
| || || || |
|Content-Type= ||SignedData||Content-Type=||Dear MrSmith|
|multipart/ || ||application/ ||Received |
|signed || ||pdf || 100 tins |
| /| || || || |
| / -------------------+ /| || Mr.Jones |
| \ -------------------+ / -----+ |
| \| || || \ -----+ |
|Content-Type= || || \| |+------------+
|application/ || |+-------------+
|pdf || |
| || |
|Content-Type= || |
|application/ || |
|pkcs7-signature|| |
| || |
| /| || |
| / -------+ |
| \ -------+ |
| \| ||----------+
| |
+---------------+
Figure F.2: Signing Using application/pkcs7-signature
图F.2：使用应用程序/pkcs7签名进行签名
This second approach (multipart/signed) has the advantage that the signed data can be decoded by any MIME-compatible system even if it does not recognize CMS-encoded electronic signatures.
第二种方法（多部分/签名）的优点是，签名数据可以由任何MIME兼容系统解码，即使它不识别CMS编码的电子签名。
Annex G (Informative): Relationship to the European Directive and EESSI
附录G（资料性附录）：与欧洲指令和EESSI的关系
This annex provides an indication of the relationship between electronic signatures created under the present document and requirements under the European Parliament and Council Directive on a Community framework for electronic signatures.
本附件说明了根据本文件创建的电子签名与欧洲议会和理事会关于共同体电子签名框架的指令要求之间的关系。
NOTE: Legal advice should be sought on the specific national legislation regarding use of electronic signatures.
注：应就有关使用电子签名的具体国家立法征求法律意见。
The present document is one of a set of standards that has been defined under the "European Electronic Signature Standardization Initiative" (EESSI) for electronic signature products and solutions compliant with the European Directive for Electronic Signatures.
本文件是“欧洲电子签名标准化倡议”（EESSI）为符合欧洲电子签名指令的电子签名产品和解决方案定义的一套标准之一。
This directive defines electronic signatures as:
本指令将电子签名定义为：
- "data in electronic form which are attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which serve as a method of authentication".
- “附属于其他电子数据或与其他电子数据有逻辑关联的电子形式的数据，并用作认证方法”。
The directive states that an electronic signature should not be denied "legal effectiveness and admissibility as evidence in legal proceedings" solely on the grounds that it is in electronic form.
该指令指出，不应仅以电子形式的电子签名为理由而否定电子签名“在法律诉讼中作为证据的法律效力和可采性”。
The directive identifies an electronic signature as having equivalence to a hand-written signature if it meets specific criteria:
该指令将满足以下特定标准的电子签名确定为等同于手写签名：
- it is an "advanced electronic signature" with the following properties:
- 它是一种“高级电子签名”，具有以下特性：
a) it is uniquely linked to the signatory;
a) 它与签字人有着独特的联系；
b) it is capable of identifying the signatory;
b) 能够识别签字人；
c) it is created using means that the signatory can maintain under his sole control; and
c) 使用签字人可在其单独控制下维持的方式创建；和
d) it is linked to the data to which it relates in such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is detectable.
d) 它与相关数据的链接方式应确保可以检测到数据的任何后续变化。
- it is based on a certificate that meets detailed criteria given in Annex I of the directive and is issued by a "certification-service-provider" that meets requirements given in Annex II of the directive. Such a certificate is referred to as a "qualified certificate";
- 它基于满足本指令附件一中给出的详细标准的证书，并由满足本指令附件二中给出的要求的“认证服务提供商”颁发。这种证书称为“合格证书”；
- it is created by a "device", for which detailed criteria are given in Annex III of the directive. Such a device is referred to a "secure-signature-creation device".
- 它由一个“装置”创建，该装置的详细标准见本指令附录III。这种设备被称为“安全签名创建设备”。
This form of electronic signature is referred to as a "qualified electronic signature" in EESSI (see below).
这种形式的电子签名在EESSI中称为“合格电子签名”（见下文）。
An electronic signature created in accordance with the present document is:
根据本文件创建的电子签名是：
a) considered to be an "electronic signature" under the terms of the Directive;
a) 被视为指令条款下的“电子签名”；
b) considered to be an "advanced electronic signature" under the terms of the Directive;
b) 被视为指令条款下的“高级电子签名”；
c) considered to be a "Qualified Electronic Signature", provided the additional requirements in Annex I, II, and III of the Directive are met. The requirements in Annex I, II, and III of the Directive are outside the scope of the present document, and are subject to standardization elsewhere.
c) 被视为“合格电子签名”，前提是满足本指令附录I、II和III中的附加要求。本指令附录I、II和III中的要求不在本文件的范围内，并在其他地方进行标准化。
EESSI looks at standards in several areas. See the ETSI and CEN web sites for the latest list of standards and their versions:
EESSI关注多个领域的标准。有关标准及其版本的最新列表，请参见ETSI和CEN网站：
- use of X.509 public key certificates as qualified certificates;
- 使用X.509公钥证书作为合格证书；
- security Management and Certificate Policy for CSPs Issuing Qualified Certificates;
- CSP颁发合格证书的安全管理和证书政策；
- security requirements for trustworthy systems used by CSPs Issuing Qualified Certificates;
- 颁发合格证书的CSP使用的可信系统的安全要求；
- security requirements for Secure Signature Creation Devices;
- 安全签名创建设备的安全要求；
- security requirements for Signature Creation Systems;
- 签名创建系统的安全要求；
- procedures for Electronic Signature Verification;
- 电子签名核查程序；
- electronic signature syntax and encoding formats;
- 电子签名语法和编码格式；
- protocol to interoperate with a Time-Stamping Authority;
- 与时间戳机构互操作的协议；
- Policy requirements for Time-Stamping Authorities; and
- 时间戳管理机构的政策要求；和
- XML electronic signature formats.
