Network Working Group S. Bradner
Request for Comments: 3751 Harvard U.
Category: Informational 1 April 2004
Network Working Group S. Bradner
Request for Comments: 3751 Harvard U.
Category: Informational 1 April 2004
Omniscience Protocol Requirements
全知协议要求
Status of this Memo
本备忘录的状况
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
本备忘录为互联网社区提供信息。它没有规定任何类型的互联网标准。本备忘录的分发不受限制。
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). All Rights Reserved.
版权所有（C）互联网协会（2004年）。版权所有。
Abstract
摘要
There have been a number of legislative initiatives in the U.S. and elsewhere over the past few years to use the Internet to actively interfere with allegedly illegal activities of Internet users. This memo proposes a number of requirements for a new protocol, the Omniscience Protocol, that could be used to enable such efforts.
在过去几年中，美国和其他地方已经采取了一些立法举措，利用互联网积极干预互联网用户据称的非法活动。这份备忘录提出了一个新的协议，全知协议的一些要求，可以用来实现这样的努力。
In a June 17, 2003 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, entitled "The Dark Side of a Bright Idea: Could Personal and National Security Risks Compromise the Potential of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing Networks?," U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), the chair of the committee, said he was interested in the ability to destroy the computers of people who illegally download copyrighted material. He said this "may be the only way you can teach somebody about copyrights." "If we can find some way to do this without destroying their machines, we'd be interested in hearing about that," Mr Hatch was quoted as saying during a Senate hearing. He went on to say "If that's the only way, then I'm all for destroying their machines." [Guardian]
2003年6月17日，美国参议院司法委员会主席、美国参议员奥林·哈奇（R-Utah）在一次题为“光明想法的黑暗面：个人和国家安全风险是否会损害点对点文件共享网络的潜力”的听证会上，他说，他对破坏非法下载版权材料的人的电脑的能力感兴趣。哈奇先生在参议院听证会上说，他说这“可能是你教别人版权的唯一方法。”“如果我们能找到一些方法做到这一点而不破坏他们的机器，我们将有兴趣听到这一点。”。他接着说：“如果这是唯一的办法，那么我完全支持摧毁他们的机器。”
Mr. Hatch was not the first U.S. elected official to propose something along this line. A year earlier, representatives, Howard Berman (D-Calif.) and Howard Coble (R-N.C.), introduced a bill that would have immunized groups such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) from all state and federal laws if they disable, block, or otherwise impair a "publicly accessible peer-to-peer file-trading network."
哈奇并不是第一位提出类似建议的美国当选官员。一年前，加利福尼亚州的霍华德·伯曼（Howard Berman）和加利福尼亚州的霍华德·科布尔（Howard Coble）两位代表提出了一项法案，如果美国电影协会（MPAA）和美国唱片业协会（RIAA）等团体禁用、阻止或以其他方式损害某项法律，他们将不受所有州和联邦法律的约束“可公开访问的对等文件交易网络。”
The attitude of some of the copyright holders may be that it's OK for a few honest people to have their computers or networks executed as long as the machines and networks of the dishonest are killed. But it is not likely that any measurable error rate would be acceptable to the public. Clearly, anyone implementing laws of this type need some way to reduce the error rate and be sure that they are dealing with a real bad guy and not an innocent bystander.
一些版权持有者的态度可能是，只要不诚实的人的机器和网络被杀死，少数诚实的人就可以让他们的计算机或网络被执行。但公众不大可能接受任何可测量的错误率。显然，任何实施这类法律的人都需要某种方法来降低错误率，并确保他们面对的是真正的坏人，而不是无辜的旁观者。
Part of determining if someone is a "bad guy" is determining his or her intent. Historically, western jurisprudence has required that prosecutors show that a person intended to commit a crime before that person could be convicted of committing that crime. [Holdsworth, Restatement, Prosser, United States v. Wise, Garratt v. Dailey] Because it can be quite difficult to establish a person's intent lawmakers have, in some cases, reduced the requirement for prosecutors to establish intent and mere possession is now proof enough of intent.
确定某人是否是“坏人”的一部分是确定他或她的意图。从历史上看，西方判例要求检察官在一个人被判有罪之前证明该人有意犯罪。[Holdsworth，Repeartment，Prosser，United States v.Wise，Garratt v.Dailey]由于很难确定一个人的意图，因此在某些情况下，立法者降低了检察官确定意图的要求，现在仅仅拥有就足以证明意图。
This memo proposes a set of requirements for a new protocol to be used by prosecutors to determine a person's intent, thus reducing the need to dilute the historical legal requirement to show intent and by groups such as the MPAA and RIAA to be sure they are dealing with lawbreakers and not 60 year old non computer users.
