Network Working Group R. Housley
Request for Comments: 2528 SPYRUS
Category: Informational W. Polk
NIST
March 1999
Network Working Group R. Housley
Request for Comments: 2528 SPYRUS
Category: Informational W. Polk
NIST
March 1999
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Internet X.509公钥基础设施
Representation of Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) Keys in Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificates
Internet X.509公钥基础设施证书中密钥交换算法（KEA）密钥的表示
Status of this Memo
本备忘录的状况
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
本备忘录为互联网社区提供信息。它没有规定任何类型的互联网标准。本备忘录的分发不受限制。
Copyright Notice
版权公告
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
版权所有（C）互联网协会（1999年）。版权所有。
Table of Contents
目录
Abstract ........................................................ 2
1. Executive Summary ........................................... 2
2. Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 2
2.1. Communication and Topology ................................ 2
2.2. Acceptability Criteria .................................... 2
2.3. User Expectations ......................................... 3
2.4. Administrator Expectations ................................ 3
3. KEA Algorithm Support ....................................... 3
3.1. Subject Public Key Info ................................... 3
3.1.1. Algorithm Identifier and Parameters ..................... 4
3.1.2. Encoding of KEA Public Keys ............................. 5
3.2. Key Usage Extension in KEA certificates ................... 5
4. ASN.1 Modules ................................................ 5
4.1 1988 Syntax ................................................. 5
4.2 1993 Syntax ................................................. 6
5. References ................................................... 6
6. Security Considerations ...................................... 7
7. Authors' Addresses ........................................... 8
8. Full Copyright Statement ..................................... 9
Abstract ........................................................ 2
1. Executive Summary ........................................... 2
2. Requirements and Assumptions ................................ 2
2.1. Communication and Topology ................................ 2
2.2. Acceptability Criteria .................................... 2
2.3. User Expectations ......................................... 3
2.4. Administrator Expectations ................................ 3
3. KEA Algorithm Support ....................................... 3
3.1. Subject Public Key Info ................................... 3
3.1.1. Algorithm Identifier and Parameters ..................... 4
3.1.2. Encoding of KEA Public Keys ............................. 5
3.2. Key Usage Extension in KEA certificates ................... 5
4. ASN.1 Modules ................................................ 5
4.1 1988 Syntax ................................................. 5
4.2 1993 Syntax ................................................. 6
5. References ................................................... 6
6. Security Considerations ...................................... 7
7. Authors' Addresses ........................................... 8
8. Full Copyright Statement ..................................... 9
Abstract
摘要
The Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) is a classified algorithm for exchanging keys. This specification profiles the format and semantics of fields in X.509 V3 certificates containing KEA keys. The specification addresses the subjectPublicKeyInfo field and the keyUsage extension.
密钥交换算法（KEA）是一种用于交换密钥的分类算法。本规范描述了X.509 V3证书中包含KEA密钥的字段的格式和语义。该规范涉及subjectPublicKeyInfo字段和keyUsage扩展。
This specification contains guidance on the use of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure certificates to convey Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) keys. This specification is an addendum to RFC 2459, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: Certificate and CRL Profile". Implementations of this specification must also conform to RFC 2459. Implementations of this specification are not required to conform to other parts from that series.
本规范包含关于使用Internet公钥基础设施证书传递密钥交换算法（KEA）密钥的指南。本规范是RFC 2459“Internet X.509公钥基础设施：证书和CRL配置文件”的附录。本规范的实施还必须符合RFC 2459。本规范的实施无需符合该系列的其他部分。
The goal is to augment the X.509 certificate profile presented in Part 1 to facilitate the management of KEA keys for those communities which use this algorithm.
其目标是扩充第1部分中介绍的X.509证书配置文件，以便为使用此算法的社区管理KEA密钥。
This profile, as presented in [RFC 2459] and augmented by this specification, supports users without high bandwidth, real-time IP connectivity, or high connection availability. In addition, the profile allows for the presence of firewall or other filtered communication.
该配置文件如[RFC 2459]中所述，并由本规范扩展，支持没有高带宽、实时IP连接或高连接可用性的用户。此外，配置文件允许存在防火墙或其他过滤通信。
This profile does not assume the deployment of an X.500 Directory system. The profile does not prohibit the use of an X.500 Directory, but other means of distributing certificates and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are supported.