- XML电子签名格式。
Each of these standards addresses a range of requirements, including the requirements of Qualified Electronic Signatures, as specified in Article 5.1 of the Directive. However, some of them also address general requirements of electronic signatures for business and electronic commerce, which all fall into the category of Article 5.2 of the Directive. Such variation in the requirements may be identified either as different levels or different options.
这些标准中的每一个都提出了一系列要求，包括本指令第5.1条规定的合格电子签名要求。然而，其中一些还涉及商业和电子商务电子签名的一般要求，这些要求都属于该指令第5.2条的范畴。要求中的此类变化可能被确定为不同的级别或不同的选项。
Since some of these standards address a range of requirements, it may be useful to identify a set of standards to address a specific business need. Such a set of standards and their uses define a class of electronic signature. The first class already identified is the qualified electronic signature, fulfilling the requirements of Article 5.1 of the Directive.
由于其中一些标准解决了一系列的需求，因此确定一组标准来解决特定的业务需求可能是有用的。这一套标准及其使用界定了一类电子签名。已经确定的第一类是符合本指令第5.1条要求的合格电子签名。
A limited number of "classes of electronic signatures" and corresponding profiles could be defined in close cooperation with actors on the market (business, users, suppliers). The need for such standards is envisaged, in addition to those for qualified electronic signatures, in areas such as:
可以与市场上的行为者（企业、用户、供应商）密切合作，确定数量有限的“电子签名类别”和相应的简介。除了合格电子签名的标准外，还设想在以下领域需要此类标准：
- different classes of electronic signatures with long-term validity;
- 具有长期有效性的不同类别的电子签名；
- electronic signatures for business transactions with limited value.
- 有限价值商业交易的电子签名。
G.4.3. Electronic Signature Classes and the ETSI Electronic Signature Format
G.4.3. 电子签名类和ETSI电子签名格式
The electronic signature format defined in the present document is applicable to the EESSI area "electronic signature and encoding formats".
本文件中定义的电子签名格式适用于EESSI领域的“电子签名和编码格式”。
An electronic signature produced by a signer (see Section 5 and conformance Section 10.1) is applicable to the proposed class of electronic signature: "qualified electronic signatures fulfilling article 5.1".
签名人制作的电子签名（见第5节和第10.1节）适用于拟议的电子签名类别：“符合第5.1条规定的合格电子签名”。
With the addition of attributes by the verifier (see Section 6 and conformance Section 10.2) the qualified electronic signature supports long-term validity.
通过验证人添加属性（见第6节和第10.2节），合格电子签名支持长期有效性。
Annex H (Informative): APIs for the Generation and Verification of Electronic Signatures Tokens
附录H（资料性附录）：用于生成和验证电子签名令牌的API
While the present document describes the data format of an electronic signature, the question is whether there exist APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) able to manipulate these structures. At least two such APIs have been defined; one set by the IETF and another set by the OMG (Object Management Group).
虽然本文件描述了电子签名的数据格式，但问题是是否存在能够操纵这些结构的API（应用程序编程接口）。至少定义了两个这样的API；一组由IETF设置，另一组由OMG（对象管理组）设置。
In order to be able to use either of these APIs, it will be necessary to frame the previously defined electronic signature data structures using a mechanism-independent token format. Section 3.1 of RFC 2743 [RFC2743] specifies a mechanism-independent level of encapsulating representation for the initial token of a GSS-API context establishment sequence, incorporating an identifier of the mechanism type to be used on that context and enabling tokens to be interpreted unabmiguously.
为了能够使用这两种API中的任何一种，必须使用独立于机制的令牌格式来构建先前定义的电子签名数据结构。RFC 2743[RFC2743]第3.1节规定了GSS-API上下文建立序列初始令牌的封装表示的机制独立级别，包括将在该上下文上使用的机制类型标识符，并允许对令牌进行不一致的解释。
In order to be processable by these APIs, all electronic signature data formats that are defined in the present document shall be framed following that description.
为了能够通过这些API进行处理，本文件中定义的所有电子签名数据格式应按照该说明进行编排。
The encoding format for the token tag is derived from ASN.1 and DER, but its concrete representation is defined directly in terms of octets rather than at the ASN.1 level, in order to facilitate interoperable implementation without use of general ASN.1 processing code. The token tag consists of the following elements, in order:
令牌标记的编码格式源自ASN.1和DER，但其具体表示形式是直接根据八位字节定义的，而不是在ASN.1级别定义的，以便于在不使用一般ASN.1处理代码的情况下实现互操作。令牌标记按顺序由以下元素组成：
1) 0x60 -- Tag for RFC 2743 SEQUENCE; indicates that constructed form, definite length encoding follows.