这份备忘录提出了一套新协议的要求，供检察官用于确定一个人的意图，从而减少了稀释历史法律要求以显示意图的需要，也减少了MPAA和RIAA等团体的需要，以确保他们与违法者而不是60岁的非计算机用户打交道。
For the purpose of these requirements, I will assume that the OP is implemented using a client-server model, where the OP client is installed on the user's computer and the server is installed on a computer run by a law or copyright enforcement organization. OP Clients would register with all OP Servers that pertain to the legal jurisdiction in which the client is located each time the computer is started. OP Servers would then, on whatever schedule they have been configured to use, send OP Queries to OP Clients to find out if the computer operator has engaged in an illegal act of interest to the operator of the OP Server. Future versions of the OP might operate using a peer-to-peer model if the copyright enforcement people can ever get over their visceral disgust at the very concept of peer-to-peer networks.
出于这些要求的目的，我将假设OP是使用客户机-服务器模型实现的，其中OP客户机安装在用户的计算机上，服务器安装在法律或版权执行组织运行的计算机上。每次启动计算机时，OP客户端都会向属于客户端所在法律管辖区的所有OP服务器注册。然后，OP服务器将按照其配置使用的任何时间表向OP客户端发送OP查询，以查明计算机操作员是否参与了OP服务器操作员感兴趣的非法行为。如果版权执法人员能够克服对对等网络概念的内心厌恶，OP的未来版本可能会使用对等模式。
For the purpose of this memo, I will use copyright infringement as an example of an illegal act that the OP protocol could be used to expose. The OP has numerous possible applications beyond ferreting out copyright infringement. For example, the OP would be of great assistance to instructors trying to determine if their students are producing original work or engaging in plagiarism. The same function would be invaluable to newspaper editors checking up on reporter's dispatches.
在本备忘录中，我将以版权侵权为例，说明OP协议可用于揭露的非法行为。除了查出版权侵权外，OP还有许多可能的应用。例如，OP将对试图确定学生是否在创作原创作品或从事剽窃的教师有很大帮助。同样的功能对于报纸编辑检查记者的报道也是非常宝贵的。
Also for the purpose of this memo, I assume that an evil-doer (also referred to as a miscreant) is in full control of a computer and that OP Servers will generally be operated by "Good guys." (See Functional Requirements FR5-7 for requirements to ensure that the latter is the case.) In the context of this memo, "evil-doer" and "miscreant" are defined as individuals or groups of individuals who perform acts that the operator of an OP Server has a legally recognized right to prevent. In the context of this memo, "good guys" refers to individuals or groups of individuals who have a legally recognized right to prevent certain acts that computer users may attempt to do with their computers. The use of this term is not meant to convey any value judgment of the morality, forward thinking nature, public spiritedness, or the monetary worth relative to most of humanity of such individuals or groups of individuals.
同样出于本备忘录的目的，我假设一个恶棍（也称为恶棍）完全控制一台计算机，并且OP服务器通常由“好人”操作。（参见功能要求FR5-7，了解确保后者的要求。）在本备忘录中，“恶棍”和“恶棍”被定义为执行OP服务器操作员有权阻止的行为的个人或个人团体。在本备忘录的上下文中，“好人”指的是具有法律承认的权利的个人或个人团体，他们有权阻止计算机用户可能试图对其计算机进行的某些行为。本术语的使用并不意味着传达对此类个人或群体的道德、前瞻性、公共精神或相对于大多数人类的金钱价值的任何价值判断。
OR1: The OP client must be able to install itself into all types of computers over the objections of the computer user.
OR1:OP客户端必须能够在计算机用户的反对下将自己安装到所有类型的计算机中。
Discussion: The OP client would be installed by legal mandate in all new computers, but since there are hundreds of millions of existing computers, the OP client must be able to install itself in all of these existing computers in order to afford universal coverage of all possible miscreants. This installation must be accomplished even if the user, many of whom have full administrative control over their computers, tries to prevent it.
讨论：OP客户端将根据法律授权安装在所有新计算机中，但由于现有计算机数亿台，OP客户端必须能够安装在所有这些现有计算机中，以便对所有可能的歹徒进行全面覆盖。即使用户（其中许多人对其计算机拥有完全的管理控制）试图阻止安装，也必须完成此安装。
OR2: True OP clients must not be findable by the computer user by any means, including commercial virus detectors, but all hackers' programs that mimic OP clients must be easily findable by commercial virus detectors.