此配置文件不假定部署X.500目录系统。该配置文件不禁止使用X.500目录，但支持其他分发证书和证书吊销列表（CRL）的方式。
The goal of the Internet Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is to meet the needs of deterministic, automated identification, authentication, access control, and authorization functions. Support for these services determines the attributes contained in the certificate as well as the ancillary control information in the certificate such as policy data and certification path constraints.
Internet公钥基础设施（PKI）的目标是满足确定性、自动识别、身份验证、访问控制和授权功能的需求。对这些服务的支持决定了证书中包含的属性以及证书中的辅助控制信息，如策略数据和证书路径约束。
The goal of this document is to profile KEA certificates, specifying the contents and semantics of attributes which were not fully specified by [RFC 2459]. If not specifically addressed by this document, the contents and semantics of the fields and extensions must be as described in [RFC 2459].
本文档的目标是分析KEA证书，指定[RFC 2459]未完全指定的属性的内容和语义。如果本文件未明确说明，字段和扩展的内容和语义必须如[RFC 2459]所述。
Users of the Internet PKI are people and processes who use client software and are the subjects named in certificates. These uses include readers and writers of electronic mail, the clients for WWW browsers, WWW servers, and the key manager for IPSEC within a router. This profile recognizes the limitations of the platforms these users employ and the sophistication/attentiveness of the users themselves. This manifests itself in minimal user configuration responsibility (e.g., root keys, rules), explicit platform usage constraints within the certificate, certification path constraints which shield the user from many malicious actions, and applications which sensibly automate validation functions.
Internet PKI的用户是使用客户端软件的人员和进程，是证书中指定的主体。这些用途包括电子邮件的读写器、WWW浏览器的客户端、WWW服务器以及路由器中IPSEC的密钥管理器。该概要文件认识到这些用户使用的平台的局限性以及用户自身的复杂性/关注度。这表现在最小的用户配置责任（例如，根密钥、规则）、证书中明确的平台使用约束、保护用户免受许多恶意操作的认证路径约束，以及明智地自动化验证功能的应用程序。
As with users, the Internet PKI profile is structured to support the individuals who generally operate Certification Authorities (CAs). Providing administrators with unbounded choices increases the chances that a subtle CA administrator mistake will result in broad compromise or unnecessarily limit interoperability. This profile defines the object identifiers and data formats that must be supported to interpret KEA public keys.
与用户一样，Internet PKI配置文件的结构也支持通常运营证书颁发机构（CA）的个人。为管理员提供无限的选择会增加CA管理员的细微错误导致广泛妥协或不必要地限制互操作性的可能性。此概要文件定义了解释KEA公钥必须支持的对象标识符和数据格式。
This section describes object identifiers and data formats which may be used with [RFC 2459] to describe X.509 certificates containing a KEA public key. Conforming CAs are required to use the object identifiers and data formats when issuing KEA certificates. Conforming applications shall recognize the object identifiers and process the data formats when processing such certificates.
本节描述可与[RFC 2459]一起使用的对象标识符和数据格式，以描述包含KEA公钥的X.509证书。要求合格CA在颁发KEA证书时使用对象标识符和数据格式。合格申请应在处理此类证书时识别对象标识符并处理数据格式。
The certificate identifies the KEA algorithm, conveys optional parameters, and specifies the KEA public key in the subjectPublicKeyInfo field. The subjectPublicKeyInfo field is a SEQUENCE of an algorithm identifier and the subjectPublicKey field.
该证书标识KEA算法，传递可选参数，并在subjectPublicKeyInfo字段中指定KEA公钥。subjectPublicKeyInfo字段是算法标识符和subjectPublicKey字段的序列。
The certificate indicates the algorithm through an algorithm identifier. This algorithm identifier consists of an object identifier (OID) and optional associated parameters. Section 3.1.1 identifies the preferred OID and parameters for the KEA algorithm. Conforming CAs shall use the identified OID when issuing certificates containing public keys for the KEA algorithm. Conforming applications supporting the KEA algorithm shall, at a minimum, recognize the OID identified in section 3.1.1.