1) 0x60——RFC 2743序列的标签；表示构造形式、定长编码遵循。
2) Token-length octets, specifying length of subsequent data (i.e., the summed lengths of elements 3 to 5 in this list, and of the mechanism-defined token object following the tag). This element comprises a variable number of octets:
2) 标记长度八位字节，指定后续数据的长度（即，此列表中元素3到5的总长度，以及标记后面的机制定义的标记对象的总长度）。该元素由数量可变的八位字节组成：
a) If the indicated value is less than 128, it shall be represented in a single octet with bit 8 (high order) set to "0" and the remaining bits representing the value.
a) 如果指示值小于128，则应以单个八位字节表示，位8（高阶）设置为“0”，其余位表示该值。
b) If the indicated value is 128 or more, it shall be represented in two or more octets, with bit 8 of the first octet set to "1" and the remaining bits of the first octet specifying the number of additional octets. The subsequent octets carry the value, 8 bits per octet, with the most significant digit first. The minimum number of octets shall be used to encode the length (i.e., no octets representing leading zeros shall be included within the length encoding).
b) 如果指示值为128或更多，则应以两个或更多个八位字节表示，第一个八位字节的第8位设置为“1”，第一个八位字节的剩余位指定额外八位字节的数量。随后的八位字节携带值，每八位字节8位，最高有效位在前。应使用最少数量的八位字节对长度进行编码（即，长度编码中不应包含表示前导零的八位字节）。
3) 0x06 -- Tag for OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
3) 0x06--对象标识符的标记。
4) Object identifier length -- length (number of octets) of the encoded object identifier contained in element 5, encoded per rules as described in 2a) and 2b) above.
4) 对象标识符长度——元素5中包含的编码对象标识符的长度（八位字节数），按照上述2a）和2b）中所述的规则进行编码。
5) object identifier octets -- variable number of octets, encoded per ASN.1 BER rules:
5) 对象标识符八位字节——根据ASN.1 BER规则编码的可变八位字节数：
- The first octet contains the sum of two values:
- 第一个八位组包含两个值之和：
(1) the top-level object identifier component, multiplied by 40 (decimal); and
(1) 顶级对象标识符组件，乘以40（十进制）；和
(2) the second-level object identifier component.
(2) 第二级对象标识符组件。
This special case is the only point within an object identifier encoding where a single octet represents contents of more than one component.
这种特殊情况是对象标识符编码中唯一一个八位字节表示多个组件内容的点。
- Subsequent octets, if required, encode successively lower components in the represented object identifier. A component's encoding may span multiple octets, encoding 7 bits per octet (most significant bits first) and with bit 8 set to "1" on all but the final octet in the component's encoding. The minimum number of octets shall be used to encode each component (i.e., no octets representing leading zeros shall be included within a component's encoding).
- 如果需要，后续的八位字节会依次对表示的对象标识符中的较低分量进行编码。一个组件的编码可以跨越多个八位字节，每个八位字节编码7位（首先是最高有效位），并且在组件编码中除最后一个八位字节外的所有八位字节上，位8都设置为“1”。应使用最少数量的八位字节对每个组件进行编码（即，组件编码中不应包含代表前导零的八位字节）。
NOTE: In many implementations, elements 3 to 5 may be stored and referenced as a contiguous string constant.
注意：在许多实现中，元素3到5可以作为连续字符串常量存储和引用。
The token tag is immediately followed by a mechanism-defined token object. Note that no independent size specifier intervenes following the object identifier value to indicate the size of the mechanism-defined token object.
令牌标记后面紧跟着一个机制定义的令牌对象。请注意，在对象标识符值之后没有独立的大小说明符介入，以指示机制定义的令牌对象的大小。
Tokens conforming to the present document shall have the following OID in order to be processable by IDUP-APIs:
符合本文件要求的令牌应具有以下OID，以便可由IDUP API处理：
id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1) IDUPMechanism (4)
etsiESv1(1) }
id-etsi-es-IDUP-Mechanism-v1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)
electronic-signature-standard (1733) part1 (1) IDUPMechanism (4)
etsiESv1(1) }
The IETF CAT WG produced, in December 1998, an RFC (RFC 2479 [RFC2479]) under the name of IDUP-GSS-API (Independent Data Unit Protection) able to handle the electronic signature data format defined in the present document.
IETF CAT WG于1998年12月以IDUP-GSS-API（独立数据单元保护）的名义编制了一份RFC（RFC 2479[RFC2479]），能够处理本文件中定义的电子签名数据格式。
The IDUP-GSS-API includes support for non-repudiation services.
IDUP-GSS-API包括对不可否认服务的支持。
It supports evidence generation, where "evidence" is information that either by itself, or when used in conjunction with other information, is used to establish proof about an event or action, as well as evidence verification.
它支持证据生成，其中“证据”是指信息本身，或与其他信息一起使用时，用于确定事件或行为的证据，以及证据验证。
IDUP supports various types of evidences. All the types defined in IDUP are supported in the present document through the commitment-type parameter.
IDUP支持各种类型的证据。本文档通过commitment type参数支持IDUP中定义的所有类型。
Section 2.3.3 of IDUP describes the specific calls needed to handle evidence ("EV" calls). The "EV" group of calls provides a simple, high-level interface to underlying IDUP mechanisms when application developers need to deal with only evidence: not with encryption or integrity services.
IDUP第2.3.3节描述了处理证据（“EV”调用）所需的特定调用。当应用程序开发人员只需要处理证据（而不是加密或完整性服务）时，“EV”组调用为底层IDUP机制提供了一个简单的高级接口。
All generations and verification are performed according to the content of a NR policy that is referenced in the context.
根据上下文中引用的NR策略的内容执行所有生成和验证。
Get_token_details is used to return the attributes that correspond to a given input token to an application. Since IDUP-GSS-API tokens are meant to be opaque to the calling application, this function allows the application to determine information about the token without having to violate the opaqueness intention of IDUP. Of primary importance is the mechanism type, which the application can then use as input to the IDUP_Establish_Env() call in order to establish the correct environment in which to have the token processed.