OR2：计算机用户不得通过任何方式（包括商业病毒检测器）查找真正的OP客户端，但所有模仿OP客户端的黑客程序必须能够通过商业病毒检测器轻松查找。
Discussion: Since anyone whose intent was to violate the law would not want the OP client to be watching their action, they would try to disable the OP client. Thus the OP Client, once installed, should be invisible to all methods a user might employ to discover it. Users must be able to find and remove any virus or worm that tries to masquerade as an OP client to escape detection.
讨论：由于任何意图违反法律的人都不希望OP客户端监视他们的行为，因此他们会尝试禁用OP客户端。因此，OP客户机一旦安装，就应该对用户用来发现它的所有方法都不可见。用户必须能够找到并删除任何试图伪装成OP客户端以逃避检测的病毒或蠕虫。
OR3: The OP must be able to communicate through uncooperative firewalls, NATs, and when the computer is disconnected from the Internet.
OR3：OP必须能够通过不合作的防火墙、NAT以及计算机与Internet断开连接时进行通信。
Discussion: Since the evil-doer may have control of a local firewall or NAT, the OP must be able to communicate with the OP server, even when the firewall or NAT has been configured to block all unused ports. Also, since the evil-doer might try to hide his or her evil-doing by disconnecting the computer from the network, the OP must be able to continue to communicate, even under these circumstances. Meeting this requirement may require that the OP client be able to reconfigure the user's machine into a cell phone or to implement GMPLS-WH [GMPLS-WH].
讨论：由于作恶者可能控制本地防火墙或NAT，因此OP必须能够与OP服务器通信，即使防火墙或NAT已配置为阻止所有未使用的端口。此外，由于作恶者可能会试图通过断开计算机与网络的连接来隐藏其作恶行为，因此即使在这种情况下，OP也必须能够继续通信。满足此要求可能需要OP客户端能够将用户的机器重新配置为手机或实现GMPLS-WH[GMPLS-WH]。
OR4: Neither the operation of the OP client or the OP server must be able to be spoofed.
OR4:OP客户端或OP服务器的操作都不能被欺骗。
Discussion: The user must not be able to create their own version of an OP client that can fool the OP server. Nor can it be possible for someone to create their own OP server that can be used to query OP clients.
讨论：用户不能创建自己的OP客户端版本，该版本可能会欺骗OP服务器。也不可能有人创建自己的OP服务器，用于查询OP客户端。
Discussion: Because of the potential for a user to hide their illicit activities by mimicking the operation of the OP client on their machine, it must not be possible to do so. In the same vein, because of the potential for violating the user's privacy, it must not be possible for a non-authorized OP server to be seen as authorized by OP clients. Since there will be an arbitrary, and changing, number of OP servers, at least one for each type of protected material, OP authentication and authorization must be able to be accomplished with no prior knowledge of a particular OP server by the OP client.
讨论：由于用户可能通过在其机器上模拟OP客户端的操作来隐藏其非法活动，因此不能这样做。同样，由于存在侵犯用户隐私的可能性，非授权的OP服务器不可能被OP客户端视为已授权。由于OP服务器的数量是任意且不断变化的，每种类型的受保护材料至少有一个OP服务器，OP客户端必须能够在事先不知道特定OP服务器的情况下完成OP身份验证和授权。
OR5: The OP client must be able to be installed on any portable device that can be used to play protected material or execute protected software.
OR5：OP客户端必须能够安装在任何可用于播放受保护材料或执行受保护软件的便携式设备上。
Discussion: Since small, portable devices, such as MP3 players, are becoming the preferred method of playing back prerecorded music and videos, they must all include OP clients. OP clients must be able to be automatically installed on all such existing devices.
讨论：由于小型便携式设备（如MP3播放器）正在成为播放预先录制的音乐和视频的首选方法，因此它们都必须包含OP客户端。OP客户端必须能够自动安装在所有此类现有设备上。
FR1: The OP client must be able to determine the user's intent.
FR1：OP客户端必须能够确定用户的意图。
Discussion: Just knowing that the user has a copy of a protected work on their system does not, by itself, mean that the copy is illegal. It could easily be a copy that the user purchased. The OP must be able to tell if a copy is an illegal copy with complete reliability. The OP must be able to differentiate between an original, and legal, copy and a bit-for-bit illegal reproduction. The OP client must be able to differentiate between copies that were created for the purpose of backup, and are thus generally legal, and those copies created for the purpose of illegal distribution. In the case of some types of software, the OP client must be able to determine the intent of the user for the software. An example of this need is related to the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and similar laws around the world. These laws outlaw the possession of circumvention technology, such as crypto analysis software, in most cases. Some exemption is made for legitimate researchers, but without an OP it is quite hard to determine if the circumvention technology is to be used for research or to break copyright protections for the purpose of making illegal copies of protected material. With the OP, the DMCA, and laws like it, can be rewritten so that circumvention technology is legal and developers can find out if their security protocols are any good, something which may be illegal under current law.
