Network Working Group R. Housley
Request for Comments: 2951 T. Horting
Category: Informational P. Yee
SPYRUS
September 2000
Network Working Group R. Housley
Request for Comments: 2951 T. Horting
Category: Informational P. Yee
SPYRUS
September 2000
TELNET Authentication Using KEA and SKIPJACK
使用KEA和SKIPJACK的TELNET身份验证
Status of this Memo
本备忘录的状况
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
本备忘录为互联网社区提供信息。它没有规定任何类型的互联网标准。本备忘录的分发不受限制。
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2000). All Rights Reserved.
版权所有（C）互联网协会（2000年）。版权所有。
Abstract
摘要
This document defines a method to authenticate TELNET using the Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA), and encryption of the TELNET stream using SKIPJACK. Two encryption modes are specified; one provides data integrity and the other does not. The method relies on the TELNET Authentication Option.
本文档定义了使用密钥交换算法（KEA）对TELNET进行身份验证的方法，以及使用SKIPJACK对TELNET流进行加密的方法。指定了两种加密模式；一个提供数据完整性，另一个不提供。该方法依赖于TELNET身份验证选项。
AUTHENTICATION 37
认证37
Authentication Commands:
身份验证命令：
IS 0 SEND 1 REPLY 2 NAME 3
是0发送1回复2名称3
Authentication Types:
身份验证类型：
KEA_SJ 12 KEA_SJ_INTEG 13
KEA_SJ 12 KEA_SJ_整数13
Modifiers:
修改器：
AUTH_WHO_MASK 1 AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER 0 AUTH_SERVER_TO CLIENT 1
身份验证用户掩码1身份验证客户端到服务器0身份验证服务器到客户端1
AUTH_HOW_MASK 2 AUTH_HOW_ONE_WAY 0 AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL 2
验证方式掩码2验证方式单向0验证方式双向2
ENCRYPT_MASK 20 ENCRYPT_OFF 0 ENCRYPT_USING_TELOPT 4 ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE 16 ENCRYPT_RESERVED 20
加密\u掩码20加密\u关闭0使用\u TELOPT 4加密\u交换后16加密\u保留20
INI_CRED_FWD_MASK 8 INI_CRED_FWD_OFF 0 INI_CRED_FWD_ON 8
这张面具8张，这张面具关闭了0张，这张面具打开了8张
Sub-option Commands:
子选项命令：
KEA_CERTA_RA 1 KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB 2 KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA 3 KEA_RESPONSEA 4
KEA_CERTA_RA 1 KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB 2 KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA 3 KEA_RESPONSEA 4
TELNET, as a protocol, has no concept of security. Without negotiated options, it merely passes characters back and forth between the NVTs represented by the two TELNET processes. In its most common usage as a protocol for remote terminal access (TCP port 23), TELNET normally connects to a server that requires user-level authentication through a user name and password in the clear. The server does not authenticate itself to the user.
TELNET作为一种协议，没有安全概念。在没有协商选项的情况下，它只是在两个TELNET进程所代表的NVT之间来回传递字符。TELNET作为远程终端访问协议（TCP端口23）的最常见用法是，它通常连接到需要通过明文中的用户名和密码进行用户级身份验证的服务器。服务器不向用户进行自身身份验证。
The TELNET Authentication Option provides for:
TELNET身份验证选项提供以下功能：
* User authentication -- replacing or augmenting the normal host password mechanism; * Server authentication -- normally done in conjunction with user authentication; * Session parameter negotiation -- in particular, encryption key and attributes; * Session protection -- primarily encryption of the data and embedded command stream, but the encryption algorithm may also provide data integrity.
* 用户身份验证--替换或扩充正常的主机密码机制；*服务器身份验证--通常与用户身份验证一起完成；*会话参数协商——特别是加密密钥和属性；*会话保护——主要是对数据和嵌入式命令流进行加密，但加密算法也可以提供数据完整性。
In order to support these security services, the two TELNET entities must first negotiate their willingness to support the TELNET Authentication Option. Upon agreeing to support this option, the parties are then able to perform sub-option negotiations to determine
为了支持这些安全服务，两个TELNET实体必须首先协商其支持TELNET身份验证选项的意愿。在同意支持该选项后，双方可以进行子选项谈判，以确定
the authentication protocol to be used, and possibly the remote user name to be used for authorization checking. Encryption is negotiated along with the type of the authentication.