Get_token_details用于将与给定输入令牌对应的属性返回给应用程序。由于IDUP-GSS-API令牌对于调用应用程序来说是不透明的，因此此函数允许应用程序确定关于令牌的信息，而不必违反IDUP的不透明意图。最重要的是机制类型，然后应用程序可以将其用作IDUP_-Establish_-Env（）调用的输入，以建立正确的环境来处理令牌。
Generate_token generates a non-repudiation token using the current environment.
Generate_token使用当前环境生成不可否认令牌。
Verify_evidence verifies the evidence token using the current environment. This operation returns a major_status code that can be used to determine whether the evidence contained in a token is complete (i.e., can be successfully verified (perhaps years) later). If a token's evidence is not complete, the token can be passed to another API, form_complete_pidu, to complete it. This happens when a status "conditionally valid" is returned. That status corresponds to the status "validation incomplete" of the present document.
验证\u证据使用当前环境验证证据令牌。此操作返回一个主要的_状态代码，可用于确定令牌中包含的证据是否完整（即，可以在几年后成功验证）。如果令牌的证据不完整，可以将令牌传递给另一个API form_complete_pidu来完成它。当返回状态“条件有效”时，会发生这种情况。该状态对应于本文件的“验证未完成”状态。
Form_complete_PIDU is used primarily when the evidence token itself does not contain all the data required for its verification, and it is anticipated that some of the data not stored in the token may become unavailable during the interval between generation of the evidence token and verification unless it is stored in the token. The Form_Complete_PIDU operation gathers the missing information and includes it in the token so that verification can be guaranteed to be possible at any future time.
Form_complete_PIDU主要在证据令牌本身不包含其验证所需的所有数据时使用，预计在生成证据令牌和验证之间的间隔期间，未存储在令牌中的某些数据可能变得不可用，除非它存储在令牌中。Form_Complete_PIDU操作收集丢失的信息并将其包含在令牌中，以便保证在将来任何时候都可以进行验证。
Non-repudiation interfaces have been defined in "CORBA Security", a document produced by the OMG (Object Management Group). These interfaces are described in IDL (Interface Definition Language) and are optional.
“CORBA安全性”是由OMG（对象管理组）生成的文档，其中定义了不可否认接口。这些接口是用IDL（接口定义语言）描述的，是可选的。
The handling of "tokens" supporting non-repudiation is done through the following interfaces:
通过以下接口处理支持不可否认性的“令牌”：
- set_NR_features specifies the features to apply to future evidence generation and verification operations;
- set_NR_features指定应用于未来证据生成和验证操作的特征；
- get_NR_features returns the features that will be applied to future evidence generation and verification operations;
- get_NR_features返回将应用于未来证据生成和验证操作的功能；
- generate_token generates a non-repudiation token using the current non-repudiation features;
- generate_token使用当前的不可否认特征生成不可否认令牌；
- verify_evidence verifies the evidence token using the current non-repudiation features;
- 验证\u证据使用当前的不可否认性特征验证证据令牌；
- get_tokens_details returns information about an input non-repudiation token. The information returned depends upon the type of token;
- get_tokens_details返回有关输入不可否认令牌的信息。返回的信息取决于令牌的类型；
- form_complete_evidence is used when the evidence token itself does not contain all the data required for its verification, and it is anticipated that some of the data not stored in the token may become unavailable during the interval between generation of
- 当证据令牌本身不包含其验证所需的所有数据，并且预计未存储在令牌中的某些数据可能在生成证据的间隔期间变得不可用时，将使用完整证据
the evidence token and verification unless it is stored in the token. The form_complete_evidence operation gathers the missing information and includes it in the token so that verification can be guaranteed to be possible at any future time.
证据令牌和验证，除非它存储在令牌中。form_complete_证据操作收集丢失的信息并将其包含在令牌中，以便保证在将来任何时候都可以进行验证。
NOTE: The similarity between the two sets of APIs is noticeable.
注意：两套API之间的相似性是显而易见的。
Annex I (Informative): Cryptographic Algorithms
附件一（资料性）：加密算法
RFC 3370 [10] describes the conventions for using several cryptographic algorithms with the Crytographic Message Syntax (CMS). Only the hashing and signing algorithms are appropriate for use with the present document.
RFC 3370[10]描述了使用多种密码算法和Crytographic Message Syntax（CMS）的约定。只有哈希和签名算法适合用于本文档。
Since the publication of RFC 3370 [10], MD5 has been broken. This algorithm is no longer considered appropriate and has been deleted from the list of algorithms.
自RFC 3370[10]出版以来，MD5已被打破。此算法不再被认为是合适的，已从算法列表中删除。
The SHA-1 digest algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 180-1. The algorithm identifier for SHA-1 is:
SHA-1摘要算法在FIPS Pub 180-1中定义。SHA-1的算法标识符为：
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
sha-1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) oiw(14)
secsig(3) algorithm(2) 26 }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field is optional. If present, the parameters field shall contain an ASN.1 NULL. Implementations should accept SHA-1 AlgorithmIdentifiers with absent parameters as well as NULL parameters. Implementations should generate SHA-1 AlgorithmIdentifiers with NULL parameters.
AlgorithmIdentifier参数字段是可选的。如果存在，参数字段应包含ASN.1 NULL。实现应该接受没有参数和空参数的SHA-1算法标识符。实现应生成带有空参数的SHA-1算法标识符。
The following is a selection of work that has been done in the area of digest algorithms or, as they are often called, hash functions:
以下是在摘要算法或哈希函数（通常称为哈希函数）领域所做的一些工作：
- ISO/IEC 10118-1 (1994) [ISO10118-1]: "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 1: General". ISO/IEC 10118-1 contains definitions and describes basic concepts.