讨论：仅仅知道用户的系统上有受保护作品的副本本身并不意味着该副本是非法的。它很可能是用户购买的副本。OP必须能够完全可靠地判断副本是否为非法副本。OP必须能够区分原件、合法副本和逐位非法复制品。OP客户端必须能够区分为备份目的创建的副本（因此通常是合法的）和为非法分发目的创建的副本。对于某些类型的软件，OP客户端必须能够确定用户对软件的意图。这种需求的一个例子是美国《数字千年版权法》（DMCA）和世界各地的类似法律。在大多数情况下，这些法律禁止拥有规避技术，如密码分析软件。合法的研究人员可以获得一些豁免，但如果没有OP，很难确定规避技术是用于研究还是为了制作受保护材料的非法副本而破坏版权保护。有了OP，DMCA和类似的法律可以被重写，这样规避技术就合法了，开发者可以发现他们的安全协议是否良好，这在现行法律下可能是非法的。
FR2: The OP client must be able to remotely differentiate between illegal material and other material with the same file name.
FR2:OP客户端必须能够远程区分非法材料和具有相同文件名的其他材料。
Discussion: A user might create a file that has the same filename as that of a protected work. The OP must not be fooled into thinking that the user's file is a protected one.
讨论：用户可能创建与受保护作品具有相同文件名的文件。千万不要让OP误以为用户的文件是受保护的文件。
FR3: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the filename has been changed.
FR3:OP客户端必须能够找到非法副本，即使文件名已更改。
Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected work by just changing its name.
讨论：用户不能仅仅通过更改其名称来伪装受保护的作品。
FR4: The OP client must be able to find illegal copies, even if the user has modified the work in some way.
FR4:OP客户端必须能够找到非法副本，即使用户以某种方式修改了作品。
Discussion: The user must not be able to disguise a protected work by modifying the work, for example, by prepending, appending, or inserting extra material, or by changing some of the protected work. The OP must be able to make a legal
讨论：用户不能通过修改作品来伪装受保护的作品，例如，通过预编、附加或插入额外的材料，或者通过更改某些受保护的作品。OP必须能够做出合法的决定
determination that a modified work is no longer legally the same as the original if the amount and type of modification exceed a subjective threshold.
如果修改的数量和类型超过主观阈值，则确定修改的作品在法律上不再与原始作品相同。
FR5: The OP client must not be able to be run by a hacker, and the OP interface into a user's computer must not be able to be exploited by a hacker.
FR5：OP客户端不得被黑客运行，进入用户计算机的OP接口不得被黑客利用。
Discussion: OP clients will be attractive targets for hackers since they will have full access within a user's computer. The interface between the OP client and server must be secure against all possible hacking attacks.
讨论：OP客户端将成为黑客的诱人目标，因为它们将在用户的计算机中拥有完全访问权限。OP客户端和服务器之间的接口必须安全，防止所有可能的黑客攻击。
FR6: The OP client must be able to discern the motives of the operator of the OP server and not run if those motives are not pure.
FR6：OP客户端必须能够识别OP服务器操作员的动机，如果这些动机不纯粹，则不能运行。
Discussion: Since it cannot be assumed that the operators of the OP server will always have the best motives, the OP client must be able to reject requests from the OP server if the operator of the server has an evil (or illegal) intent. For example, the OP client must block any operation that might stem from a vendetta that the OP server operator might have against the user.
讨论：由于不能假设OP服务器的操作员总是有最好的动机，因此如果服务器的操作员有邪恶（或非法）意图，OP客户端必须能够拒绝来自OP服务器的请求。例如，OP客户机必须阻止任何可能源于OP服务器操作员可能对用户有敌意的操作。
FR7: The OP client must not be able to be used to extract information from a user's computer that is unrelated to illegal copies.
FR7：OP客户端不得用于从用户计算机提取与非法副本无关的信息。
In order to minimize the threat to the privacy of the user, the OP client must not be able to be used to extract information from the user's computer that is not germane to determining if the user has illegal copies of works or intends to use protected works in illegal ways.
为了将对用户隐私的威胁降至最低，OP客户端不得用于从用户计算机提取与确定用户是否拥有作品的非法副本或打算以非法方式使用受保护作品无关的信息。
FR8: The OP client must be able to differentiate between protected material that was placed on the user's computer by the user and any material placed by others.