要使用的身份验证协议，以及可能用于授权检查的远程用户名。加密和身份验证类型一起协商。
Authentication and parameter negotiation occur within an unbounded series of exchanges. The server proposes a preference-ordered list of authentication types (mechanisms) that it supports. In addition to listing the mechanisms it supports, the server qualifies each mechanism with a modifier that specifies whether encryption of data is desired. The client selects one mechanism from the list and responds to the server indicating its choice and the first set of authentication data needed for the selected authentication type. The client may ignore a request to encrypt data and so indicate, but the server may also terminate the connection if the client refuses encryption. The server and the client then proceed through whatever number of iterations is required to arrive at the requested authentication.
身份验证和参数协商发生在一系列无界的交换中。服务器提出了一个它支持的按首选项排序的身份验证类型（机制）列表。除了列出它支持的机制外，服务器还使用一个修饰符限定每个机制，该修饰符指定是否需要对数据进行加密。客户端从列表中选择一种机制，并响应服务器，指示其选择以及所选身份验证类型所需的第一组身份验证数据。客户机可能会忽略加密数据的请求，并因此指示，但如果客户机拒绝加密，服务器也可能会终止连接。然后，服务器和客户机继续进行任何次数的迭代，以达到请求的身份验证。
Encryption is started immediately after the Authentication Option is completed.
身份验证选项完成后，将立即启动加密。
This paper specifies the method in which KEA is used to achieve TELNET Authentication. KEA (in conjunction with SKIPJACK) [4] provides authentication and confidentiality. Integrity may also be provided.
本文详细介绍了利用KEA实现TELNET认证的方法。KEA（结合SKIPJACK）[4]提供身份验证和保密性。也可以提供完整性。
TELNET entities may use KEA to provide mutual authentication and support for the setup of data encryption keys. A simple token format and set of exchanges delivers these services.
TELNET实体可以使用KEA为数据加密密钥的设置提供相互认证和支持。一种简单的令牌格式和一组交换提供了这些服务。
NonceA and NonceB used in this exchange are 64-bit bit strings. The client generates NonceA, and the server generates NonceB. The nonce value is selected randomly. The nonce is sent in a big endian form. The encryption of the nonce will be done with the same mechanism that the session will use, detailed in the next section.
此交换中使用的NonceA和NonceB是64位字符串。客户端生成NonceA，服务器生成NonceB。随机选择nonce值。nonce以大端形式发送。nonce的加密将使用会话将使用的相同机制完成，将在下一节中详细介绍。
Ra and Rb used in this exchange are 1024 bit strings and are defined by the KEA Algorithm [4].
此交换中使用的Ra和Rb是1024位字符串，由KEA算法定义[4]。
The IVa and IVb are 24 byte Initialization Vectors. They are composed of "THIS IS NOT LEAF" followed by 8 random bytes.
IVa和IVb是24字节的初始化向量。它们由“这不是叶子”后跟8个随机字节组成。
CertA is the client's certificate. CertB is the server's certificate. Both certificates are X.509 certificates [6] that contain KEA public keys [7]. The client must validate the server's certificate before using the KEA public key it contains. Likewise, the server must validate the client's certificate before using the KEA public key it contains.
CertA是客户端的证书。CertB是服务器的证书。这两个证书都是包含KEA公钥[7]的X.509证书[6]。客户端必须先验证服务器的证书，然后才能使用它包含的KEA公钥。同样，服务器必须在使用其包含的KEA公钥之前验证客户端的证书。
On completing these exchanges, the parties have a common SKIPJACK key. Mutual authentication is provided by verification of the certificates used to establish the SKIPJACK encryption key and successful use of the derived SKIPJACK session key. To protect against active attacks, encryption will take place after successful authentication. There will be no way to turn off encryption and safely turn it back on; repeating the entire authentication is the only safe way to restart it. If the user does not want to use encryption, he may disable encryption after the session is established.
完成这些交换后，双方拥有一把通用的煎锅钥匙。通过验证用于建立SKIPJACK加密密钥的证书以及成功使用派生的SKIPJACK会话密钥，可以提供相互身份验证。为了防止主动攻击，将在成功身份验证后进行加密。无法关闭加密并安全地将其重新打开；重复整个身份验证是重新启动身份验证的唯一安全方法。如果用户不想使用加密，他可以在会话建立后禁用加密。
There are two distinct modes for encrypting TELNET streams; one provides integrity and the other does not. Because TELNET is normally operated in a character-by-character mode, the SKIPJACK with stream integrity mechanism requires the transmission of 4 bytes for every TELNET data byte. However, a simplified mode SKIPJACK without integrity mechanism will only require the transmission of one byte for every TELNET data byte.