- ISO/IEC 10118-1（1994）[ISO10118-1]：“信息技术-安全技术-哈希函数-第1部分：总则”。ISO/IEC 10118-1包含定义并描述了基本概念。
- ISO/IEC 10118-2 (1994) [ISO10118-2]: "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 2: Hash-functions using an n-bit block cipher algorithm". ISO/IEC 10118-2 specifies two ways to construct a hash-function from a block cipher.
- ISO/IEC 10118-2（1994）[ISO10118-2]：“信息技术-安全技术-散列函数-第2部分：使用n位分组密码算法的散列函数”。ISO/IEC 10118-2规定了从分组密码构造哈希函数的两种方法。
- ISO/IEC 10118-3 (1997) [ISO10118-3]: "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 3: Dedicated hash-functions". ISO/IEC 10118-3 specifies the following dedicated hash-functions:
- ISO/IEC 10118-3（1997）[ISO10118-3]：“信息技术-安全技术-哈希函数-第3部分：专用哈希函数”。ISO/IEC 10118-3规定了以下专用哈希函数：
- SHA-1 (FIPS 180-1); - RIPEMD-128; - RIPEMD-160.
- SHA-1（FIPS 180-1）；-RIPEMD-128；-RIPEMD-160。
- ISO/IEC 10118-4 (1998) [ISO10118-4]: "Information technology - Security techniques - Hash-functions - Part 4: Hash-functions using modular arithmetic".
- ISO/IEC 10118-4（1998）[ISO10118-4]：“信息技术-安全技术-哈希函数-第4部分：使用模运算的哈希函数”。
- RFC 1320 (PS 1992): "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm". RFC 1320 specifies the hash-function MD4. Today, MD4 is considered outdated.
- RFC1320（PS 1992）：“MD4消息摘要算法”。RFC1320指定哈希函数MD4。如今，MD4被认为已经过时。
- RFC 1321 (I 1992): "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm". RFC 1321 (informational) specifies the hash-function MD5. Today, MD5 is not recommended for new implementations.
- RFC 1321（I 1992）：“MD5消息摘要算法”。RFC1321（信息性）指定哈希函数MD5。今天，MD5不推荐用于新的实现。
- FIPS Publication 180-1 (1995): "Secure Hash Standard". FIPS 180-1 specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), dedicated hash-function developed for use with the DSA. The original SHA, published in 1993, was slightly revised in 1995 and renamed SHA-1.
- FIPS出版物180-1（1995）：“安全哈希标准”。FIPS 180-1指定了安全哈希算法（SHA），这是为DSA开发的专用哈希函数。最初的SHA于1993年出版，1995年稍作修订，并更名为SHA-1。
- ANSI X9.30-2 (1997) [X9.30-2]: "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - Part 2: The Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1)". X9.30-2 specifies the ANSI-Version of SHA-1.
- ANSI X9.30-2（1997）[X9.30-2]：“金融服务业的公钥加密-第2部分：安全哈希算法（SHA-1）”。X9.30-2规定了SHA-1的ANSI版本。
- ANSI X9.31-2 (1996) [X9.31-2]: "Public Key Cryptography Using Reversible Algorithms for the Financial Services Industry - Part 2: Hash Algorithms". X9.31-2 specifies hash algorithms.
- ANSI X9.31-2（1996）[X9.31-2]：“金融服务业使用可逆算法的公钥密码术-第2部分：散列算法”。X9.31-2指定哈希算法。
The DSA signature algorithm is defined in FIPS Pub 186. DSA is always used with the SHA-1 message digest algorithm. The algorithm identifier for DSA is:
DSA签名算法在FIPS Pub 186中定义。DSA始终与SHA-1消息摘要算法一起使用。DSA的算法标识符为：
id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
x9-57 (10040) x9cm(4) 3 }
id-dsa-with-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840)
x9-57 (10040) x9cm(4) 3 }
The AlgorithmIdentifier parameters field shall not be present.
算法识别器参数字段不应存在。
The RSA signature algorithm is defined in RFC 3447 [RFC3447]. RFC 3370 [10] specifies the use of the RSA signature algorithm with the SHA-1 algorithm. The algorithm identifier for RSA with SHA-1 is:
RSA签名算法在RFC 3447[RFC3447]中定义。RFC 3370[10]规定了RSA签名算法与SHA-1算法的结合使用。带有SHA-1的RSA算法标识符为：
Sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 }
Sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 }
NOTE: RFC 3370 [10] recommends that MD5 not be used for new implementations.
注：RFC3370[10]建议MD5不用于新的实现。
The following is a selection of work that has been done in the area of digital signature mechanisms:
以下是在数字签名机制领域所做的一些工作：
- FIPS Publication 186 (1994): "Digital Signature Standard". NIST's Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) is a variant of ElGamal's Discrete Logarithm-based digital signature mechanism. The DSA requires a 160-bit hash-function and mandates SHA-1.