证书通过算法标识符指示算法。此算法标识符由对象标识符（OID）和可选的关联参数组成。第3.1.1节确定了KEA算法的首选OID和参数。合格CA在颁发包含KEA算法公钥的证书时，应使用识别的OID。支持KEA算法的一致性应用程序应至少识别第3.1.1节中确定的OID。
The certificate conveys the KEA public key through the subjectPublicKey field. This subjectPublicKey field is a BIT STRING. Section 3.1.2 specifies the method for encoding a KEA public key as a BIT STRING. Conforming CAs shall encode the KEA public key as described in Section 3.1.2 when issuing certificates containing public keys for the KEA algorithm. Conforming applications supporting the KEA algorithm shall decode the subjectPublicKey as described in section 3.1.2 when the algorithm identifier is the one presented in 3.1.1.
证书通过subjectPublicKey字段传递KEA公钥。此subjectPublicKey字段是位字符串。第3.1.2节规定了将KEA公钥编码为位字符串的方法。合格CA在颁发包含KEA算法公钥的证书时，应按照第3.1.2节所述对KEA公钥进行编码。当算法标识符为3.1.1中给出的标识符时，支持KEA算法的一致性应用程序应按照第3.1.2节所述对主题公钥进行解码。
The Key Exchange Algorithm (KEA) is an algorithm for exchanging keys. A KEA "pairwise key" may be generated between two users if their KEA public keys were generated with the same KEA parameters. The KEA parameters are not included in a certificate; instead a "domain identifier" is supplied in the parameters field.
密钥交换算法（KEA）是一种用于交换密钥的算法。如果两个用户的KEA公钥是使用相同的KEA参数生成的，则可以在两个用户之间生成KEA“成对密钥”。KEA参数不包括在证书中；而是在参数字段中提供“域标识符”。
When the subjectPublicKeyInfo field contains a KEA key, the algorithm identifier and parameters shall be as defined in [sdn.701r]:
当subjectPublicKeyInfo字段包含KEA密钥时，算法标识符和参数应符合[sdn.701r]中的定义：
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }
KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING
KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING
CAs shall populate the parameters field of the AlgorithmIdentifier within the subjectPublicKeyInfo field of each certificate containing a KEA public key with an 80-bit parameter identifier (OCTET STRING), also known as the domain identifier. The domain identifier will be computed in three steps: (1) the KEA parameters are DER encoded using the Dss-Parms structure; (2) a 160-bit SHA-1 hash is generated from the parameters; and (3) the 160-bit hash is reduced to 80-bits by performing an "exclusive or" of the 80 high order bits with the 80 low order bits. The resulting value is encoded such that the most significant byte of the 80-bit value is the first octet in the octet string.
CAs应在每个证书的subjectPublicKeyInfo字段内填充算法标识符的参数字段，该证书包含一个具有80位参数标识符（八位字符串）的KEA公钥，也称为域标识符。域标识符将分三步计算：（1）使用Dss Parms结构对KEA参数进行DER编码；（2） 从参数生成160位SHA-1散列；和（3）通过对80个高阶位与80个低阶位执行“异或”，将160位散列减少到80位。对结果值进行编码，使得80位值的最高有效字节是八位字节字符串中的第一个八位字节。
The Dss-Parms is provided in [RFC 2459] and reproduced below for completeness.
Dss参数在[RFC 2459]中提供，为完整起见，请复制如下。
Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE {
p INTEGER,
q INTEGER,
g INTEGER }
Dss-Parms ::= SEQUENCE {
p INTEGER,
q INTEGER,
g INTEGER }
A KEA public key, y, is conveyed in the subjectPublicKey BIT STRING such that the most significant bit (MSB) of y becomes the MSB of the BIT STRING value field and the least significant bit (LSB) of y becomes the LSB of the BIT STRING value field. This results in the following encoding: BIT STRING tag, BIT STRING length, 0 (indicating that there are zero unused bits in the final octet of y), BIT STRING value field including y.
KEA公钥y在subjectPublicKey位字符串中传输，以便y的最高有效位（MSB）成为位字符串值字段的MSB，y的最低有效位（LSB）成为位字符串值字段的LSB。这将导致以下编码：位字符串标记、位字符串长度、0（表示y的最后八位字节中没有未使用的位）、包括y的位字符串值字段。
The key usage extension may optionally appear in a KEA certificate. If a KEA certificate includes the keyUsage extension, only the following values may be asserted:
密钥使用扩展可以选择性地出现在KEA证书中。如果KEA证书包含keyUsage扩展，则只能断言以下值：
keyAgreement; encipherOnly; and decipherOnly.