有两种不同的加密TELNET流的模式；一个提供完整性，另一个不提供完整性。由于TELNET通常以逐字符模式运行，因此具有流完整性机制的SKIPJACK需要为每个TELNET数据字节传输4个字节。然而，没有完整性机制的简化模式SKIPJACK只需要为每个TELNET数据字节传输一个字节。
The cryptographic mode for SKIPJACK with stream integrity is Cipher Feedback on 32 bits of data (CFB-32) and the mode of SKIPJACK is Cipher Feedback on 8 bits of data (CFB-8).
具有流完整性的SKIPJACK的加密模式是32位数据的密码反馈（CFB-32），SKIPJACK的模式是8位数据的密码反馈（CFB-8）。
The first and least complicated mode uses SKIPJACK CFB-8. This mode provides no stream integrity.
第一个也是最简单的模式使用SKIPJACK CFB-8。此模式不提供流完整性。
For SKIPJACK without stream integrity, the two-octet authentication type pair is KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF. This indicates that the SKIPJACK without integrity mechanism will be used for mutual authentication and TELNET stream encryption. Figure 1 illustrates the authentication mechanism of KEA followed by SKIPJACK without stream integrity.
对于没有流完整性的SKIPJACK，两个八位组身份验证类型对是KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER|u EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF。这表明无完整性机制的SKIPJACK将用于相互身份验证和TELNET流加密。图1展示了KEA的身份验证机制，随后是SKIPJACK，没有流完整性。
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Client (Party A) Server (Party B)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Client (Party A) Server (Party B)
<-- IAC DO AUTHENTICATION
<--IAC DO身份验证
IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION -->
IAC将进行身份验证-->
<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND <list of authentication options> IAC SE
<--IAC SB身份验证发送<身份验证选项列表>IAC SE
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION
NAME <user name> -->
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION
NAME <user name> -->
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_CERTA_RA CertA||Ra IAC SE -->
IAC SB身份验证是指客户机到服务器的身份验证、如何相互身份验证、交换后加密身份验证
<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB CertB||Rb||IVb|| Encrypt( NonceB ) IAC SE
<--IAC SB身份验证回复KEA_SJ身份验证客户端到服务器|身份验证如何相互|交换后加密| INI|CRED|FWD|OFF IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA KEA|CERTB|RB IVB|NONCEB| RB IVB|IVB| ENCRYPT（NONCEB）IAC SE
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA IVa||Encrypt( (NonceB XOR 0x0C12)||NonceA ) IAC SE -->
IAC SB身份验证是KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_u TO_SERVER|AUTH_mu MUTUAL|u ENCRYPT|u AFTER|u EXCHANGE|INI_CRED_FWD|u KEA_IVA|u RESPONSEB|u NONCEA IVA| ENCRYPT（（NonceB XOR 0x0C12）| NONCEA）IAC SE-->
Client (Party A) Server (Party B)
客户端（甲方）服务器（乙方）
<client begins encryption> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_RESPONSEA Encrypt( NonceA XOR 0x0C12 ) IAC SE
<客户端开始加密>--IAC SB身份验证回复KEA_SJ AUTH_client_u TO_SERVER|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL|u ENCRYPT_AFTER|u EXCHANGE|INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_RESPONSEA ENCRYPT（NonceA XOR 0x0C12）IAC SE
<server begins encryption>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1.
<server begins encryption>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 1.
SKIPJACK with stream integrity is more complicated. It uses the SHA-1 [3] one-way hash function to provide integrity of the encryption stream as follows:
具有流完整性的SKIPJACK更复杂。它使用SHA-1[3]单向散列函数提供加密流的完整性，如下所示：
Set H0 to be the SHA-1 hash of a zero-length string. Cn is the nth character in the TELNET stream. Hn = SHA-1( Hn-1||Cn ), where Hn is the hash value associated with the nth character in the stream. ICVn is set to the three most significant bytes of Hn. Transmit Encrypt( Cn||ICVn ).