- FIPS出版物186（1994）：“数字签名标准”。NIST的数字签名算法（DSA）是ElGamal基于离散对数的数字签名机制的变体。DSA需要一个160位的散列函数并强制SHA-1。
- IEEE P1363 (2000) [P1363]: "Standard Specifications for Public-Key Cryptography". IEEE P1363 contains mechanisms for digital signatures, key establishment, and encipherment based on three families of public key schemes:
- IEEE P1363（2000）[P1363]：“公钥密码的标准规范”。IEEE P1363包含基于三类公钥方案的数字签名、密钥建立和加密机制：
- "Conventional" Discrete Logarithm (DL)-based techniques, i.e., Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement, Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (MQV) key agreement, the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), and Nyberg-Rueppel (NR) digital signatures;
- 基于“传统”离散对数（DL）的技术，即Diffie-Hellman（DH）密钥协议、Menezes-Qu-Vanstone（MQV）密钥协议、数字签名算法（DSA）和Nyberg-Rueppel（NR）数字签名；
- Elliptic Curve (EC)-based variants of the DL-mechanisms specified above, i.e., EC-DH, EC-MQV, EC-DSA, and EC-NR. For elliptic curves, implementation options include mod p and characteristic 2 with polynomial or normal basis representation;
- 上述DL机制的基于椭圆曲线（EC）的变体，即EC-DH、EC-MQV、EC-DSA和EC-NR。对于椭圆曲线，实现选项包括mod p和特征2，具有多项式或正规基表示；
- Integer Factoring (IF)-based techniques, including RSA encryption, RSA digital signatures, and RSA-based key transport.
- 基于整数分解（IF）的技术，包括RSA加密、RSA数字签名和基于RSA的密钥传输。
- ISO/IEC 9796-2 (1997) [ISO9796-2]: "Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function". ISO/IEC 9796-2 specifies digital signature mechanisms with partial message recovery that are also based on the RSA technique but make use of a hash-function.
- ISO/IEC 9796-2（1997）[ISO9796-2]：“信息技术-安全技术-提供消息恢复的数字签名方案-第2部分：使用散列函数的机制”。ISO/IEC 9796-2规定了具有部分消息恢复的数字签名机制，该机制也基于RSA技术，但使用哈希函数。
- ISO/IEC 9796-4 (1998) [ISO9796-4]: "Digital signature schemes giving message recovery - Part 4: Discrete logarithm based mechanisms". ISO/IEC 9796-4 specifies digital signature mechanisms with partial message recovery that are based on Discrete Logarithm techniques. The document includes the Nyberg-Rueppel scheme.
- ISO/IEC 9796-4（1998）[ISO9796-4]：“提供消息恢复的数字签名方案.第4部分：基于离散对数的机制”。ISO/IEC 9796-4规定了基于离散对数技术的部分消息恢复数字签名机制。该文件包括Nyberg-Rueppel方案。
- ISO/IEC 14888-1 [ISO14888-1]: "Digital signatures with appendix - Part 1: General". ISO/IEC 14888-1 contains definitions and describes the basic concepts of digital signatures with appendix.
- ISO/IEC 14888-1[ISO14888-1]：“带附录的数字签名-第1部分：总则”。ISO/IEC 14888-1包含了数字签名的定义，并在附录中描述了数字签名的基本概念。
- ISO/IEC 14888-2 [ISO14888-2]: "Digital signatures with appendix - Part 2: Identity-based mechanisms". ISO/IEC 14888-2 specifies digital signature schemes with appendix that make use of identity-based keying material. The document includes the zero-knowledge techniques of Fiat-Shamir and Guillou-Quisquater.
- ISO/IEC 14888-2[ISO14888-2]：“带附录的数字签名-第2部分：基于身份的机制”。ISO/IEC 14888-2规定了使用基于身份的密钥材料的带有附录的数字签名方案。该文件包括菲亚特·沙米尔和吉卢·奎斯夸特的零知识技术。
- ISO/IEC 14888-3 [ISO14888-3]: "Digital signatures with appendix - Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms". ISO/IEC 14888-3 specifies digital signature schemes with appendix that make use of certificate-based keying material. The document includes five schemes:
- ISO/IEC 14888-3[ISO14888-3]：“带附录的数字签名-第3部分：基于证书的机制”。ISO/IEC 14888-3规定了使用基于证书的密钥材料的带有附录的数字签名方案。该文件包括五项计划：
- DSA; - EC-DSA, an elliptic curve-based analog of NIST's Digital Signature Algorithm; - Pointcheval-Vaudeney signatures; - RSA signatures; - ESIGN.
- DSA；-EC-DSA，基于椭圆曲线的NIST数字签名算法模拟；-Pointcheval杂耍签名；-RSA签名；-设计。
- ISO/IEC 15946-2 (2002) [ISO15946-2]: "Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves - Part 2: Digital signatures", specifies digital signature schemes with appendix using elliptic curves.
- ISO/IEC 15946-2（2002）[ISO15946-2]：“基于椭圆曲线的密码技术-第2部分：数字签名”，规定了带有附录的使用椭圆曲线的数字签名方案。
- The document includes two schemes:
- 该文件包括两项计划：
- EC-DSA, an elliptic curve-based analog of NIST's Digital Signature Algorithm;
- EC-DSA，基于椭圆曲线的NIST数字签名算法模拟；
- EC-AMV, an elliptic curve-based analog of the Agnew-Muller-Vanstone signature algorithm.
- EC-AMV，一种基于椭圆曲线的模拟Agnew Muller-Vanstone签名算法。
- ANSI X9.31-1 (1997) [X9.31-1]: "Public Key Cryptography Using Reversible Algorithms for the Financial Services Industry - Part 1: The RSA Signature Algorithm". ANSI X9.31-1 specifies a digital signature mechanism with appendix using the RSA public key technique.