关键协议；仅加密；而且只能破译。
The encipherOnly and decipherOnly values may only be asserted if the keyAgreement value is also asserted. At most one of encipherOnly and decipherOnly shall be asserted in keyUsage extension. Generally, the keyAgreement value is asserted without either the encipherOnly or decipherOnly value being asserted.
仅当keyAgreement值也被断言时，才可以断言EncrypherOnly和DecrypherOnly值。密钥使用扩展中最多只能声明EncrypherOnly和DecrypherOnly中的一个。通常，密钥协商值在未声明仅加密或仅解密值的情况下被断言。
PKIXkea88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-kea-profile-88(7) }
PKIXkea88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-kea-profile-88(7) }
BEGIN ::=
BEGIN ::=
-- EXPORTS ALL --
--全部出口--
-- IMPORTS NONE --
--没有进口--
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }
KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING
KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING
END
终止
PKIXkea93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-kea-profile-93(8) }
PKIXkea93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-mod-kea-profile-93(8) }
BEGIN ::=
BEGIN ::=
-- EXPORTS ALL --
--全部出口--
IMPORTS ALGORITHM-ID
FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-93(3) }
IMPORTS ALGORITHM-ID
FROM PKIX1Explicit93 {iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit-93(3) }
KeaPublicKey ALGORITHM-ID ::= { OID id-keyExchangeAlgorithm
PARMS KEA-Parms-Id }
KeaPublicKey ALGORITHM-ID ::= { OID id-keyExchangeAlgorithm
PARMS KEA-Parms-Id }
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }
id-keyExchangeAlgorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::=
{ 2 16 840 1 101 2 1 1 22 }
KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING
KEA-Parms-Id ::= OCTET STRING
END
终止
[KEA] "Skipjack and KEA Algorithm Specification", Version 2.0,
29 May 1998. available from
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-kea.htm
[KEA] "Skipjack and KEA Algorithm Specification", Version 2.0,
29 May 1998. available from
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/skipjack-kea.htm
[SDN.701R] SDN.701, "Message Security Protocol", Revision 4.0 1996-06-07 with "Corrections to Message Security Protocol, SDN.701, Rev 4.0, 96-06-07." August 30, 1996.
[SDN.701R]SDN.701，“消息安全协议”，修订版4.0 1996-06-07，带有“对消息安全协议的更正，SDN.701，修订版4.0，96-06-07”，1996年8月30日。
[RFC 2459] Housley, R., Ford, W., Polk, W. and D. Solo "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure: X.509 Certificate and CRL Profile", RFC 2459, January 1999.
[RFC 2459]Housley，R.，Ford，W.，Polk，W.和D.Solo“互联网X.509公钥基础设施：X.509证书和CRL配置文件”，RFC 2459，1999年1月。
This specification is devoted to the format and encoding of KEA keys in X.509 certificates. Since certificates are digitally signed, no additional integrity service is necessary. Certificates need not be kept secret, and unrestricted and anonymous access to certificates and CRLs has no security implications.
本规范专门介绍X.509证书中KEA密钥的格式和编码。由于证书是数字签名的，因此不需要额外的完整性服务。证书不需要保密，对证书和CRL的无限制匿名访问没有安全隐患。
However, security factors outside the scope of this specification will affect the assurance provided to certificate users. This section highlights critical issues that should be considered by implementors, administrators, and users.
但是，本规范范围之外的安全因素将影响向证书用户提供的保证。本节重点介绍实施者、管理员和用户应该考虑的关键问题。
The procedures performed by CAs and RAs to validate the binding of the subject's identity of their public key greatly affect the assurance that should be placed in the certificate. Relying parties may wish to review the CA's certificate practice statement.
CAs和RAs为验证其公钥主体身份的绑定而执行的程序极大地影响了应在证书中放置的保证。依赖方可能希望审查CA的证书实践声明。
The protection afforded private keys is a critical factor in maintaining security. Failure of users to protect their KEA private keys will permit an attacker to masquerade as them, or decrypt their personal information.
私钥的保护是维护安全性的关键因素。用户未能保护其KEA私钥将允许攻击者伪装成KEA私钥，或解密其个人信息。
The availability and freshness of revocation information will affect the degree of assurance that should be placed in a certificate.