将H0设置为零长度字符串的SHA-1哈希。Cn是TELNET流中的第n个字符。Hn=SHA-1（Hn-1 | | Cn），其中Hn是与流中第n个字符关联的哈希值。ICVn设置为Hn的三个最高有效字节。传输加密（Cn | | ICVn）。
The ciphertext that is transmitted is the SKIPJACK CFB-32 encryption of ( Cn||ICVn ). The receiving end of the TELNET link reverses the process, first decrypting the ciphertext, separating Cn and ICVn, recalculating Hn, recalculating ICVn, and then comparing the received ICVn with the recalculated ICVn. Integrity is indicated if the comparison succeeds, and Cn can then be processed normally as part of the TELNET stream. Failure of the comparison indicates some loss of integrity, whether due to active manipulation or loss of cryptographic synchronization. In either case, the only recourse is to drop the TELNET connection and start over.
传输的密文是SKIPJACK CFB-32加密（Cn | | ICVn）。TELNET链路的接收端反转该过程，首先解密密文，分离Cn和ICVn，重新计算Hn，重新计算ICVn，然后将接收到的ICVn与重新计算的ICVn进行比较。如果比较成功，则指示完整性，然后可以将Cn作为TELNET流的一部分正常处理。比较失败表示完整性有所损失，无论是由于主动操作还是加密同步的丢失。在这两种情况下，唯一的办法是放弃TELNET连接并重新开始。
For SKIPJACK with stream integrity, the two-octet authentication type pair is KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF. This indicates that the KEA SKIPJACK with integrity mechanism will be used for mutual authentication and TELNET stream encryption. Figure 2 illustrates the authentication mechanism of KEA SKIPJACK with stream integrity.
对于具有流完整性的SKIPJACK，两个八位组身份验证类型对为KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER|u EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD| OFF。这表明具有完整性机制的KEA SKIPJACK将用于相互身份验证和TELNET流加密。图2说明了具有流完整性的KEA SKIPJACK的身份验证机制。
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Client (Party A) Server (Party B)
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Client (Party A) Server (Party B)
<-- IAC DO AUTHENTICATION
<--IAC DO身份验证
IAC WILL AUTHENTICATION -->
IAC将进行身份验证-->
<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION SEND <list of authentication options> IAC SE
<--IAC SB身份验证发送<身份验证选项列表>IAC SE
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION
NAME <user name> -->
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION
NAME <user name> -->
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_CERTA_RA CertA||Ra IAC SE -->
IAC SB身份验证是一种完整的客户端到服务器的身份验证，相互身份验证，交换后加密
<-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA KEA_CERTB_RB_IVB_NONCEB CertB||Rb||IVb|| Encrypt( NonceB ) IAC SE
<--IAC SB认证回复KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_u TO_SERVER|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL|u ENCRYPT_AFTER|u EXCHANGE|INI_CRED_FWD_OFF IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA KEA_CERTB RB IVB|unceb|RB IVB|IVB|IVB| ENCRYPT（NONCEB）IAC SE
IAC SB AUTHENTICATION IS KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_IVA_RESPONSEB_NONCEA IVa||Encrypt( (NonceB XOR 0x0D12)||NonceA ) IAC SE -->
IAC SB身份验证是一个完整的身份验证客户端到服务器，身份验证方式相互，交换后加密，INI CRED FWD离开KEA IVA响应非ECA IVA加密（（非ECB XOR 0x0D12）IAC SE-->
Client (Party A) Server (Party B)
客户端（甲方）服务器（乙方）
<client begins encryption> <-- IAC SB AUTHENTICATION REPLY KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_CLIENT_TO_SERVER | AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL | ENCRYPT_AFTER_EXCHANGE | INI_CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_RESPONSEA Encrypt( NonceA XOR 0x0D12 ) IAC SE
<客户端开始加密>--IAC SB身份验证回复KEA_SJ_INTEG AUTH_client_至| u SERVER|AUTH_HOW_MUTUAL|u ENCRYPT|u EXCHANGE|INI|CRED_FWD_OFF KEA_RESPONSEA ENCRYPT（NonceA XOR 0x0D12）IAC SE
<server begins encryption>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2
<server begins encryption>
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 2
This entire memo is about security mechanisms. For KEA to provide the authentication discussed, the implementation must protect the private key from disclosure. Likewise, the SKIPJACK keys must be protected from disclosure.