- ANSI X9.31-1（1997）[X9.31-1]：“金融服务业使用可逆算法的公钥密码术-第1部分：RSA签名算法”。ANSI X9.31-1规定了使用RSA公钥技术的带有附录的数字签名机制。
- ANSI X9.30-1 (1997) [X9.30-1]: "Public Key Cryptography Using Irreversible Algorithms for the Financial Services Industry - Part 1: The Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)". ANSI X9.30-1 specifies the DSA, NIST's Digital Signature Algorithm.
- ANSI X9.30-1（1997）[X9.30-1]：“金融服务业使用不可逆算法的公钥密码术-第1部分：数字签名算法（DSA）”。ANSI X9.30-1规定了DSA，即NIST的数字签名算法。
- ANSI X9.62 (1998) [X9.62]: "Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry - The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)". ANSI X9.62 specifies the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm, an analog of NIST's Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) using elliptic curves. The appendices provide tutorial information on the underlying mathematics for elliptic curve cryptography and give many examples.
- ANSI X9.62（1998）[X9.62]：“金融服务业的公钥加密-椭圆曲线数字签名算法（ECDSA）”。ANSI X9.62规定了椭圆曲线数字签名算法，这是NIST使用椭圆曲线的数字签名算法（DSA）的模拟。附录提供了有关椭圆曲线密码术基础数学的教程信息，并给出了许多示例。
Annex J (Informative): Guidance on Naming
附件J（资料性附录）：命名指南
The subject name shall be allocated through a registration scheme administered through a Registration Authority (RA) to ensure uniqueness. This RA may be an independent body or a function carried out by the Certification Authority.
受试者姓名应通过注册机构（RA）管理的注册计划分配，以确保唯一性。该RA可以是一个独立机构或由认证机构执行的职能。
In addition to ensuring uniqueness, the RA shall verify that the name allocated properly identifies the applicant and that authentication checks are carried out to protect against masquerade.
除了确保唯一性外，RA还应验证分配的名称是否正确识别了申请人，并进行了身份验证检查以防止伪装。
The name allocated by an RA is based on registration information provided by, or relating to, the applicant (e.g., his personal name, date of birth, residence address) and information allocated by the RA. Three variations commonly exist:
RA分配的姓名基于申请人提供的或与申请人相关的注册信息（例如，其个人姓名、出生日期、居住地址）和RA分配的信息。通常存在三种变化：
- the name is based entirely on registration information, which uniquely identifies the applicant (e.g., "Pierre Durand (born on) July 6, 1956");
- 该名称完全基于注册信息，唯一标识申请人（例如，“Pierre Durand（生于1956年7月6日”）；
- the name is based on registration information, with the addition of qualifiers added by the registration authority to ensure uniqueness (e.g., "Pierre Durand 12");
- 该名称基于注册信息，并由注册机构添加限定词以确保唯一性（例如，“Pierre Durand 12”）；
- the registration information is kept private by the registration authority and the registration authority allocates a "pseudonym".
- 登记信息由登记机关保密，登记机关分配“笔名”。
Under certain circumstances, it may be necessary for information used during registration, but not published in the certificate, to be made available to third parties (e.g., to an arbitrator to resolve a dispute or for law enforcement). This registration information is likely to include personal and sensitive information.
在某些情况下，可能需要向第三方（如仲裁员）提供注册期间使用但未在证书中公布的信息，以解决争议或执法。此注册信息可能包括个人和敏感信息。
Thus, the RA needs to establish a policy for:
因此，RA需要制定以下政策：
- whether the registration information should be disclosed; - to whom such information should be disclosed; - under what circumstances such information should be disclosed.
- 是否应披露注册信息；-应向谁披露此类信息；-在何种情况下应披露此类信息。
This policy may be different whether the RA is being used only within a company or for public use. The policy will have to take into account national legislation and in particular any data protection and privacy legislation.
无论RA仅用于公司内部还是用于公共用途，本政策可能有所不同。该政策必须考虑到国家立法，特别是任何数据保护和隐私立法。
Currently, the provision of access to registration is a local matter for the RA. However, if open access is required, standard protocols, such as HTTP -- RFC 2068 (Internet Web Access Protocol), may be employed with the addition of security mechanisms necessary to meet the data protection requirements (e.g., Transport Layer Security -- RFC 4346 [RFC4346]) with client authentication.
目前，提供注册是RA的本地事务。然而，如果需要开放访问，则可以使用标准协议，例如HTTP--RFC 2068（Internet Web访问协议），并添加必要的安全机制，以满足数据保护要求（例如，传输层安全性--RFC 4346[RFC4346]），以及客户端认证。
In some cases, the subject name that is contained in a public key certificate may not be meaningful enough. This may happen because of the existence of homonyms or because of the use of pseudonyms. A distinction could be made if more attributes were present. However, adding more attributes to a public key certificate placed in a public repository would be going against the privacy protection requirements.
在某些情况下，公钥证书中包含的使用者名称可能不够有意义。这可能是因为存在同名或使用假名。如果存在更多属性，则可以进行区分。但是，向放置在公共存储库中的公钥证书添加更多属性将违反隐私保护要求。
In any case, the Registration Authority will get information at the time of registration, but not all that information will be placed in the certificate. In order to achieve a balance between these two opposite requirements, the hash values of some additional attributes can be placed in a public key certificate. When the certificate owner provides these additional attributes, then they can be verified. Using biometrics attributes may unambiguously identify a person. Examples of biometrics attributes that can be used include: a picture or a manual signature from the certificate owner.