吊销信息的可用性和新鲜度将影响证书中应包含的保证程度。
While certificates expire naturally, events may occur during its natural lifetime which negate the binding between the subject and public key. If revocation information is untimely or unavailable, the assurance associated with the binding is clearly reduced. Similarly, implementations of the Path Validation mechanism described in section 6 that omit revocation checking provide less assurance than those that support it.
虽然证书自然过期，但在其自然生存期内可能会发生事件，从而否定主题和公钥之间的绑定。如果撤销信息不及时或不可用，则与绑定相关的保证将明显减少。类似地，第6节中描述的路径验证机制的实现省略了撤销检查，与支持撤销检查的实现相比，提供的保证更少。
The path validation algorithm specified in [RFC 2459] depends on the certain knowledge of the public keys (and other information) about one or more trusted CAs. The decision to trust a CA is an important decision as it ultimately determines the trust afforded a certificate. The authenticated distribution of trusted CA public keys (usually in the form of a "self-signed" certificate) is a security critical out of band process that is beyond the scope of this specification.
[RFC 2459]中指定的路径验证算法取决于关于一个或多个受信任CA的公钥（和其他信息）的特定知识。信任CA的决定是一个重要的决定，因为它最终决定了对证书的信任。可信CA公钥的认证分发（通常以“自签名”证书的形式）是一个安全关键的带外过程，超出了本规范的范围。
In addition, where a key compromise or CA failure occurs for a trusted CA, the user will need to modify the information provided to the path validation routine. Selection of too many trusted CAs will make the trusted CA information difficult to maintain. On the other hand, selection of only one trusted CA may limit users to a closed
此外，当可信CA出现密钥泄露或CA故障时，用户需要修改提供给路径验证例程的信息。选择过多的可信CA将使可信CA信息难以维护。另一方面，仅选择一个受信任的CA可能会将用户限制在一个封闭的CA
community of users until a global PKI emerges.
在全球PKI出现之前的用户社区。
The quality of implementations that process certificates may also affect the degree of assurance provided. The path validation algorithm described in section 6 relies upon the integrity of the trusted CA information, and especially the integrity of the public keys associated with the trusted CAs. By substituting public keys for which an attacker has the private key, an attacker could trick the user into accepting false certificates.
过程证书的实现质量也可能影响所提供的保证程度。第6节中描述的路径验证算法依赖于可信CA信息的完整性，尤其是与可信CA相关联的公钥的完整性。通过替换攻击者拥有私钥的公钥，攻击者可以欺骗用户接受虚假证书。
The binding between a key and certificate subject cannot be stronger than the cryptographic module implementation and algorithms used to generate the signature.
密钥和证书主体之间的绑定不能强于用于生成签名的加密模块实现和算法。
Russell Housley SPYRUS 381 Elden Street Suite 1120 Herndon, VA 20170 USA
拉塞尔·霍斯利·斯皮罗斯美国弗吉尼亚州赫恩登市埃尔登街381号1120室，邮编20170
EMail: housley@spyrus.com
EMail: housley@spyrus.com
Tim Polk NIST Building 820, Room 426 Gaithersburg, MD 20899 USA
美国马里兰州盖瑟斯堡426室820号NIST大楼Tim Polk 20899
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
EMail: wpolk@nist.gov
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
版权所有（C）互联网协会（1999年）。版权所有。
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than English.
本文件及其译本可复制并提供给他人，对其进行评论或解释或协助其实施的衍生作品可全部或部分编制、复制、出版和分发，不受任何限制，前提是上述版权声明和本段包含在所有此类副本和衍生作品中。但是，不得以任何方式修改本文件本身，例如删除版权通知或对互联网协会或其他互联网组织的引用，除非出于制定互联网标准的需要，在这种情况下，必须遵循互联网标准过程中定义的版权程序，或根据需要将其翻译成英语以外的其他语言。
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
上述授予的有限许可是永久性的，互联网协会或其继承人或受让人不会撤销。
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
本文件和其中包含的信息是按“原样”提供的，互联网协会和互联网工程任务组否认所有明示或暗示的保证，包括但不限于任何保证，即使用本文中的信息不会侵犯任何权利，或对适销性或特定用途适用性的任何默示保证。