整个备忘录都是关于安全机制的。为了让KEA提供所讨论的身份验证，实现必须保护私钥不被泄露。同样，必须保护SKIPJACK钥匙不被泄露。
Implementations must randomly generate KEA private keys, initialization vectors (IVs), and nonces. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) to generate cryptographic keys can result in little or no security. An attacker may find it much easier to reproduce the PRNG environment that produced the keys, searching the resulting small set of possibilities, rather than brute force searching the whole key space. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. RFC 1750 [8] offers important guidance in this area, and Appendix 3 of FIPS Pub 186 [9] provides one quality PRNG technique.
实现必须随机生成KEA私钥、初始化向量（IVs）和nonce。使用不充分的伪随机数生成器（PRNG）生成加密密钥可能导致很少或没有安全性。攻击者可能会发现，复制生成密钥的PRNG环境、搜索生成的一小部分可能性比暴力搜索整个密钥空间要容易得多。生成高质量的随机数是困难的。RFC 1750[8]在这方面提供了重要的指导，FIPS Pub 186[9]的附录3提供了一种高质量的PRNG技术。
By linking the enabling of encryption as a side effect of successful authentication, protection is provided against an active attacker. If encryption were enabled as a separate negotiation, it would provide a window of vulnerability from when the authentication completes, up to and including the negotiation to turn on encryption. The only safe way to restart encryption, if it is turned off, is to repeat the entire authentication process.
通过将启用加密链接为成功身份验证的副作用，可以针对主动攻击者提供保护。如果将加密作为单独的协商启用，则它将提供一个漏洞窗口，从身份验证完成到开启加密的协商。重新启动加密（如果已关闭）的唯一安全方法是重复整个身份验证过程。
The authentication types KEA_SJ and KEA_SJ_INTEG and their associated suboption values are registered with IANA. Any suboption values used to extend the protocol as described in this document must be registered with IANA before use. IANA is instructed not to issue new suboption values without submission of documentation of their use.
认证类型KEA_SJ和KEA_SJ_INTEG及其关联的子选项值在IANA中注册。如本文档所述，用于扩展协议的任何子选项值必须在使用前向IANA注册。IANA被指示在未提交使用文件的情况下不得发布新的子选项值。
We would like to thank William Nace for support during implementation of this specification.
我们要感谢William Nace在实施本规范期间提供的支持。
[1] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Protocol Specification", ASTD 8, RFC 854, May 1983.
[1] Postel，J.和J.Reynolds，“TELNET协议规范”，ASTD 8，RFC 854，1983年5月。
[2] Ts'o, T. and J. Altman, "Telnet Authentication Option", RFC 2941, September 2000.
[2] Ts'o，T.和J.Altman，“Telnet认证选项”，RFC 29412000年9月。
[3] Secure Hash Standard. FIPS Pub 180-1. April 17, 1995.
[3] 安全散列标准。FIPS Pub 180-1。1995年4月17日。
[4] "SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification", Version 2.0, May 29,
1998. Available from http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-
kea.htm
[4] "SKIPJACK and KEA Algorithm Specification", Version 2.0, May 29,
1998. Available from http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-
kea.htm
[5] Postel, J. and J. Reynolds, "TELNET Option Specifications", STD 8, RFC 855, May 1983.
[5] Postel，J.和J.Reynolds，“TELNET选项规范”，标准8，RFC 855，1983年5月。
[6] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[6] Housley，R.，Ford，W.，Polk，W.和D.Solo，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施：X.509证书和CRL配置文件”，RFC 2459，1999年1月。
[7] Housley, R. and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates", RFC 2528, March 1999.
[7] Housley，R.和W.Polk，“互联网X.509公钥基础设施-互联网X.509公钥基础设施证书中密钥交换算法（KEA）密钥的表示”，RFC 2528，1999年3月。
[8] Eastlake, D., Crocker, S. and J. Schiller, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", RFC 1750, December 1994.
[8] Eastlake，D.，Crocker，S.和J.Schiller，“安全性的随机性建议”，RFC 1750，1994年12月。
[9) National Institute of Standards and Technology. FIPS Pub 186: Digital Signature Standard. 19 May 1994.
[9）国家标准与技术研究所，FIPS Pub 186：数字签名标准，1994年5月19日。
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