FR8:OP客户端必须能够区分用户放置在用户计算机上的受保护材料和其他人放置的任何材料。
Discussion: It must not be possible for a third party to put protected material on a user's computer for the purpose of incriminating the user. The OP client must be able to know, with certainty, who placed material on each computer, even in the cases where a third party has physical access to an unprotected computer or when the third party knows the user's logname and password.
讨论：第三方不得将受保护的材料放在用户的计算机上以指控用户。OP客户端必须能够确切地知道谁在每台计算机上放置了材料，即使在第三方可以实际访问未受保护的计算机或第三方知道用户的日志名和密码的情况下也是如此。
FR9: The OP client must only implement the laws that apply to the specific computer that it is running on.
FR9:OP客户端必须只执行适用于其运行的特定计算机的法律。
Discussion: Since the Internet crosses many legal boundaries, an OP client will have to know just where, in geo-political space, the computer it is running in is currently located in order to know what set of laws to apply when it is scanning the user's computer. The OP client must also be able to be automatically updated if the laws change or the computer is moved to a location where the laws are different. Note that this requirement also implies that the OP client knows where its OP server is located to know if the client and server are both in the same legal jurisdiction. The OP client must know what to do, or not do, when they are not in the same legal jurisdiction. The OP client must also include a mechanism to automatically retrieve any applicable new laws or court decisions and properly interpret them.
讨论：由于互联网跨越了许多法律界限，OP客户必须知道其运行的计算机在地理政治空间中的当前位置，以便在扫描用户的计算机时了解适用哪套法律。如果法律发生变化或计算机移动到法律不同的位置，OP客户端也必须能够自动更新。请注意，此要求还意味着OP客户机知道其OP服务器的位置，以了解客户机和服务器是否位于同一法律管辖区。OP客户必须知道，当他们不在同一法律管辖区时，他们应该做什么，或者不应该做什么。OP客户还必须包括自动检索任何适用新法律或法院判决并正确解释它们的机制。
The OP requires strong authentication of the clients and servers to ensure that they cannot be spoofed. It also requires the use of strong integrity technology to ensure that the messages between the client and server cannot be modified in flight. It also requires strong encryption to be sure that the communication between the client and the server cannot be observed. All of this is required in an environment where many of the users are in full control of their computers and will be actively hostile to the reliable operation of the protocol. Good luck.
OP需要对客户端和服务器进行强身份验证，以确保它们不会被欺骗。它还需要使用强完整性技术，以确保客户端和服务器之间的消息不能在传输过程中被修改。它还需要强加密，以确保无法观察到客户端和服务器之间的通信。所有这些都是在许多用户完全控制他们的计算机，并且对协议的可靠运行充满敌意的环境中所必需的。祝你好运
[Garratt v. Dailey] Supreme Court of Washington, 6 Wash. 2d 197; 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)
华盛顿最高法院，华盛顿州。2d 197；第二辑第279页第1091页（1955年）
[GMPLS-WH] Generalized Multi-Protocol Label Switching (GMPLS) for Worm Holes, work to be in process
[GMPLS-WH]针对蠕虫漏洞的通用多协议标签交换（GMPLS），工作正在进行中
[Guardian] "Senator proposes destruction of file-
swapping computers." The Guardian, June 19,
2003. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/
0,12271,980890,00.html)
[Guardian] "Senator proposes destruction of file-
swapping computers." The Guardian, June 19,
2003. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/
0,12271,980890,00.html)
[Holdsworth] Holdsworth, W., History of English Law 680-683 (1938)
[Holdsworth]Holdsworth，W.，英国法律史680-683（1938年）
[Processer] Prosser, W., et al., "Prosser and Keeton on Torts," Hornbook Series, 5th ed., 1984
[Processer]Prosser，W.等人，“Prosser和Keeton关于侵权行为”，Hornbook系列，第五版，1984年
[Restatement] 1. Restatement of the Law: sec 13 Torts (American Law Institute) (1934)
[重申]1。法律重述：第13节侵权行为（美国法律学会）（1934年）
[United States v. Wise] 550 F.2d 1180, 1194 (9th Cir.)
[United States v.Wise]550 F.2d 1180、1194（第九巡回法庭）
Scott Bradner Harvard University 29 Oxford St. Cambridge MA, 02138
斯科特·布拉德纳哈佛大学马萨诸塞州牛津圣剑桥29号，邮编02138
EMail: sob@harvard.edu
Phone: +1 617 495 3864
EMail: sob@harvard.edu
Phone: +1 617 495 3864
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确认
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