在任何情况下，登记机关都将在登记时获得信息，但并非所有信息都将放在证书中。为了在这两个相反的要求之间实现平衡，可以将一些附加属性的散列值放置在公钥证书中。当证书所有者提供这些附加属性时，可以对它们进行验证。使用生物特征属性可以明确地识别一个人。可以使用的生物特征属性示例包括：证书所有者的图片或手动签名。
NOTE: Using hash values protects privacy only if the possible inputs are large enough. For example, using the hash of a person's social security number is generally not sufficient since it can easily be reversed.
注意：只有当可能的输入足够大时，使用哈希值才能保护隐私。例如，使用一个人的社会保险号码的散列通常是不够的，因为它很容易被颠倒。
A picture can be used if the verifier once met the person and later on wants to verify that the certificate that he or she got relates to the person whom was met. In such a case, at the first exchange, the picture is sent, and the hash contained in the certificate may be used by the verifier to verify that it is the right person. At the next exchange, the picture does not need to be sent again.
如果验证者曾经与此人会面，并且后来想要验证他或她获得的证书是否与会面的人相关，则可以使用图片。在这种情况下，在第一次交换时，发送图片，并且验证器可以使用证书中包含的散列来验证其是否是正确的人。在下一次交换时，图片不需要再次发送。
A manual signature may be used if a signed document has been received beforehand. In such a case, at the first exchange, the drawing of the manual signature is sent, and the hash contained in the certificate may be used by the verifier to verify that it is the right manual signature. At the next exchange, the manual signature does not need to be sent again.
如果事先已收到签名文件，则可使用手动签名。在这种情况下，在第一次交换时，发送手动签名的绘制，并且验证器可以使用证书中包含的散列来验证它是正确的手动签名。在下一次交换时，不需要再次发送手动签名。
The name of an employee within an organization is likely to be some combination of the name of the organization and the identifier of the employee within that organization.
组织内员工的姓名可能是组织名称和该组织内员工标识符的某种组合。
An organization name is usually a registered name, i.e., business or trading name used in day-to-day business. This name is registered by a Naming Authority, which guarantees that the organization's registered name is unambiguous and cannot be confused with another organization.
组织名称通常是注册名称，即日常业务中使用的企业或商业名称。此名称由命名机构注册，这保证了组织的注册名称是明确的，并且不能与其他组织混淆。
In order to get more information about a given registered organization name, it is necessary to go back to a publicly available directory maintained by the Naming Authority.
为了获得有关给定注册组织名称的更多信息，有必要返回由命名机构维护的公共可用目录。
The identifier may be a name or a pseudonym (e.g., a nickname or an employee number). When it is a name, it is supposed to be descriptive enough to unambiguously identify the person. When it is a pseudonym, the certificate does not disclose the identity of the person. However, it ensures that the person has been correctly authenticated at the time of registration and therefore may be eligible to some advantages implicitly or explicitly obtained through the possession of the certificate. In either case, however, this can be insufficient because of the existence of homonyms.
标识符可以是姓名或假名（例如，昵称或员工编号）。当它是一个名字时，它应该具有足够的描述性，能够清楚地识别这个人。如果是笔名，证书不会透露此人的身份。但是，它确保该人在登记时已得到正确的认证，因此可能有资格通过持有证书而获得某些明示或暗示的好处。然而，在这两种情况下，由于同音词的存在，这可能是不够的。
Placing more attributes in the certificate may be one solution, for example, by giving the organization unit of the person or the name of a city where the office is located. However, the more information is
在证书中放置更多属性可能是一种解决方案，例如，通过提供人员的组织单位或办公室所在城市的名称。然而，更多的信息是
placed in the certificate, the more problems arise if there is a change in the organization structure or the place of work. So this may not be the best solution. An alternative is to provide more attributes (like the organization unit and the place of work) through access to a directory maintained by the company. It is likely that, at the time of registration, the Registration Authority got more information than what was placed in the certificate, if such additional information is placed in a repository accessible only to the organization.
在证书中，如果组织结构或工作地点发生变化，问题就越多。因此，这可能不是最好的解决方案。另一种方法是通过访问公司维护的目录来提供更多属性（如组织单位和工作地点）。在登记时，登记机关获得的信息可能比证书中的信息更多，如果这些额外信息放在只有本组织才能访问的存储库中。
Acknowledgments
致谢
Special thanks to Russ Housley for reviewing the document.
特别感谢Russ Housley审阅该文件。
Authors' Addresses
作者地址
Denis Pinkas Bull SAS Rue Jean-Jaures 78340 Les Clayes sous Bois CEDEX FRANCE EMail: Denis.Pinkas@bull.net
Denis Pinkas Bull SAS Rue Jean Jaures 78340 Les Clays sous Bois CEDEX FRANCE电子邮件：Denis。Pinkas@bull.net
Nick Pope Thales eSecurity Meadow View House Long Crendon Aylesbury Buck HP18 9EQ United Kingdom EMail: nick.pope@thales-esecurity.com
Nick Pope Thales eSecurity Meadow View House Long Crendon Aylesbury Buck HP18 9EQ英国电子邮件：Nick。pope@thales-电子安全网
John Ross Security & Standards Consultancy Ltd The Waterhouse Business Centre 2 Cromer Way Chelmsford Essex CM1 2QE United Kingdom EMail: ross@secstan.com
John Ross安全与标准咨询有限公司Waterhouse商务中心2 Cromer Way Chelmsford Essex CM1 2QE英国电子邮件：ross@secstan.com
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